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**DEFENDERS OF THE FORCE: THE HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
SECURITY FORCES 1947 – 2006**

BY

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AND
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FOREWARD

The attached history became a reality with the direction of Gen James Shames, (Director of Security Forces 2001-2004) to award a contract to research and write a history of the Air Force Security Force career feild. In September 2004, the Air Force Security Forces Center (AFSFC) was successful through the 11th Wing Contract Office, Bolling AFB, in awarding a contract for the "history project" to Dayton Aerospace INC., and Colonel (Ret) James Lee Conrad, USAF. We were fortunate to attract Jim Conrad's interest to our project, not only due to his military experience as an Air Force Officer and lawyer but due to his previous work as a published author. After a survey of the project Jim Conrad contracted with Colonel (Ret) Jerry Bullock to compile over 60 years of Air Police, Security Police and Security Forces history. Jerry Bullock and his number one assistant, his wife Lucille, traveled the country and conducted video tape interviews of the entire career field's senior leaders and many of the "rank and file" Security Forces members past and present. From these interviews and research in numerous Air Force historical archives they have been able to capture the major events and numerous contributions the Security Forces career field has made to our Air Force.

With the delivery of the final manuscript in spring 2008, Brig Gen Mary Kay Hertog, Director of Security Forces, accomplished a complete edit. A decision was made, to conclude this project with a "Postscript" of Gen Hertog's service as Director.

Many thanks to Mrs Lori Hill and Lt Col Travis Harsha of the HAF/A7S staff for the numerous reviews and edits of this text in preparing it for publication. Also, thanks to numerous HAF/A7S and AFSFC action officers who reviewed the many reditions of this text.

We are working to formally publish our history as yet another vital part of Air Force legacy that documents the selfless contributions of many Americans who served as Air Police, Security Police and Security Forces with devoted service to their country.

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June 2010

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Even though it is one of the largest career fields in the United States Air Force, the Security Forces have never had a written history of the career field. Thanks to the Air Force Security Forces Center, that has changed. We were honored to be chosen to compile this story of the men and women of the Air Police, Security Police, and Security Forces and we hope this volume suitably honors their achievements and sacrifice.

Over the course of working on this book, we have been assisted by the staffs of the Air Force Historical Research Agency at Maxwell AFB, Alabama; the Security Forces Museum at Lackland AFB, Texas; and many former and current members of the career field. From these sources we were able to obtain a wealth of official documents and images as well as personal reminiscences and photographs of days gone by. We were able to interview many of the people who helped make the history we have chronicled, including every living Air Force “Top Cop.” We gathered so much from so many different sources we had to make some difficult choices of what to include and what to exclude from the pages of this book; however, everything that was shared with us, whether included or not, added immeasurably to the overall story we wanted to tell.

Much has happened over the nearly 60 years covered by this history. We tried our best to hit the high points and at least make mention of all of the various activities, missions, changes, and challenges to the Security Forces over that period. As hard as we tried, we are nonetheless sure that we shortchanged, or completely missed, some things that someone will rightly believe important. For that we sincerely apologize. Additionally, the conclusions, observations, or opinions expressed herein are ours and do not necessarily represent the opinions or positions of the Department of Defense or the United States Air Force.

To the members of the Security Forces today, remember, you are writing the next chapter. Be a packrat; don't throw our history away. It will make life so much easier for those who come along to write the sequel.

Colonel James Lee Conrad, USAF (Ret)

Colonel Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret)

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PROLOGUE

The history of the United States Air Force Security Forces begins in 1947, but its heritage goes back centuries; to the time when men first banded together for defense or for conquest, and leaders sought to fulfill their responsibility for the discipline and security of their followers. On the march or in battle, enforcing discipline in the ranks became a key to victory; while in camp ensuring the security of men and material from loss or capture was essential to future victories. The armies of Hammurabi, Alexander the Great, the legions of Rome, and the ancient Greeks all had military police-type units that were responsible for enforcing discipline, punishing offenders, and securing encampments. By the time General George Washington organized the first military police units in the Continental Army in 1778, these organizations were known as provost units and the chief law enforcement officer was entitled as provost marshal (PM).¹

Although military policemen (MP) were assigned to guard the aircraft and air fields of the Army's air arm almost from its formation, the expansion of those security forces came about as part of the expansion in airpower ordered by President Franklin D. Roosevelt as Nazi Germany extended its control to most of Europe and North Africa. To facilitate this important task Army Regulation 95-5 was amended to create the Army Air



Army Air Service Military Police Detachment, Mitchell Field, Long Island circa 1919 (Security Forces Museum)

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MP Detachment at Randolph Field, 1941 (Security Forces Museum)

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Forces (AAF) on June 20, 1941. General (Gen) Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, the Army deputy chief of staff for air, was named Chief, Army Air Forces.² After the United States was drawn into World War II by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, Roosevelt directed the reorganization of the Army into the Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and the Army Service of Supply for the duration of the war plus six months thereafter.³

On March 12, the effective date of the Executive Order, GEN George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, issued War Department Circular 59. As part of Marshall’s directive the AAF became co-equal with the Army Ground Forces and the Army Service of Supply and General “Hap” Arnold became a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) representing the AAF view on all matters pertaining to the Army Air Forces. Marshall’s Circular 59 provided that the Army Air Forces mission was



Mrs. Eleanor Pogwist, self-proclaimed “America’s No. 1 aerial hitchhiker” is escorted from the Randolph Field, Texas flightline after attempting to stow away on a flight sometime in 1941. Her MP escorts are Privates Samuel H. Jackson and Lawrence Williams. (Security Forces Museum)



General of the Air Force Henry H. “Hap” Arnold (Air Force Photo)

to “procure and maintain equipment peculiar to the Army Air Forces, and to provide Air Force units properly organized, trained and equipped for combat operations.”⁴ The provision of interior police or guard duty, law enforcement, and defense for the air bases of the growing Army Air Force was the responsibility of Army Provost Marshal General Allen W. Guillon, a West Pointer and former Army Judge Advocate General and Adjutant General of the Army, and the Army Corps of Military Police. Three organizations were established to perform these missions: Guard Companies (later Squadrons), Military Police Companies (Aviation), and Air Base Security Battalions.

Guard Squadrons were organized to provide

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law enforcement and perform interior guard duties on stateside air bases. These units were usually formed from base personnel when the base was established, had little or no formal police or security training, and, because the various overseas theaters had priority for manpower, were often undermanned. Although a school for Guard officers was established at Miami AAF, Florida, and a military police school was set up at Buckley Field, Colorado, near Denver, until these schools could carry the training load, some local commanders provided their own specialized training to their Guard Squadrons.⁵ At Sioux Falls, South Dakota, in September 1942, the base commander set up an intensive six-week course for the 929th Guard Squadron covering skills such as first aid, defense against airborne attack, map reading, interior and prisoner guard duty, combat tactics, field fortifications, camouflage, and anti-tank measures. To augment the 929th's scant manpower, the base commander also assigned the 811th Technical Training Squadron to military police duties. Not until 1943 did the 929th have sufficient manpower assigned to be able to actually train properly and perform its duties without augmentation.⁶


The duties performed by the Guard Squadrons stateside were performed overseas by Military Police Companies (Aviation). These units, 47 of which were formed by the end of 1942, had their own Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) and were composed of mounted and motorized patrol sections, a traffic and gate section, a desk and record section, and a criminal investigative section.⁷



SSgt A. F. Schmidt and Sgt Harry Seitticatt of the 1101st Guard Squadron conduct an identification check at Douglas AAF, Arizona, in 1944. (Douglas AAF *Flight Pattern*)

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MP (Aviation) Companies performed the normal duties of military police on Army Air Forces bases and reported to the Corps of Military Police which had responsibility for these units' logistical support and training. The Military Police (Aviation) Training Camp was established at Camp Ripley, Minnesota, in May 1942. The camp provided training for individuals and units and included courses for AAF officers, enlisted men, provost marshals, and MP company commanders. That same year stateside MP (Aviation) Companies were redesignated as Guard Squadrons.



Insignia of the 982nd Military Police Company (Aviation) (Air Force Historical Research Agency)


Air Base Security (ABS) Battalions, formed to be the Army Air Force's "infantry," marked the first recognition that air bases in combat theaters required specially trained and equipped defenders. These battalions can rightfully claim the

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distinction of being the ancestors of today's Air Force security units. Although created to fulfill a valid air base defense mission in overseas areas, the ABS Battalions were authorized by Army Chief of Staff GEN George C. Marshall primarily to help absorb the AAF's 1942 quota of 53,299 black enlistees. The plan called for 23,000 black soldiers to make up fifty-seven all-black units originally to be called aerodrome defense battalions. The program was later expanded to a total of 103 units and by 1943, 296 ABS battalions were planned of which 261 were to be all black units, but not all of these units were activated. In keeping with the Army policy of segregation, the all-black ABS units had white officers.

Designed to protect air bases against riots, parachute attacks, and air raids the air base security battalions were to be equipped with small arms, machine guns, mortars, grenade launchers, rocket launchers ("bazookas"), half-tracks, self-propelled 75mm. guns, and even light tanks. Unlike the MP (Aviation) Companies and Guard Squadrons which focused on interior police or law enforcement duties common to the Military Police, the ABS units and their combat security mission were unique to the AAF.

As the war progressed, Army Air Force military police and base security responsibilities expanded to the point where it seemed in the interest of efficiency to create a separate provost marshal's office for the Air Forces. This was done on March 29, 1943, and Col H. G. Reynolds was named the Air Provost Marshal (APM) by General "Hap" Arnold, marking what the Air Force Security Forces celebrate as its birth date.⁸ Reynolds was well qualified for the position, having established the Plant Protection Division in the Office of the Under Secretary of War in 1940 and was serving as Deputy Director of the Internal Security Division in the provost marshal general's office at the time of his transfer to the Air Corps in February 1943. The APM's office was established under the Air Force Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Materiel, Maintenance, and Distribution along with finance, quartermaster, ordnance, engineering and the Women's Air Corps.⁹



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Gradually, units performing police guard, and internal security duties at AAF bases were effectively transferred to the Air Corps under the supervision of the Air Provost Marshal. By mid-1944, 60,000 men were serving in MP (Aviation) Companies, Guard Squadrons, and ABS Battalions supporting the AAF, and Reynolds' office proceeded to issue regulations covering internal security, the protection of classified material, the health and safety of workers in aircraft plants, and the recruitment, training and use of Guard Squadrons and Military Police (Aviation) Companies.

As the AAF wartime mission began to expand beyond providing aerial support for Army ground forces, the movement to create a separate and independent Air Force began to gain momentum. While AAF close air support aircraft served as "flying artillery" for the ground forces by attacking enemy formations at the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) and while fighters fought for air superiority over it, the strategic air forces performed their mission independent of the Army's ground forces many hundreds of miles from the FEBA. Strategic bombing campaigns in Europe and Japan had taken the war to the enemy homeland and by the time of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, in August 1945, only the most diehard opponents of the idea of an independent Air Force refused to acknowledge that the advent of the atom bomb coupled with the long range bomber had catapulted the air forces to a position of prominence in post-war American strategy. By 1945, the Army Air Force reached a strength of nearly 2.3 million representing 27 percent of the Army's total strength, and over 65,000 aircraft; barely four years earlier it boasted only a little over 51,000 personnel and less than 4,000 airplanes.¹⁰ At the time of Japan's surrender in August 1945, there were 11,955 officers and men in the Military Police force of the AAF.¹¹

Even in the midst of the war, Army leaders were contemplating the post-war organization of the United States Army, including the burgeoning, increasingly autonomous Army Air Force. One of the officers giving some thought to the post-war world was COL Loren F. Parmley in the Office of the Provost Marshal General. In August 1943, COL Parmley circulated a study entitled "Establishment of the Provost Marshal General's Office and a Corps of Military Police on a Permanent Basis for our Peacetime Army." Air Provost Marshal Reynolds received a copy for review and comment.

Reynolds reviewed the study as ordered, but from the "standpoint of whether such study should include Provost Marshal activities contemplated within the Army Air Forces after the termination of the present war."¹² In even raising the question, Reynolds signaled his belief that the provost marshal general should not presume to make plans for the post war air provost marshal's office. But rather than answer his own question, Reynolds kicked the can down the road.

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In his reply to Col F. Trubee Davison, a former Assistant Secretary of War for air and now chief of the AAF Special Projects Office, Reynolds reminded Davison that his office was barely six months old and by necessity he had been focused on winning the present war, not having the luxury of time to think about the proper organization for winning future ones. He did note that in his opinion, a post-war Army Air Force would

continue to need its own provost marshal, “particularly in view of the fact that Army Air Forces installations require soldiers to perform security functions and such soldiers cannot be drawn from flying and service personnel.”¹³ Even at this early date, the air base security mission served as a prime justification for the continuation of a separate provost marshal’s office for the air forces. However, Reynolds suggested the whole topic be tabled until there was time to consider the lessons learned from the war and when more detail concerning the future of the post-war Army Air Force was known.



Unidentified Army Air Corps motorcycle patrolman
(Security Forces Museum)

Unbeknownst to Reynolds, BG William F. Tompkins, director of the special planning division of the General Staff, had already shelved the provost marshal general’s study for the time being. On September 24, Tompkins advised COL Parmley that Parmley had produced “an excellent study” and that it would be held for future use.¹⁴

The subject came up again in early February 1944 as part of a study on the “Initial Post-War Air Force.”¹⁵ This time Reynolds was not reluctant to put his ideas on paper. After reviewing the experience of the APM’s office in the war to date as well as the report of the Provost Marshal General of World War I, the provost marshal organization of the British Royal Air Force, and COL Parmley’s earlier study, he offered several recommendations.

It was apparent, Reynolds wrote, that the provost marshal’s responsibilities in the post-war air forces should “be based on centralized control of security measures at all command levels by one staff agency under the Commanding General of the Air Force.”¹⁶ This arrangement would prevent a recurrence of what Reynolds believed was the “outstanding weakness” of the AAF provost marshal activities revealed by the war; namely the prerogative of commanding officers at lower command echelons to appoint provost marshals. Reynolds noted that this practice resulted in “officers without training, natural ability or interest in the security problem...” being placed in control of “physical and personnel security.”¹⁷ Most foreign military forces, and indeed COL Parmley’s earlier study, regarded the security function as “a mission entirely independent” of

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ground or service forces with provost marshals who were “responsible only to his immediate superior provost marshal for the security of physical installations and the discipline of personnel.”¹⁸

Consistent with these views, Reynolds recommended “a Security Corps within the post war Air Force be established under the command of the Air Provost Marshal who would be responsible for the following:

- a. Recruitment, training and assignment of officers and enlisted men for the performance of the security mission.
- b. Investigation of crime and accidents in which military personnel are involved.
- c. Protection of property of all air forces installations against all natural hazards.
- d. Enforcement of base regulations.
- e. Enforcement of order and discipline among military personnel.
- f. Enforcement of security regulations pertaining to all classified equipment and documents within this Hq and at each AAF facility to insure compliance with the provisions of regulations governing the security and safeguarding of all military information”.¹⁹

Reynolds stressed that to carry out these functions the “Security Corps” needed to be “entirely separate from other staff activity...” and recommended that a provost marshal function with four branches--military police, internal security, police and prisons, and investigations—be added to the proposed air base organization chart that was simultaneously making the rounds for review.²⁰

In the spring of 1944, Congress too began to consider changes to the armed forces and formed the Woodrum Committee, chaired by Virginia Representative Clifton A. Woodrum, to look at the issue of post-war military organization with a particular focus on the issue of unity of command. During his testimony before the committee, Assistant Secretary of War for Air, Robert A. Lovett, strongly supported a unified command system for the military services and also told the members that he believed the post-war armed services should include a separate Air Force. For its part, the Navy, fearing the loss of its fleet air arm to a separate air force and reluctant to see its secretary replaced on the President’s cabinet by a “secretary of national defense,” urged that the options be studied further. The Woodrum Committee agreed.



Robert A. Lovett. He also served as Secretary of Defense from 1951 to 1953. (Dept. of Defense Photo)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff promptly began the recommended study in May 1944 by creating the Special Committee for the Reorganization of National Defense. The committee included Admiral James O. Richardson and Rear Admiral Malcolm F. Schoeffel of the Navy, MG William F.

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Tompkins of the War Department General Staff, and Maj Gen Harold L. George and Col F. Trubee Davison of the AAF. The committee was thorough and it was not until April 1945 that it submitted its report to the joint chiefs. The majority opinion recommended both the creation of a Department of National Defense with a civilian secretary and an independent United States Air Force co-equal with the Army and the Navy. Admiral Richardson, the chairman, issued a dissenting opinion opposing both recommendations based on the continuing fear in naval command circles that the Navy would lose its fleet air arm to a new Air Force and its Marines to the Army in any post-war reorganization that changed the status quo.

After the committee completed its work it seemed clear that planning for either a combined armed forces under a secretary of national defense or a separate Air Force needed to continue. Indeed, planning needed to accelerate since with Germany's surrender in May 1945 it was clear that the war was winding down and the AAF would cease to exist six months after the end of the war with the expiration of Marshall's 1942 reorganization order.

The Air Staff convened its own board chaired by Maj Gen Harold M. McClelland to examine options for the organization of an independent post-war Air Force. Calls for recommendations once again went throughout the air staff and proposals were considered. On July 31, 1945, Col Reuben C. Moffat, chief of post-war plans, submitted a "Proposed Post-War Air Force Organization," in which he proposed that the new Air Force might be called the "Airy" for brevity and similarity to Army and Navy. The "Airy" might also have, he suggested, its own "Air(y) Academy."²¹

Air Provost Marshal General Reynolds submitted his own detailed recommendations in September and October. On September 19, Reynolds transmitted to the Air Staff Deputy for Personnel Policy and Management his comments on a proposed "Policy and Program for Arms and Services with the Army Air Forces in the Event of Establishment of a Single Department of Armed Forces."

In his comments Reynolds noted that since March 1943 he had often advocated "the desirability of complete integration for officers and enlisted men assigned to duty as provost marshals and military police."²² He again advocated a personnel policy that ensured that all officers and men assigned to provost duties for the Army Air Forces were actually part of the Army Air Forces. For example, he explained that while enlisted men in the Guard Squadrons and MP (Aviation) Companies in the Zone of the Interior had been in the Air Corps, "officers in the Military Police Companies (Avn) have usually been in the Corps of Military Police and have worn the insignia of that corps."²³ This arrangement had often been "destructive to morale and has not been conducive to their contributing their best efforts to the welfare of the AAF" particularly when these officers had been "engaged on town patrol activities and are required to exercise disciplinary action over Air Corps soldiers."²⁴ In other words, Reynolds firmly believed that the Air Force's police force should be an Air Force police force.

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Reynolds also argued that integration into the Air Corps of all soldiers performing military police duties and security for the Army Air Forces would make such duty attractive and would be a source of pride to the service. Reynolds' idea was to form a "Provost Corps" that performed the same duties for the AAF that the United States Marines performed for the Navy:

The majority of AAF personnel are specialists, and their primary mission is either the flying or servicing of airplanes. The AAF can be compared with the Navy since the majority of Navy personnel are also specialists. The primary mission of the US Marine Corps is to act as a security force for the Navy in peacetime...The AAF should have a corps comparable to the US Marines Corps which would relieve the specialized personnel of the AAF from the performance of the security mission...²⁵

The creation of such a Marine-like "Provost Corps" would have the added benefit, Reynolds claimed, of creating "high morale and rated officers, flying personnel and service groups could well become proud of a first-class, highly trained, well disciplined, and smartly uniformed security force who would do all of the guarding and policing for the AAF."²⁶

Reynolds made clear that his recommendations applied only if there were a post-war "Regular Air Force;" in the event of a "Single Department of the Armed Forces" then "a Corps of Military Police or comparable unit would do all the guarding, security and police work for the Army, Navy, and Air Forces."²⁷ Perhaps, Reynolds suggested, the Marines might perform such a cross-service duty.

When General McClelland's committee rendered the report on its organizational study of the post-war air force on November 7, 1945, Tab B-5 of that report was devoted to the provost marshal function. The tab was an overview of the military police and internal security functions under the responsibility of Army Service Forces, but noted that at installations within the continental United States most, if not all, of the functions were provided by the AAF. The committee estimated that an overall security program for an autonomous AAF would require that approximately 2 percent of the AAF strength would be security troops.

In its final report, the McClelland committee found that in the event a single department of the armed forces was created, "The Air Provost Marshal as now organized can continue to meet the Air Force requirements for Military Police and internal security."²⁸ Should a separate Air Force be created, then "A complete and independent [provost marshal's] branch will be required. This will involve some expansion of the [Air Provost Marshal's] office."²⁹

The studies were finished; now it was up to the President and Congress to make a decision. On the issues of a unified Department of National Defense and an independent Air Force, President Harry S. Truman and GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower, the wartime Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe, were in lockstep. Truman had long believed that the antiquated military command system had been a contributing factor to

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the Pearl Harbor debacle and on December 19, 1945, the President delivered a message to Congress advocating a unified command under a Department of National Defense with three branches representing land, sea and air forces. A separate Air Force was needed and justified because, Truman noted, “Air power has been developed to a point where its responsibilities are equal to those of land and sea power, and its contribution to our strategic planning is as great.”³⁰ Eisenhower told a Congressional committee that modern warfare and future United States security demanded the creation of a Department of National Defense. “I cannot perceive,” he testified, “any logic behind the objections which are voiced against this proposal.”³¹ On the concept of an independent Air Force, “Ike” was equally blunt: “No sane officer of any arm could contest that thinking. The Air Forces have long ago grown up and if anything was needed to show their equal status with all others” one needed to only look at their wartime record.³²



President Harry S. Truman (Truman Library)

In February 1947, the President submitted to Congress the National Security Act of 1947 based on a collaborative Army-Navy draft. The legislation he submitted created an independent Air Force but allowed the Navy to retain naval aviation and the Marine Corps. The Congress held hearings on the bill in June and passed it the following month. On July 26, 1947, with the stroke of his pen, Harry Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947 into law authorizing the creation of the United States Air Force which would take over the personnel, aircraft and mission of the AAF, including the military police force that would eventually become the United States Air Force Security Forces.³³ The heritage went on, but now the history could begin.

¹ While the function is ancient, the use of the term provost marshal to designate the officer responsible for the activities of military police units did not evolve until the Middle Ages. The word provost comes from Middle English and was derived from the Old English *profost* and Old French *provost*, which in turn came from the Medieval Latin *propositus*, or one in charge. Keepers of prisons were generally called provosts and the title became closely associated with law enforcement and justice. The word marshal, from the Old French *mareschal*, traces its origins to Middle Ages Europe where the marshal was a high official in the household of a king, prince, or noble in charge of the cavalry. Over time the title was used to designate the commander of the king’s military forces and the highest ranking officer within the court. Over time these separate titles merged into that of “provost marshal” and was applied to the sovereign’s chief military law enforcement officer.

² Since at least the formation of the Air Force, Army grade abbreviations have been, except for some general officers grades, three capital letters while Air Force abbreviations are abbreviations of the words themselves. This convention is observed throughout this work to distinguish Army Air Corps, Army Air Forces, and United States Air Force personnel from those of the Army.

³ Executive Order 9082, February 28, 1942.

⁴ Quoted in Herman S. Wolk, *Toward Independence: The Emergence of the US Air Force 1945-1947* (Air Force History and Museums Program, 1996), 4.

⁵ On April 4, 1946, the Buckley school moved to Lackland AAF, Texas, and conducted a single class of the Army Air Forces Guard Course before being moved to Keesler AAF, Mississippi, on July 8, 1946 (History Office, HQ 37 Training Wing, *Lineage Training and Support Organizations on Lackland Air Force Base February 1941 – October 1994* (37th Training Wing Special Study 94-1, Lackland AFB, TX, Nov 94).

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- ⁶ Jerry M. Bullock, *Air Force Security Police* (Paducah, KY: Turner Publishing, 1996), 14.
- ⁷ Table of Organization and Equipment 19-217, Military Police Company (Aviation) Post, Camp or Station, 1 May 1942.
- ⁸ *Security Police Digest*, Number 1 (1973), 3.
- ⁹ AAF Organizational Chart, October 1943 in Herman S. Wolk, *Planning and Organizing the Postwar Air Force* Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1984), 32.
- ¹⁰ *Army Air Forces Statistical Digest, World War II*, Table 3 (Army Air Forces Office of Statistical Control, December 1945).
- ¹¹ *Army Air Forces Statistical Digest, World War II*, Tables 7 and 8 (Army Air Forces Office of Statistical Control, December 1945).
- ¹² Comment No. 2, Routing and Record Sheet from Air Provost Marshal to Chief, Special Projects Office, dated 12/14/43.
- ¹³ Comment No. 2, Routing and Record Sheet from Air Provost Marshal to Chief, Special Projects Office, dated 12/14/43.
- ¹⁴ Memorandum for Provost Marshal General, dated 24 September 1943.
- ¹⁵ Referenced in Routing and Record Sheet, Subject: Establishment of the Air Provost Marshal General's Office and a Corps of Military Police on a Permanent Basis for our "Initial Post War Air Force," 1 March 1944 (emphasis in original).
- ¹⁶ Referenced in Routing and Record Sheet, Subject: Establishment of the Air Provost Marshal General's Office and a Corps of Military Police on a Permanent Basis for our "Initial Post War Air Force," 1 March 1944.
- ¹⁷ Referenced in Routing and Record Sheet, Subject: Establishment of the Air Provost Marshal General's Office and a Corps of Military Police on a Permanent Basis for our "Initial Post War Air Force," 1 March 1944.
- ¹⁸ Referenced in Routing and Record Sheet, Subject: Establishment of the Air Provost Marshal General's Office and a Corps of Military Police on a Permanent Basis for our "Initial Post War Air Force," 1 March 1944.
- ¹⁹ Referenced in Routing and Record Sheet, Subject: Establishment of the Air Provost Marshal General's Office and a Corps of Military Police on a Permanent Basis for our "Initial Post War Air Force," 1 March 1944.
- ²⁰ Referenced in Routing and Record Sheet, Subject: Establishment of the Air Provost Marshal General's Office and a Corps of Military Police on a Permanent Basis for our "Initial Post War Air Force," 1 March 1944.
- ²¹ Thankfully for the future United States Air Force, only his suggestion of a separate military academy survived.
- ²² Routing and Record Sheet, Subject: Policy and Program for Arms and Services with the Army Air Forces in the Event of Establishment of a Single Department of Armed Forces, 19 Sept 45, 2.
- ²³ Routing and Record Sheet, Subject: Policy and Program for Arms and Services with the Army Air Forces in the Event of Establishment of a Single Department of Armed Forces, 19 Sept 45, 2.
- ²⁴ Routing and Record Sheet, Subject: Policy and Program for Arms and Services with the Army Air Forces in the Event of Establishment of a Single Department of Armed Forces, 19 Sept 45, 2.
- ²⁵ Memo, Future Planning for Air Provost Marshal Policies and Procedures, 27 Aug 45, 1.
- ²⁶ Routing and Record Sheet, Subject: Policy and Program for Arms and Services with the Army Air Forces in the Event of Establishment of a Single Department of Armed Forces, 19 Sept 45, 2.
- ²⁷ Routing and Record Sheet, Subject: Policy and Program for Arms and Services with the Army Air Forces in the Event of Establishment of a Single Department of Armed Forces, 19 Sept 45, 2. Most post war planners assumed that a single department of national defense would result in many cross service common functions (i.e. military police, judge advocate, medical) being performed by a single executive agent from one of the services or by a "purple suit" organization assigned not to a service, but to the department of national defense. This assumption proved false, but the idea of "purple suiting" continues to have life depending upon each Secretary of Defense's inclination and the strength of resistance by the services and their Congressional allies.
- ²⁸ *Study on Organization of the Air Forces in a Single Department of Armed Forces*, 7 Nov 45, 2.

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²⁹ *Study on Organization of the Air Forces in a Single Department of Armed Forces*, 7 Nov 45, 2. By now post-war demobilization had begun and air provost marshal activities and personnel had been greatly reduced.

³⁰ Quoted in Herman S. Wolk, *Toward Independence: The Emergence of the US Air Force 1945-1947* (Air Force History and Museum Program, 1996), 17.

³¹ Quoted in Herman S. Wolk, *Toward Independence: The Emergence of the US Air Force 1945-1947* (Air Force History and Museum Program, 1996), 15.

³² Quoted in Herman S. Wolk, *Toward Independence: The Emergence of the US Air Force 1945-1947* (Air Force History and Museum Program, 1996), 15.

³³ Public Law 80-253, July 26, 1947.

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CHAPTER ONE

FROM MP TO AP: 1947-1950

Section 207 of the National Security Act of 1947 authorized the creation of the United States Air Force, but it did not spring forth fully formed from the nib of Harry Truman's fountain pen; that was a task yet to be completed. Section 208(f) provided that the Air Force "shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations... [and] shall be responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Air Force to meet the needs of war." On September 18, 1947, the Department of the Air Force became operational



General Carl A. Spaatz (Air Force photo)

with the swearing in of W. Stuart Symington as the first Secretary of the Air Force. Gen Carl A. Spaatz was named as the Air Force Chief of Staff.



W. Stuart Symington (Air Force photo)

Section 208(e) of the Act established a two-year period for the completion of the transfer of AAF personnel, equipment, and facilities to the Air Force. There were far fewer military police to transfer to the new Air Force, at least when compared to AAF wartime strength. From a strength of almost 60,000 police, guard, and security personnel the number of officers and men involved in law enforcement and security activities had dwindled to fewer than 10,000 with post-war demobilization. As the World War II military drew down, however, the military police remained constant at around 2.5 percent of total Army Air Forces strength. As manpower and budgets dwindled, the specialized training schools for AAF military police were closed. The orderly transfer of these personnel to the new Air Force and the

organization and training of the air service's nascent police force were among the first challenges to be faced by the Air Force provost marshal.

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In February 1946, forty-seven-year-old Col Joseph V. Dillon had replaced Reynolds as air provost marshal. Dillon, son of a New York City police captain, was a West Pointer, Georgetown University Law School graduate, and a former Army judge advocate who had served as deputy provost marshal general, commander of the Military Police (Aviation) Training Camp at Camp Ripley, Minnesota, and as provost marshal general of both the North African and European Theaters. One of his officers described him as “...an impressive looking guy [who]... looked like a New York City police commissioner.”¹ It was said of Joe Dillon that “...he knew how to command” and his intelligence, determination, and understanding of the military police mission would provide the crucial leadership needed to transition the Army Air Forces police into the Air Force police.



Joseph V. deP. Dillon as a brigadier general (Security Forces Museum)

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To assist Dillon in planning for the creation of a provost marshal organization for an independent Air Force and ultimately in overseeing the transfer of personnel from the Army Air Force to the United States Air Force, General Spaatz procured the transfer of Col Mitchell “Mike” Mabardy, provost marshal for the occupation forces in Germany, from the Army to the Army Air Corps.



3543rd Army Air Force Base unit basic military trainees dry firing M-1 rifle, July 1947
(Security Forces Museum)

One area Dillon and Mabardy focused on during the months of transition planning leading up to the actual creation of the Air Force was air provost career planning. In July 1947, Dillon reported to the Air Staff on Mabardy’s study of “Enlisted Men’s Attitudes toward Military Police Duty and Guard Duty in the AAF.” The study focused on the advisability of creating an “AAF Career Police Force” and polled enlisted men about their attitudes toward serving in the military police and gathered data concerning the demographics and grade structure of the force.

Mabardy was surprised to find that “15% of all AAF enlisted men not on MP duty desire assignment in an AAF Career Police Force.”² Most of the AAF military police questioned favored a permanent career police force and preferred being assigned to one rather than to some other Army job. Probably not as surprising was the finding that men actually assigned to MP duties, when given a choice, preferred guard duty over kitchen police (KP) or latrine orderly. However, other AAF enlisted men not assigned to MP duties preferred guard duty over KP, but not over latrine orderly!³

Mabardy’s study painted a picture of a military police force with half as many high school graduates and over twice the number of men below age 25 as the rest of the AAF. They also trailed the AAF by over 50 percent in the average number of enlisted men in the top three enlisted grades. Based on the results of this study, Dillon declared that he would take action to “advance the doctrine of the ‘AAF Career Police Force’ as

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well as aggressive measures to eliminate unfavorable conditions handicapping the effectiveness of the AAF police establishment such as assignment of unsuitable personnel and failure to obtain authorized grades for personnel who are effective.”⁴ This was the first attempt, but by no means the last, to deal with the recurring challenges of qualifications and promotions of Air Force police.


Throughout August 1947, representatives of the Army and the infant Air Force met to hammer out agreements to facilitate the separation of the services. Col Dillon met with BG Blackshear M. Bryan, the Army Provost Marshal, and others to discuss the transfer of provost functions from the Army to the US Air Force and by August 27, the two had tentatively agreed that “the functions now performed by the Army for the [Army] Air Forces will be transferred to the Air Forces, but inasmuch as the Army has no personnel to transfer, it was agreed to accept the functions without the personnel to perform them.”⁵

On September 15, 1947, the “Army-Air Force Agreements as to the Initial Implementation of the National Security Act of 1947” were concluded. The eleven sections of the document covered such areas as personnel, intelligence, logistics, research and development, and budget. Section XI (B) covered provost marshal general functions.

The Army-Air Force Agreements established a joint provost marshal staff manned by the aggregate military and civilian personnel authorizations available to the air provost marshal and the provost marshal general on a 60/40 Air Force/Army ratio. This joint staff was to operate by mutual agreement in areas common to the two services, but independently on individual service concerns.⁶

The agreement also covered various specific provost marshal functions. For example, the policing of common carriers transporting troops was agreed to be a local commander responsibility so no reallocation of personnel from the Army to the Air Force was necessary. The security of Air Force bases was agreed to be the responsibility of the Air Force, but with no personnel reallocated from the Army for the mission. Likewise, the operation of guard houses, conduct of loyalty investigations, the granting of industrial plant clearances, criminal investigations, and apprehensions were to be the responsibility of each service and no personnel performing these duties for the AAF would be reallocated to the Air Force. The APM was given no direct responsibility for domestic disturbances and off-base patrols would be performed by the service with the largest garrison wherever bases and posts were located in the same area. The Army assumed responsibility for running a military police school for both services with faculty allocated between the two services according to each service’s enrollment in the school. Personnel would be reallocated from the Army to the Air Force for this purpose and the Air Force was allowed to participate in establishing the school curriculum.⁷

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Transfer of all Army Air Corps officers to the United States Air Force officially occurred on September 26, 1947. Included in this transfer were all military police officers then serving in MP (Aviation) Companies along with the personnel of the Army Air Forces Air Provost Marshal's Office. Colonel Dillon became the first Air Provost Marshal of the United States Air Force and while the letterhead on the air provost marshal's daily reports changed from "Headquarters Army Air Forces" to "Department of the Air Force, Headquarters, United States Air Force" on September 29, Colonel Dillon's signature block did not change from "Colonel, Air Corps" to "Colonel, USAF" until the October 10 report.

While there may have been some other explanation, the delay in changing the signature block could well have been an example of old habits dying hard. Indeed, the reality of an independent Air Force did take some time to catch on. As late as the autumn of 1948, Airmen at Langley Air Force Base (AFB), Virginia observed with frustration "that most news items in the press, including those emanating from supposedly reliable major international press services and wire services, persisted in referring to this third military service as: 'the Army Air Force,' and persisted likewise in discussing 'Army bomber,' 'Army fighters,' 'Army Air Fields,' and 'soldiers of the Army Air Force,' in innumerable instances, ad momentum and ad nauseum, despite the fact that a separate and independent US Air Force had existed for more than a year..."⁸

Transfers of MP (Aviation) Companies and Guard Squadrons were often made *en mass* with entire units transferred to Air Force control. Approximately twenty-two MP companies were converted to Air Police (AP) squadrons in this manner although the

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designation of Air Police did not come into use until November 1948. The transfer of personnel was to be completed by December 1948, but was not actually finished until 1953. Until then many Air Police squadrons actually contained Army military policemen on duty with, but not actually members of, the Air Force. It would be April 1952 until Army grade titles were finally abandoned and Army military occupation specialty (MOS) codes were replaced by Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSC).⁹

As APM, Dillon was responsible for exercising “control over all matters pertaining to Provost Marshal activities in the United States Air Force including the inspection thereof.”¹⁰ Although initially established under the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and Administration, on January 2, 1948, the Air Provost Marshal’s Division was reestablished as a directorate under Air Force Inspector General (IG) Maj Gen Hugh J. Knerr by USAF General Order #1. Other directorates under the IG were the Air Inspector, Special Investigations, and Procurement Inspection. The Air Provost Marshal Division (APMD), later renamed as a directorate, was responsible for discipline, law enforcement, criminal investigations, corrections, and air base and plant security. Lt Col Eugene Smith, former head of the Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) in Europe, was named chief of Air Force CID under the APMD. Lt Col David S. Blackwell oversaw corrections and confinement, while Col Kenneth McKenzie administered the industrial security program. Lt Col “Mike” Mabardy took over discipline, law enforcement, and base security. In August 1948, responsibility for the counterintelligence mission at air bases was transferred from the A-2 (Intelligence) to base air provost marshals.¹¹ This additional responsibility was to be short lived, however, because of the work of Brig Gen Joseph F. Carroll.

Carroll, an assistant director at the Federal Bureau of Investigations, had been “borrowed” by Secretary Symington for the purpose of making recommendations for the creation of an independent investigative organization for the Air Force. Symington was concerned that since under the organization chosen by the Air Force the base air provost marshal reported to the local commander rather than to the APMD, the officer’s ability to conduct impartial investigations on his base might be hampered by the commander.

On August 1, 1948, Carroll recommended consolidating the inspector general’s procurement inspection and special investigations directorates, along with the APMD’s criminal investigation division and counterintelligence function, into a single investigative agency reporting to the IG. Carroll was named commander of the resulting Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) and Eugene Smith was named chief of the Criminal Branch. While base air provost marshals often continued to maintain unofficial investigative branches, the OSI claimed jurisdiction over investigations of all but the most minor of offenses.

In an Air Command and Staff School paper written the following year, Smith advocated creating an OSI-type organization for the Department of Defense. In this paper he put his finger on an issue that caused, and continues to cause, friction between commanders and their staff judge advocates and the OSI. Smith was convinced that “the advantages, efficiency and savings, both in personnel and equipment, to be gained from a

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centralized investigative agency...far outweigh the sacrifice of “Chain of Command” and commander “prerogatives.”¹² Generations of commanders forced to rely on often young, inexperienced air policemen to investigate cases of importance to them, but not of interest to OSI, might very well disagree with Smith’s conviction.

The Air Provost Marshal Directorate as organized was what would later be called a “functional stovepipe.” At the top, Air Provost Marshal Dillon and his staff were the professional supervisors of the air provost marshals at various command levels and drafted regulations and guidance for the performance of the duties of the air provost marshals and the Air Police squadrons. However, the only air provost marshals reporting directly to Dillon were the three regional APMs whose area of responsibility coincided with the three IG regions. These regional APMs assisted Dillon in supervising APMD activities in their regions and “made visits to installations to assist Commanders in the improvement of military discipline and security and in the operation of Air Police organizations and correctional facilities.”¹³ Each of the Air Force Major Commands (MAJCOM) had an air provost marshal and staff reporting to the MAJCOM commander, as did each Numbered Air Force (NAF) or Air Division under the MAJCOMs. While they reported to and served their individual commanders, the APMs in the field also had to respond to Dillon as their functional supervisor.

As part of fulfilling his functional oversight role, in 1947 Dillon held the first Air Provost Marshal Conference bringing together MAJCOM, NAF, Air Division, and Air Materiel Command Area provost marshals in a forum where “all phases of Air Provost Marshal activities were discussed, as well as related subjects, that an Air Provost Marshal needs to know in discharging his assigned duties.”¹⁴ The APMD also communicated with the field through its monthly *Air Provost Marshal Digest*.

The actual work of Air Force law enforcement and security was performed at individual Air Force bases by base air provost marshals and their Military Police and, after November 1948, Air Police squadrons. Upon independence, the Air Force, following the lead of its Strategic Air Command (SAC), scrapped the existing Army Air Force organization. Under the old organizational model, the combat group commander reported to the base commander which led to ridiculous situations such as the brigadier general commanding the 311th Reconnaissance Group reporting to the MacDill Air Base commander who was a colonel in the cavalry.¹⁵ Instead the Air Force implemented the Hobson Plan, developed by Col Kenneth B. Hobson, Chief of the AAF Organizational Division, which made the combat wing commander paramount and placed the wing commander in the position of directing rather than requesting that his flying activities be supported. As implemented in SAC, for example, each wing had operational and maintenance squadrons assigned to it along with a medical group and a support group or air base group, comprised of a food services squadron, operations squadron, installations squadron, motor vehicle squadron, material squadron, and an Air Police squadron.¹⁶ The base air provost marshal, an officer on the support group commander’s staff who often did double duty as commander of the AP squadron, was responsible for base law enforcement and security, the safeguarding of classified information, censorship, travel

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control; the organization, training, and equipping of AP units; and the confinement and retraining of prisoners.

The base air provost marshal was not necessarily a career military policeman since the postwar draw down of the AAF created an excess of pilots who were “banked” for future needs. These grounded aviators, most with no military police experience or training, were often assigned to air provost marshal’s billets or to the command of MP or AP companies. Some did very well, but one of “Mike” Mabardy’s most pressing issues between 1946 and 1948 was the weeding out of substandard personnel.¹⁷ This was not the last time that pilots would be “banked” by assigning them to “career broadening” jobs in the security forces and other non-flying specialties.

The typical base Air Police Squadron (APS) was initially organized along the same lines as the MP (Aviation) Companies and consisted of a personnel section, a material section and an operations section that encompassed law enforcement, security, and corrections. The law enforcement section generally included a reports and administration flight, a pass and identification flight, and base and town patrol flights. Four Air Police squadrons made up an Air Police Group (APG), the commander of which reported either to the support group commander or directly to the wing commander.

The base air provost marshals and their men were generally winning the approval of commanders for their professionalism as military policemen. The APM of the 363rd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing at Langley AFB, Virginia, for example, was praised for his work on “Project Vulnerability” to enhance “the base’s security organization,



Airman Third Class William E. Lindsey in uniform with Air Police brassard and white gaiters (Security Forces Museum)

including the commencement of an effective Interior Guard System.”¹⁸ From October 28 to November 4, 1948, the 363rd was placed on “secret” alert during the period of the November 3 general election because headquarters warned that a “definite possibility existed of ‘trouble,’ nature not specified, from subversive elements in this country aimed against vital military aviation installations.”¹⁹ During the alert, the wing’s “State of Readiness...proved excellent” and the cooperation of the “Wing Provost Marshal and the staff and personnel of the Air Police Squadron, was especially commendable.”²⁰

Not all commanders treated their air policemen as professionals, however. Capt Benjamin C. Marshall, one of the best of the pilots without a cockpit assigned to air provost marshal duties in 1947, recalled how the base commander at Ellsworth AFB,

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South Dakota, told him that his men had “by-God better get after mowing the fence line now!” The commander didn’t care that these men were military police; their job was to “take care of the base” and that ‘by-God’ included cutting the grass!²¹

As part of formalizing the organization of the Air Police, the APMD began drafting and publishing a number of Air Force Regulations (AFR). In late 1948, AFR 125-26 established policies for the security of classified information and equipment, personnel identification systems, visitor control, contractor access to Air Force installations, safeguarding atomic energy information, and screening and forwarding investigations to AFOSI. AFR 125-7 articulated policies and procedures for the apprehension and confinement of women in July 1949. That same month AFR 125-12 established a uniform system of recording and reporting Air Police activities while AFR 125-13, *Conduct of Transient Military Personnel on Public Carriers*, established the Air Police’s responsibility for the control of the conduct of Air Force personnel on public transportation and in terminals. Provision for the enforcement of base traffic regulations. The use of the “AF Traffic Ticket” (AF Form 64) was also developed and set out in AFR 125-14.

The law enforcement authority of the Air Police over military personnel was provided for through military law. Since the new service was an offspring of the Army, Congress adopted the Articles of War as the military law of the Air Force.²² The Air Force’s first *Manual for Courts-Martial* (MCM) went into effect on February 1, 1949, and was merely the current Army manual with a Presidential preface making it applicable to the Air Force.²³ Chapter V, paragraph 20(b) (1) of the Air Force MCM provided that, “In the execution of their police duties, military police, and such persons as are designated pursuant to orders of an appropriate commanding officer to perform military police duties, are vested with such powers of arrest or confinement over persons subject to military law as are provided by Army Regulations.”²⁴


Although Air Force police were operating under Air Force regulations, from their uniforms the casual observer would see little difference between them and their AAF antecedents, unless they noticed the new Air Force silver and blue stylized wing grade insignia on the sleeves of the enlisted men. Although President Truman approved a blue uniform for the Air Force in January 1948, it would not be in supply channels for issue until September 1950, and until then the Air Police generally wore Army uniforms.²⁵

Army military police brassards with a white “MP” on a dark blue band and even the crossed pistols insignia of their Army counterparts were common uniform items for the infant Air Force police force.²⁶ An Air Police brassard, initially an Air Force blue band with yellow “Air Police” lettering, was issued in 1948-1949 to replace the Army one then in use, but before distribution of the replacement brassard had become widespread, a new one with “Air Police” in gray letters on a dark blue band replaced it and became standard. No matter what the form, the brassard was heartily disliked by those who wore it. It wrinkled easily and slipped down the wearer’s sleeve. Even worse, it closely resembled the brassards worn by personnel assigned temporary duties such as officers of the day and aerodrome officers. Air policemen soon began what would be a

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long campaign to replace the brassard with a mark of office that designated them as law enforcement professionals, such as the badge carried by their civilian counterparts. In an effort to distinguish them, some Air Police units wore white gaiters and white helmet liners with the letters “AP” painted on the front, earning them the derisive nickname of “snow drops.”

One difference an observer might notice between the Air Police and their Army predecessors after 1949 was the increasing presence of black air policemen. Although in the summer of 1946 the Army Air Forces argued for the total exclusion of blacks from its ranks, by the following summer it had closed the flight-training program for black pilots at Tuskegee, Alabama, and established integrated flight training classes at Randolph Field, Texas. Upon independence, however, Air Force leaders were determined to be at the forefront of racial integration and despite widespread opposition within its own officer corps, pushed for integration, not because black airmen had earned it, but based on the more acceptable and practical argument that to discriminate against a racial group that made up approximately seven percent of its total force was an inefficient use of manpower.



Integrated Air Police training class at Army MP School Camp Gordon, Georgia, 1949 (Security Forces Museum)

Integration of the military was coming regardless of the personal attitudes of some officers and men. In June 1948, President Truman signed the Selective Service Act reinstating the draft, which would prompt a flood of black draftees, and the following month issued Executive Order 9981 providing for equal treatment and opportunity for African-American servicemen. The Air Force proposed on January 8, 1949, to open all its career fields to blacks, limited only by individual qualifications and the needs of the service. The new plan retained some all-black service units, but eliminated all of the Air Force's other all-black organizations. On May 11, 1949, Air Force Letter 35-3 "spelled out a new bill of rights for Negroes in the Air Force."²⁷ Living quarters as well as work places, the letter instructed, would no longer be segregated for most units.

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It seems likely that few if any black military policemen transferred from the Army to the Air Force since the Military Police specialty was effectively closed to black soldiers by 1947. By War Department Circular 224 issued on October 22, 1941, black MP units were established only at Army installations “at which substantial numbers of colored troops were located.”²⁸ For the AAF this included primarily Tuskegee Army Air Field in Alabama where black pilots underwent segregated flight training. A total of ten battalions and three companies of black MPs were activated within the continental United States to police predominantly black installations. Circular 224 also authorized the use of black MPs “among colored troops in sections of cities and towns frequented by such troops” and on “all colored convoys other than tactical.”²⁹ The three all black Army divisions, the 92nd and 93rd Infantry and the 2nd Cavalry, were also authorized black military police units. Since these men could only police other blacks, once the all-black divisions were deactivated after the war, it is likely that the men in their MP units were either discharged or reassigned to other duties.

While the Air Force opened all its specialties to blacks, because standardized tests were used to assign recruits to career fields, many black Airmen, who tended to do poorly on these tests, were assigned to non-technical or “soft” career fields. Because of this, for many years, most African-Americans in the Air Force were concentrated in administration, food service, supply, transportation, and the Air Police specialties.³⁰

As blacks were being integrated into the new Air Force, women were being segregated. In June 1948, Congress established the Women in the Air Force (WAF) organization with a strength limited to 300 officers and 4,000 enlisted women. Only career fields “traditional” to women were open to them and the Air Police was not among them.

Issues involving the roles and missions of the respective services caused by the creation of the Department of Defense and the advent of the US Air Force remained unresolved into 1948. Seeking to eliminate confusion and stop interservice bickering, Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal called the Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet with him in Key West, Florida, in March 1948. The four-day summit between Forrestal and the service chiefs resulted in a paper entitled “Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” better known as the Key West Agreement of April 21, 1948. The agreement itself did not directly address security forces in any detail, but discussions held at Key West between Army and Air Force provost marshal leadership expanded upon the September 1947 Army-Air Force Agreements



James V. Forrestal (DoD photo)

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and resulted in changes in the mission and organization of the Air Force provost marshal function.

The Army-Air Force agreements had given the Air Force the responsibility for the security of its air bases, but the scope of that responsibility was undefined. The Army no longer considered defense of air bases part of its mission, but refused to transfer manpower to the Air Force so it could do it. At Key West, Dillon, newly selected for promotion to brigadier general, cut the remaining ties with the Army provost marshal general, dissolving the joint provost marshal staff established by the Army-Air Force Agreements and agreeing with the Army that air base ground defense, at least inside the perimeter, was the responsibility of the Air Force installation commander which justified beefing up the Air Force Military Police contingent for air base defense.³¹ However, the actual extent of the Air Force's responsibility for air base ground defense was by no means clearly settled at Key West and the issue would continue to come up.

On June 18, 1948, the French, British, and American governments announced currency reform for their respective occupation zones in West Germany. Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin denounced the Allied action and used it to trigger what many call the first engagement of the Cold War between the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union. The devastated German capital of Berlin would be the "battleground" as Stalin ordered the severing of all land and water routes through the Soviet zone of East Germany to the western zone of Berlin. Only three narrow air corridors agreed upon after the war remained open across Soviet-occupied eastern German airspace to Berlin. It would be the new Air Force's initial challenge and the first challenge for the recently adopted strategy of world-wide "containment" of Soviet expansionism. Neither backing down nor provoking a war with the Soviets by attempting to force open an overland to Berlin were viable options, so President Harry S. Truman approved an airlift to supply the US forces in the city. US Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) commander Gen Curtis E. LeMay started "Operation Vittles" to resupply US forces in the city and later the civilian population. American airfields in England and Germany fed the Berlin airlift. While most of the attention rightfully focused on the pilots and their aircraft, without the supplies marshaled and escorted by Air Force military police and their Army counterparts to various departure airfields and then escorted from their arrival point at Tempelhof AB, Berlin, the Soviets could well have succeeded in eliminating the Allied zone of the city. By the time the Berlin Airlift ended on September 30, 1949, the Air Force had delivered 1.78 million tons of supplies at that cost of twenty-two Air Force pilots' lives and \$300 million dollars spent.



One consequence of the Berlin blockade, likely unforeseen by Stalin, was the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on April 4, 1949, by the World War II western Allies as a counterweight to Soviet forces and influence in Eastern Europe. West Germany, as the most likely future battleground, became an integral part of the alliance and as Germany was rearmed, the Soviet

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Union and its client states in Eastern Europe formed the Warsaw Pact on May 14, 1955. For the next 36 years, NATO and the Warsaw Pact faced off against each other along the Soviet Iron Curtain stretching from, as Winston Churchill noted when coining the term, the Baltic Sea in the north to the Adriatic Ocean in the south.

As NATO grew, American forces in Germany, in occupied Berlin, and other locations in Europe grew to meet the United States' North Atlantic Treaty obligations and air bases were established across Europe under the control of the United States Air Forces in Europe as part of that commitment.

These air bases required Air Police. The duties of an air policeman overseas were generally similar to his stateside counterpart, with one important difference; instead of dealing with local American communities in proximity to the bases, they had to deal with foreign communities and host nation governments on a myriad of issues from criminal jurisdiction to base security. Many of these issues were officially addressed in Europe by the NATO Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) negotiated with the host nation. In Japan the US agreed to an Administrative Agreement. These agreements and good working relationships with local law enforcement authorities resulted in few “unofficial” solutions that could keep an airman who had violated host nation laws from rotting in a foreign jail.

Often the Air Police units overseas were augmented with local nationals, paid by the Air Force, who dealt with host nation civilians, who acted as translators and assisted in manning the gates to the base. Germany and Japan were unique in that they were occupied countries, and under the occupation government, German and Japanese officials reported to the representatives of the Allied powers, and the countries were under occupation law established by the Allies.³² In both countries these local augmentees were designated Civilian Support Units and had their own uniforms and unit designations.

Under the Army-Air Force Agreement of September 1947, the Air Force had inherited AAF prisoners in Army stockades and became responsible for the continued imprisonment and rehabilitation of those personnel and all other Air Force personnel sentenced to confinement by a court-martial. Operating prisons had been a provost marshal responsibility for centuries, and the US Army had followed that tradition. Indeed the 70th Article of War made it a crime for a provost marshal to refuse to accept and keep a prisoner properly committed to him. Although official Army policy was to rehabilitate and return to duty as many prisoners as possible many air provost were unable to achieve this goal. Despite the air provost marshal's pride as far back as 1945 in operating “a system for the rehabilitation of garrison prisoners” that “returned to full duty status a substantial number of delinquent soldiers,” many local confinement facilities were not operated with rehabilitation in mind.³³

Stockades and guardhouses at the post and air base level were generally run on the theory that confinement needed to be tough. Lieutenant Robert T. Sweeny managed the guardhouse at Fairmont Army Air Field, Nebraska, a B-29 bomber base. Fairmont was a base “with strict security and hard duty for those on the flight line—the Guard

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House had to be ‘worse,’” Lt Sweeny recalled years later.³⁴ “Tough” often translated to degrading work details and maltreatment. At one Air Force base, a winter diversion was to routinely strip prisoners to the waist and drive them around base in a jeep. During an inspection tour, another officer found a prisoner labeled a flight risk handcuffed and shackled to his bed by order of the base commander.³⁵

These methods did not sit well with Air Provost Marshal Dillon, who firmly believed that mere punishment without an honest attempt at rehabilitation was unjustified and a waste of Air Force resources for several reasons. First, the Air Force’s investment in an airman was lost if he was separated before the expiration of his term of service. Second, the Air Force’s prisoners were for the most part not hardened criminals and were salvageable with some effort. Finally, although rehabilitation was the policy, Dillon was well aware that the system as it currently existed returned to duty a negligible number of prisoners.³⁶ But Dillon also had an almost paternal reason for favoring rehabilitation, believing that “the military had an obligation to young servicemen, to return them to their communities no worse than we got them.”³⁷ In Dillon’s view, a centralized corrections system that focused less on punishment and more on the rehabilitation and return to duty of suitable prisoners was more valuable to the Air Force.

Dillon first proposed the establishment of four regional correction centers to the air adjutant general in February 1948. This proposal, however, drew the opposition of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Lt Gen Idwal Edwards, who believed that “the restoration and retraining of prisoners is not a desirable source of Air Force Personnel.”³⁸ Dillon did succeed in placing the plan on the agenda for the Air Force Board, but when that body was dissolved the proposal died. The door was reopened, however, when Secretary of the Air Force Symington answered a Congressional inquiry on armed services corrections by expressing support for rehabilitation and, in concept, the sort of centralized rehabilitation program proposed by the Army.

Centralized correction and rehabilitation soon became the Air Force’s goal when a 1949 study by the Air Force director of personnel planning concluded that the Air Force needed a centralized corrections system. The director of training, in turn, requested that APMD survey the base level corrections program and propose a plan for the establishment of a retraining center for prisoners. Not surprisingly, the guardhouse survey found them to be generally worthless due to lack of trained corrections personnel and rehabilitation specialists.³⁹

The corrections and retraining plan Dillon submitted in January 1950 was based on a plan successfully implemented at Hamilton Army Airfield, California, in 1944 by Lt Col Clifford V. Oje. Oje, a former Los Angeles schoolteacher with a PhD in education, developed a four-phase program. The first phase involved hard labor under armed guard, the second featured hard labor under unarmed guard, while the third phase was a mixture of light duties and intensive retraining classes. Those who progressed satisfactorily had their sentences remitted in phase four and were offered training in a new military specialty. A rehabilitation board comprised of officers from the provost marshal, judge

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advocate, and chaplain's offices, along with a psychiatrist, determined when a prisoner progressed from phase to phase.⁴⁰

The same month Dillon submitted his plan, at a conference held at Air Training Command (ATC) Headquarters at Scott AFB, Illinois and received approval on a plan for a "Centralized Rehabilitation Program for Certain Categories of Prisoners" to be managed by ATC. Dillon's survey, along with his four-phase plan and the Scott conference report, were forwarded to the Air Force Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, Maj Gen William F. McKee. No action was taken, however, since the Air Force had determined to wait for the Department of Defense (DoD) to issue joint service guidance on the subject. By this time, 135 officers and 3,000 air policemen were supervising approximately 5,400 prisoners at 163 stockades at a cost of \$25 million.⁴¹

In addition to DoD guidance on confinement, Dillon and his Army and Navy counterparts also awaited the most comprehensive revamping of the American military justice system since the Continental Congress adopted the British Articles of War. The impetus behind the change was two-fold. First, the millions of draftees during World War II who came in contact with or observed the military justice system then in place were troubled by its focus on discipline at the expense of individual rights. Many draftees were lawyers and when they returned home after the war they began to question in their professional circles whether such a system was compatible with the Constitutional rights of American soldiers. Second, a unified Department of Defense needed a uniform justice system. Since the founding of the country the Army, and then the Air Force, had followed the Articles of War while the Navy's justice system was codified in the Articles for the Government of the Navy. The result was that procedures and punishments varied from service to service.

In the summer of 1948, Secretary of Defense Forrestal appointed a committee chaired by Harvard law professor Edmund Morgan to draft a uniform code of military justice applicable to all the services. The result of the committee's work was a code that sought to combine the existing commander-dominated, disciplinary focused system with the civilian criminal justice system and its focus on due process. The proposed uniform Code set more civilian-like rules for the gathering of evidence, the conduct of courts-martial, and the role of judge advocates. The Morgan committee's uniform code of military justice was introduced in the House of Representatives in the spring of 1949 and was the subject of three weeks of intense hearings. The Senate spent about three days in hearings on the proposed code a few weeks later. Few major changes were made by either body and on May 5, 1950, President Truman signed the *Uniform Code of Military Justice* (UCMJ) into law with an effective date of May 31, 1951.⁴²

One intention of the UCMJ was to make "the actual service of sentence uniform throughout the Armed Forces" and on July 20, 1950, DoD issued its uniform corrections policy.⁴³ With its publication, rehabilitation rather than punishment became the goal of confinement for all services. "It is the policy of the Department of Defense," stated paragraph X of DoD's "Uniform Policies and Procedures Affecting Military Prisoners",

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“that discipline be administered on a corrective rather than a punitive basis.”⁴⁴ The policy specifically required that prisoners sentenced to be discharged be eligible to return to duty under conditions established by each service. The policy did not, however, mandate a centralized as opposed to local program of rehabilitation, and since it was not to become effective until May 31, 1951, the Air Force made little further progress toward implementing a corrections program.

While important, the issuance of the UCMJ and the DoD corrections policy were not to have the immediate impact upon the APMD and the Air Police that another event of that summer would have. On June 25, 1950, a war broke out in Asia.

¹ Interview of Lawrence A. Carpenter, 28 September 1981 as quoted in Dr. Roger G. Miller, *Crime, Correction, and Quality Force: A History of the 3320th Correction and Rehabilitation Squadron 1951-1985* (Randolph AFB, TX: Air Training Command History and Research Office, 1987), Chapter II, note 1.

² Memorandum for Assistant Chief of Air Staff-1, Subject: Diary of the Air Provost Marshal Division, 3 – 6 July 1947, 1 (AFHRA).

³ Memorandum for Assistant Chief of Air Staff-1, Subject: Diary of the Air Provost Marshal Division, 3 – 6 July 1947, 1 (AFHRA).

⁴ Memorandum for Assistant Chief of Air Staff-1, Subject: Diary of the Air Provost Marshal Division, 3 – 6 July 1947, 3 (AFHRA).

⁵ Memorandum for Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Subject: Diary of the Air Provost Marshal Division, 3 September 1947 (AFHRA).

⁶ Richard I. Wolf, *The United States Air Force: Basic Documents on Roles and Missions* (Washington D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1987), 135-137.

⁷ Richard I. Wolf, *The United States Air Force: Basic Documents on Roles and Missions* (Washington D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1987), 135-137.

⁸ History of 363rd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (Langley), 1 Oct – 30 Nov 1948, Chapter VII, 113. A close relative of one of the authors, then an Air Force officer, persisted in referring to him as a member of the “Air Corps” until well into the 1980’s!

⁹ Historical Report of 28th Air Police Squadron, April 1952.

¹⁰ Lecture, “Organization of the Headquarters US Air Force” by Brig Gen Rueben C. Hood, Jr. to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 15 December 1947 (Industrial College of the Armed Forces Publication Number L49-59).

¹¹ History of 363rd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (Langley), 1 Oct – 30 Nov 1948, Chapter I, 1.

¹² Air Command and Staff School Paper, November 1949.

¹³ History of the Inspector General, United States Air Force, Washington, D.C. 1 July 1949 to 30 June 1950, Vol. I, 3 (AFHRA). On April 1, 1950 the three IG regions were consolidated into one and the regional APMs and their staffs were inactivated.

¹⁴ History of the Inspector General, United States Air Force, Washington, D.C. 1 July 1949 to 30 June 1950, Vol. I, Chapter II, 4. These conferences, now known as the Worldwide Security Forces Conference, are still held each year.

¹⁵ History of the Strategic Air Command (<http://www.strategic-air-command.com/history/organization-01.htm>).

¹⁶ These squadrons were later designated as services, communications, civil engineering, transportation, supply, and air police squadrons respectively. This remains the basic Air Force organization today.

¹⁷ Undated Mabardy interview cited in Jerry M. Bullock, *Air Force Security Police* (Turner Publishing: Paducah, KY, 1996), 18.

¹⁸ History of 363rd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (Langley) 1 Oct – 30 Nov 1948, Chapter I, 2.

¹⁹ History of 363rd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (Langley) 1 Oct – 30 Nov 1948, Chapter VIII, 115.

²⁰ History of 363rd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (Langley) 1 Oct – 30 Nov 1948, Chapter VIII, 115.

²¹ Jerry M. Bullock, *Air Force Security Police* (Turner Publishing: Paducah, KY, 1996), 19.

²² “An Act to provide for the administration of military justice within the United States Air Force, and for other purposes,” June 25, 1948 (62 Stat. 1014).

²³ The preface was issued by Presidential Executive Order 10020 and became a part of the Air Force MCM. The Air Force version of the MCM covered Air Force personnel and, until midnight 26 July 1949, to

“Army personnel under the command and authority of the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force...” (*Manual for Courts-Martial U. S. Air Forces 1949*, vii).

²⁴ *Manual for Courts-Martial U. S. Air Forces 1949*, 16.

²⁵ Army olive drab was not officially phased out until 1952.

²⁶ As late as March 1952 the 3902nd APS adorned the cover of its monthly history report with the crossed pistols flanked by the letters “AP” (Monthly History, 3902nd Air Police Squadron, Offutt AFB, Nebraska, March 1952).

²⁷ Morris J. MacGregor, Jr., *Integration of the Armed Forces 1940-1965* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army, 1985) Chapter 16 (<http://www.army.mil/cmhp/books/integration/IAF-fm.htm>).

²⁸ Maj Leamon C. Bratton, “History of Blacks in the Military Police Corps” *Military Police* (Spring 1995), 38.

²⁹ Maj Leamon C. Bratton, “History of Blacks in the Military Police Corps” *Military Police* (Spring 1995), 38.

³⁰ James E. Westheider, *Fighting on Two Fronts: African Americans and the Vietnam War* (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 38.

³¹ Capt Marie Shadden, *The Peacekeepers: Security Police History 1947 – 1982* (Lackland AFB, TX: USAF Security Police Academy, 1983), 6.

³² The occupation of western Germany ended in 1955 with the recognition of the Federal Republic of Germany. Because of its location deep within Communist East Germany, Berlin remained under occupation until 1990 when East and West Germany reunited. The occupation of Japan officially ended in 1952.

³³ “Study on Organization of the Air Forces 7 November 1945,” Tab B-5, 2.

³⁴ Interview with Lt Col Robert T. Sweeny, USAF (Ret.), 21 January 1982 as quoted in Dr. Roger G. Miller, *Crime, Correction, and Quality Force: A History of the 3320th Correction and Rehabilitation Squadron 1951-1985* (Randolph AFB, TX: Air Training Command History and Research Office, 1987), 13.

³⁵ Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Sweeny, USAF (Ret.), 21 January 1982 as quoted in Dr. Roger G. Miller, *Crime, Correction, and Quality Force: A History of the 3320th Correction and Rehabilitation Squadron 1951-1985* (Randolph AFB, TX: Air Training Command History and Research Office, 1987), 16 and note 11.

³⁶ Of approximately 1,000 airmen considered between April 1949 and December 1950, only 14 were returned to duty (History of the Office of Inspector General, United States Air Force, Washington, D.C., 1 July 1951 – 31 December 1951, Vol. II).

³⁷ Obituary, “Joseph Vincent dePaul Dillon, No 6776, Class of 1920,” *Assembly* (Fall 1972), 112 as quoted in Dr. Roger G. Miller, *Crime, Correction, and Quality Force: A History of the 3320th Correction and Rehabilitation Squadron 1951-1985* (Randolph AFB, TX: Air Training Command History and Research Office, 1987), 15.

³⁸ History of the Office of Inspector General, United States Air Force, Washington, D.C., 1 January 1951 – 30 June 1951, Vol. II, Part II, p.5.

³⁹ Dr. Roger G. Miller, *Crime, Correction, and Quality Force: A History of the 3320th Correction and Rehabilitation Squadron 1951-1985* (Randolph AFB, TX: Air Training Command History and Research Office, 1987), 19.

⁴⁰ Dr. Roger G. Miller, *Crime, Correction, and Quality Force: A History of the 3320th Correction and Rehabilitation Squadron 1951-1985* (Randolph AFB, TX: Air Training Command History and Research Office, 1987), 27-28.

⁴¹ Interview with Lt Col Robert T. Sweeny, USAF (Ret.), 21 January 1982 as quoted in Dr. Roger G. Miller, *Crime, Correction, and Quality Force: A History of the 3320th Correction and Rehabilitation Squadron 1951-1985* (Randolph AFB, TX: Air Training Command History and Research Office, 1987), 19 and note 21.

⁴² Pub. Law 506; 64 Stat. 108.

⁴³ History of the Office of the Inspector General, United States Air Force, Washington, D.C., 1 July 1950 to 31 December 1950, Vol. II, Chapter II, 8.

⁴⁴ Air Force Bulletin No. 10, “Uniform Policies and Procedures Affecting Military Prisoners,” 20 July 1950. The Air Force republished DoD’s policy in AF Bulletin No. 26, 25 July 1950.

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CHAPTER TWO

KOREA: 1950-1953

On January 12, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson gave a speech to the National Press Club. In the speech, which given the audience was widely reported by the media; Acheson delineated the United State's defensive perimeter in the Pacific. Those nations within that perimeter "must and will be held," Acheson explained, but as for the security of those nations outside of that perimeter the United States could not "guarantee these areas against military attack."¹ Should those nations be attacked, Acheson advised that "the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations..."² Acheson's litany of countries within that defensive perimeter omitted both Taiwan and South Korea.



Secretary of State Dean Acheson greets Winston Churchill in 1953 (National Archives)

In 1905 after the Russo-Japanese War the Korean peninsula was occupied by Japan and by 1910 was formally made part of the Japanese Empire. With Japan's surrender on August 14, 1945, the victorious Allies decided to divide the peninsula between a Soviet occupation zone in the north and an American zone in the south at the 38th north line of latitude, or 38th Parallel, allegedly for no better reason than a National Geographic Society map showed that the 38th Parallel divided the peninsula roughly in half. As with Eastern Europe, the Soviets established a Communist client state in the

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north confronted by an American supported semi-democratic government in the south. In 1948, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the north and the Republic of Korea in the south became independent nations born into confrontation with each other. In compliance with a United Nations Security Council resolution, all but 200 US troops left South Korea on June 29, 1949.

North Korean Communist dictator Kim Il Sung, perhaps emboldened by the apparent lack of commitment by the United States to defend democratic South Korea, from what he read in Acheson's speech, or perhaps apprehensive of the virulent anti-Communism of South Korean President Syngman Rhee, sought to make good on his September 1948 claim to all of the Korean Peninsula. With the support of his Soviet and Chinese Communist allies who badly underestimated US resolve, Kim launched 90,000 Russian-supplied North Korean troops organized into seven assault infantry divisions across the 38th Parallel against four partially deployed, and very surprised, divisions of the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA). Supported by over 150 Soviet-supplied T34/85 tanks and SU76 self-propelled 76mm guns and backed by 1,700 122mm howitzers, the North Korean forces rapidly gained ground. Over 200 Russian-supplied YAK ground-attack aircraft supported the attack and pounded South Korean airfields destroying the tiny ROK Air Force on the ground.

By June 27, the South Korean capital of Seoul had been abandoned and one-third of the ROKA had been destroyed. In the face of the Communist juggernaut, American citizens were evacuated from South Korea through the port of Inchon west of Seoul and aboard transport aircraft flying from Suwon Air Base, 15 miles south of the capital. Aircraft from the US Air Force's Far East Air Force (FEAF) provided cover for the transports and on June 27, four F-82 Twin Mustangs of FEAF's 5th Air Force shot down three North Korean fighters, scoring the first aerial victories of the Korean War.



F-82 Twin Mustang (Air Force photo)



GEN Douglas MacArthur and State Department John Foster Dulles pictured at Haneda Air Base, Tokyo, on June 21, 1950 (Army photo)

That same day the United Nations Security Council, demanded that North Korea cease its aggression having been rebuffed and taking advantage of a Soviet absence from the council passed a resolution requesting that member nations come to the aid of South Korea. President Truman put the United States in the forefront of this effort by immediately authorizing GEN Douglas MacArthur, commander of the Far East Command (FECOM), to commit United States air and naval forces to the defense of the Republic of Korea. Aircraft that had proven themselves against Japan and Germany—the F-51, the B-26, and the B-29—were rushed to the fight from Maj Gen Earle E. Partridge’s Japan based Fifth Air Force along

with limited numbers of the jet-propelled F-80 “Shooting Star” fighters. The Navy dispatched the aircraft carriers of the Pacific Fleet to within striking distance of the peninsula.

On June 30, Truman committed American ground troops to the battle and Army occupation troops from Japan were rushed to Korea to augment the outnumbered South Korean forces already fighting for their lives. On July 7, MacArthur was named commander of United Nations Command.

With its surrogate invading South Korea and with the Americans supporting the other side, tensions between the United States and Soviet Union ran high in Europe. At the American air base at Tulln, Austria, the Soviets drove a tank up to the main gate soon after the North Koreans attacked. The tank eventually withdrew, but the Soviets blocked the road between the base and Vienna. Practically all of the base’s 200 men were issued weapons and assigned to guard the perimeter and an off-base radio site to augment the small Air Police contingent. The base remained on alert for a week but, with the exception of an Air Police augmentee alone on a remote post who boldly challenged and then let pass a Soviet jeep full of machine gun toting soldiers, confrontation was avoided.³

The general demobilization after World War II left the United States militarily unprepared to prosecute both a major ground war in Asia and meet its commitments in Europe. On the eve of the North Korean attack, the total strength of the entire United States military was 1.3 million men and a build-up quickly began using the draft and by activating Reserve and National Guard units. Between July 1950 and June 1953, the Air

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Force alone mobilized 146,683 reservists and another 46,413 Air National Guardsmen to meet its requirements. With mobilization, the Air Force's strength increased from 411,277 men on June 30, 1950, to 973,474 by mid-1952.

Like the Air Force in general, the Air Police also suffered from manning shortages in the post-World War II era. At the start of the Korean War, the Air Police were authorized approximately 9,400 officers and men, but they expanded along with the Air Force, attaining a strength of approximately 23,000 by the end of 1950—an increase of 150 percent in six months.⁴ An immediate increase in manpower was obtained by the simple expedient of assigning 4,650 basic trainees from the Air Force Indoctrination Center at Lackland AFB, Texas, to Strategic Air Command (SAC) and Military Air Transport Service (MATS) Air Police squadrons.

Shortages in base Air Police squadrons remained chronic into the fall of 1950, however. For example, the Air Police squadron at Pope AFB, North Carolina, was authorized one officer and 28 Airmen. In September 1950, they had on duty only 10 Airmen and the base Air Staff Judge Advocate was acting as provost marshal and Air Police commander.⁵ The only problem the 25th APS at Hill AFB, Utah had to report in July 1950 “was the shortage of Airmen and the low experience of those assigned.”⁶ Shortages alternated with overages, for some bases were receiving large numbers of new personnel. The 33rd APS at Otis AFB, Massachusetts received 150 trained Airmen between October and December 1950 and had to have two additional barracks assigned to the squadron to house them.⁷

Bases overseas also suffered from personnel shortages. The 6160th APS at Itazuke AB, Japan, reported that “at the beginning of the Korean War, approximately two hundred (200) more Civilian Japanese Guards [later called Special Guards] were employed by the Base...”⁸ The Japanese guards were trained in “hand and arm signals, riot formations, close and extended order drill, operation, maintenance and safe handling of the Pistol Caliber 45 and the Carbine Caliber 30M2.”⁹ This reliance on Japanese guards was in part due to the fact that, as the unit reported, “At all time during this period approximately fifty percent (50%) of the assigned personnel were not qualified in their specialty.”¹⁰ Of note is that Japanese women were employed as civilian guards.

This massive influx of personnel had to be trained and that requirement brought about a critically needed examination of the Air Police training program. The Air Force did not have its own school for training Air Police since under the terms of the Army/Air Force Agreement of 1947, the Army's Provost Marshal General's School trained both Military Police and Air Police. But the Army training was considered “inadequate to meet Air Force training and personnel requirements” because the quota for the Air Force was too small to meet its needs and the program did not provide training in the security field.¹¹ The Army was not totally deaf to this criticism and did construct a mock air base in late 1951 to make its security training more relevant to the Air Police's security mission.

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Due to the shortage of training facilities, however, many air policemen and officers arrived at their duty stations with no formal training and units were forced to establish their own training programs. The Continental Air Command (ConAC) Air Provost Marshal noted in November 1950 that, “Several thousand airmen already have gone to air force [sic] bases in the United States without receiving previous air police training. This presented a tremendous training problem to the receiving commands and necessity for training these men, before reporting to duty, was recognized by all concerned.”¹²

Strategic Air Command, faced with training its share of the over 4,000 basic Airmen assigned to it, established a standardized base-level training program. On August 3, 1950, SAC Headquarters issued SAC Letter 320, “Personnel Augmentation of Air Police Squadron,” which established training programs at five bases.¹³ Other squadrons receiving large numbers of unqualified personnel also started intensive training programs on their own. In August 1950, for example, the 27th Air Police Squadron at SAC’s Bergstrom AFB, Texas, established a school for training 161 basic Airmen and expected to take in more.¹⁴

Of the bases listed in SAC Letter 320, the 22nd Air Police Squadron at March AFB, California, had the largest contingent to be trained—288 Airmen right out of basic training at Lackland AFB, Texas. Fourteen officers and four Airmen were placed on

special duty with the newly created 22nd Air Police Provisional Training Squadron commanded by Capt Wayne M. Frarie “to conduct a comprehensive, thorough, efficient and adequate training program which would enable these basic Airmen with a minimum of Air Force experience to qualify in all phases as Air Policemen.”¹⁵



A trainee learns traffic control at March AFB, California, as part of the SAC Letter 320 program (Air Force Historical Agency)

SAC Letter 320 mandated an eight-week program in two phases. Phase One, lasting a minimum of three weeks, covered basic Air Police indoctrination, the use of the M-3A1 carbine, the .45 caliber submachine gun, and the 12-gauge riot shot gun, judo, internal security, and general areas such as traffic control, major and petty crimes and

traffic accident investigations. Phase Two of the training consisted of five weeks of on-the-job training. A revision to the SAC AP training program also made it necessary to “put into effect a compact course in Infantry Field training.”¹⁶ Fortunately for the 22nd its director of military training, 1st Lt Steve Lemak, was a former infantry officer who prepared “field problems that could be applied to Air Police work or associated with Air Police work.”¹⁷

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SAC trainees undergo mock air assault (air Force Historical Agency)

Some of the Airmen to be trained at March were less than enthusiastic. Many of the trainees, the squadron officers noted, “were dissatisfied with the thought of becoming an Air Policeman,” but “with the exception of a very few, interest and enthusiasm increase[d] as the program went on.” The trainees marched to class and meals and the “Gig System” of awarding demerits for deficiencies was used: too many demerits; no weekend pass.

The permanent party personnel of March AFB were not used to having large formations of Airmen marching on base. TSgt John Renfroe, a former World War II Army combat engineer, marched the trainees to the mess hall through the Green Acres housing area at 0500 every morning and the counting of cadence and the tramp of marching feet awoke the residents. Complaints were made and Renfroe suggested that maybe he should quit counting cadence when marching through Green Acres. The base commander’s reply was succinct; if Renfroe didn’t count cadence then he could join the trainees and “we’ll have you march a little.”¹⁸




John Renfroe (CMSgt John Renfroe)

Two hundred sixty-six of March’s trainees were recommended for specialty code SSN 677 (Air Force Policeman, semi-skilled) and received their graduation certificates on October 12, 1950 in an impressive ceremony that included a dress parade, graduation program, and graduation dance.



Graduation exercises, March AFB (Air Force Historical Agency)



March AFB AP training diploma (Air Force Historical Research Agency)

SAC's Letter 320 training program was a one-time effort and after the contingents at the bases designated were trained, it was discontinued. By that time, the Air Training Command had been directed to establish a four-week course to produce 6,000 "semi-skilled" Air Police by December 16, 1950. The course was duly established at Tyndall AFB in the Florida panhandle and "accomplished its mission in a most commendable manner."¹⁹

Not that there weren't criticisms from the field directed at the Tyndall training. The 6205th Air Police Group at Clark AFB in the Philippines received 149 graduates of the Tyndall school for assignment to its two Air Police squadrons in February 1951. After reviewing the curriculum of the school, the consensus in the 6205th was that it placed "too much emphasis...on training films, and too little on practical application."²⁰

An officer from the ConAC Air Provost Marshal Directorate (APMD) visited the Tyndall school for three weeks in October 1950 and observed the training. He reported upon his return that "SOMEONE MAY GET SHOT:"

The graduates are instructed that, should anyone, regardless of rank or uniform, attempt to break away or disregard his challenge or order to halt that the sentry shall enforce his directive even to the point of shooting should that be necessary. Anyone approaching a secured area...must do so with caution...These boys are going to "play for keeps."²¹

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Whether this was meant as praise or criticism is unclear. What was clear was that the APMD was so well satisfied that the school was established for an indefinite period beginning in January 1951 and the original four-week course was extended to six weeks with a training quota of 10 officers, 10 non-commissioned officers, and 50 trainees per course. By June 1951 Tyndall had graduated 1,500 men.

Even though the Air Force now had its own Air Police school, 75 men per week continued to attend the Army's Provost Marshal School at Camp Gordon, Georgia. The 3335th Training Squadron from Scott AFB, Illinois, provided the Air Force contingent at Camp Gordon. A magazine article from the time commented that, "The Army tie-up is quite apropos, for the Air Policeman is half infantryman."²²

The Air Force facilities at the school were not as good as they could have been and as late as the autumn of 1952 the 3335th reported many inadequacies at the Camp Gordon. Air Force trainees were arriving with an incomplete clothing issue and the training cadre itself was in need of Air Force blue uniforms. They tried mail ordering the uniforms, but weren't able to obtain an adequate supply. "Cleaning rods, combination tools and brushes" for the M-1 "Garand" rifle were in short supply and when Army supply channels failed to furnish them, they were sought out at nearby Air Force bases.²³ The physical facilities also left something to be desired. One squadron had no classrooms in their squadron area and another's dining hall had a "coffee urn, dough mixer, toaster, grill and drains...in constant need of repair."²⁴

Back in Korea, American, British, and ROKA troops of Lieutenant General (LTG) Walton Walker's Eighth Army withdrew in the face of the Communist onslaught and by early August 1950 had established a 60-mile perimeter around the port of Pusan, 150 miles southeast of Seoul. Taegu Air Base, inside that perimeter, was the only continuously operational tactical air base in South Korea left to the FEAF and served as the site for both Eighth Army Headquarters and 5th Air Force's advanced headquarters. While its back was to the wall, the fortunes of war soon changed in favor of the United Nations Command. On September 1, 1950, General MacArthur made a daring amphibious landing with the US X Army Corps at Inchon in the North Korean rear and drove toward Seoul. At the same time, the North Koreans made a major effort to destroy the Pusan Perimeter and on September 8, drove to within eight miles of Taegu, but in the face of a determined defense on the ground and relentless air attacks could advance no further. The Eighth Army launched its own offensive from the Pusan position against the decimated and under-supplied North Korean forces on September 16.

On September 17, US Marines recaptured Kimp'o Air Base and on September 26, Seoul was wrested from the North Koreans. With the aggressors on the run, the UN authorized pursuit across the 38th Parallel, which was crossed by the Eighth Army on October 9. The North Korean capital of Pyongyang was entered on October 19 and a week later South Korean forces reached positions on the Yalu River, the border between North Korea and the People's Republic of China. In late November the new F-84 "Thunderjet" and F-86 "Saberjet" fighters were sent to confront the newly introduced North Korean MiG-15 jet fighters, often flown by Soviet pilots.

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Air Force installations sprang up throughout Korea as the victorious UN forces advanced northward. All told the Air Force would establish a total of 55 installations or K-Sites in Korea. From K-1 near Pusan to K-55 at Osan-ni the K-Sites were spread



K-10 airfield (Air Force photo)

throughout both Koreas. K-30 (Sinuiju), K-32 (Oesichon-dong), and K-35 (Hoeryong) were established close to the Yalu. Two bases, Pyongyang (K-23) and Pyongyang East (K-24), were established at the North Korean capital. K-24 was defended by the 6002nd APS formerly stationed at Pusan East (K-9). The 6002nd arrived at K-24 on November 21 and, using automatic weapons borrowed from an Army anti-aircraft artillery unit, “established perimeter defensive positions against possible guerrilla attack.”²⁵ The APs manned three machine gun positions as part of the K-24 defenses.

As the number of installations and Air Force personnel increased, so did the number of Air Police units. On September 1, 1950, there was one Air Police squadron in Korea—the 6131st at Pohang (K-3). By year’s end that number had risen to five with the addition of the 51st APS at Kimp’o (K-14), the 6150th at Pohang replacing the 6131st which had been transferred to Suwon (K-13), the 6149th at Taegu, and the 6002nd at Tongae (no K number).²⁶ One year later that number had risen to twelve.

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The existence of numerous Air Force installations in combat zones brought about a reevaluation of the Air Police's security mission. The APMD recognized that with the war in Korea "internal security had taken on a new meaning within the Air Force..."²⁷ The war had caused a shift from a security program directed primarily toward protecting "classified military information and materiel from espionage efforts" to one emphasizing "the protection from injury or destruction by sabotage, of combat aircraft and materiel vital to the combat mission of the Air Force."²⁸



Air Policeman in Korea (*Klaxon*)

Through a combination of physical security, restricted areas, control of personnel entering the installation, augmentation of the guard force, emphasizing sabotage alert plans, and security indoctrination, the APMD believed "a reasonable degree of security against acts of sabotage and attacks by minor armed groups" could be insured.²⁹ On October 19, 1950, the APMD drafted an Air Force letter on the subject of internal installations security that was sent to all command echelons to acquaint commanders with these concepts.

The first Air Police deaths of the Korean War occurred in November 1950. On November 1, twenty-two-year-old Corporal Joseph R. Morin of Taegu's 6149th Air Police Squadron was returning from a search detail looking for a downed pilot when he and an ROKA soldier left their jeep not far from Heyp Chen to "prepare food and to relieve themselves."³⁰ One of the two stepped on a land mine and both were killed. Five days later, while defending the 5th Air Force advance headquarters at K-23 near Pyongyang, North Korea, Sgt Ira F. Lord, Jr. of the headquarters security detachment was killed in an engagement with enemy guerillas. Lord was awarded a Presidential Accolade posthumously.³¹

On October 28, the face of the war again changed as masses of Communist Chinese troops attacked the South Koreans at Chosan and forced them to retreat. With over 300,000 Chinese troops in Korea, General MacArthur told Washington on November 28, "We face an entirely new war." Despite determined resistance from South Korean and UN troops and massive aerial bombardment, the Chinese/North Korean tide was unstoppable and by January 1, 1951, the enemy crossed the 38th Parallel into South Korea. By January 4, Chinese and North Korean troops had recaptured Seoul and Kimp'o and Suwon Air Bases. It was not until January 15 that the enemy flood was stemmed 50 miles south of Seoul along a line running across the Korean peninsula from

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Pyongtack on the west coast to Samchok on the east. UN and South Korean casualties were high, but the legend surrounding one group of the dead had a particular impact on the Air Police.

Before Chinese forces recaptured Kimp'o AB near Seoul, its aircraft had been evacuated and reportedly a force of Air Police and Airmen remained to defend the base. These defenders were outnumbered and outgunned and were quickly overrun. Word soon spread throughout the Air Force that the Chinese executed the captured Airmen and hung their bodies (skinned, depending on the source) on meat hooks from the rafters of a building or hanger that was then burned. The "Kimp'o Massacre" never occurred, but the story was used as an example of the human cost of being unprepared by those who advocated that the Air Force in general and the Air Police in particular needed to be responsible for, and trained and equipped to provide for, the defense of air bases.³²

Some also date the start of Air Force marksmanship training from the "Kimp'o Massacre." One apocryphal account had SAC commander Gen Curtis LeMay viewing the American dead upon Kimp'o's recapture and finding Airmen shot dead in the act of vainly trying to fit .45 caliber pistol magazines into their .30 caliber M-2 carbines.³³ LeMay supposedly swore that if he had anything to do with it, all Airmen would know how to handle a weapon in defense of their bases.

How to best handle the defense of air bases was more than an academic exercise; it was a key to airpower. One of the early proponents of airpower, Italian Army General Giulio Douhet aptly described the tactics that a weaker airpower can use to defeat or cripple a stronger foe by observing in 1921 that "it is easier and more effective to destroy the enemy's aerial power by destroying his nests and eggs on the ground than to hunt his flying birds in the air."³⁴ In other words, a weaker airpower had a chance of winning the air war by attacking and destroying enemy air forces on the ground rather than by confronting them in the air.

Although recognized as an important mission, air base defense had been a hot potato since Air Force independence. The 1947 Army/Air Force Agreement, as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) paper, "Functions of the Armed Forces" (Key West Agreement), of April 21, 1948 that sought to assign roles and missions to each of the armed services, clearly made the defense of installations the owning service's responsibility. However, the Key West Agreement did not mention air base defense specifically, providing only that it was the owning service's responsibility to "develop, garrison, supply, equip and maintain bases."³⁵ But in the joint forces language that was then developing, the term "garrison" included "all units assigned to a base or area for defense, development, operation and maintenance of facilities."³⁶ An Air Force base was defined as a facility "for which the Air Force has operating responsibility, together with interior lines of communication and minimum surrounding area required for local security. (Normally not greater than an area of 20 square miles)."³⁷

The argument over air base defense was primarily over where the dividing line between internal security and base defense was drawn. Many in the Air Force believed

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that the Air Force's base defense responsibility ended at the perimeter fence; anything outside the fence was the Army's problem. But Army doctrine was based on fire and maneuver and tying themselves to the static defense of fixed installations, particularly those of another service, violated that doctrine.

The Key West Agreement also did not detail the responsibilities of area commanders for defense of bases in their areas and the JCS publication, *Joint Action Armed Forces (JAAF)*, issued September 19, 1951, failed to clear things up. The Army continued to focus on the language making base defense the owning service's responsibility, while many in the Air Force keyed in on the general defense responsibilities of the area commander to argue that since this officer was usually an Army general, and since the Army's general mission was to "seize, occupy and defend land areas," the Army was responsible for base defense outside the base perimeter.³⁸

On April 5, 1950, T/O&E 1-8024T established the standard for manning and equipping an Air Police squadron consistent with the Air Force view that operations outside the fence and duties above and beyond interior guard were not a mission of the Air Police. The functions of the squadron established in 1-8024T included law enforcement, interior security, and the confinement and rehabilitation of prisoners. It was also capable of assisting the base air provost marshal in carrying out his inspection function, but it was not "capable of performing duties outside the vicinity of the wing perimeter."³⁹

The organization established by 1-8024T was a peacetime organization and its shortcomings were brought home to General Dillon in a December 1950 letter from Korea written by Air Police Capt Garland "Gish" Jarvis, another pilot turned policeman. "Lack of adequate and diversified training for personnel and insufficient firepower are, in my opinion, the most serious deficiencies," wrote Jarvis. The basic Air Police manpower authorization of 123 men and 8 officers set out in 1-8024T was inadequate in a war zone, he argued, because a squadron "could have details of Air Police in several locations at one time" and it was often "necessary to use other personnel for security duties..." As an example, Jarvis reported that, "The base at Kimpo was secured by Marines, MPs, Air Police, ROK infantry, Turks of the NATO forces and US Army ground forces." Most troubling to Jarvis, however, was the sending of Air Police into a war without proper equipment and combat training. "[R]adios, sirens, warning lights, automatic weapons, flashlight batteries, luminous wand flashlights or electric lanterns..." were all unobtainable he reported. What was needed, in his opinion, were "more carbines, less pistols, some machine guns to be mounted on jeeps and flare guns..." Jarvis believed the Air Force needed to be able to "provide for effective defense of an air base for an indefinite period" since "ground defense forces are not immediately available and guerrilla attacks are expected at any time." But even if the proper equipment could be obtained, the typical air policeman was not trained for the challenge. "Specialized training can be conducted in the field," the captain conceded, "but it is impractical to train personnel and utilize them at the same time in a forward zone."⁴⁰

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Dillon took Jarvis's comments to heart. On December 15, 1950, T/O&E 1-8026T, Air Police Squadron (Special), "designed for security and base defense" was published.⁴¹ An aggressive program was implemented to procure M-20 armored vehicles, M1919A4 .30 caliber machine guns, M8 grenade launchers and AN/PRC-6 tactical radios for the Korean Air Police squadrons. While the APMD's efforts to rectify organizational and equipment deficiencies were welcome, someone else had already taken the lead in training.

By the time of Jarvis's letter and even before the "Kimp'o Massacre," Col James R. "Jim" Luper, Air Provost Marshal of SAC, had already snagged the hot potato of air base defense in mid-toss and was changing the Air Police mission in SAC. A tall, handsome West Pointer, Luper was a highly decorated AAF bomber pilot and former POW recycled into a provost marshal, but unlike some of the post war retreats in the career field, he was a quick study and an innovative, inspiring leader, not afraid to stick his neck out. He was responsible for the security of America's strategic bomber force and if he had anything to do with it, SAC at least would ensure that its AP's were trained to fight off ground attacks. Luper shared Col H. G. Reynolds's earlier vision of the Air



Col Jim Luper and his B-17 in 1944 (Bernie Baines Collection)

Police as the Air Force's "Marine Corps."⁴² He was also inspired by Britain's Royal Air Force Regiment, an organization created in 1942 for the specific purpose of defending RAF facilities after the British Army proved unable or unwilling to do so.

Luper established an air base ground defense training program for his APs with the full backing of SAC commander Gen Curtis LeMay, a staunch supporter of the Air Police who said he wanted his "Air Policemen to outfight the infantry and out propagandize the Marine Corps."⁴³ The mission of the old Air Base Security Battalions was somewhat revived when in March 1950, Luper began sending SAC air policemen to the Army Ranger School at Camp Carson, Colorado.

Luper ultimately established the SAC Security School at Camp Carson under the 3924th Air Police Squadron (Special) with the 3924th eventually becoming a direct reporting unit to SAC with Luper in operational control.⁴⁴ The school had a threefold mission: indoctrinate supervisory personnel within SAC's security forces in the SAC concept of surface defense operations; train supervisory personnel within SAC's security forces in all phases of defense operations; and perform such other special duties as the commander of Strategic Air Command may direct.⁴⁵

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The training at the school was designed to provide SAC security forces with the capability to detect and prevent subversive attacks, effectively resist organized subversive attacks, and conduct a limited defense of air bases until relieved by other forces.⁴⁶ Luper's training program sought to mold a ground combat force and was keyed to the potential challenges faced in Korea. Sergeant Renfroe, who graduated from the school and was later assigned as first sergeant of the 3924th APS (Special), recalled that "away from the center part of the post they built a simulated Korean village and essentially trained the people almost like infantry."⁴⁷

The school provided weapons training and for the first time actually worked out the details of air base ground defense organization, tactics, and doctrine. The SAC Concept of Surface Defense Operations or SAC Concept P-21 as taught at the school envisioned a defense in depth with Internal Defense Operations and Air Base Defense Operations an Air Force responsibility and External Defense Operations a joint service responsibility.⁴⁸ In a departure from the Air Force's previous position that air base defense ended at the fence, SAC Concept P-21 and SAC Regulation 55-2 contemplated operations outside of the base perimeter to prevent direct fire, to provide early warning, and to defend approaches to "keep the fight away from the base."⁴⁹

Luper saw a larger mission for the school than just training SAC Air Police; he sought to use it to convert the Air Force to his way of thinking on air base defense. "The SAC Security Program should not be regarded as just another program," he wrote. "It is one which is having and must continue to have, far-reaching effects upon the development of the general character of the Air Force, its basic mission, organization, functions, and even its philosophy."⁵⁰

The graduates of Luper's school, who bloused their trousers over their combat boots as a mark of distinction and proudly called themselves "Luper's Troopers," were sent to stateside SAC bases and to the Far East trained in ground combat and full of fight.⁵¹ Sergeant Renfroe saw this pride on display in a bar near Camp Carson when some Army troopers gave some of "Luper's Troopers" grief about their bloused trousers, a trademark, so they thought, of Army paratroopers. One of the Air Force sergeants informed them that he would wear his trousers however he liked. "One of the army troops got up and went over to him and was going to hit him or something," Renfroe observed from his chair.⁵² All told, four or five soldiers went after the sergeant, "And he sent two of them to the hospital that evening...The next day we got a call down at the squadron from the commanding general at Fort Carson wanting to know how it all happened. And who the guy was that beat up his troops. And so we told him and he went out and talked to the general [who] said, well, they deserved it."⁵³

Presaging the future, these "security forces" troops began to see themselves as separate from and a cut above mere air policemen and a rift began to open between the law enforcement and security branches of the Air Police. Until the Air Force decided to train Air Police in air base defense, "Luper's Troopers" were the sole source of infantry trained air policemen capable of more than interior guard and law enforcement duties.

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The first six months of the Korean War also saw the APMD busy continuing to deal with the details of the formalization of the Air Police mission and overseeing the evolution of the career field. One important item was the development of a distinctive Air Police uniform. Independent air policemen had worn variations of the Army MP uniform or AAF coveralls with some local marks of distinction, such as blue or white helmet liners with AP lettering and unit insignia, in executing their duties.⁵⁴ In September 1950 the Air Force chief of staff expressed his desire that “air policemen,



TSgt John Renfroe and another Air Policeman in the Air Force blue uniform. Note bloused trousers, Sam Browne belt, and white hat cover. (CMSgt John Renfroe)

when on duty and in contact with the public, be distinctly and uniformly dressed.”⁵⁵ The new uniform approved by the chief of staff consisted of the Air Force blue tunic with trousers bloused over black boots and black leather accoutrements including a Sam Browne belt and nightstick. A white garrison cap cover and the hated Air Police brassard completed the uniform. Issuing the special items of equipment to the field was expected to be complete by January 1951. In the field Army style battle dress or khakis were the uniform of the day.

A flurry of Air Force regulations and directives directly affecting the Air Police were also issued during this time. One of the most important was Air Force Regulation (AFR) 35-571 of July 21, 1950 that established job descriptions for air provost marshals and Air Police officers.⁵⁶ Other directives included one prohibiting hitchhiking by Air Force personnel;⁵⁷ a regulation setting out procedures for Air Force participation in Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Boards;⁵⁸ a regulation prescribing the functions and duties of APMs in the maintenance of military discipline;⁵⁹ a policy dealing with the proper disposition of Air Force absentees and deserters;⁶⁰ an Air Force Manual (AFM) on wildlife conservation and game law enforcement;⁶¹ and an AFM that allowed the direct appointment of outstanding civilians to the Air Police.⁶²

An earlier Air Force regulation, AFR 125-13, *Conduct of Transient Military Personnel on Public Carriers*, July 25, 1949, now required extensive implementation due to the large number of military personnel riding the railroads of the country. Since ConAC was responsible for the Air Force component of homeland defense, the task of policing the railroads fell to it. ConAC instituted the Train Rider Program in conjunction with the Army to place air and military policemen on the trains carrying almost 70,000 military personnel yearly. By April 6, 1951, the ConAC air provost marshal, Lt Col Benjamin Royal, had been authorized an additional 18 officers and 220 men detailed to do nothing but ride the rails and enforce discipline among the military passengers.⁶³

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“Headquarters stops” were established for the train riders at New York City; Fort Meade, Maryland; Savannah and Atlanta, Georgia; Birmingham, Alabama; San Antonio, Texas; Cheyenne, Wyoming; Los Angeles and San Francisco, California; and Seattle, Washington.⁶⁴

The yearly Air Provost Marshal’s Conference was held on November 29 and 30, 1950 at Tyndall AFB and the subject of base security dominated the agenda. At the end of the conference the APMD concluded that the attendees “returned to their duties with a better knowledge of existing threats to Air Force security, and well briefed on plans, both current and projected, for furnishing the USAF with the needed protection.”⁶⁵

On January 25, 1951, United Nations troops under the new Eighth Army commander, LTG Matthew Ridgway, launched “Operation Thunderbolt” against the Chinese and North Koreans. For the next two weeks UN forces, supported by 5th Air Force fighter bombers, advanced slowly yet steadily against sometimes determined resistance. Kimp’o was recaptured on February 10 and Seoul was reoccupied on March 14. But “being captured and being secure...were,” in the words of one Kimp’o airman, “two different things.”⁶⁶ Infiltrators continued to be a serious threat to personnel and resources throughout the war. Often their targets were random, as when infiltrators would kill men at night on the way to the latrine or slit open tents and cut the throats of sleeping Americans. Sometimes particular targets were selected. “One morning,” recalled Sergeant Hubert A. Rideout, a radioman with Kimp’o’s 45th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, “as I was walking past the base commanders [*sic*] quarters South Korean military police were dragging a man out to their truck, they shot him in the head just before tossing him in the back. Seems he had gained entrance to the commanders [*sic*] quarters and attacked him with a knife.”⁶⁷

On April 11, President Truman, in a highly unpopular move, relieved GEN Douglas MacArthur of command of Far East Command because of the General’s public criticism of Truman’s Korean policies. Ridgway moved up to FECOM and UN Command commander. LTG James Van Fleet succeeded Ridgway as Eighth Army commander. Eleven days later, Chinese and North Korean forces launched a counter-offensive against American and ROKA positions 40 to 50 miles northeast of Seoul. American, British, Canadian and Australian forces plugged the hole the Communist forces had punched in the line and by May 1 the enemy had been drowned in a cauldron of fire and blood with the loss of around 70,000 men. Two weeks later the enemy attacked at Taepo on the east coast and at Chunchon, 45 miles northeast of Seoul, and routed the South Korean forces. But by May 20, Eighth Army had completely stopped the enemy offensive and on May 22 the United Nations Command ordered a counteroffensive all along the line. On June 13, 1951, Van Fleet was ordered to halt offensive operations and on June 23 the North Koreans, through the Soviet Union, proposed a cease-fire. Talks began on July 10 at Kaesong, North Korea, on the 38th Parallel.

The war and its focus on security did not deter Air Provost Marshal Dillon from his project of revamping the Air Force correctional system along more progressive lines.

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In fact, the massive influx of draftees and recalled Reservists and the accompanying increase in disciplinary problems made the establishment of an effective confinement and rehabilitation program even more important.

On December 1, 1950, DoD finally issued instructions implementing the guidance in its July 20, 1950, memorandum, "Uniform Policies and Procedures Affecting Military Prisoners." The instructions, republished in Air Force Bulletin No. 1 on January 2, 1951, stated that "provision should be made for the rehabilitation of military prisoners...to prepare for successful return to duty those prisoners whose sentences do not include punitive discharges and those with sentences including punitive discharges who are considered restorable."⁶⁸ DoD's instructions also favored centralized rehabilitation programs as opposed to those run at base level advising that, "such measures should...be carried out in rehabilitation centers or retraining commands operated by each service..."⁶⁹ Wanting to be ready when the Air Force officially decided on the scope and organization of its corrections program, Dillon continued to staff the corrections division of the APMD with the best, most experienced personnel he could find.

In January 1951, Leighton W. Dudley, a recalled Air Force Reserve major was added to the corrections division as chief of the Confinement Branch. Dudley, a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of the University of North Carolina and a graduate of Harvard Law School, had been working at the Federal Reformatory at Chillicothe, Ohio, when recalled to active duty. Lt Col Robert Sweeny, chief of the Corrections Division, found in Dudley a man who understood "the bureaucratic world, political world and how and why they work."⁷⁰ Sweeny overlooked the fact that Dudley, who often wore a Harvard letterman's sweater beneath his uniform coat, was "not particularly 'military,'" since he was "a real Corrections professional..."⁷¹

In June 1951, Capt Lawrence Carpenter was added to the staff in a temporary duty status as Dudley's assistant. Carpenter, a smallish man with an almost meek personality recalled to active duty as an air traffic controller, had been interviewed by Maj Shumway, chief of the Retraining Branch, in February 1951. Shumway, the former boxer and fighter pilot, was not impressed with the diminutive Carpenter and didn't hire him despite his experience with the Federal Bureau of Prisons. But in April, a report surveying the Shaw AFB, South Carolina, base stockade written by Carpenter as an additional duty made its way to the APMD Corrections Division. Carpenter's report recommended the establishment of a "climate" within military prisons that "closely approximates that to be found in the normal military organization" as an aid to rehabilitation and Sweeny was impressed.⁷² Sweeny convinced Dillon to have Carpenter brought to the Corrections Division where he found him to be "the most productive single person I ever met in the military service."⁷³

Of particular interest to Dillon and Sweeny was the recommendation in Carpenter's report that military prison guards not be armed as a step toward normalizing the prison environment and aiding prisoner rehabilitation. This was not all that revolutionary a concept since, while armed guards might guard 95 percent of all Air Force prisoners wherever they went, in civilian prisons unarmed guards were common.

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Using unarmed guards in Air Force prisons would have two beneficial effects. First, manpower could be saved by not having armed guard's constantly on duty and second, the removal of armed guards would subtly shift emphasis from custody to correction, opening the way for more of a focus on rehabilitation.

In May 1951, Dillon took a calculated risk by instituting an unarmed guard test program at nine bases. Dillon was banking on the fact that most Air Force prisoners were imprisoned for minor offenses and had no desire to escape and, therefore, did not require armed guards.⁷⁴ The success of the test program would hinge on the proper classification of prisoners into maximum, medium, and minimum security based on each prisoner's offense and the level of danger they presented as authorized by the newly published AFR 125-35. When prisoners were classified according to the regulation, less than 10 percent of Air Force prisoners fell into the maximum security classification requiring armed guards. One instance of escape from an unarmed guard could have killed Dillon's plan, but the planned six-month test proved so successful that it was extended Air Force-wide before the end of the test period. The success of the unarmed guard program strengthened the hand of those favoring an "enlightened" corrections system focusing on rehabilitation rather than custody and punishment.⁷⁵

All of Dillon's preparations for establishing a centralized rehabilitation program paid off when on August 1, 1951, he received instructions from the Air Force Council to produce a detailed plan for a rehabilitation center. Captain Carpenter was tasked with preparing Tab A of the plan describing the underlying philosophy of the retraining center. Carpenter's plan melded his own theories on creating the "climate" of a normal military organization to downplay the custodial aspect of confinement in favor of emphasizing rehabilitation with those of Clifford Oje's four step retraining program at Hamilton Army Air Field. "The retraining center is to be in every essential a military organization in the Air Force pattern," Carpenter's plan stated, and "will avoid traditional and correctional methods, repressive regimentation, and the blunt impersonality and degradation common to penal institutions and penal practice."⁷⁶

On September 20, 1951, the Air Force Council approved the plan submitted by Dillon and on October 27, 1951, the 3320th Retraining Group was activated at Amarillo AFB, Texas, with Lt Col Stephen E. Tackney, a former World War II provost marshal, as commander and Capt Lawrence Carpenter in the important position of confinement officer.

Other Air Force confinement facilities did not disappear with the activation of the 3320th. Prisoners not selected for retraining continued to serve their sentences in local confinement facilities. Violent offenders and those with long sentences to confinement served their sentences at one of the Army-run United States Disciplinary Barracks, the most notable of which was at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The USDB were manned by guards from all services and accepted prisoners from all services.

Base level confinement facilities were generally not as enlightened as the 3320th and the officers in charge of them often lacked adequate training. Second Lieutenant (2nd

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Lt) Ervin Stewart arrived at San Marcos AFB, Texas, as a personnel officer in July 1951, but when the pilot who had been serving as prison officer was reassigned, Stewart was transferred to the 3585th Air Police Squadron and assigned as prison officer simply because he had worked for the Alabama State Troopers as a dispatcher after his discharge from the Army at the end of World War II. Stewart had no formal training in either Air Police or corrections and he and the 35 men under his command were responsible for prisoners sentenced to six months or less confinement. One turnkey was stationed inside the facility and armed guards patrolled the outside to prevent escape. There was no formal retraining program for the prisoners and on the one occasion where Stewart supported clemency for a prisoner with carpentry skills who had worked around the facility, the man showed up at the clemency board drunk.⁷⁷

The lack of training of those assigned corrections duty had been noted by the Corrections Division. In 1950, the Army Military Police School at Camp Gordon, Georgia, had established a Disciplinary Guard Course combining the Adjutant General's Corrections and Custodial Method's course and the Military Police School Guardhouse Administration Course. The APMD had obtained training slots at the new course for Air Force officers and Airmen assigned to corrections duty. Even though the availability of the course had been publicized in the *Air Provost Marshal's Digest* the response from the field was disappointing. Out of the over 1,000 Airmen and 65 officers assigned to corrections duties, only 32 Airmen and five officers volunteered to attend the training. "It may become necessary," the Corrections Division concluded, "to make this a formal training requirement for those in supervisory positions at base level confinement facilities."⁷⁸ In May 1952, the APMD also offered training for 50 corrections personnel at the Institute of Correctional Administration at George Washington University.⁷⁹

Some bases really embraced the new rehabilitation concept. The 28th Air Police Squadron at Rapid City AFB, South Dakota, added books to the stockade library and constructed a new visitor's area and a woodworking hobby shop, planted grass and flowers and whitewashed the rocks along the entrance to the facility.⁸⁰ Another squadron praised its rehabilitation program, concluding it was "making better men of these whose mistakes have cost them, and letting them learn from those mistakes to be a credit rather than burden to the United States Air Force."⁸¹ In line with the new focus on rehabilitation, Air Police squadron Stockade, Prison, or Corrections Branches became Rehabilitation Branches.



Representative Carl Vinson (Carl Vinson
Institute of Government, University of Georgia)

The Air Force as a whole also went through a reorganization. Since its independence from the Army, the Air Force's organization had been in a state of evolution and Georgia Representative Carl Vinson, chairman of the powerful House Military Affairs Committee, felt it was time to stop the evolution and codify the new service's organization. Air Force leaders argued that the codification should take place after evolution developed the most efficient organization and dragged their feet in coming up with draft legislation for Vinson. The

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powerful Vinson was not to be put off and his committee produced its own bill entitled the Air Force Organization Act of 1951.

Vinson's bill was potentially important to the future of the Air Police since it established the provost marshal general, along with the air adjutant general and inspector general, as a statutory staff position. By making these positions statutory, the Senate would have confirmation powers over nominees and their functions would become quasi-independent corps within the Air Force entitled to manage their personnel separate from the line of the Air Force and establish qualifications for entry into that corps. The draft legislation also established five major commands: ConAC, SAC, Tactical Air Command (TAC), Air Materiel Command (AMC), and European Support Command. It also essentially eliminated the Air Force's medical, legal, chaplain, and engineering functions by requiring the Army to provide these services to the Air Force. The law also provided that the Air Force chief of staff would "supervise" the Air Force.



Secretary of the Air Force Thomas K. Finletter
(Air Force photo)

While wary of opposing Vinson, the provision making the chief of staff a "supervisor" instead of a "commander" did prompt Chief of Staff Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg and Air Force Secretary Thomas K. Finletter to cooperate with the Congressman. In meetings with the committee, Finletter and Vandenberg won the committee's approval to drop the statutory staff agencies in exchange for the Air Force's creation of an Air Staff comprised of the chief of staff and no more than five deputy chiefs of staff (DCS). The committee also agreed to reduce the number of major commands established by law to three (SAC, TAC, and Air Defense Command), allowing the Secretary of the Air Force the leeway to establish others as needed.

The supervisory language pertaining to the chief of staff, however, remained in the bill as passed by the House of Representatives on January 24, 1951.

When the Senate took up its version of the bill, Finletter renewed his argument that the National Security Act intended that the chief of staff should command, not supervise, Air Force fighting commands. The Senate agreed and passed its version of the bill deleting the supervision language on June 21, 1951. The bill ultimately reported out of conference committee and signed by President Truman on September 19, 1951, provided that the chief of staff commanded SAC, TAC, and ADC and supervised the rest of the Air Force. The reliance on the Army for specialized support was eliminated, but the only special staff position created was that of judge advocate general to be appointed by the President for a four-year term. The statutory position of Air Force provost marshal general would never be created.

While the organization of the Air Force was thrashed out at the highest levels, the question of air base defense continued to be an issue at the APMD, now relocated from

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the Pentagon to offices in Building T-8 on the south side of Washington's Newark Street. Despite recognizing the need for air base defense and applauding Colonel Luper's efforts at creating doctrine and tactics, a staff study conducted by the APMD in June 1951 concluded that after over a year at war "the USAF has no stated policy, nor has adequate tactical training doctrine been developed for the establishment of local ground defense at air bases."⁸² What doctrine did exist was SAC doctrine and in August 1951 that doctrine was reviewed by the Air Staff and found to be in accord with the Air Staff's desires.

As published in October 1951 in SAC Manual 205-2, SAC's doctrine was based on a rejection of the notion that air base ground defense conflicted with the Army's mission. It pointed out that the Army's doctrine was offensive and it assumed the defensive for limited periods only in order to regain the offensive as soon as possible. While Army defensive positions might incidentally provide security for air bases, they could not be depended upon since the Air Force could not expect the Army to sacrifice its offensive fire and maneuver to protect Air Force assets not vital to its own mission. Because of this and other factors SAC concluded that air base ground defense was inevitably an organic mission of the Air Force.

The first base to implement the new SAC security program based on 205-2 was March AFB. The 22nd APS leadership noted that the new plan for security "required a more mobile Security Force capable of providing better security for the base while at the same time increasing the interest of Security Forces personnel in their duties."⁸³ In addition to enhancing base security, the new security plan resulted in security becoming "more than mere guard duty" with the added benefit of "eliminating many requests for reclassification out of the Security and Law Enforcement Career Field."⁸⁴

The APMD air base defense study of 1951 came to some conclusions and made several recommendations to the Air Force Council "for achieving a local ground defense capability within the Air Force."⁸⁵ The study determined that the problem that faced the Air Force was how to create a ground defense capability that could protect its combat effectiveness from damage by small bodies of enemy ground forces, guerillas, civil disturbances, and saboteurs. The study concluded, in addition to the finding that the Air Force had no tactics or doctrine for air base defense, that in wartime "there is a threat to Air Force bases and facilities both from sabotage and attack by...enemy ground forces, partisans, and other irregular forces" and this threat was most effectively met "by a defense capability at the enemy target---the Air Force installation."⁸⁶ In the author's opinion the entire manpower of the air bases, if properly trained, "represents a considerable ground defense potential" in addition to the Air Police, but the Air Police remained the "logical nucleus" for expansion of local ground defense capability.⁸⁷ The study also concluded that an Air Force center for the development of doctrine and tactics and the training of Air Police in security and defense was needed. Finally, the study found that the responsibility for the defense of air bases was inherent in the functions of the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCS/O).

Based on these conclusions the study recommended that commanders be charged with the responsibility for ground defense; that the Air Force develop training and tactical

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doctrine for the local ground defense of air bases; that all personnel in the Air Force receive basic training in ground combat tactics and weapons; that the Air Police and security systems at Air Force bases be the nucleus around which commanders developed their ground defense capability; that overall responsibility for air base ground defense at the Air Force headquarters level be given to the DCS/O; and that the Air Police School at Tyndall be immediately expanded with the additional missions of developing air base ground defense training and tactical doctrine and for conducting unit and individual training of Air Police in ground defense, security, and law enforcement.⁸⁸

On December 4, 1951, the Air Force Council concurred with the study's recommendations cautioning only that basic training not be lengthened for base defense training, indicating that it "favored changing the name of units from Air Police units to a more descriptive title such as 'Air Base Defense Units,' or...having units of both designations," and that the recommended training center be "named 'Air Base Defense Training Center,' or other appropriate name."⁸⁹ AFR 24-1 was also amended to place the responsibility for achieving a local ground defense capability upon installation commanders. Based on the actions of the Air Force Council the APMD noted, "it has now become necessary to expand the functions of the Air Police to establish a local defense capability."⁹⁰

The APMD quickly began to support the needed expansion of capability by adding three M20 armored cars to each overseas base and by ordering new communication equipment and .30 caliber Browning Automatic Rifles (BAR). TO&E 1-8024T, the basic Air Police squadron, was beefed up by including equipment contained in 1-8026T such as the M20 in order to give 1-8024T "greater mobility and firepower."⁹¹

The Korean War and the menace presented by Communism brought additional interest in another of the Air Provost Marshal's functions—censorship. The Air Force censorship program was initially the province of the APMD's Installations Security Division and work began on establishing guidelines and an organization for administering the program soon after the start of the Korean War. By October 1950, a joint service working group had completed a joint censorship regulation that was published for the Air Force as AFR 205-30.⁹² The regulation "established policies and procedures for the censorship of communications of military and attached civilian personnel."⁹³ The APMD was also working on a T/O&E establishing "administrative and operational teams for censorship."⁹⁴ In early 1951 the APMD requested a training quota for the Air Force at the Army's four-week long censorship course.

Later that year, reflecting the growing importance of censorship operations, the APMD created a Censorship and Travel Control Branch. In August 1951, ConAC authorized the formation of the 2277th Training Squadron (Censorship) to administer the 128 Air Force Reserve officers who were assigned to the national censorship program in ten Air Force national censorship teams. Early in 1952 the APMD censorship branch reported that the Army had completed plans for a series of courses in secret ink detection.

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On the ground in Korea neither side gained much territory and a war of attrition along almost static battle lines was beginning. The truce negotiations begun in July proved to be a sham by the enemy to improve their positions and had been cancelled by late August 1951. A UN offensive was launched against the Communists after talks were cancelled that gained little but casualties and added the names of battles such as Heartbreak Ridge and Bloody Ridge to the history of the war. For the most part the war had degenerated into a toe-to-toe slugfest with sharp, deadly actions between dug in opponents facing each other over a World War I style no-man's land. On October 23 truce talks were resumed at Kaesong and the UN suspended offensive operations. By November 27 a ceasefire line was agreed upon and the talks continued at a new site--Panmunjom.

The Communist onslaught in Korea may have been blunted, but they were on the march elsewhere in 1951. Air Police in the Philippines may have seen more combat than their brethren in Korea that year. The enemy in the Philippines was the Communist insurgent group known as the Hukbalahap or Huks. The Huks were so active in Central Luzon that newspapers referred to the area as "Huklandia" and the American air base at Clark Field attracted them like moths to a flame.⁹⁵ In the first three months of 1951, the 6205th Air Police Group (APG) destroyed 14 buildings, three of which contained explosives caches, in operations against "local dissident forces" without any American casualties.⁹⁶ In April and May, 1951 the two squadrons of the 6205th Air Police Group had three "incidents" with the Huks or, as they were referred to, "dissidents."⁹⁷

The first incident involved the capture and robbery of civilian contractors at the water intake dam on the base. Negritos from Saluga, a village on the base, caught five of the Huks and when the Air Police, OSI, and Philippine Constabulary appeared on the scene to take custody of the prisoners, the remaining Huks fired on them. Reinforcements from the Air Police were called in and returned fire with .30 caliber and .50 caliber machine guns, and the Huks retreated to the northwest section of the sprawling base.

Early on the morning of April 28, two suspicious individuals were sighted near the reservoir dam and were fired upon by the Air Police guards. As the non-commissioned officer in charge and another air policeman searched for any dead or wounded they were twice fired upon. A squad of air policemen equipped for combat were rushed to the scene and deployed, and the Huks melted away.

The final incident that spring occurred on May 19 when an automobile traveling along the Mitchell Highway was fired upon from outside of the base perimeter. An AP task force was dispatched and while taking up positions inside the perimeter fence was fired upon. Reinforcements were called for and air cover was requested. The Philippine Constabulary was sent out to make contact with the "dissidents" and drove them toward the Zambales Mountains. No casualties were suffered by the Air Police during any of the incidents.

The new year of 1952 opened with an impasse at Panmunjom over prisoner exchange. The UN wanted North Korean and Chinese prisoners who did not want to be

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repatriated to their home countries to stay in UN custody. The Communists demanded forced reparation of prisoners who did not want to return. As the negotiations continued, bloody, often futile assaults for a few yards of ground or a hilltop continued. The stalemated war and its rising casualties were becoming unpopular at home and the Republican presidential candidate, retired General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, vowed if elected he would “go to Korea.”

In 1952 limited steps were finally taken to implement SAC’s base defense doctrine Air Force-wide. In April a new organization for AP squadrons (T/O&E 1-8033) was issued that provided a nucleus for air base ground defense.⁹⁸ Colonel Luper’s training program also continued and in March 1952, he extended it to SAC Air Police stationed overseas when he ordered half of Royal Air Force Lakenheath’s 3909th Air Police Squadron to the British Army’s training facility in the Rockingham Forest near Brigstock for several weeks of ground combat training.⁹⁹

Other than Luper’s program, however, the Air Force still lacked an air base ground defense training school and air policemen continued to attend Army infantry training courses. Lieutenant Ervin Stewart was picked to attend the Army’s 15-week Associate Infantry Officer’s Course at Fort Benning, Georgia, in January 1952 for no other reason than he was the junior officer assigned to the 3585th APS. He remembered it as two weeks of classroom training in Class A (service dress) uniform followed by an intense 13 weeks of fatigues, combat boots, and “red on blue” combat training. He was one of only three Air Force officers in the course and was “adopted” by some of the “disgruntled Army Korea vets” who were his classmates.¹⁰⁰

The war continued to take its toll of air policemen. On March 2, 1952, Private First Class Dale R. Post was killed by friendly fire during a skirmish with guerillas at Urusan Aerodrome (K-11).¹⁰¹ Best estimates are that between seven and nine air policemen would die of illness, wounds, or accidents in Korea.¹⁰²

Infiltrators and guerillas were not the only threat air policemen faced. On June 11, 1952, Staff Sergeant (SSgt) Daniel R. Norris was on duty at the 6161st Air Police Squadron’s operations office serving as sergeant of the guard of Air Police Operations. Suddenly, a “deranged individual” with a loaded and cocked .45 caliber pistol entered the office.¹⁰³ Norris quietly and cautiously signaled everyone in the office to get out and proceeded to talk with the man. Humoring him, Norris managed to get close enough to jump him and during the ensuing struggle over the weapon, it discharged into the floor. Norris managed to overpower the intruder and disarm him. For his actions in “disregarding the danger to his own life in protecting others,” Norris was awarded the Soldier’s Medal on September 16, 1952, “for heroism not involving actual conflict with the enemy.”¹⁰⁴

The security mission also brought about an expansion of the Air Force’s use of war dogs--K-9 or later military working dog (MWD)--units. Armies had used dogs since the time of the ancient Egyptians. Benjamin Franklin proposed using “large, strong and fierce” dogs against the Indians during the French and Indian War, but the first recorded

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Army Air Force dog handlers at Craig Field, Alabama, in 1943 (Army photo)

use of dogs by the United States Army was during the 2nd Seminole War when 33 bloodhounds and 5 handlers were used to track the Seminole Indians and the runaway slaves they were harboring in the swamps of Florida.¹⁰⁵ The Army made extensive use of war dogs in both world wars; in World War II alone the Army procured 10,000 dogs.

Most of the dogs and handlers used in Korea were trained at the new FEAF Sentry Dog Training Center, opened in April 1952 at Showa Air Station, Japan. Planning for the Showa School actually began in 1949 with FEAF commander Gen George E. Stratemeyer's request for Army K-9 units to deter the pilferage that plagued Asian air bases. General Dillon advised Stratemeyer that the availability of Army trained dogs would be problematic and that his command might be better served by establishing its own training school.¹⁰⁶ On December 5, 1951 FEAF headquarters initiated "Project Kennel" and authorized the construction of kennels and other dog training facilities at Showa near Tachikawa AB.

Construction of the facilities began on March 10, 1952. A staff consisting of one officer, four or five enlisted trainers, a veterinarian, a kennel master, and six Japanese trainers was assembled at the school. In April eighty-five dogs furnished by the Nippon

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Far East Air Forces Dog Center, Showa AB, Japan (Claude Anderson)

Police Dog Association of Tokyo and the Japan Kennel Club were examined in a Tokyo park. Fifty of the best German shepherds were selected and purchased from their owners for \$75.00 each. The dogs were transported to Showa and slept staked out in the open close to where their kennels were being built. The staff bunked in tents near the dogs.

Before being matched with a handler, each dog was pre-trained. Pre-training lasted for three 48-hour weeks and was performed primarily by the Japanese civilian handlers on the staff. The first week of pre-training concentrated on basic obedience on the leash and simple commands such as heel, sit, come, down, and stay were taught. Week two covered advanced obedience concentrating on the same commands, but now both on and off of a 25-foot leash. Advanced obedience also introduced group training and exposure to explosions to habituate the dogs to the noise. The final week covered advanced training, including jumping, crawling, negotiating an obstacle course, riding in and exiting vehicles, attacks on command, and guarding.

The handlers, all volunteers from Air Police units, were then assigned temporarily to the Showa School where they were matched to a pre-trained dog. Handler and dog trained together for an additional three weeks on basic obedience, advanced obedience, and night operations. The handlers also were trained on the feeding, grooming, and care of their individual dog. Each day prior to beginning scheduled training the trainee handlers cleaned the kennels and runways and groomed their dogs. After successfully completing the course, dog and handler were graduated and returned to their home units as a team.

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Due to the dog's training, sentry dog and handler were so much of a team that they were literally inseparable. The center's manual stressed that, "Sentry dogs are trained to be obedient, suspicious of strangers, and unfriendly to everyone but their handlers. Their aggressiveness has been developed to a point where they will attack on command. To best maintain the dog's 'sharpness,' unfriendly nature, and alerting qualities, they must be constantly trained, cared for, and handled by only one person."¹⁰⁷

By November 1952, Showa had trained 200 dogs that were sent to AP squadrons in Korea and throughout FEAF. On December 16, 1952, "Project Kennel" officially became the FEAF Sentry Dog Training School with the mission of procuring dogs and training handlers for the FEAF. The school also trained Army and Marine dog handlers as well as Japanese Civilian Service Unit (CSU) personnel and Japanese police.

Air Police squadrons in Korea eventually included sentry dog sections of six to eight dogs attached for air base security. The Air Force sentry dogs were used primarily for patrolling the base perimeter and guarding fuel storage sites, bomb dumps, and supply areas. Sentry dog handlers were lightly armed with a .45 caliber pistol and a carbine, but often had no flashlights, flare guns or radios for communications with the command post—a potentially dangerous oversight. The dogs and their handlers were a warm-blooded early warning system and some felt exposed and alone. "The enemy was shadowy, lived in the dark, infiltrated, sabotaged and ambushed," one handler recalled. "I, alone with my dog in the dark, was supposed to stop that."¹⁰⁸

The sentry dog teams in Korea were generally successful at their primary mission. Col Clifford V. Oje, Air Provost Marshal of Far East Air Forces, reported that the use of K-9 teams in FEAF's area of operation, including Korea, had "proved most beneficial," and that "all written and verbal reports from the field indicated exceptionally good results. In every instance where Sentry Dogs have been used, thievery and pilferage have stopped."¹⁰⁹

Despite the rapid expansion of the Air Police, shortages of personnel remained and recruiting efforts were ongoing throughout the war. In late 1951, the 3335th Technical Training Squadron at Camp Gordon, Georgia, supplied the basic training base at Sampson AFB, New York, with a display aimed at giving new recruits "a better idea of the work in the Air Police field. It is believed that this project will create an interest...in this particular career field..."¹¹⁰

Some personnel shortages arose because Air Police were detailed to other duties on the base. The commander of the 5001st APS at Ladd AFB, Alaska, complained that each week he lost 14 men to kitchen police (K.P.), ration breakdown, and sergeant at arms details on Ladd and lost additional personnel to resupply details for Air Force installations at Nome, Galena, and other "outposts."¹¹¹ "Placing these men on details and TDY," the commander lamented, "constitutes a never ending problem of providing a sufficient number of men to man posts..."¹¹²

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However, the quick build up of the career field meant to fix the shortages in personnel yielded some recruits who were not up to the job. Maj Jack A. Weyant, commander of the 93rd APS at Castle AFB, California, complained heartily about his squadron's shortage of enlisted personnel, but he also highlighted a bigger problem: that of quality versus quantity. "It has been the experience of this squadron," Weyant wrote in January 1952, "that the caliber of personnel assigned to air police duties is of low intelligence quotient which is no fault of the individuals themselves..."¹¹³ In Weyant's opinion not just anyone was fit to be an air policeman. "There is a need," Weyant reported, "for the following type personnel for which replacements are difficult to obtain: A high caliber individual with good normal background, adequately mature and of normal intelligence."¹¹⁴ These sorts of men were needed because the duties of the Air Police had become more complex. "Security is not just the use of a guard to walk a post," Weyant observed:

it has now a wide scope of responsibility. Today, for adequate protection and detection, a man must be capable of meeting emergency situations which call for leadership [*sic*] and initiative. A man of limited capabilities can be trained continuously and still not sufficiently fill the requirements necessary in times of emergency or even normal requirements.¹¹⁵

Weyant was not alone in his criticisms of the Airmen build-up that was caused by the addition of the Air Police to his unit. The commander of the 28th APS at Rapid City AFB, South Dakota, noted that of 30 replacements he received in April 1952, "the majority of these Airmen are immature and do not have the aptitude for Air Policemen..."¹¹⁶ But even as these SAC units struggled with personnel shortages, Jim Luper was determined to keep standards in his Air Police force high and required the reassignment from the Air Police of any man with a special or general court-martial conviction.¹¹⁷

The shortage of qualified Air Police and the growing emphasis on security had an impact on morale. SAC Regulation 205-13, for example, placed additional emphasis on security and because of this the security function at one base was "increased ten per-cent in personnel taken from Air Police flights."¹¹⁸ Because these transfers came at the expense of the air police flights, the inevitable consequence was "that airmen performing air police duties are having to put out maximum effort."¹¹⁹ Those men reassigned to security were not always pleased with the change since security duty was often cold (or hot), lonely, and often mind-numbingly boring. Morale suffered accordingly. "While everything possible is done to make the working conditions in the Security Flight as pleasant as possible," one unit candidly reported, "a morale problem will always exist because of the undesirable duties that must be performed by the Security Guards."¹²⁰ Regardless of whether morale was affected by long hours or bad duty, one commander laid the problem at the feet of his own supervisors, observing that morale "...can be improved if the officers and non-commissioned officers will put forth more effort to instill in his men the importance of the Air Policeman's job."¹²¹

An air policeman, a designation being more and more applied to law enforcement personnel exclusively, did have an important job. The air policeman was responsible for

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assisting commanders in enforcing good order and discipline, deterring crime, and controlling traffic and entry to the installation. Armed with “notebook, pencil, riot club, pistol or carbine,” the air policeman had a “hard job” since the “security of any base depends on the Air Police and without their interest in the affairs and well being of the base, it would be impossible to correct the discrepancies of all personnel concerned with the base.”¹²²

Given the diverse population of an Air Force base, serious crime was surprisingly low. Absences without leave, drunk and disorderly, thefts, prostitution, and traffic violations constituted the vast majority of Air Force criminal activity. Traffic control, given the increasing numbers of privately owned vehicles allowed on base, was a major concern and air policemen were authorized by joint services regulation to issue AF Traffic Tickets (AF Form 64) to violators. While seemingly a minor mission given higher profile activities of the Air Police, traffic control garnered a lot of attention at the base level. So much so that one of the major items reported by the 375th Troop Carrier Wing at Donaldson AFB, South Carolina, was that the, “Air Provost Marshal’s office continued to wage its war against violation of traffic regulations.”¹²³

In Germany the war on traffic violators was waged by a unique unit of US forces patrolling the Autobahn. Begun in 1948 by various MP squadrons in the American zone, the Army highway patrols enforced traffic laws against both German and American drivers. By 1951 the highway patrol mission was consolidated in the 62nd Military Police Company; a unit organized along the lines of the New Jersey State Highway Patrol by one of the New Jersey highway patrol’s former commanders, BG J. Norman Schwarzkopf, deputy provost marshal of the United States Army in Europe (USAEUR).

The 62nd was disbanded in 1958, but during its time in existence, Air Force AP’s served with it as evidenced by the survival of one of the 62nd’s distinctive highway patrol brassards incorporating a United States Air Forces in Europe patch and by recollections of Army MP’s who served in the 62nd.¹²⁴ Some AP units in Germany had their own highway patrols. For example, Erding Air Depot’s 85th APS created a separate Highway Patrol section in the autumn of 1950 and also formed a mounted horse patrol in its Industrial Security section that same year.¹²⁵



62nd Military Police Company, United States Air Forces in Europe, brassard (Security Forces Museum)

Drunk and disorderly Airmen off base often came into contact with Air Police town patrol flights. In larger cities with servicemen from multiple services stationed nearby or passing

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through, air policemen might serve in joint service Armed Forces Police Detachments. A more common arrangement was the teaming of base Air Police with local law enforcement authorities both in the Zone of the Interior (the United States) and overseas. The 27th APS had six Airmen assigned to its town patrol who worked in conjunction with the Austin, Texas, city police. The normal procedure was to combine two air policemen with two Austin car patrolmen while the remaining four paired off and patrolled “establishments and sites where servicemen congregate.”¹²⁶ During May 1952, 13 Airmen were reported by the 27th’s town patrol for being drunk and disorderly and one for a uniform violation. Jurisdiction over crimes committed by Airmen off-base depended on the community involved and, overseas, on the agreement with the host country. The military authorities at Donaldson AFB, South Carolina, and the local government of Greenville experimented with a policy of allowing the city police to treat military members apprehended for minor offenses in the same manner as civilians. After six months of this experiment, the base commander and the mayor and city council agreed to revert to the former practice of turning minor military offenders over to the Air Police for punishment by unit commanders. In Japan, a major change came about in 1953 when the Administrative Agreement between the United States and Japan was changed to allow trial of military offenders in Japanese courts.



Air Police town patrol checks identification on a Japanese street during the early 1950s (Air Force Historical Research Agency)



Two Air Policemen check map positions (Security Forces Museum)

Thefts, a major focus of the Air Police on base, broke down into two types: thefts of personal property and thefts of government property. While air police flights investigated both, the focus of their attention was understandably the recovery of stolen Air Force property and the apprehension of the thieves. Practically every monthly report from this era lists the dollar amount of government property missing versus the dollar amount of government property recovered. Often, particularly overseas, civilian local nationals were responsible for the majority of both types of thefts. It was not unknown, however, for Air Force personnel to be involved and occasionally, the thieves were the law enforcers themselves. In April 1952, FECOM's 6400th Air Police Squadron confiscated \$2,000 in stolen property and apprehended 28 Airmen who were part of the theft ring. In somewhat of an embarrassment for the 6400th it was discovered that, "The ring of thieves involved airmen from...Supply, Air Police, and Food Service."¹²⁷

The suppression of prostitution was also an Air Police responsibility with the goal of reducing the incidence of venereal disease among the troops. In Korea, prostitution was a problem near Air Forces bases and the 6149th APS investigations section at Taegu AB was serious about its control. The flight established close liaison with Korean civilian and military police and accompanied them on raids of brothels. A series of raids in October 1950 netted seven US servicemen. The raids were not for the purpose of closing these establishments; that was left to local authorities. The sole function of the Air Police in these operations was "to look after the welfare of US military personnel found patronizing the raided establishments..."¹²⁸

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Of course, suppressing prostitution was easier said than done and the ladies of the evening were never completely put out of business and the adverse effects of patronizing their places of business continued to blossom. In April 1951 the 27th APS, deployed from Bergstrom in October 1950 to Taegu, noted that the majority of the deficiencies dealt with by the air base group Airmen's Council were for venereal disease. The delinquents were lectured on the adverse effects of venereal disease and it was confidently proclaimed that, "it is felt these discussions are aiding in combating the high disease rate within the squadron."¹²⁹ Just in case the lectures failed to deter those seeking such services, the 27th APS raided two Korean houses of prostitution the following month.

Another criminal activity that would plague the Air Force and all services in the future also appeared during the Korean War. In its report for June 1952, the 6400th APS at Tachikawa AB, Japan, site of a Rest and Relaxation (R & R) Center for troops from Korea, noted that its investigations section was called upon to conduct preliminary investigations into what appeared to be the homicides of two Airmen. Investigation revealed, however, that the deaths were not homicides but "overdoes (sic) of narcotics."¹³⁰ The author of the report continued on an ominous note:

It is well at this point to comment on the widespread use of narcotics among the younger airmen in this area. The situation has reached almost critical proportions. Precautionary measures being taken to curtail this practice include placing establishments selling 'dope' Off Limits, thorough examination of personnel who seem to be sick, drunk or otherwise incapacitated and more rigid supervision of airmen off duty.¹³¹

By November, a "large increase in narcotics cases" was reported, but some progress in controlling drug abuse among the Airmen at Tachikawa was also seen:

This section [investigations] has made much progress in stamping out drug addicts, and eliminating the sources of narcotics. Particular attention has been given to this operation because of the arrest of such a large number of users.¹³²

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Air Police color guard, 6400th APS, 1952 (Air Force Historical Agency)

“Dope” was not the only threat the air policemen of Tachikawa Air Base confronted in 1952. Japanese Communists, backed by the Soviet Union, were taking to the streets, especially in May and particularly in Tokyo. Because of Communist “uprisings, disturbances and riots in the Tokyo area” on May 1, the 6400th was placed on alert and issued weapons and ammunition.¹³³

Two Airmen of the 6400th were in a particularly precarious situation. Assigned as guards in Tokyo, they would be tempting targets for the Communists. The decision was made to retrieve them from the city and a rescue team of 20 armed men and an M20 armored car led by Capt John A. Taylor and Brig Gen John P. Doyle set out for Tokyo. The base “waited tensly [*sic*]” during the night until word was received that the Airmen had been evacuated to Haneda Air Base and safety.

That night, Air Police combat teams with augmentees from the maintenance and supply groups moved into the field. Organized into three strike teams, “these combat ready units manned their positions and awaited the Communists next move.”¹³⁴ By dawn the threat had abated and the base went off of alert and “the tired troops returned to their quarters and welcome rest.”¹³⁵

On May 29, the Communists again took to the streets. Tachikawa was once again placed on alert and reports were received that 400 Communists were marching on the nearby Tama Bomb Dump. Weapons were again issued and riot control preparations

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were made. Captain Taylor led a reconnaissance force to Tama to confirm the reports of a Communist advance on the bomb dump. The 400 Communists “had vanished” by the time Taylor and his force arrived at Tama and it was later discovered that the report had been erroneous.¹³⁶ Because the 6400th APS was short on personnel, twelve Airmen from the 7th Motor Vehicle Supply Squadron were used to augment the guard at Tama.

During this latest period of unrest, the 6400th was forced to reduce its base defense capability by sending an officer and 50 men to aid in the protection of Far East Air Forces Headquarters. On May 31, after the “restless fury of the Communist Party in Japan...” had “marred the spring weather and feeling of calm,” the men were released and the 6400th APS returned to normal operations.¹³⁷

Throughout the summer of 1952 the Korean truce talks droned on and on at Panmunjom. Violent, localized clashes marked the fighting along the lines and the 5th Air Force launched major bombing raids against North Korean targets including on August 29 the largest raid of the war, launching 1,400 aircraft against targets at Pyongyang.

Because of the war the major focus of the Air Force security program continued to be ground defense and in 1952 some major changes happened in the Air Force’s training program. Even though Capt Paul M. Benedict’s 3626th Training Squadron (Air Police) expanded training by one week to allow a week of field training for combat tactics, between January and March 1952 enrollment dropped from 344 students to 136. The reason for the decrease was that the Tyndall school was being phased out in favor of a new school at Parks AFB, California.



Air Base Defense School Insignia (Col Jerry M. Bullock)

The creation of the Air Base Defense School at Parks under Air Training Command was a direct response to the Air Force Council directive of December 1951 to open such a school, but Parks had been previously considered as a site for an Air Police school. Early in 1951, the APMD began plans to consolidate the Tyndall and

Camp Gordon schools at “Parlos [Parks] (Shoemaker) AFB to enable the Air Force to train its entire requirement of Air Police, independent of the Army.”¹³⁸ The planned school would provide training for basic air policemen, non-commissioned officers, Air Police officers, and air provost marshals and evolve air base ground defense doctrine and tactics for the Air Police.



Smoke grenades deployed during training at the Parks AFB ABD School (Col Jerry M. Bullock)

However, by late 1951 it appeared that the idea would have to be abandoned “due to non-availability of adequate range and maneuver space” at Parks.¹³⁹ But by 1952 Parks’ lack of space

was to be overcome by the simple, but not too efficient, expedient of moving heavy weapons and combat tactics training to the wide-open spaces of Beale AFB, California, 135 miles northeast. The facility at Beale was not optimum: In addition to being a long distance from the main school at Parks, the scrub land at Beale caught fire frequently and, since the flight path for San Francisco International Airport crossed over the training area, a flight plan had to be filed before mortars could be fired.¹⁴⁰ Nevertheless, on June 24, 1952 ATC announced that the Air Base Defense School would open at Parks effective August 1, 1952, but was later slipped to December 1.



Mortar range with mock tanks at ABD School (Col Jerry M. Bullock)

Col Morton D. Magoffin was named commander of Parks’ 3625th Technical Training Group (Air Base Defense) with the mission of conducting “formal training for selected personnel in the doctrine, tactics, and techniques necessary for the local defense of Air Force’ installations.¹⁴¹ Magoffin’s faculty came from the 3626th Training Squadron (Air Police) at Tyndall, the 3335th Training Squadron at Camp Gordon (also scheduled to be closed), and the SAC Security School, as well as Army instructors on loan to the school under the Special Category Army With Air Force (SCARWAF) program. Detachment 1 of the 3625th consisted of 20 officers and 60 Airmen at Beale who conducted training for classes of approximately 345 Airmen every four weeks.

The school’s curriculum envisioned four different courses of instruction: A twelve-week Air Police (Basic) course; a nine-week senior non-commissioned officer’s course; a twelve-week course for Air Police officers; and a nine-week course for air provost marshals.¹⁴² After his appointment as commander, Colonel Magoffin and his key officers and instructors were temporarily assigned to the 3924th APS (Special) at the SAC Security School to learn from the pros.

Until Parks opened, the SAC Security School at Camp Carson, under the command of Lt Col Jack Murphy and his deputy, Maj Benjamin C. Marshall, would remain the premiere training school for air base ground defense. Not only did the school

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provide hands on training for SAC security forces, it was also a forum for spreading the gospel of air base defense to senior officers. Throughout September and October 1952, the school hosted a series of Senior Officers Security Conferences as part of the SAC Security Training Program. The purposes of these conferences were to “sell’ the need for security to the Air Force planners” and to indoctrinate “senior and key officer personnel of the command in order to provide them a working knowledge and an appreciation of the SAC Security Program.”¹⁴³ During the five, three-day conferences held in September and October, six major generals, 15 brigadier generals and 100 colonels attended. General LeMay himself attended one of the conferences.



Lt Col Jack Murphy (left) escorts the Air Force Inspector General, Bryant L. Boatner (center), on a 1953 tour of the SAC Security School. (Air Force Historical Research Agency)

From October 20 – 24, 1952, SAC Inspector General Brig Gen John F. McBlain and Col Jim Luper hosted a world-wide SAC security forces commander and APM conference at March AFB, California. The highlight of the conference was observing a mock attack against the base by aggressor forces.

In October, SAC Headquarters issued instructions on the subject of ground defense training

making it a base commander responsibility to organize and train troops for the defense mission.¹⁴⁴ These instructions, along with the recently issued AFR 355-4, *Local Ground Defense of Air Force Installations*, made it clear that all of the base personnel constituted the pool from which ground defense troops should be drawn. AFR 355-4 established three categories of base personnel for air base defense: Category I – those indispensable to the base’s assigned mission; Category II – those directly contributory to the assigned mission; and Category III – all other elements. Ground defense augmentees were generally to be drawn from Categories II and III and since every commander of course believed his men were indispensable, lobbying for Cat I status was intense and ultimately caused the program to collapse as more and more Cat I exemptions were granted. All bases in SAC nevertheless established some sort of air base defense augmentee training programs.

In the war zone, truce talks broke down on October 8 and GEN Mark Clark, who replaced Ridgway as FECOM commander in the spring, launched “Operation Showdown.” The next three months were marked by savage fighting with the Chinese at places like White Horse Hill, The Hook, and T-Bone Hill, all adding to the lengthening casualty lists on both sides.

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For the Air Police, one of the most significant events of 1953 was a September inspection tour, the findings of which would initiate a change of course for the Air Police. But since large organizations, like great ships, do not respond to changes in course quickly, the new direction would not become apparent for some time.

Maj Benjamin C. Marshall accompanied a SAC IG inspection team on a tour of six Korean air bases. One of his primary goals was to assess the feasibility of “sending a security flight of 200 men to an area of guerilla activity where a good deal of practical experience could be gained in combating such tactics.”¹⁴⁵ While base defense officers, generally on the operations staff, and base provost marshals were “very anxious to assist in and receive benefit from additional Security Troops to be furnished by SAC,” they admitted that the likelihood of actual base defense operations was remote given the current static situation the war was in.¹⁴⁶ The idea was abandoned, but the concept of augmenting base ground defense forces with specially trained combat forces was not forgotten; it would reappear on another Asian battleground.

It was Marshall’s other finding that would later call into question the Air Force’s entire base ground defense doctrine. During his tour, Marshall discovered that “thievery by Korean Nationals---intent upon feeding their starving families...” was the “main inherent security threat” at American air bases in Korea and this threat was handled primarily by the Korean National Police.¹⁴⁷ In fact, Marshall reported to Colonel Luper, that according to Lt Col Curtis Hussa, Air Provost Marshal, Fifth Air Force (Rear) at Taegu, “no actual case of sabotage has been reported in Fifth Air Force” and that no American air bases had been attacked by guerillas, although they did attack trains and convoys particularly between Pusan and Taegu.¹⁴⁸

In summary, two things were apparent from Marshall’s report. First, that in Korea “the great majority of [base security] was handled by police rather than security guards” and, second, that “The nature of the guerilla activity concerned looting and theft rather than hostile attack.”¹⁴⁹ The question of whether the preparedness of the base security forces to repel attacks may have deterred guerilla assaults was not asked.

The military stalemate on the ground that began in 1952 continued into 1953. The Air Force had obtained air supremacy over Korea and continued to inflict a heavy toll on enemy MiGs while also mounting an effective interdiction and strategic bombing campaign along the battle line and into North Korea. In December 1952, President-elect Dwight Eisenhower made good on his campaign promise to “go to Korea” and left determined to conclude hostilities. By March 1953, North Korea expressed willingness to exchange wounded and prisoners and to discuss a cease fire, but some of the war’s most savage fighting occurred around Old Baldy, T-Bone and Pork Chop Hills in March and April as the North Koreans attempted to improve their positions before any cease fire. On April 20 an exchange of prisoners was begun and on April 26 talks resumed at Panmunjom.

As the transfer of key personnel from the SAC Security School to Parks accelerated in November and December 1952 it was clear that its days were numbered.

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On February 26, 1953 Col Jim Luper addressed the graduates of SAC Security School Class 53A. Flying back to Offutt, Luper's B-25 bomber encountered severe weather and icing. On its final approach to Offutt with Luper at the controls, the aircraft became uncontrollable and crashed short of the runway, killing Luper and his Army advisor.¹⁵⁰ His school did not long survive him. On March 9, 236 Airmen started training in Class 53B. On March 20, Lt Col Murphy returned from SAC Headquarters with word that the school would be closed. Training ended on April 25 and the SAC Security School was deactivated on July 1, 1953. Approximately 1,300 men had been trained during the period of the school's operation.

Classes began at Parks in January 1953 with the Air Police Course (Basic) with the other courses being initiated between then and March 9 when the Air Provost Marshal's Course accepted its first students. By May the peak load of 35 classes and 1,416 students was reached.



M-1 rifle training at Parks AFB, 1955 (Col Jerry M. Bullock)

Although heavy fighting continued in Korea throughout the summer and the Panmunjom talks progressed fitfully, two events elsewhere in the world provided the North Koreans and Chinese with impetus to accept a cease fire. On March 5, 1953, Soviet strongman Joseph Stalin died and on May 23, 1953, the first atomic artillery shell was successfully fired by the United States at Frenchman's Flat, Nevada. These events may have been the final nudge needed for the Communist forces to agree to a cease fire, but South Korean President Syngman Rhee balked. On June 25 the Communists launched a 100,000-man attack against the ROKA and were stopped only by tremendous artillery barrages. On July 10, after receiving assurances that Rhee would sign a cease fire, talks resumed and at 1000 hours on July 27, after approximately 18 million transcribed words over the course of 575 meetings, an armistice was signed with a cease fire to begin at 2200 hours. Sometime between the signing and the actual start of the cease fire, Capt Ralph S. Parr, Jr., patrolling near the Yalu River in his F-86, shot down an Il-12 transport, making him a double ace and marking the Air Force's last kill of the war.

The Korean War ended where it started, making the 38th Parallel the most defended border in the world. After over 142,000 American casualties and approximately 1,500,000 Chinese and North Korean casualties, the Korean War became a war in remission that technically continues to this day.

¹ Excerpts of Acheson's speech (<http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1319331/posts>).

² Excerpts of Acheson's speech (<http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1319331/posts>).

³ Alvie E. Myers and Donald E. Austin, "Full Alert – All Troops Ordered to Defend Tulln Air Base," <http://home.earthlink.net/~highjack3/tullnalert.htm> (January 2004).

⁴ History of the Inspector General United States Air Force Washington D.C. 1 July 1950 to 31 December 1950, Vol. II, Chapter I, 1-2.

⁵ Historical Data, Continental Air Command Air Provost Marshal, September 1950, 7.

⁶ Historical Report, 25th Air Police Squadron, Hill AFB, Utah 1 July 1950-31 December 1950.

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- ⁷ 33rd Air Police Historical Report, Otis AFB, Massachusetts, July – September 1950.
- ⁸ 6160th Air Police Squadron, History of the Korean Operation, 25 June 1950 – 1 November 1950, 3.
- ⁹ 6160th Air Police Squadron, History of the Korean Operation, 25 June 1950 – 1 November 1950, 3.
- ¹⁰ 6160th Air Police Squadron History, January 1951, 2.
- ¹¹ 6160th Air Police Squadron History, January 1951, 2.
- ¹² Historical Data, Continental Air Command Air Provost Marshal, November 1950, 3.
- ¹³ The five bases listed in SAC Letter 320 and the units affected were: 22nd APS, March AFB, California; 92nd APS, Spokane, Washington; 9th APS Fairfield-Suisan AFB, Washington; 93rd APS, Castle AFB, California; and 43rd APS, Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona.
- ¹⁴ Historical Report, 27th Air Police Squadron, 27th Fighter Escort Wing, 27th Air Base Group (SAC), Bergstrom AFB, Texas, August 1950.
- ¹⁵ “Air Police Training Program March A.F.B., Calif.”(Tab A) ; 22nd Bombardment Wing Regulation 50-19, 3 August 1950.
- ¹⁶ “Air Police Training Program March A.F.B., Calif.”(Tab A).
- ¹⁷ “Air Police Training Program March A.F.B., Calif.”(Tab A).
- ¹⁸ Interview of CMSgt John Renfroe, USAF (Ret), by Colonel Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), December 14, 2004.
- ¹⁹ Interview of CMSgt John Renfroe, USAF (Ret), by Colonel Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), December 14, 2004.
- ²⁰ Historical Report for Period 1 January Through 28 February 1951, 6205th Air Police Group, Clark AFB, PI.
- ²¹ Historical Data Continental Air Command Air Provost Marshal, October 1950, 4.
- ²² Copy of article from unidentified magazine “More Than Just A Cop,” (no date).
- ²³ Historical Data, 3335th Tng Sq, 3250 TTG, 3310 TTWg, Scott AFB, 1 Sep 51 – 30 Sep 51, Squadron Activity Report (Tab A).
- ²⁴ Historical Data, 3335th Tng Sq, 3250 TTG, 3310 TTWg, Scott AFB, 1 Sep 51 – 30 Sep 51, Squadron Activity Report (Tab A).
- ²⁵ 6002nd Air Police Squadron, 6002nd Airbase Group, 6002nd Tactical Support Wing, Historical Data for November 1950, Chapter III, 1.
- ²⁶ Judy G. Endicott, ed. *The USAF in Korea: Campaigns, Units and Stations 1950-1953* (Air Force History and Museums Program, 2001).
- ²⁷ History of the Inspector General United States Air Force Washington, D.C. 1 July 1950 to 31 December 1950, Vol. II, Chapter III, 12.
- ²⁸ History of the Inspector General United States Air Force Washington, D.C. 1 July 1950 to 31 December 1950, Vol. II, Chapter III, 12.
- ²⁹ History of the Inspector General United States Air Force Washington, D.C. 1 July 1950 to 31 December 1950, Vol. II, Chapter III, 12.
- ³⁰ Historical Data Report, 6149th Air Police Squadron, November 1950.
- ³¹ Vietnam Security Police Association, http://www.vspa.com/t_korea-lord-ira-1950.htm (February 22, 2005).
- ³² While air police newly assigned to Kimp’o were shown the “site” of this atrocity until the 1960s, the “Kimp’o Massacre” is a legend of uncertain origins (See Jerry M. Bullock, Air Force Security Police, (Turner Publishing: Paducah, KY, 1996), 23 reporting a conversation between the author and the late Lt Col Stephen McNabb, then 5th Air Force Provost Marshal, denying any massacre at Kimp’o). In 1977 Col Ronald J. Marzano, 3289th TTG/CC, asked PACAF Security Police headquarters to look into the story. After pursuing likely sources of information, Lt Col Gary G. Allison reported that he could find no evidence that the “massacre” ever occurred (Letter Lt Col Allison to Col Marzano, 19 October 1977, SF Museum. The legend, however, will not die (See Random Nuclear Strikes, <http://www.softgreenglow.com/mt/archives/001560.html>, August 12, 2003, and Daniel Witter, “Weapons Training at Beale,” Marysville-Yuba City, California Appeal-Democrat, April 10, 2004).
- ³³ TSgt Arnold Vitabrio, USAF (Ret.), “Outline History of the United States Air Force Marksmanship School,” <http://www.airforceshooting.org/avarticle.html> (February 22, 2005).
- ³⁴ Giulio Douhet, *The Command of the Air* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 53-54.
- ³⁵ Functions of the Armed Forces and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Section II, Paragraph A(6).
- ³⁶ Air Force Pamphlet 5-1-1, *Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage*, June 1950.

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- ³⁷ Air Force Pamphlet 5-1-1, *Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage*, June 1950.
- ³⁸ Functions of the Armed Forces and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Section IV, Paragraph A(1)(b).
- ³⁹ History of the Inspector General United States Air Force Washington D.C. 1 July 1949 to 31 December 1950, Vol. II, 8.
- ⁴⁰ Letter from Jarvis to Dillon as cited in Capt Marie Shadden, *The Peacekeepers: Security Police History 1947 – 1982* (Lackland AFB, TX: USAF Security Police Academy, 1983), 25-26.
- ⁴¹ History of the Inspector General United States Air Force Washington D.C. 1 January 1951 to 30 June 1951, Vol. I, Chapter II, 8.
- ⁴² Interview with Lt Col Mayville (USAF, Ret.), August 6, 1981, as cited in Capt Marie Shadden, *The Peacekeepers: Security Police History 1947 – 1982* (Lackland AFB, TX: USAF Security Police Academy, 1983), 6.
- ⁴³ Quoted in Col Jerry M. Bullock, “Jim Luper – Security Force Pioneer,” *Security Police Digest*, Issue 2, 1980, 15. LeMay was for many years a fixture at the yearly Peacekeeper Challenge. A crack shot, he competed in the marksmanship competition and the award for the best marksman is still called the LeMay Cup.
- ⁴⁴ SAC General Order Number 21 (25 Apr 51).
- ⁴⁵ SAC Regulation 24-9, 27 August 1952, paragraph 2.
- ⁴⁶ SAC Regulation 24-9, 27 August 1952, paragraph 2.
- ⁴⁷ Interview of CMSgt John Renfroe, USAF (Ret), by Colonel Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), December 14, 2004.
- ⁴⁸ SAC Senior Officers Security Conference “Blue Book,” October 1952.
- ⁴⁹ SAC Concept P-21 chart in SAC Senior Officers Security Conference “Blue Book,” October 1952.
- ⁵⁰ Forward to SAC Senior Officers Security Conference “Blue Book,” October 1952.
- ⁵¹ Interview of CMSgt John Renfroe, USAF (Ret), by Colonel Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), December 14, 2004. Until well into the 1980’s only Security Police were authorized to blouse their trousers. This distinction went away when Army-style battle dress units (BDUs) were introduced and then only because the BDU trousers had to be bloused.
- ⁵² Interview of Lt Col Stuart B. Higginbotham, USAF (Ret), and CMSgt John Renfroe, USAF (Ret), by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), 1 March 2005.
- ⁵³ Interview of Lt Col Stuart B. Higginbotham, USAF (Ret), and CMSgt John Renfroe, USAF (Ret), by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), 1 March 2005.
- ⁵⁴ For example, the commander of the 42nd Air Division prescribed white helmet liners with the 42nd insignia accented by lightning bolts for his APs.
- ⁵⁵ Historical Data Continental Air Command Air Provost Marshal, September 1950, 3.
- ⁵⁶ AFR 35-571, *Authorized Officer Military Occupational Specialties*, 21 July 1950.
- ⁵⁷ AFR 125-27, *Soliciting Rides*, 14 September 1950.
- ⁵⁸ AFR 14-15, *Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Boards*, 12 September 1950. Disciplinary control boards were, and are still, mechanisms for placing certain civilian establishments “off limits” to troops stationed nearby.
- ⁵⁹ AFR 125-3, *Military Discipline*, 9 October 1950.
- ⁶⁰ AFR 35-73, *Absence Without Leave and Desertion*, 6 September 1950.
- ⁶¹ AFR 93-14, *Game Law Enforcement and Wildlife Conservation on Air Force Installations*, 11 December 1950.
- ⁶² AFM 36-5, Appointment of Officers in the Air Force Reserve or the Air Force of the United States, December 1950.
- ⁶³ History of the Inspector General United States Air Force Washington, D.C. 1 January 1951 to 30 June 1951, Vol. II, Part I.
- ⁶⁴ “Train Rider Program,” *Air Provost Marshal Digest*, November 1952.
- ⁶⁵ History of the Inspector General United States Air Force Washington, D.C. 1 July 1950 to 31 December 1950, Vol. II, Chapter I, 5.
- ⁶⁶ Herbert A. Rideout, “45th Tac Recon Sqdn 67th Tac Recon Wing Recollections” (<http://www.angelfire.com/ca4/korea/>).
- ⁶⁷ Herbert A. Rideout, “45th Tac Recon Sqdn 67th Tac Recon Wing Recollections” (<http://www.angelfire.com/ca4/korea/>).

⁶⁸ Air Force Bulletin No. 10, “Uniform Policies and Procedures Affecting Military Prisoners,” 20 July 1950, 6. A punitive discharge is a discharge imposed as part of a court-martial sentence.

⁶⁹ Air Force Bulletin No. 10, “Uniform Policies and Procedures Affecting Military Prisoners,” 20 July 1950, 7.

⁷⁰ Interview of Lt Col Robert T. Sweeny, USAF (Ret), 21 January 1982 as quoted in Dr. Roger G. Miller, *Crime, Correction, and Quality Force: A History of the 3320th Correction and Rehabilitation Squadron 1951-1985* (Randolph AFB, TX: Air Training Command History and Research Office, 1987), 21.

⁷¹ Interview of Lt Col Robert T. Sweeny, USAF (Ret), 21 January 1982 as quoted in Dr. Roger G. Miller, *Crime, Correction, and Quality Force: A History of the 3320th Correction and Rehabilitation Squadron 1951-1985* (Randolph AFB, TX: Air Training Command History and Research Office, 1987), 22.

⁷² Report to Lt Col Robert H. Farrell, Inspector General, 20th Fighter Bomber Wing, Shaw AFB, SC, Subj: Post Prison, 28 Feb 51 as quoted in Miller, *Crime, Correction, and Quality Force*, 22.

⁷³ Interview of Lt Col Robert T. Sweeny, USAF (Ret), 21 January 1982, 21 January 1982, as quoted in Dr. Roger G. Miller, *Crime, Correction, and Quality Force: A History of the 3320th Correction and Rehabilitation Squadron 1951-1985* (Randolph AFB, TX: Air Training Command History and Research Office, 1987), 23.

⁷⁴ While Dillon’s assumption was generally true, escapes did occur. For example, on March 12, 1950, the 27th Air Police Squadron at Bergstrom AFB, Texas, reported the escape of Prisoner Walter F. Bodanski from the base stockade. Bodanski remained at large for one hour and after his capture was admitted to the hospital (27th Air Police Squadron, Weekly Report, 9 March 1950 – 15 March 1950). Many unit histories during this period report escapes by prisoners.

⁷⁵ On March 11, 1952, Air Force Letter 125-8, “Treatment of Prisoners,” codified a policy of using armed guards only when necessary to ensure the safety of persons and property and prevent flight.

⁷⁶ Manuscript, Subj: Plan for the Establishment of the Air Force Retraining Center, August 51, Tab A, 1 as quoted in as quoted in Dr. Roger G. Miller, *Crime, Correction, and Quality Force: A History of the 3320th Correction and Rehabilitation Squadron 1951-1985* (Randolph AFB, TX: Air Training Command History and Research Office, 1987), 26-27 (emphasis in original).

⁷⁷ Interview of Colonel Ervin Stewart, USAF (Ret) by Colonel Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), 24 January 2005.

⁷⁸ History of the Office of the Inspector General United States Air Force, Washington, D.C., 1 July 1950 to 31 December 1950, Vol. II, Chapter II, 11.

⁷⁹ History of the Office of the Inspector General United States Air Force, Washington, D.C., 1 January 1952 – 30 June 1952, Vol. II, 3.

⁸⁰ Historical Report of 28th Air Police Squadron, 1 March 1952 – 31 March 1952.

⁸¹ 6160th Air Police Squadron History, January 1952.

⁸² History of the Office of Inspector General, United States Air Force, Washington, D.C., 1 July 1951- 31 December 1951, Vol. II, 3.

⁸³ Historical Report of 22d Air Police Squadron, 22d Air Base Group, March Air Force Base, California, February 1952.

⁸⁴ Historical Report of 22d Air Police Squadron, 22d Air Base Group, March Air Force Base, California, February 1952, 2.

⁸⁵ Historical Report of 22d Air Police Squadron, 22d Air Base Group, March Air Force Base, California, February 1952, 2.

⁸⁶ Historical Report of 22d Air Police Squadron, 22d Air Base Group, March Air Force Base, California, February 1952, 3.

⁸⁷ Historical Report of 22d Air Police Squadron, 22d Air Base Group, March Air Force Base, California, February 1952, 3.

⁸⁸ Historical Report of 22d Air Police Squadron, 22d Air Base Group, March Air Force Base, California, February 1952, 4.

⁸⁹ Historical Report of 22d Air Police Squadron, 22d Air Base Group, March Air Force Base, California, February 1952, 6.

⁹⁰ Historical Report of 22d Air Police Squadron, 22d Air Base Group, March Air Force Base, California, February 1952, 7.

⁹¹ Historical Report of 22d Air Police Squadron, 22d Air Base Group, March Air Force Base, California, February 1952, 8.

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- ⁹² AFR 205-30, *Armed Forces Censorship*, 25 October 1950.
- ⁹³ History of the Office of the Inspector General United States Air Force, Washington, D.C., 1 July 1950 to 31 December 1950, Vol. II, Chapter III, 15.
- ⁹⁴ History of the Office of the Inspector General United States Air Force, Washington, D.C., 1 July 1950 to 31 December 1950, Vol. II, Chapter III, 15.
- ⁹⁵ Betty Barton Christiansen, *The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: Civic Action* (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1998), 8.
- ⁹⁶ Historical Report for Period 1 January through 28 February 1951, 6205th Air Police Group, Clark AFB, PI, 3.
- ⁹⁷ Historical Report for Period 1 September through 31 October 1951, 6205th Air Police Group, Clark AFB, PI.
- ⁹⁸ *Air Provost Marshal Digest*, No. 3, 9.
- ⁹⁹ *Air Provost Marshal Digest*, No. 3, 19.
- ¹⁰⁰ Interview of Colonel Ervin Stewart, USAF (Ret) by Colonel Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), 24 January 2005.
- ¹⁰¹ Caption on photo in Security Forces Museum, Lackland AFB, TX.
- ¹⁰² See Appendix I.
- ¹⁰³ HQ Far East Air Forces General Orders No. 473, 16 September 1952 (<http://www.wpafb.af.mil/museum/history/korea/go52-473.htm>).
- ¹⁰⁴ HQ Far East Air Forces General Orders No. 473, 16 September 1952 (<http://www.wpafb.af.mil/museum/history/korea/go52-473.htm>).
- ¹⁰⁵ "Early American Dogs: 1775 – 1898" (<http://community-2.webtv.net/Hahn-50thAP-K9/K9History24/>).
- ¹⁰⁶ USAFE established a similar military working dog school in the Hindenburg Kaserne at Wiesbaden AB, West Germany, in January 1953.
- ¹⁰⁷ Sentry Dogs Manual No. 2, revised May 1, 1953, quoted at <http://community-2.webtv.net/Hahn-50thAP-K9/K9History24/>
- ¹⁰⁸ Wilson Powell posting, Korean War Project webpage, <http://www.koreanwar.org/html/units/usaf/1503aps.htm> (March 2005).
- ¹⁰⁹ Wilson Powell posting, Korean War Project webpage, <http://www.koreanwar.org/html/units/usaf/1503aps.htm> (March 2005).
- ¹¹⁰ Historical Data, 3335th Tng Sq, 3250 TTG, 3310 TTWg, Scott AFB, 1 Sep 51 – 30 Sep 51, Squadron Activity Report (Tab A).
- ¹¹¹ History of 5001st APS, Ladd AFB, Alaska, Alaskan Air Command (April –June 1952), 3.
- ¹¹² History of 5001st APS, Ladd AFB, Alaska, Alaskan Air Command (April –June 1952), 3.
- ¹¹³ History of 93d Air Police Squadron, 93d ABG, Castle Air Force Base, California (Jan 1952), 4.
- ¹¹⁴ History of 93d Air Police Squadron, 93d ABG, Castle Air Force Base, California (Jan 1952), 4 .
- ¹¹⁵ History of 93d Air Police Squadron, 93d ABG, Castle Air Force Base, California (Jan 1952), 4.
- ¹¹⁶ Historical Report of 28th Air Police Squadron, 28th Air Base Group, Rapid City, South Dakota, 1 April 1952 – 30 April 1952.
- ¹¹⁷ SAC Regulation 125-2.
- ¹¹⁸ Historical Report, 27th Air Police Squadron, 27th Air Base Group, Bergstrom AFB, Austin, Texas, 1 February 1952 – 29 February 1952, 3.
- ¹¹⁹ Historical Report, 27th Air Police Squadron, 27th Air Base Group, Bergstrom AFB, Austin, Texas, 1 February 1952 – 29 February 1952, 3 .
- ¹²⁰ 31st Air Police Squadron History, 31st Air Base Group, Turner AFB, Georgia, March 1952, 4 .
- ¹²¹ 31st Air Police Squadron History, 31st Air Base Group, Turner AFB, Georgia, June 1952, Exhibit 2 .
- ¹²² 6160th Air Police Squadron, 6160th Air Base Group, 6160th Air Base Wing, Japan Air Defense Force, Itazuke AB, Japan, March 1952, 3.
- ¹²³ History of the 375th Troop Carrier Wing (Medium), Donaldson AFB, California, April – June 1952, 20 .
- ¹²⁴ Letter from Mr. Christopher Yaroch to Col Mike Vendzules, 22 December 2004. Mr. Yaroch has donated the brassard to the Air Force Security Forces Museum, Lackland AFB, Texas. Unfortunately the author has not uncovered any other information regarding Air Force involvement in the highway patrol.
- ¹²⁵ 85th Air Police History, Erding Air Depot, West Germany, Sep-Oct 1950.
- ¹²⁶ Historical Report, 27th Air Police Squadron, 27th Air Base Group, Bergstrom AFB, Austin, Texas, 1 May 1952 – 31 May 1952, 4 .

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- ¹²⁷ Historical Report, 6400th Air Police Squadron, 6400th Air Depot Wing, April 1952.
- ¹²⁸ Historical Data Report, 6149th Air Police Squadron, 6149th Air Base Group, 6149th Tactical Support Wing, October 1950, 2 .
- ¹²⁹ Historical Report, 27th Air Police Squadron, 27th Air Base Group, March 1951, 2.
- ¹³⁰ Historical Report, 6400th Air Police Squadron, 6400th Air Depot Wing, June 1952, 2.
- ¹³¹ Historical Report, 6400th Air Police Squadron, 6400th Air Depot Wing, June 1952, 2.
- ¹³² Historical Report, 6400th Air Police Squadron, 6400th Air Depot Wing, November 1952, 2.
- ¹³³ Historical Report, 6400th Air Police Squadron, 6400th Air Depot Wing, May 1952, 1.
- ¹³⁴ Historical Report, 6400th Air Police Squadron, 6400th Air Depot Wing, May 1952, 1.
- ¹³⁵ Historical Report, 6400th Air Police Squadron, 6400th Air Depot Wing, May 1952, 1.
- ¹³⁶ Historical Report, 6400th Air Police Squadron, 6400th Air Depot Wing, May 1952, 2.
- ¹³⁷ Historical Report, 6400th Air Police Squadron, 6400th Air Depot Wing, May 1952, 3.
- ¹³⁸ History of the Inspector General United States Air Force Washington, D.C., 1 January 1951 to 30 June 1951, Vol. II, Part I.
- ¹³⁹ Abstract of History of 3725th Air Force Indoctrination Wing, Parks AFB, California, 1 October 1951 – 31 December 1951.
- ¹⁴⁰ Discussion with Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret.), November 2004.
- ¹⁴¹ History of 3275th Military Training Wing, Parks AFB, California, January – June 1955, 2.
- ¹⁴² History of the Office of the Inspector General United States Air Force, Washington, D.C., 1 January 1952 – 30 June 1952, Vol. II, 6.
- ¹⁴³ History of the 3924th Air Police Squadron (Special), 1 August 1952 – 31 January 1953, Chapter V, 21-22.
- ¹⁴⁴ Ltr, IGBDB 370.2, HqSAC, 30 Oct 52.
- ¹⁴⁵ History of the 3924th Air Police Squadron (Special), 1 August 1952 – 31 January 1953, Chapter V, 11.
- ¹⁴⁶ History of the 3924th Air Police Squadron (Special), 1 August 1952 – 31 January 1953, Chapter V, 11.
- ¹⁴⁷ Report of Major Benjamin C. Marshall to Deputy Inspector General for Security, Strategic Air Command, Subject: Surface Defense Operations, Far East (no date), History of the 3924th Air Police Squadron (Special), 1 August 1952 – 31 January 1953, Chapter V, Inclosure #6 .
- ¹⁴⁸ Report of Major Benjamin C. Marshall to Deputy Inspector General for Security, Strategic Air Command, Subject: Surface Defense Operations, Far East (no date), History of the 3924th Air Police Squadron (Special), 1 August 1952 – 31 January 1953, Chapter V, Inclosure #6 .
- ¹⁴⁹ History of the 3924th Air Police Squadron (Special), 1 August 1952 – 31 January 1953, Chapter V, 11.
- ¹⁵⁰ Col Jerry M. Bullock, “Jim Luper – Security Force Pioneer,” *Security Police Digest*, Issue 2, 1980, 15. The SAC Marksmanship Trophy first awarded in 1961 was named the Colonel J. R. Luper Memorial Trophy in his memory.

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CHAPTER THREE

THE “NEW LOOK”: 1953 – 1960

On July 31, 1953, Maj Gen Joseph V. Dillon retired after thirty-three years active military service. As the Air Force’s first air provost marshal, Dillon oversaw the separation of the air provost function from the Army, the initial organization of the Air Police and its transition from a police force to a combat force to meet the challenges of war, and the creation of an enlightened program of confinement and correction. He had done well.

Dillon’s successor was his deputy, Brig Gen William Lafayette Fagg. The 48-year-old Oklahoman was a 1929 graduate of West Point who started his military career in



Brig Gen William Lafayette Fagg (Air Force photo)

the infantry as an instructor at the Infantry School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In 1941 he graduated from the University of Virginia Law School and served as a judge advocate until he was assigned to the staff of the 69th Infantry Division in 1943. After service as an observer with the Fifth Army in Italy, he returned to the 69th in March 1944 as a battalion, and later regimental commander. In July, 1944, he was reassigned to Europe as the air operations officer at Ninth Army headquarters.¹

After the war Fagg served as commandant of the Ground Liaison School at Keesler Field, Mississippi, as well as regional commander of the 970th Counter Intelligence Course in Germany, and executive officer of the Intelligence Division at European Command Headquarters. On September 26, 1947, he was transferred to the Air Force and was appointed deputy inspector general in March 1949. He returned to the United States in August 1950 and after graduation from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in July 1951 he was selected to be the executive officer to the Air Force inspector general and in June 1952 was named Dillon’s deputy. Except for his time as the deputy APM, he had no experience in the Air Police when he succeeded Dillon in August 1953.²


He did have some strong opinions, however. One of his opinions was that calling every provost marshal in the Air Force an *air* provost marshal was confusing. According to one source, he declared soon after taking the position that, “There is only one Air Provost Marshal and I am it” and soon all other air provost marshals became simply provost marshals.³

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Who was called what was trivial compared to the shortage of Air Police manpower caused by postwar demobilization that challenged Fagg. An “early out” program had been initiated to return draftees to civilian life as soon as possible and AP squadrons saw their manning levels plummet. The reduction in force affected the Air Police at all levels and by November 1953, Fagg was forced to reorganize the APMD “because of manpower limitations” and the existing four divisions of the directorate were consolidated into three “revitalized” divisions.⁴ The functions of the Air Police and Corrections Divisions were consolidated under a new Operations Division under Col Clifford V. Oje. An Enforcement-Corrections Branch and a Requirements Branch were also created under the Operations Division. The Installations Security Division assumed responsibility for local ground defense and that function became a branch, along with Internal Security and Censorship and Travel Control, within the Installations Security Division. Industrial Security was the third division with two branches—Eastern and Western Region Security.

The rapid loss of personnel also seriously impacted base Air Police squadrons and “work arounds” became necessary. One partial solution to the shortage of air policemen was to increase the use of civilians. During the Korean War, Air Materiel Command bases, which generally had small numbers of military personnel but large numbers of civilian workers, had established civilian guard forces to provide for base security in the event of a deployment of the relatively few military personnel on the base. The 25th APS at Hill AFB, Utah tested such an organization in late 1951. At Hill, the 25th APS commander, Capt James G. Davis, also served as provost marshal reporting to the base IG and as AP squadron commander reporting to the base commander. The 25th APS included an Air Police Office with 1st Lt Chester R. Scott, Jr. serving as Air Police Officer. Reporting to the Air Police Officer were two almost identical guard forces, one military and one civilian. Joseph C. McDonald was named civilian chief of the Air Police Branch and Charles F. Hull was chief of Civilian Guards. The military guards reported to 2nd Lt Thomas C. O’Shea.⁵

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Project Native Son contingent 1954 (Air Force Historical Research Agency)

Overseas, just as during the manpower shortages experienced in the early months of the Korean War, more reliance was placed on local national guards. At Clark AB, Philippines, the effects of the “early out” program were acutely felt in early 1954 and the operations section of the 6200th Air Police Squadron was barely able to “maintain security and law enforcement at a minimum level of effectiveness...”⁶ In April 1954, the squadron began “Project Native Son” to train “indigenous personnel” to assume some Air Police security functions and alleviate the mission shortfalls caused by the lack of air policemen.⁷ The arrival of eighty-eight trained personnel from the States that same month also helped.

The “early out” program was not the only cause of manpower shortages; the United States was transitioning to a new strategy for dealing with the worldwide Communist threat. The strategy of containment in effect since shortly after World War II was based on the belief that the Soviet Union was:



Maj Tom Fleek, 6200th APS commander, 1953 (Col Ed Johnson)

Impervious to logic of reason, and...highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw--and usually does when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so.⁸

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Called “containment,” the policy as embraced by the Truman administration required the United States to confront and contain the Soviet Union by diplomatic, economic, and even military means whenever and wherever it might make a move toward expanding Communist influence. The Berlin Airlift, the creation of NATO, the Korean War, and the formation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 were all efforts at containment.⁹ Truman’s successor, President Dwight Eisenhower,



President Dwight D. Eisenhower (White House photo)

fully aware of how unpopular the Korean War became with the American public, sought to modify the policy of containment to prevent “an open-ended commitment of US forces worldwide...that could drain the nation’s resources.”¹⁰ Eisenhower’s goal, according to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, was a containment strategy that allowed the United States to confront Communist aggression “by means and at places of our own choosing.”¹¹

The “New Look” of American strategy would rely more on nuclear deterrence and less on conventional forces. While total end strength of the armed forces dropped from 3.6 million in 1953 it remained at a yearly average of 2.8 million throughout the 1950’s, but that strength was redistributed. Since “New Look” sought to avoid ground wars, the Army and Navy were cut while the Air Force, particularly the strategic bomber force, was increased. Eisenhower’s desire to balance the budget and lower tax rates also made the conventional force savings “New Look” offered very attractive.

On October 30, 1953, Eisenhower approved National Security Council (NSC) document 162/2 which declared that, “The risk of Soviet aggression will be minimized by maintaining a strong security posture, with emphasis on adequate offensive retaliatory strength and defensive strength. This must be based on massive atomic capability...”¹² Although the development of the Polaris submarine missile system would give a new mission to the Navy, the Air Force, particularly SAC, quickly became the premiere service capable of providing both atomic deterrence and massive retaliation.



B-47 medium bombers (Air Force photo)

Consequently, Army funding was cut to support only 17 weak divisions while Air Force funding increased to support 143 wings. The bulk of the increase in Air Force funding went to SAC so that by the end of 1953, 11 of the 17 atomic strike force wings had been fully equipped. At that time SAC’s bomber force consisted of 329 B-47 “Stratojet” medium bombers and 185 giant transcontinental B-36 “Peacemakers” heavy bombers supported by 500 tankers and 200

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fighters. SAC personnel numbered 160,000 stationed at 29 US and 10 overseas bases.¹³

SAC's mission as a nuclear strike force necessitated the creation of a more realistic plan for storing nuclear weapons. Since the early days of the atomic bomb, or special weapons as they came to be called, ownership of the bombs belonged to the Atomic Energy Commission with the Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) acting as Air Force custodian. When SAC wanted to load a special weapon on an aircraft, the bomber would have to fly to the air force base mated to one of the AFLC weapons storage facilities at Limestone Air Force Station (AFS), Maine; Stony Brook AFS, Massachusetts; Fairfield-Susian AFS, California; Deep Creek AFS, Washington; or Mt. Rushmore AFS, South Dakota, to pick up a bomb. Six-hundred-man AFLC security units guarded these storage areas and were responsible for security of the weapon until it was signed for by the aircraft commander and radar navigator.¹⁴

This arrangement did nothing to facilitate the rapid nuclear response envisioned by NSC 162/2. To remedy this problem, in August 1953, the "Bombs On Base" program was established and the Department of Defense gradually took custody of nuclear weapons and began to relocate them to storage facilities on or near the bases that would use them. For the time being AFLC continued to provide the security for these new storage facilities. This drawdown was not completed until 1962.

The buildup of the Air Force driven by "New Look" did not translate to an increase in the numbers of Air Police. In fact, its strength was actually reduced to avoid a fight with Congress. While considering the Department of Defense budget for 1954, Congress noticed what it believed was an extraordinary build up of Air Police during the Korean War. Air Force representatives were questioned about this increase during hearings held by the House Subcommittee on Appropriations and, unversed in the mission of the Air Police, were unable to adequately explain why the Air Force needed so many more police than the other services. Not persuaded by the Air Force's explanation, Congress was about to impose a statutory ceiling on the number of Air Police when the Air Force volunteered to cut the force by twenty percent.¹⁵

These personnel cuts coincided with the rise in importance in internal security and resource protection. One of the undisputed lessons of Korea, noted by Maj Ben Marshall and confirmed by others, was that theft of Air Force property was the major threat to air bases. In 1952 alone, the value of Air Force property stolen was \$1 million with only 24 percent of it being recovered.¹⁶ Base exchanges, armories, finance offices, motor pools, and civil engineering facilities all contained funds, merchandise, or materiel tempting to thieves. Thievery had become so prevalent that in 1955 the Air Police was able to get OSI coordination on AFR 125-21, *Air Police Investigations*, authorizing the addition of a criminal investigative capability to Air Police squadrons.¹⁷

Given the low recovery rates of stolen property, the focus of the Air Police began to shift from investigation of losses and the recovery of property to the deterrence and prevention of theft. But with the decline in manpower, Air Police squadrons at the bases were unable to guard everything that needed guarding and were therefore forced to

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divest some of their security functions to users while also relying more on passive security measures.



Congratulations from the Colonel (Air Force Historical Research Agency)

The Air Force Resource Protection Program that was subsequently established by AFR 205-5 in March 1951 relied on training property custodians to institute good management practices that deterred theft such as not allowing large amounts of cash to remain in registers or drawers overnight. Fences were erected around motor pools and storage areas and alarms and better locks were installed on other facilities. The owner/user, not the Air Police, became primarily responsible for the security of their facilities, thereby allowing the APs to use their limited resources to secure operational assets such as aircraft and weapons. If the proper measures were implemented by the owner/users, it was possible "...to provide adequate security for Air Force property without utilizing any Air Police...other than occasional property is used or stored."¹⁸

patrols when personnel are not on duty...where

Manpower shortages also increased the reliance on technology as a force multiplier. One piece of needed technology was added to the equipment of the Air Police in March 1955, when handheld radios were issued to patrolmen and security forces. To link these radio-equipped posts together, SAC designed and fielded at its bases a Central Security Control center that was later picked up Air Force-wide.¹⁹

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The “New Look,” the shortage of Air Police manpower, the rise of resource protection, and the experience of Korea led inevitably to a reevaluation of the air base ground defense doctrine forged in the war. Throughout 1954, the 3625th Technical Training Group (Air Base Defense) at Parks AFB continued to train Air Police security forces in a comprehensive 13 week course including four weeks of heavy weapons training and field exercises on the “ideal terrain” at Beale AFB.²⁰ In addition to providing practical training, the Parks school was also coming into its own as the Air Force’s ground defense doctrine center. In early 1954, AFR 125-46 was published



ABD School Weapons Branch, 1954 (Col Jerry M. Bullock)



Lt Jerry Bullock, OIC Small-Arms Weapons, Parks AFB ABD School, 1954-1955 (Col Jerry M. Bullock)

“establishing the procedures by which projects pertaining to Provost Marshal activities will be referred to the USAF Air Base Defense School for the development of tactics, doctrine, equipment and technique.”²¹ By the end of the year, the school had been tasked to prepare an Air Force sabotage manual, ten manuals on ground defense of air bases, and one on covert enemy action. The manuals were intended to “give detailed guidance to operational elements on local ground defense.”²²

But changes were underway that were to diminish the importance of base ground defense. Whether it was an indication of the decline in the importance of its function or

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just a solution to a manpower shortage, on May 5, 1954, a SCARWAF officer, LTC Jack B. Street, became chief of the Local Ground Defense Branch at the APMD.²³ The APMD was again reorganized on November 1, 1954, and under this latest reorganization the Local Ground Defense Branch was renamed the Defense Branch of the Installations Security Division.²⁴

Saving money began to trump realistic weapons training. In a cost cutting move the APMD, in early 1954 procured a “subcaliber training device” for the 57mm recoilless rifle used for local air base ground defense.²⁵ These devices allowed the use of .30 caliber ammunition in the weapon and would permit “training to be conducted on existing small arms ranges and at a considerable savings in ammunition.”²⁶ While true, the use of these devices would also prevent trainees from getting the actual “feel” of the weapon and an appreciation of its true effectiveness.



Lt Col Paul Uhrinak presents diplomas for successfully completing Air Base Defense School to Maj Kim and Capt Kim, two Korean officers. (Col Jerry M. Bullock)

On March 5, 1955, the 3625th closed its Detachment 1 at Beale AFB. The decision was based on the long distance between Parks and Beale, the lack of adequate housing for the training staff, and the lack of classrooms. Abandoning the training ranges at Beale meant less realistic, less intensive field and heavy weapons training at the school. With the consolidation of training at Beale the Air Base Defense Course was shortened from 13 weeks to 12 weeks and by July, the Air Base Defense School was changing its emphasis to “air police instruction.”²⁷ It was a simple matter of supply and demand and the demand for “air base defense students were not so immediate or urgent as the pressing demand for air police.”²⁸ In a move that foretold an increase on the reliance on base on-the-job-training (OJT) programs in air base defense, the school instituted a four-week Air Base Defense Instructor Course for the purpose of qualifying NCOs to “assist in training students in local defense at Air Force installations.”²⁹

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In May 1955, the Air Base Defense School hosted an Air Force Security Symposium attended by high-level security officers from Air Force commands world-



Gen Truman H. Landon (Air Force photo)

wide. From May 23 through 27 these officers, joined by Air Provost Marshal Fagg, the Air Force Inspector General, Lt Gen Truman H. Landon, and their respective deputies, Brig Gen John M. Breit and Maj Gen Joseph F. Carroll, studied the Air Force security program.³⁰ The primary objective of the symposium was to “examine and analyze all aspects of our security problem as it exists today, anticipate what the problem may be in the future, then recommend those changes to security directives that will help...provide, within...capabilities, the best security for the Air Force.”³¹

One of the things the attendees appear to have initiated was a special staff study on air base ground defense doctrine and training. The study was completed in the spring of 1956 and in a textbook example of “fighting the last war” concluded: “The Air Base Defense current doctrine was outmoded and should be redesigned; the current curriculum was unrealistic and should be immediately revised to lower the emphasis in heavy weapons and combat infantry tactics training.”³² Headquarters Air Training Command also directed that the Air Base Defense School be closed by November 20, 1956, and that it along with all other Air Police training, as well as the basic military training conducted at Parks AFB, be transferred to Lackland AFB, Texas. The move began in the summer of 1956 and by November 20, 1956, the Air Base Defense School was reestablished at Lackland “with a minimum loss of student production.”³³ Parks closed in 1959.

But the Air Base Defense School was not reestablished at Lackland in its previous form. Instead of comprehensive ground defense training, a very limited amount of training time in AP training courses was devoted to rudimentary ground defense training. This was consistent with new realities and the 3700th Military Training Wing at Lackland noted that the “most significant change in...all the Air Police training courses...was the change in emphasis from air base defense training to that of security defense.”³⁴ The reasoning behind the change was to bring training in line with the new philosophy that rejected “The theory...of defense of a base against mass attack,” in favor of a theory that “emphasized the use of Air Police as a security force in protection of those areas vital to the primary mission of the base.”³⁵

Under the new theory, law enforcement, resource protection, riot control, and the use of small security forces as opposed to the large ground defense forces in base security were the focus. Gone was training in long-range heavy weapons such as the 57mm recoilless rifle, the 60mm mortar, land mines and booby traps. They were replaced by training on short range weapons such as the .30 caliber carbine, submachine guns, grenades, and shotguns. No mock airbases or Asian villages were built at Lackland for

training in base defense; instead a 310-square-foot “Traffic City” was constructed to provide “students with practical experience in directing traffic...”³⁶

Intelligence estimates and another Air Force staff study in 1957 finally killed the doctrine and organization for base ground defense developed during the Korean War. Based on the new strategy of avoiding ground combat in favor of massive retaliation with nuclear weapons, intelligence estimates concluded that the primary ground threat to Air Force installations were small teams of highly trained enemy agents with the mission of clandestinely penetrating nuclear strike installations. They further concluded that massed ground offensives were highly unlikely.³⁷ Given these estimates the Air Staff study completed by the provost marshal in May 1957 concluded that AFR 355-4, *Local Ground Defense of Air Force Installations*, was “impractical, unmanageable” and did not provide a “defense-in-being consistent with up-to-date estimates and war planning concepts.”³⁸ The study concluded that base security could be best attained by reliance on the Internal Installation Security Program established by AFR 205-5, *Internal Installation Security*. This program focused on protecting operational resources on bases with combat missions from sabotage by using Air Police resources almost exclusively to control entry to sensitive areas. If a threat exceeded the capability of the small security teams established by AFR 205-5, then “the base must be garrisoned by friendly ground forces or evacuation...must be accomplished.”³⁹

The Air Staff approved the APMD study and AFR 205-5 replaced 355-4 and the focus of base security changed from defense against overt external threats to security against a covert internal threat. The term “local ground defense” was eliminated, replaced by the amorphous term “reinforced security.”⁴⁰ The vision shared by Reynolds and Luper of the Air Police as a sort of “blue infantry” or the “Marine Corps of the Air Force” was officially dead and the Air Police reverted from a trained combat force to a guard force.

Not that being part of a guard force didn’t have risks. On April 3, 1956, Capt George E. Morris, provost marshal of Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, rushed to the scene of an emergency involving an RB-66 aircraft whose overheated brakes had started a fire in the right landing gear assembly. The base fire department quickly extinguished the flames, but the overheated tire exploded and Morris, standing some 30 feet away, was struck by debris from the shattered wheel assembly. He was killed instantly. A South Carolina native and World War II pilot, Morris was the father of three young children and had planned on leaving the base to attend a training course that day. He was the first Air Force Air Police officer killed in the line of duty.⁴¹



Capt George E. Morris (Albuquerque Journal)

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One of the goals of Air Force Regulation 205-5 when it was first published in 1951 had been to establish guidance for the security of atomic weapons. When the regulation was published bombs were the only atomic weapons in the SAC inventory, but by 1957 a new weapon was being added. In the summer of 1957 Maj “Gish” Jarvis, Lt Jerry Bullock, and CMSgt Bob Frink traveled to the newly established Cooke AFB, California, to inspect a construction project at the base.

The project they viewed was unlike any ever seen before. The workmen were building the first launch facilities for the nuclear armed Atlas Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and Jarvis, Bullock and Frink were there to begin planning for the security of these sites. Project Atlas officially began on January 16, 1951, and by May 1956 a production contract for the missile had been awarded to Convair. Despite the failure of the missile’s first flight test the previous month, the first Air Force strategic missile wing, the 704th, was activated at Cooke (today’s Vandenberg) Air Force Base on July 1, 1957. When the Atlas, as well as the Titan ICBMs, also in development, became fully operational and deployed SAC’s security requirements would again grow.

Yet another increase in SAC’s security requirements came in 1956 when the command began to put its bombers on sustained alert status at selected bases. Alert aircraft armed with nuclear weapons and their supporting tankers were expected to be in the air one hour from notice. Both the alert crew quarters and the alert aircraft parking area on the main ramp were perimeter fenced, with secure access gates guarded by the Air Police. Each alert aircraft was also guarded by an air policeman twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year. It was an uncomfortable, lonely, but essential duty and it would go on for the next thirty-five years.⁴²

SAC also added to its mission and the mission of its Air Police when it finally took over the security of special weapons storage areas from Air Materiel Command. The AMC guards were transferred to SAC, although it took some of them a while to become acclimated to SAC’s way of doing things.⁴³



Elite Guard SSgt Billy Morris (Air Force photo)

In December 1956, the Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command (CINC SAC), Gen Curtis LeMay, created a new duty for select SAC air policemen when he directed Maj Herbert Meyer, commander of Offutt AFB, Nebraska's 3902nd APS, to create a special guard force. This guard unit, officially designated Detachment A, 3902nd APS, but known by all as the "Palace Guard," was envisioned by LeMay to be an elite force with a threefold mission: provide security for SAC Headquarters at Offutt; furnish personal protection for the CINC and Vice CINC of SAC; and represent SAC at military and civilian functions.

To make the guard truly elite, strict qualifications were established for assignment to the guard. Members were handpicked from the 3902nd and other SAC air police units. A khaki uniform (later changed to blue) set off with a white scarf, white boot laces in black, highly polished combat boots, and a white aiguillette was chosen to distinguish detachment personnel from other air policemen. The white boot laces and white scarves were not unique to the elite guard since AFR 125-7, *Air Police Uniforms*, mandated those accouterments for all air policemen during ceremonies and while assigned to MAJCOM or NAF headquarters.⁴⁴ Unique to the guard, however, was a distinctive blue beret with the SAC crest and a bone handled, chrome plated, Smith and Wesson .38 caliber revolver in a cross draw holster.

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Elite Guard Drill Team (Col Ed Johnson)

performed routine security duties as part of the guard. Until it was disbanded in 1969, the Drill Team thrilled spectators at events nationwide.

Soon after the establishment of Detachment A, LeMay determined that a special group was needed to represent SAC nationwide and a drill team was created as part of the detachment. Using chrome plated, Springfield .03 rifles with fixed bayonets, the SAC Drill Team perfected an intricate, and dangerous, silent drill routine that sent the potentially lethal Springfields hurtling through the air in a strictly choreographed routine. When not appearing at events, the Drill Team's members

In May 1961, Detachment A was officially renamed the SAC Elite Guard. Often copied, but in the opinion of many never duplicated, the SAC Elite Guard served at Offutt until 1992 when SAC was deactivated and its mission assumed by United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and Air Force Space Command (AFSPC).⁴⁵



SAC Elite Guard Certificate of Service (Security Forces Museum)

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Strategic Air Command's increasing nuclear security mission prompted the command to examine its Air Police organization in 1957. The result was an initiative called Project Hot Point. Beginning in September 1957, Strategic Air Command Air Police squadrons were split: Law enforcement, corrections, traffic control and related functions were assigned to the Headquarters Squadron Sections of the local Air Base Group. The Air Police squadrons retained only their security and mobility functions.⁴⁶ In effect, the "Hot Point" reorganization created two organizations: Law Enforcement and Combat Defense. In conjunction with this reorganization, SAC issued a new regulation, SACR 50-9, *Law Enforcement-Combat Defense Forces Training*, establishing a training program for its Air Police force. On January 6, 1958, Brig Gen Fagg and Maj Gen Carroll visited March AFB, California, where they received a briefing on the "Hot Point" reorganization. While they both expressed satisfaction with the briefing and the security situation at the base, the Hot Point organization was never mandated Air Force-wide.⁴⁷

On March 13, 1958, CINC SAC, Gen Thomas S. Power, took the next step in his initiative to improve SAC's security forces. In a letter to his numbered air force commanders, Power noted that while the "Hot Point" reorganizations were being "successfully accomplished," an "acceptable degree of security and effective military law enforcement...will not automatically be achieved and retained merely as a result of this implementation."⁴⁸ What was required to meet this goal was "a well-trained, highly professional air police force, physically fit, proficient in the use of assigned weapons, and commanded by officers of proved leadership ability."⁴⁹

Power directed his commanders to take three actions. First, they were to ensure that their Air Police commanders possessed "strong leadership qualities" and if they did



Gen Thomas S. Power (Air Force photo)

not they were to be replaced with an officer who did, even if that officer did not possess the "technical qualifications requisite for that position."⁵⁰ Second, they should emphasize the training standards in SACR 50-9 including weapons proficiency. Finally, they were to "promote a high degree of physical fitness among Air Police personnel" by instituting a physical fitness program.⁵¹

SACR 50-9 contemplated that the training program be conducted during normal duty hours. But this desire bumped into the reality of diminished manpower. Capt William H. Wise, commander of Westover AFB's 814th APRON (AP Squadron), reported that "due to inadequate manning authorizations, personnel shortages and the heavy requirements levied by the Air Police Squadron's current mission...it would not be possible to conduct training in conjunction with normal duty time."⁵²

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Guardmount at Laredo AFB, Texas, 1959 61 Walker AFB, New Mexico combined Central Security Control and law enforcement desk, 1955 (Col Jerry M. Bullock)

Wise's manpower problems were not his alone; many Air Police units were still feeling the effects of the "voluntary" 20 percent reduction in manpower offered up by the Air Force to placate Congress. While Wise was struggling to meet training requirements, Hamilton AFB's 78th APS was reporting "considerable personnel shortages" so that, "Very little law enforcement work was performed."⁵³ Obtaining air policemen was not necessarily based on set criteria, particularly if the men were transferred from

another career field. Oliver D. Gilmer, for example, was reassigned along with other B-36 crewmen after the B-36 was retired. He discovered that how some personnel were chosen for their new career field was not especially scientific. "If you was [sic] six feet tall, thirty to thirty-four in the waist, thought [of] yourself as a sharp airman, 'Air Police, here I come,'" Gilmer remembered. "If you were fat, clothes wouldn't fit you, 'Mess hall, here I come as a cook.'"⁵⁴ Gilmer entered the Air Police and later retired as an OSI agent.



Walker AFB, New Mexico, combined Central Security Control and Law Enforcement Desk, 1955 (Col Ed Johnson)

One problem air policemen struggled against was the low regard held for them by the rest of the force. Much of this was due to the Air Police being thought of as a non-technical force in a highly technical service and it was seen by some as a repository for those with the lowest scores on the enlistment qualifying test and populated by men fit for directing traffic or standing guard duty but little else. This was a condescending, elitist attitude, but it was not entirely unfounded since by late 1960, less than 60 percent of the air policemen on duty had high school diplomas. Fair or not, this was the reputation within the Air Force of the security and law enforcement forces at that time.⁵⁵

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Adding injury to insult was the fact that Air Police promotions were almost nonexistent in the late 50's--major was a high grade among Air Police officers and very few enlisted air policemen made it to master sergeant. For months on end in 1958 and 1959, the 78th APS historical report contained the following observation: "Despite the current shortage of personnel, lack of promotions, and frozen promotions, the morale of this organization remains good."⁵⁶ In sum, the Air Police of the late fifties looked much the same as the AAF Military Police force "Mike" Mabardy found in 1947: younger, less educated, and of junior officer and enlisted grades than the rest of the Air Force.

One morale builder was that the long awaited Air Police badge to replace the brassard was finally coming to pass. The effort to introduce a badge began back in October 1955 when Provost Marshal Fagg judged that commander opposition to a distinctive badge had abated enough for him to solicit opinions from the field on the desirability of authorizing a badge for air policemen. Almost all of the inputs received at the headquarters from the field supported the creation of a badge, including one from an air policeman who probably summed up the entire force's attitude toward the brassard when he observed, "A young Air Policeman going into harness for the first time would certainly have more respect for a nice badge than for a faded brassard stuck together with paper clips or staples and pinned on with a damn big safety pin, which eventually ends up at his elbow."⁵⁷ Since many air policemen already sported unauthorized, unofficial badges obtained from local tinsmiths or trophy shops and since this was a morale issue of longstanding, Fagg was bowing to the inevitable, but he at least wanted to regularize the design and wear of any badge.⁵⁸



Brig Gen Burnham inspects one of the first of the newly issued Air Police Shields (Security Forces Museum)

One year later the APMD received permission to design and test a badge for the Air Police. The design accepted for the badge, done by Mr. Thomas H. Jones, designer of Arlington's Tomb of the Unknowns, was a 3" X ½" inch silver-plated disc surrounded by scalloped edges and containing a blue and white enamel inlaid Air Force crest with "Department of the Air Force" above and "United States of America" below the crest. Surmounting the disc was an eagle in front of a cloud with the words "Air Police" in a banner under the eagle's talons. In May 1957, Air Police units in MATS, SAC, and USAFE received 400 prototype badges for field trials.⁵⁹

The wear test of the Air Police badge revealed that the blue and white enamel inlay chipped off easily and the pins holding the badge to the uniform had a tendency to break off. A redesign in

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February 1959 eliminated the inlays and replaced the pins with a safety clasp similar to civilian police badges. Distribution of the redesigned badges began to the units in the field. The “badge” also became the “shield”, the latter term having a more defensive connotation than the former. In February 1959, Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen Curtis LeMay, and the then-Provost Marshal, Brig Gen Robert F. Burnham, were issued Air Police shields #1 and #2 and the long quest for a permanent mark of professionalism for the Air Police and the elimination of the Army-style brassard finally ended. However, until 1960, when the last units received their shields, AP units continued to wear brassards.⁶⁰

Initially, Air Force leadership was concerned that young APs would abuse the authority the shield represented, so they were issued to AP squadron commanders who were responsible for them as squadron property. Each shield had a serial number stamped on it and they were checked out just as weapons were when a man went on duty and turned in when he came off duty.⁶¹

Another consequence of the SAC build-up and its nuclear security requirements and the Air Police’s manpower shortage was the increasing use of passive security measures, such as the miles of fencing springing up around bases and the use of military working dogs to patrol the perimeter of the base and the alert areas. By 1955 the Air Force needed hundreds of additional sentry dogs quickly to augment the 1,379 already on duty world-wide. In mid-1955, representatives of the Strategic Air Command and the Department of the Air Force consulted the Army Office of The Quartermaster General about beginning a large scale procurement of dogs for the Air Force. From 1956 to 1957, the Army Quartermaster Corps found itself scrambling to secure sufficient quantities of dogs for the Army as Air Force requirements increased. In September 1957 the Quartermaster Corps announced the need to acquire 1,000 dogs in that month alone.⁶²



In late 1956, as the Army’s requirements for dogs began to decrease, a study was made by the Army to determine the cost of continued operation of the Army Dog Training Center at Fort Carson, Colorado, and whether, in view of the Army’s limited requirements, the Army should continue to operate the Center since it was now primarily training Air Force dogs. On December 29, 1956, the Army announced that the Army Dog Training Center at Fort Carson would be closed by June 30, 1957, and that the Air Force would be given the opportunity to take over the dog training operation. The Army’s decision to divest itself of the dog center was based on its declining need for dogs and its desire to demobilize its K-9 force. The dog procurement program for 1957 had been started by the Army, but the decision to close the dog center suspended all procurement pending the establishment of suitable training facilities by the Air Force. During the fiscal year prior to suspension of procurement, 382 dogs had been purchased and 25 training classes had been conducted for the Air Force.⁶³

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The Air Force was now faced with the need to establish its own procurement and training center to meet its K-9 requirements. By 1958 the Air Force was ready to open its own dog training center and on October 20, 1958, established the Sentry Dog Training Branch of the Department of Security Police Training at Lackland AFB, Texas. Eventually over 700 acres would be set aside for training dogs and handlers, and more than 700 kennels would be built to house the dogs.



Sentry Dog Training Branch of the Department of Security Police Training at Lackland AFB, Texas (Claude Anderson)

On December 31, 1958, General Fagg retired from the Air Force. During his four-and-a-half-year tenure as Air Provost Marshal and Provost Marshal, he had presided over a 20 percent reduction in the Air Police field, the demise of air base ground defense, the transformation of the Air Police from a combat force to a guard force, addressed challenges resulting from the rise of Strategic Air Command and nuclear security, and introduced the Air Police shield. In fairness to him, he could have done little to resist the changes in Air Police manning and mission. It is even arguable that any of them were “wrong” at the time, although in hindsight some clearly were. Given the massive change in national security strategy, the focus on budget savings, and the transition the Air Force was undergoing to become a nuclear deterrent and strike force, it is unlikely that even someone with more of a military police background could have done better.



Brig Gen Robert F. Burnham (Air Force photo)

Brig Gen Robert F. “Pinky” Burnham, the new provost marshal, entered the Coast Guard Academy in 1930, but resigned three years later to seek an appointment as a flying cadet in the Army Air Corps, which he finally obtained in February 1935. After graduation from flying training school he was commissioned a second lieutenant in 1937. During World War II, Burnham first served as the supervisor of flying schools in Alabama and Arkansas and in 1943 was assigned to the South Pacific as a B-17 pilot. He took command of the 307th Bomb Group in early 1944 and after flying 46 combat missions, Burnham returned to the United States to take command of Lockbourne Field, Ohio. After

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assignments at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, Air Force headquarters, and NATO headquarters he was assigned to the Office of the Air Force Inspector General as the provost marshal in January 1959.⁶⁴ Prior to becoming air provost marshal, Fagg had served as deputy APM for a year. Burnham, on the other hand, had absolutely no prior provost marshal experience.

General Burnham came on board during the continuing effort by some to close the 3320th Retraining Group (RTG) at Amarillo AFB, Texas. As with most decisions in the 1950's it was driven by cost. However, the 3320th also had institutional enemies including "hard-nosed commanders bitterly opposing spending money and resources on 'eight-balls'."⁶⁵ The first attempt to close the RTG began in 1956 when the ATC commander, Lt Gen Charles T. Myers, directed Amarillo AFB to study the 3320th RTG. The resulting study concluded that dollar for dollar, the RTG was slightly cheaper than base level confinement and that in four years it had returned to duty 1,307 retrainees or enough to fill the airmen authorizations of three fighter groups.⁶⁶ The Amarillo AFB commander strongly recommended the retraining program continue and the closure effort went no further.

In April 1957, Myers forwarded another study of the 3320th to the chief of staff with his recommendation that the RTG be deactivated based on the cost of retraining versus the lower cost of improving enlistment screening procedures. However, Secretary of the Air Force, James H. Douglas, Jr. turned down the proposal. The opponents of the RTG gained a high level ally when later that year the Air Force vice chief of staff proposed that the 3320th be abolished and that base confinement facilities conduct their own rehabilitation programs. Mr. James P. Goode, Deputy Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower, Personnel and Organization and an RTG supporter, reminded everyone of the lack of effectiveness of the pre-1952 local rehabilitation programs and pointed out that trained professionals were not available at the base level to administer rehabilitation programs. With that the vice chief's proposal died.



Lt Gen Joseph F. Carroll (Air Force photo)

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The most serious attempt to close down the RTG occurred in 1959 and began with an Air Force inspector general memorandum sent by Lt Gen Carroll to Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen Curtis E. LeMay, recommending the RTG's closure. Carroll attached to his memorandum the report of an IG inspection of the 3320th that found that the RTG was not accomplishing its mission effectively; that three-fourths of the retrainees failed either at Amarillo or after being restored to duty; and that it was 90 percent cheaper to train a



Gen Curtis E. LeMay (Air Force photo)

new recruit than a retrainee. Carroll argued that the 3320th be closed since it actually performed a procurement function and the retrainees it "procured" were more expensive than the cost of training a new recruit.⁶⁷ Arguments for and against Carroll's recommendation went on through the remainder of the year. Although it was a close in the end, the 3320th survived largely due to the efforts of Mr. Goode.

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Air Police honor guard greets Air Force legend Maj General Benjamin Foulois at Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts, in 1959 (Col Ed Johnson)

¹ Official Air Force Biography, Air Force Link Website (<http://www.af.mil/bios/bio.asp?bioID=5382>).

² Official Air Force Biography, Air Force Link Website (<http://www.af.mil/bios/bio.asp?bioID=5382>).

³ Jerry M. Bullock, *Air Force Security Police*, (Turner Publishing: Paducah, KY, 1996), 20.

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- ⁴ History of the Office of the Inspector General, United States Air Force, 30 June 1953-31 Dec 1953, Vol. III, Section II, 1.
- ⁵ Historical Report, 25th Air Police Squadron, Hill AFB, Utah, From 1 September 1951 To 12 October 1951.
- ⁶ History of 6200th Air Police Squadron, Clark AB, Philippines, 1 January - 30 June 1954, 7.
- ⁷ History of 6200th Air Police Squadron, Clark AB, Philippines, 1 January - 30 June 1954, 7.
- ⁸ Telegram from George F. Kennan to Secretary of State, February 22, 1946 (The “Long Telegram”), Part V, (1).
- ⁹ The members of SEATO were the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, The Philippines, and Pakistan. The organization was initiated by the United States in September 1954 partly in response to the defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu, Indochina, in May 1954 by the Communist Viet Minh.
- ¹⁰ Herman S. Wolk, “The ‘New Look’,” *Air Force Magazine Online*, Vol. 86, No. 8, August 2003, 2.
- ¹¹ Herman S. Wolk, “The ‘New Look’,” *Air Force Magazine Online*, Vol. 86, No. 8, August 2003, 3.
- ¹² *A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on Basic National Security Policy (NSC 162/2)*, October 30, 1953.
- ¹³ Herman S. Wolk, “The ‘New Look’,” *Air Force Magazine Online*, Vol. 86, No. 8, August 2003, 6.
- ¹⁴ E-mail Lieutenant Colonel Ted Morris, USAF (Ret) to Colonel Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), March 15, 2005.
- ¹⁵ Lt Col Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973* (Office of Air Force History: Washington, D.C., 1979), 7.
- ¹⁶ *Air Provost Marshal Digest*, 1952, 7.
- ¹⁷ *APM Digest*, February 1956, 4.
- ¹⁸ *Air Provost Marshal Digest*, Vol. VI, No. 4 (April 1953), 7-8.
- ¹⁹ *PM Digest*, March 1956, 8-9.
- ²⁰ History from 1 January 1955 to 30 June 1955, 3275th Military Training Wing, Parks AFB, California, Chapter III, 13.
- ²¹ History of the Office of the Inspector General, United States Air Force, 1 January 1954-30 June 1954, Vol. II, 4.
- ²² History of the Office of the Inspector General, United States Air Force, 1 July 1954-31 December 1954, Installations Security Division, 2.
- ²³ History of the Office of the Inspector General, United States Air Force, 1 January 1954-30 June 1954, Installations Security Division, 9.
- ²⁴ History of the Office of the Inspector General, United States Air Force, 1 July 1954-31 December 1954, Installations Security Division, 2.
- ²⁵ History of the Office of the Inspector General, United States Air Force, 1 January 1954-30 June 1954, Vol. II, 5.
- ²⁶ History of the Office of the Inspector General, United States Air Force, 1 January 1954-30 June 1954, Vol. II, 5.
- ²⁷ History of the 3275th Military Training Wing, Parks AFB, California, 1 July 1955 – 31 December 1955, 19.
- ²⁸ History of the 3275th Military Training Wing, Parks AFB, California, 1 July 1955 – 31 December 1955, 19.
- ²⁹ History of the 3275th Military Training Wing, Parks AFB, California, 1 July 1955 – 31 December 1955, 19.
- ³⁰ Although sources give January 1956 as the date of the official changeover from Air Provost Marshal to Provost Marshal, it appears that Fagg had dropped the outmoded and unnecessary appellation of “Air” from his title earlier than that date. The *APM Digest* was re-titled the *PM Digest* beginning with the March 1956 issue.
- ³¹ History from 1 January 1955 to 30 June 1955, 3275th Military Training Wing, Parks AFB, California, Chapter III, 14.
- ³² History of the 3275th Military Training Wing, Parks AFB, California, 1 July 1956 – 31 December 1956, Chapter III, 22.
- ³³ History of the 3275th Military Training Wing, Parks AFB, California, 1 July 1956 – 31 December 1956, Chapter III, 23.

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- ³⁴ History of the 3700th Military Training Wing and Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas, Volume XXIX (Narrative), January – June 1957, 131.
- ³⁵ History of the 3700th Military Training Wing and Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas, Volume XXIX (Narrative), January – June 1957, 131–132.
- ³⁶ History of the 3700th Military Training Wing and Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas, Volume XXIX (Narrative), January – June 1957, 142.
- ³⁷ Fox, *Air Base Defense*, 8.
- ³⁸ Staff Study, The Provost Marshal, Local Ground Defense of Air Bases, May 1957 as quoted in Fox, *Air Base Defense*, 8.
- ³⁹ Staff Study, The Provost Marshal, Local Ground Defense of Air Bases, May 1957 as quoted in Fox, *Air Base Defense*, 8.
- ⁴⁰ Staff Study, The Provost Marshal, Local Ground Defense of Air Bases, May 1957 as quoted in Fox, *Air Base Defense*, 8.
- ⁴¹ “Officer Is Killed in Kirtland Mishap,” *Albuquerque Journal*, April 4, 1956.
- ⁴² The President's Nuclear Initiative (PNI) announced by President George H. W. Bush on September 27, 1991, took off alert the entire bomber force.
- ⁴³ The process of mastering SAC's way of doing things was known by the troops as being “SACumcised.”
- ⁴⁴ AFR 125-7, *Air Police Uniforms*, 25 May 1956.
- ⁴⁵ All information on SAC Elite Guard from the SAC Elite Guard Association webpage (www.saceliteguard.com).
- ⁴⁶ History of the 12th Air Division and 807th Air Base Group, March AFB, California, 1-31 January 1958, 2.
- ⁴⁷ History of the 12th Air Division and 807th Air Base Group, March AFB, California, 1-31 January 1958, 3.
- ⁴⁸ Letter to Commander, Eighth Air Force, Subject: Combat Defense Forces Training, 13 March 1958 attached to History of 57th Air Division, Westover AFB, Massachusetts, May 1958.
- ⁴⁹ Letter to Commander, Eighth Air Force, Subject: Combat Defense Forces Training, 13 March 1958 attached to History of 57th Air Division, Westover AFB, Massachusetts, May 1958.
- ⁵⁰ Letter to Commander, Eighth Air Force, Subject: Combat Defense Forces Training, 13 March 1958 attached to History of 57th Air Division, Westover AFB, Massachusetts, May 1958.
- ⁵¹ Letter to Commander, Eighth Air Force, Subject: Combat Defense Forces Training, 13 March 1958 attached to History of 57th Air Division, Westover AFB, Massachusetts, May 1958.
- ⁵² History of 57th Air Division, Westover AFB, Massachusetts, May 1958, 5 - 6.
- ⁵³ 78th Air Police Squadron History, Hamilton AFB, California, March 1958.
- ⁵⁴ Oral History with Oliver D. Gilmer (F341.5 .M57 vol. 747, pt. 1), Center for Oral History and Cultural Heritage University of Southern Mississippi, October 25, 1999.
- ⁵⁵ The author cannot count the number of times he heard this opinion expressed while he was on active duty. See also Capt Marie Shadden, *The Peacekeepers: Security Police History 1947 – 1982* (Lackland AFB, TX: USAF Security Police Academy, 1983), 52.
- ⁵⁶ 78th Air Police Squadron History, Hamilton AFB, California, 1 January 1959 – 31 March 1959.
- ⁵⁷ *APM Digest*, December 1955, 9.
- ⁵⁸ The Security Forces Museum at Lackland AFB, Texas, has a collection including many of these unofficial badges.
- ⁵⁹ “History of the Air Police Badge” (<http://community-2.webtv.net/Hahn-50thAP-K9/Air Police History3/>).
- ⁶⁰ “History of the Air Police Badge” (<http://community-2.webtv.net/Hahn-50thAP-K9/Air Police History3/>); Capt Marie Shadden, *The Peacekeepers: Security Police History 1947 – 1982* (Lackland AFB, TX: USAF Security Police Academy, 1983), 54.
- ⁶¹ *PM Digest*, Nov-Dec 1959.
- ⁶² Capt Marie Shadden, *The Peacekeepers: Security Police History 1947 – 1982* (Lackland AFB, TX: USAF Security Police Academy, 1983), 46; Anna M. Waller, *Dogs and National Defense* (Department of the Army, Office of the Quartermaster General, 1958), 62.
- ⁶³ Anna M. Waller, *Dogs and National Defense* (Department of the Army, Office of the Quartermaster General, 1958), 62.
- ⁶⁴ Burnham's official Air Force biography states that he assumed the position of Provost Marshal in July 1959.

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⁶⁵ James P. Goode as quoted in Dr. Roger G. Miller, *Crime, Correction, and Quality Force: A History of the 3320th Correction and Rehabilitation Squadron 1951-1985* (Randolph AFB, TX: Air Training Command History and Research Office, 1987), 71.

⁶⁶ Dr. Roger G. Miller, *Crime, Correction, and Quality Force: A History of the 3320th Correction and Rehabilitation Squadron 1951-1985* (Randolph AFB, TX: Air Training Command History and Research Office, 1987), 72.

⁶⁷ Dr. Roger G. Miller, *Crime, Correction, and Quality Force: A History of the 3320th Correction and Rehabilitation Squadron 1951-1985* (Randolph AFB, TX: Air Training Command History and Research Office, 1987), 72.

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CHAPTER FOUR

“FLEXIBLE RESPONSE” AND INTO VIETNAM: 1961 – 1964

When the young, charismatic President John Fitzgerald Kennedy took office in January 1961, he did not embrace Eisenhower’s strategy of relying on massive nuclear retaliation to oppose Communist expansionism. During the presidential campaign of 1960, Kennedy charged that the Eisenhower administration’s obsession with balancing the budget had severely weakened America’s conventional forces and created a “missile gap” with the Soviets in nuclear weapons strength.

While the so-called “missile gap” did exist, the gap actually favored the United States. However, Kennedy’s campaign charges that New Look’s focus on Strategic Air Command’s nuclear strike force had severely weakened conventional ground forces were valid. In 1953 the Army’s strength was over a million and a half men and 20 combat divisions, but by 1958, after the post-Korean War manpower adjustments had kicked-in, the Army had shrunk to less than 900,000 men and 15 divisions. Kennedy and his advisors felt that massive retaliation’s reliance on nuclear weapons at the expense of conventional forces limited the United State’s options in a crisis to either backing down or triggering a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union.



President John F. Kennedy (John F. Kennedy Library)

A new strategy was needed, and one was proposed in 1960 when retired Army Chief of Staff GEN Maxwell Taylor published, *The Uncertain Trumpet*. In the book he criticized the massive retaliation doctrine and proposed something he called “Flexible Response.” Taylor wanted the United States to be ready to respond worldwide with whatever forces it would take to defeat the Communist-inspired insurgencies. He believed these insurgencies were the main threat to world stability and against which nuclear weapons were of little use.

When Kennedy assumed office in January 1961, relations with the Soviet Union were troubled. In the spring of 1960, Francis Gary Power’s U2 spy plane had been shot down during an intelligence gathering flight over the Soviet Union and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev had been cool toward the United States ever since. While the possibility of a general nuclear war was remote, Soviet support of wars of “national liberation” increased. In May 1961, Kennedy, referring to these wars, told Congress that

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the great battleground between the Communists and the Free World in the 1960's would be "the lands of the rising peoples."¹

As revolts seeking democratic reforms in these developing nations broke out, Kennedy noted that the Soviet and Chinese Communists supplied weapons, sent in agitators, and launched propaganda campaigns, all with the goal of taking control of these rebel movements and transforming them into Communist revolutions. As Kennedy took office, Communist-backed insurgencies were challenging the governments of Laos, South Vietnam, the Congo, and Algeria, and the threat of revolution hung over countries in South America, Africa, and Asia. In most of these areas the Communists were backing the insurgents while the United States was aiding government forces.

Once Kennedy adopted the doctrine of flexible response, massive retaliation was officially de-emphasized and attention shifted to the need for battle-ready conventional forces as a deterrent to limited war. Kennedy, therefore, directed his secretary of defense to "reorganize and modernize the Army's divisional structure, to increase its non-nuclear firepower, to improve its tactical mobility in any environment, to insure its flexibility to meet any direct or indirect threat, to facilitate its coordination with our major allies, and to provide more modern mechanized divisions in Europe and bring their equipment up to date..."²



Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (DoD photo)

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara was seen by Kennedy as the ideal person to implement his program to revamp the country's military organization in order to implement flexible response. A former president of Ford Motor Company, McNamara had a well-established reputation for cost-cutting and efficiency. Although a former wartime Army Air Forces lieutenant colonel, McNamara was not especially knowledgeable about defense matters, but he immersed himself in the subject and soon began to take an active role in managing the defense department by questioning the status quo, setting objectives, and stimulating progress. Despite his mandate for change, McNamara nevertheless rejected radical changes, such as that

proposed by a Kennedy-appointed committee headed by Senator W. Stuart Symington that would have abolished the military departments, replaced the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a single chief of staff, and established three functional unified commands. Despite his effort to bring business-like efficiency to the Department of Defense and cut costs when possible, from 1961 to 1964 Robert McNamara, presided over the largest peacetime military buildup in American history.

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The year 1961 would be a year of great change for the Air Police. On March 15, 1961, Provost Marshal Burnham approved a name change for his office. The Air Provost Marshal Directorate was renamed the Directorate of Security and Law Enforcement and the Army-like title of provost marshal was scrapped. While Burnham acknowledged that the demise of the old title might “cause a slight tug at the heartstrings,” there were compelling reasons for the change.³ First, the old title was a holdover, archaic term from the Army. Second, it was not consistent with Air Force nomenclature. Finally, it was a title associated principally with law enforcement that failed to encompass the increasingly important Air Police mission of nuclear security. Burnham advised those wedded to the old ways to get with it and reminded them that, “The unhesitant departure from tradition, when justified, has been a characteristic of the Air Force since its inception.”⁴

Burnham also declared war on “cliff hangers” or terms that hung on in common usage even though officially changed. Among the enemy were “police and prison officer” which had been changed to “confinement officer” in 1951; “guardhouse” and “stockade” replaced by “confinement facility” that same year; “billy club” instead of “nightstick;” and “Air Police badge” instead of “Air Police shield.”⁵ He banned these terms from official communications.

A survey of the career field made in late 1960 and published early in 1961 revealed the typical air policeman to be 25 years old, although fully 25 percent of the force was under the age of 21. Seventy-two percent were high school graduates and about 50 percent of them had graduated from the Air Police School. Forty-five percent of them were on their first enlistment and the odds favored that he was married. The survey uncovered two problems: 50 percent of Air Police School graduates completed only one enlistment and married airmen below the grade of airman first class were most likely to be disciplinary problems.⁶

Not all was well in the ranks of the officers who led these young airmen. Many officers were leaving the career field for other Air Force specialties, resulting in a shortage of trained Air Police officers. Lt Col Kenneth E. Husemoller, base deputy commander for security and law enforcement at Walker AFB, New Mexico, thought he knew why this was happening and passed his observations on to the base commander. Col Husemoller chalked the exodus up to dissatisfaction with the Air Police career field. While the conclusion may have been obvious, Husemoller believed the reasons for this dissatisfaction might not be and he highlighted three sources of concern. First, opportunities for advancement in the career field were limited since the “the highest position an officer can expect is base-level BDCL [base deputy commander for law enforcement]...” a job that “normally calls for a major...”⁷ Second, it was “extremely disillusioning” for an Air Police officer with years of experience to find himself subordinated to “a higher ranking officer, with no air police experience, who has been assigned to the career field only for sake of filling a UMD [unit manning document] slot.”⁸ Finally, there was no orderly input of officers into the Air Police and officers were assigned based not on past experience or ability, but to fill vacancies in units. The solution, Lt Col Husemoller argued, was the encouragement of “air police

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professionalism” and that would require that officers be selected for duty in the field “according to their ability, desire and aptitude,” an end to the practice of assigning untrained officers to Air Police leadership positions, and the expansion of promotion opportunities.⁹

Base commander, Col Roderic D. O’Connor, forwarded Lt Col Husemoller’s letter to higher headquarters with his own letter concurring in his subordinate’s observations. O’Connor noted that an “esprit de corps and personal pride” had been fostered among the enlisted Air Police and, given the hardships of being an Air Police officer compared to other officer career fields; he recommended that “positive steps be taken at Air Force Headquarters level to enhance the attractiveness of assignment to air police and combat defense work.”¹⁰ Among the positive steps O’Connor recommended were the more careful selection of Air Police officers; competitions among air police and combat defense units; a continuing recruitment effort to attract the “right” officers to the career field; the offering of direct commissions to qualified civilian policemen; and giving gold and silver badges for 10 and 20 years of service. How O’Connor’s recommendations were received at headquarters is unrecorded, but some of his ideas would be implemented years later.

In 1960 and 1961, the armament and equipment of the Air Police changed, consistent with the post-Korean War transition from combat force to guard force. Training on the Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR) was dropped, and .30 and .50 caliber machine guns and the 57mm recoilless rifle were deleted from the armory as unnecessary.

In May 1961, the venerable .45 caliber automatic pistol would also be scrapped after it was decided that it was too difficult for airmen to qualify on the heavy pistol and that its characteristic stopping power and ability to penetrate jungle foliage was unnecessary for police work. After testing was conducted by the Air Force Marksmanship School, the decision was made to replace the .45 with the Smith & Wesson .38 caliber “Combat Masterpiece” revolver.¹¹ The testing had established that the lighter weight, 9 1/8-inch long revolver yielded higher percentages of newly enlisted airmen who qualified at Marksman, or better, on the firing range with less training. Unlike the .45, the lighter .38 did not require the shooter to consciously raise the barrel to offset the weight of the weapon and its lighter recoil allowed it to be better kept on the aiming point. The tests also determined that the revolver was safer to handle primarily because it was easier to tell that the revolver was unloaded, as opposed to the automatic, which always seemed to harbor an often overlooked “one in the chamber” that resulted in death or injury to the careless handler or to those unfortunate enough to be in the line of fire. “It was a dangerous weapon,” explained one Airman who was not sad to see the .45 go. “You had a lot of accidental firings.”¹² The first issues of the new weapon were anticipated in the summer of 1962.

The M-2 .30 caliber carbine would also soon be gone in favor of the Colt AR-15 .223 caliber rifle, although budgetary restrictions would delay the new weapon’s fielding. The AN/PRC-37 walkie-talkie radios currently in use were also slated for replacement in

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1961. However, until replacements could be purchased, units were authorized to lease off-the-shelf Motorola or General Electric radios from commercial sources.¹³

In addition to the changes in the Air Police, the spring and summer of 1961 were to be interesting times. On April 17, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), with President Kennedy's approval, landed 1,500 Cuban exiles at Cuba's Bay of Pigs in an effort to trigger a popular uprising against Fidel Castro's Communist government. However, Cuban forces cut off the exiles' beachhead and Kennedy refused to send in American air support. By April 19, 90 of the invaders were dead and 1,189 captured, resulting in Castro being driven even closer to the Soviets; a move that would have serious repercussions.

Coincidentally, the month of the Bay of Pigs saw the activation of the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron, nicknamed Jungle Jim, at Eglin AFB, Florida. Their mission was the development of doctrine, tactics, and equipment to provide air support to counter-insurgency operations in jungle environments.¹⁴

On August 12, 1961, East German leader Walter Ulbricht signed an order directing that access to and from East Berlin to West Berlin be closed. Roads, railways, the subway, and even buildings were cut in half and barbed wire and barricades went up. On August 15, construction began on a concrete wall and this action, coupled with Khrushchev's attempts to coerce Kennedy into signing a treaty ceding all of Berlin to the East German government, led to the first test of flexible response. Taking the advice of Gen Lauris Norstad, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), Kennedy authorized the largest overseas deployment of military aircraft since the Second World War. Tactical Air Command quickly deployed 210 aircraft to Europe and this rapid conventional force response, backed by nuclear weapons based in Great Britain and West Germany, was a great success. By the summer of 1962, Berlin had ceased to be a potential flashpoint.



Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota K-9 Section, summer 1961 (Security Forces Museum)

Almost unnoticed amidst these other events, Air Police TSgt Kenneth Pitts, along with three military working dogs, departed Lackland AFB on June 22, 1961, bound for the Republic of Vietnam.¹⁵

Like Korea, Vietnam was another Asian country divided after World War II. Bordering China to the north, the South China Sea on the east and Laos and Cambodia to the west, by the 1890's Vietnam, along with Laos and Cambodia, were part of French Indochina. After the fall of France to Hitler's armies in 1940, the Japanese, through its German ally, forced the French Vichy government to accept its occupation of French



1965 photo of Ho Chi Minh (Associated Press)

Indochina. As World War II ended and the defeated Japanese departed, the French announced plans for the creation of a French-dominated federation of Indochina. This federation was accepted in Cambodia and Laos, but Vietnamese nationalists demanded the complete independence of Vietnam. By 1946, Vietnam was plunged into bitter fighting between the French and the nationalist Viet Minh, led by Ho Chi Minh, a founding member of the French Communist Party. The struggle

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between the French and the Viet Minh dragged on until the disastrous French defeat by Ho's Viet Minh at Dienbienphu in May 1954.

From April to July 1954, representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, the People's Republic of China, North Korea, South Korea, Vietnam, the Viet Minh party, Laos, and Cambodia, met at Geneva, Switzerland, to restore peace in both Korea and Indochina. No agreement was reached on transforming the Korean armistice into a permanent peace, but agreements were reached providing for an armistice and political settlement in Indochina.

Undeterred by the bloody example set by a divided Korea, the Geneva conferees agreed that Vietnam was to be divided at the 17th parallel into the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the north with Ho as its first president, and the Republic of Vietnam under Emperor Bao Dai in the south. The Geneva accord also provided that elections be held in 1956 with the goal of reuniting North and South Vietnam. When the time for elections came, however, South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem, who had engineered the abolition of the Bao Dai monarchy in 1955, refused to hold them, allegedly because he feared that Ho's popularity would have led to reunification under Communist rule. Diem was supported by the United States in this decision. Frustrated in his efforts to unify all of Vietnam under his rule at the ballot box, Ho organized a guerrilla force, the National Liberation Front, or Viet Cong, to win South Vietnam by subversion and force.

Like Eisenhower, who first implemented a policy of supporting Diem, Kennedy viewed the conflict in Vietnam as part of the larger, global Cold War, and came to regard it as a prototype for the Communist strategy of wars of liberation. After the embarrassing debacle at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961, and after agreeing to a compromise with the Pathet Lao in Laos, Kennedy felt compelled to take a strong stand in Vietnam.

In late 1961, the Kennedy administration decided to dramatically increase the United States' commitment to South Vietnam and although he rejected Joint Chiefs Chairman, General Maxwell Taylor's, proposal to send combat troops, Kennedy did launch Project Beefup. In an effort to save Diem's government, Beefup more than doubled US military assistance and included previously withheld equipment such as armored personnel carriers and more than 300 military aircraft. The number of US military advisers also increased from 3,205 at the end of 1961 to more than 9,000 by the end of 1962. These "advisers" were also authorized to play an increasingly active role in combat.

The Air Police, however, were no longer trained for combat. Already stripped of their heavy weapons, by January 1962, Air Police officers received only classroom



South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem
(UPI-Bettmann/Corbis)

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training, no live fire, on firearms.¹⁶ By summer, “live” fire training on the .38 used plastic, reusable plastic bullets propelled by only a primer. Ostensibly, the new



Air Police field training in the early 1960s (Air Force Security Forces Center)

“ammunition” was developed to “avoid delays in training due to weather, the lack of outdoor range facilities, plus the need for an improved method of premarksmanship training.”¹⁷ However, many believed the primary reason for the change was cost; the plastic bullets cost a mere \$7.50 for 1000 rounds and could be reused up to 15 times.

Weapons discipline remained a continuing concern. Although the mixing of young men and lethal weapons always results in some accidents, the incidents of accidental shootings among the supposedly trained professionals of the Air Police rose to such an extent in the early sixties that headquarters felt a warning was needed. Many of these incidents were the results of “quick draw” contests with “unloaded” weapons or other horseplay resulting in death or injury. Air Police in the field were reminded that, “The careless discharge of a weapon is clearly defined as constituting a disorder or neglect prejudicial to good order within the scope of Article 134, UCMJ.”¹⁸ It was also noted that many incidents not resulting in death or injury went unreported or were excused as accidents and this reflected “unfavorably upon the leadership and discipline maintained by commissioned and noncommissioned Air Police officers.”¹⁹ Urging a hard line against weapons safety violations Burnham, warned that, “The man who draws his pistol unnecessarily, forgets to unload it before cleaning, or in any way ignores the rules of safety and good judgment, does not deserve to wear the shield of an Air Policeman.”²⁰

The Air Police presence in Southeast Asia increased in November 1961, when Detachment 2, 4400th CCT Squadron arrived at Bien Hoa Air Base outside of South Vietnam’s capital of Saigon. Codenamed “Farm Gate,” 41 officers and 115 airmen of the unit deployed for 179 days temporary duty with eight T-28, four RB-26, and four SC-47 aircraft and the mission of training the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) in

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counterinsurgency operations. In addition to training VNAF, Detachment 2 would also operate an air control facility for all USAF activities in Southeast Asia not assigned to the Military Assistance Advisory Group. Operational control over Farm Gate along with some 13th Air Force units in South Vietnam was exercised by Pacific Air Forces 2nd Advanced Echelon (ADVON).²¹

Air Police volunteers deployed with Farm Gate. Tasked with guarding the American cantonment area, like all Farm Gate personnel, these men wore civilian clothes, but carried brand new Browning .30 caliber rifles and Thompson submachine guns. In the event of enemy attack their mission was to buy enough time for the Americans to reach the river and float down to Saigon.²² Unprepared and ill-trained, the Air Police were gradually and unknowingly being drawn into a combat mission.

The year ended with a harbinger of change when on December 1, 1961, WAF Reserve officer, OSI agent, and law student, Capt Renee Rubin, was awarded the entry level Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) of Air Police Officer at Hamilton AFB, California. Rubin caused quite a stir when she arrived for AP technical training and the Airman at the technical training squadron orderly room called the WAF commander and told her there was a woman signing in for the AP course. "You can't go to that, women aren't allowed," the female colonel told Rubin when Rubin confirmed that she was here to attend the course.²³



Col Renee Rubin with Security Police senior leaders in 1978 (Col Jerry M. Bullock)

The colonel asked someone for a copy of the regulation and after reading it confirmed what Captain Rubin already knew—the regulation had nothing in it that would exclude an otherwise qualified female officer and sent her to the course director’s office. Rubin was a curiosity and she recalled that, “When I arrived, men were standing in the doorways of all the rooms on the first floor of the building waiting to examine the new enrollee.”²⁴ Rubin became the first female to be awarded the Air Police AFSC, but her achievement did not even rate a mention in the directorate’s history for the period. She would not be joined by another woman for 11 years.

One would expect that with Air Force personnel and aircraft deployed to Vietnam, an area where they might be attacked by well-trained, highly motivated insurgent forces, air base defense would become an Air Police priority. However, the Air Force and the Air Police had learned the lessons of Korea so well that pilferage and sabotage were still considered the primary threats, that no efforts to develop air base defense doctrine and tactics were made even in the face of an active insurgency. In fact, air base defense preparations were actively discouraged.

In February 1962, Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces (HQ PACAF) directed 2nd ADVON to implement standard Air Force internal security procedures. The ADVON commander in turn requested 13th Air Force’s director of security and law enforcement to perform a staff assistance visit (SAV) and make recommendations concerning the

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implementation of security procedures. The resulting SAV report actually advised against the use of air base ground defense forces since they were unfamiliar with their weapons.²⁵ Incredibly, the report, while acknowledging that large scale enemy assaults against Air Force facilities were possible, also warned that arming security personnel with more than a basic load of ammunition might actually encourage Viet Cong (VC) guerilla and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) attacks!²⁶

The first 6,000 of the “more dependable, accurate, safe and modern” .38 revolvers reached the field in February 1962, and were issued to SAC air policemen.²⁷ Holsters and ammunition pouches were not included since these were procured under a separate contract from another vendor. Until the .38 holsters were delivered, modified .45 holsters were used. On April 16, 1962, training on the .45 automatic was discontinued at the Air Police School and the conversion of the Air Police’s primary sidearm from one designed for combat to one designed for police and guard work was complete.

One particularly high visibility guard detail was the Headquarters USAF Security Force. This 33-man force guarded the “Gold Coast” in the Pentagon’s E-Ring where the offices of the secretary of the Air Force and chief of staff were located. The members of this force were “hand-picked, razor-sharp air policemen” with the “utmost tact and diplomacy” picked for their “exemplary performance” in the Air Police field.²⁸ The uniforms of the security force were distinctive: blue tunic and trousers, wheel hat with white band and chin strap, a white backing for the Air Police shield, a whistle on a lanyard attached to the right shoulder, and a .38 revolver. One NATO dignitary said, “I’ve never seen more efficient military policemen anywhere.”²⁹

Police and guard duties were the primary missions of the Air Police and the primary focus of the latter mission was on SAC’s nuclear weapons. While flexible response relegated their awesome power to a weapon of last resort, McNamara made increasing the quality and quantity of America’s nuclear arsenal a priority. The principal mission of America’s nuclear forces was one of deterrence and McNamara’s chosen strategy was one of mutual assured destruction, or MAD, based on the promise that should the Soviet Union attack the United States with nuclear weapons, the United States would retaliate in kind with sufficient strength to obliterate 25 percent of the Soviet Union's population and 50 percent of its industrial capacity. To make this strategy credible, McNamara sped up the modernization and expansion of weapon and delivery systems, including the production and deployment of the solid-fuel Minuteman ICBMs and Polaris Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs).

At the start of the decade, Strategic Air Command had two main types of ICBMs in its inventory—the Atlas and the Titan. By the early ‘60s, the Atlas was deployed in three variants, the Atlas D, E, and F. Three Atlas D, 27 Atlas E, and 72 Atlas F missiles were based in silo complexes located throughout the United States. These complexes were supported by Strategic Missile Squadrons at Air Force bases near the complexes, mostly in the central United States; however, some sites were constructed in New York and Washington. Launch facilities were also located at Vandenberg AFB, California, but these were generally prototypes of complexes to be constructed elsewhere. The volatile

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nature of the single-stage, liquid fueled Atlas made them a maintainer's nightmare and several accidents caused the complete loss of missile and silo. Advancements in solid fuel rocket technology had made the Atlas system so obsolete that all of the Atlas complexes were slated for decommissioning and closure by 1965.

Developed in parallel with the Atlas, the Titan I was the United States' first true multistage ICBM. Produced by the Glenn L. Martin Company, Titan I was a two-stage, liquid-fueled, rocket-powered missile and as with the Atlas, its volatile, liquid fuel system was a severe drawback. Deployed in a "hard" silo, the missile had to be raised to the surface by a special launcher for firing and had an effective range of 5,500 nautical miles. As each stage was fired, its engines and fuel tanks dropped away, thereby decreasing the weight and mass of the vehicle which made the missile more efficient and resulted in increased range and a larger payload.



Titan II launch at Vandenberg AFB, California, sometime in the mid-1960s (Air Force photo)

In June 1960, the Air Force awarded the Martin Company the Titan II contract. Developed in parallel with the Titan I, the Titan II took shape rapidly. Captive flight tests began in December 1961, and by February 1963, a Titan II fired from the Air Force Missile Test Center (AFMTC) in Florida logged a successful 6,500-mile flight. With their 6,300-mile operational range, the Air Force based the Titan II's in the vast area between the states of Colorado and Washington, while the Titan II's with their 9,000-mile range were based farther south in Arizona, Kansas, and Arkansas. Congress authorized the Air Force to deploy 12 Titan squadrons, evenly split between Titan I and Titan II.

By the late 1950s, advances in solid-fuel propellants enabled the Air Force to develop a solid-fuel ICBM, the Minuteman I, to replace the Atlas and Titan I missiles. The Minuteman, a three-stage, solid-propellant, rocket-powered ICBM with a range of approximately 5,500 nautical miles, rapidly went from formal development in September 1958 to operational alert at Malmstrom AFB, Montana, in October 1962. The missiles were inserted into unmanned, hardened, underground 12-foot diameter silos buried approximately 80 feet deep and covered by a 100-ton blast door which was blown off prior to missile launch. The missiles were deployed in flights of ten missiles controlled by a single, centrally located launch control center (LCC) buried at a depth of 40 to 100 feet below ground and manned by a Missile Combat Crew. The above ground missile alert facility (MAF) contained living quarters and support equipment for the facility manager, chef, and security personnel. The security personnel were, of course, air policemen.



Minuteman I test launch (Air Force photo)

By the early 60's, two manuals governed Air Police security operations. The first was AFM 205-3, *Air Police Security Operations*, dated February 15, 1963. AFM 205-3 provided general guidance for all aspects of installation security and focused on the threats posed by clandestine operations such as espionage, subversion, and sabotage. The threat posed by hostile mobs or enemy forces was recognized, but security forces were expected to mount only a holding action since, "Defense against numerically superior trained forces for a sustained period of time is the responsibility of the US Army and other friendly ground forces."³⁰ Strategic Air Command, always the leader in air base

security, did not completely scrap combat skills training and set up the "Tough Tiger" program to continue to provide some combat skills training to selected air policemen. Sixteenth Air Force also established its own Air Police Academy at Torrejon AB, Spain, to "give the APs assigned to Strategic Air Command bases in Spain the specialized training needed to protect the jet bombers that pack the counterpunch so important to the defense of the free world."³¹ At the Torrejon academy, SAC APs involved in nuclear weapons security received three weeks of training in judo, riot control measures, search and seizure, and combat skills, with the vast majority of the training "geared to security measures."³²

The installation security concept set out in AFM 205-3 conceded that all areas of an installation could not be completely protected and directed that "the primary effort be directed to the protection of those elements of our weapons systems that are indispensable to the Air Force counterforce posture."³³ These indispensable resources were to be protected day-to-day by an installation security program made up of five elements: personnel security embodied in the Security Clearance Program; administrative security involving the safeguarding of military information; a physical security program capable of detecting threats and alerting security forces; a security education program; and security testing procedures.³⁴

The security system of an installation was made up of twelve components. These included a security priority list which categorized the "critical elements" of an installation into two groups: Category I which included elements of weapons systems "which are indispensable to the combat or combat support missions" and Category II for elements "not a part of the weapon systems but which contribute to the direct support of the mission."³⁵ Restricted areas with circulation control systems to positively identify personnel seeking access and protected by physical safeguards such as alarms, fences, and checkpoints were mandatory for Category I resources. A Central Security Control or

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CSC was to serve as the “nerve center for all security communications and operations...”³⁶

Another of the twelve components was the Sabotage Alert Teams, or SATs, that were manned on a 24-hour basis and provided “mobile, armed, and...instantaneous response to any requirement for aid or reinforcement from a Category I element.”³⁷ AFM 205-3 established an Air Police squadron organization for installations with combat missions and directed combat support requirements consisting of a Combat Defense Squadron (CDS) of from two to seven security flights, including sentry dog teams along with confinement and law enforcement flights, whose personnel were administratively assigned to the CDS.

While AFM 205-3 did touch on nuclear or special weapons security, its focus was installation security as a whole. It was AFM 207-1, *Doctrine and Requirements for Security of Aerospace Systems*, published on June 10, 1964, that became “the bible” for Air Force aerospace systems and special weapons security. The basic concept of the Aerospace Systems Security Program established by AFM 207-1 was “to achieve throughout the USAF a state of physical security from enemy clandestine operations...by deterring the enemy from employing such operations against aerospace systems.”³⁸

The Aerospace Systems Security Program was built upon base and site security operations and these two operations shared three principles: All security programs existed to “counteract the analyzed threat of enemy action;” all security programs would share a “uniform and specific priority structure;” and across the Air Force “a high order of standardization in security doctrine, procedures, facilities, and terms will prevail.”³⁹



A2C John Meakin, Jr. of the 814th Combat Defense Squadron on the Westover AFB, Massachusetts, flightline with a B-52 in 1965 (John Meakin, Jr.)

The “uniform and specific priority structure” established by AFM 207-1 classified aerospace systems as Priority A, B, and C. Priority A systems were strategic bombers and tactical and air defense fighter aircraft in “cocked” status on alert, armed and ready to launch; alert refueling and electronic countermeasures aircraft; alert aircrews and

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aerospace ground equipment (AGE) used for starting engines on alert aircraft; missiles on strategic alert and on-duty missile combat crews and facilities essential to their launch; nuclear weapons storage sites; and components of command and control and early warning systems.

Regardless of classification, priority resources were to be segregated in restricted areas subject to entry control procedures. Certain Priority A resources also required close security areas within the restricted area. For example, for Priority A aircraft on the ramp, the close security area perimeter was required to be established “not closer than 10 feet nor farther than wing tip distance from the fuselage.”⁴⁰ The close security area perimeter was the innermost line of security control; even the aircraft’s guards were not allowed across that line. Only the aircraft commander could authorize entry into the close security area.

When nuclear weapons were involved, whether loaded aboard an aircraft or not, a “no lone” zone could be designated in accordance with AFR 122-4. Inside a “no lone” zone, the “Two-Man System” applied and no individual was allowed inside the zone unless accompanied by another. The “Two-Man System” was primarily a nuclear safety/reliability requirement and Air Police officers were reminded by headquarters that ensuring compliance was not a primary responsibility of the Air Police.⁴¹

Priority A and B resource restricted areas required entry control procedures. Because of the nature of the resource entry control procedures were the strictest for Priority A. To enter these areas two things were needed: verifiable authority and verifiable identity. Those personnel who required routine access to a restricted area could be issued a badge allowing unescorted entry; otherwise, a temporary pass requiring an escort could be issued if the individual was vouched for by someone authorized to do so. Two verification systems were used. The exchange badge system involved two identical restricted area badges with one worn by the individual and the other kept in the entry control point (ECP). When the individual desired entry he exchanged his badge for the one in the ECP after the sentry on duty compared the two. The single badge procedure required the ECP controller to verify the photograph and physical description on the badge with the individual’s features.

Two up channel reports were provided to cover incidents involving aerospace systems. The first, nicknamed HELPING HAND, was used to report a hostile or possibly hostile event had been detected at a base or site. If investigation confirmed or reasonably established enemy action at the base or site, emergency security operations were to be initiated and a COVERED WAGON report sent to higher headquarters.⁴² Although not part of the AFM 207-1 lexicon, an incident involving the compromise of a nuclear weapon was codenamed BROKEN ARROW. These standardized reports replaced the SEVEN HIGH reports previously used to report a weapons system security violation.

Under AFM 207-1, the “Aerospace Security Forces” had the “primary functional responsibility for the Aerospace Systems Security Program.”⁴³ Air Police personnel augmented if needed by other Airmen made up the Aerospace Security Forces and they

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served as sentries, ECP controllers, and in three-man SATs, which under AFM 207-1 were called Security Alert Teams, although they served the same function as AFM 205-3's Sabotage Alert Teams. Weapons system security fell most heavily on the military side of the Air Police since Air Force civilian police and foreign nationals could only be used to secure Priority C resources. Airman Third Class (A3C) Frank Farris was one of those aerospace security forces personnel upon which the Aerospace Security Program depended.

Fresh out of basic training, Farris was assigned on a direct duty assignment (DDA) to Pease AFB, New Hampshire's, Air Police force. Like all DDAs he was assigned to the Air Police having had no Air Police training. A Floridian, he was amazed by the cold and snow of the New Hampshire winter and absolutely puzzled by the cold weather gear he was issued. Since no one explained how to put the bulky clothing on when it was issued, Farris went searching for "someone who had been there awhile...to explain to me how you donned the cold weather gear."⁴⁴



81st APS Airman in winter gear at RAF Bentwaters, United Kingdom (Col Jerry M. Bullock)

When he finally got himself dressed he found that he could, "barely walk...decked out like a bunny" in mukluks and heavy quilted pants.⁴⁵

Young Farris waddled to the CSC and drew a .30 caliber carbine, crawled into the back of a truck with some other troops and set out for his posting as a boundary guard in the alert aircraft area. The truck stopped, his name

was called, and he "stumbled" out of the truck and went around to the front of the vehicle. Standing in the headlights was an Airman who handed him a package with the special security instructions, or SSIs, for the post and then clambered into the truck which drove off into the dark, trailing a cloud of snow. Frank Farris was now alone on the flightline and "it's dark; it's cold; it's snowing. I have no idea what I'm doing, don't know...what direction is north, south, east, or west."⁴⁶

Swallowing his panic and fighting off desperation, Farris pulled out his flashlight to read his SSI's in hope that they might tell him what to do. The SSI's told him the limits of his post, but since he had no idea where he was he had no idea where those limits were. Seeing three B-47 bombers looming up in the snow, he started walking toward them when a voice shouted out of the darkness, "Halt! Don't come any closer."⁴⁷ Farris had wandered into another Airman's post. Within the shadow of three nuclear armed bombers a comic conversation took place.

Farris: "Wait, wait. I need help. Come over and talk to me."

Airman: "I can't talk to you. It's a violation of my SSI."

Farris: "Well, I'm new. I don't know what to do, so yell at me. Tell me what to do."⁴⁸

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So in the numbing cold, swirling snow, and the dark of a New Hampshire winter night, one Airman shouted at another and taught him his duties. Frank Farris would learn; they mostly all did.

Sometimes security forces were assigned “additional duties” that were not quite required for safeguarding priority resources. Airman (Amn) Ernest Koontz was part of the security detachment guarding a Ballistic Missile Early Warning Site (BMEWS) at Melville Air Station, Labrador, Canada, but ended up enhancing the local scenery for visitors. The area around Goose Bay and Melville was a popular destination for hunters and fishermen. More than one general officer would arrive on a recreational outing, termed an “inspection tour”, which resulted in Koontz and his comrades being turned out to enhance the experience. When a distinguished visitor was to visit the BMEWS, a snowplow would clear the road to the site, sloughing dirty snow off the sides of the road. Since dirty snow was unacceptable, Koontz and his fellow airmen were sent into the woods to “get clean snow and cover up dirty snow so it would look pretty” for the VIP.⁴⁹

In the ICBM missile fields the Combat Defense Squadrons eventually morphed into Missile Security Squadrons (MSS), but continued to perform the same mission. All missile silos and launch facilities were Priority A resources and Air Police manned ECP's at the aboveground launch facilities and secured the widely scattered missile silos. Missile Security Squadrons had wide geographical areas of responsibility and were more mobile than the normal CDS. So far afield were some of the silos from their parent base that Air Police Camper Teams driving pickup trucks equipped with camper units in the truck beds were formed to patrol these isolated missile fields.

In addition to its ICBMs, the United States also fielded Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles, or IRBM's, overseas in allied countries. The deployment of one of these IRBM systems, the “Jupiter,” was part of a series of events that brought the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear war in a crisis triggered by the fears of two men.

By the summer of 1962, Soviet ICBMs could reach Europe, but not the United States in any great numbers or with any accuracy. However, American Jupiter IRBM's located in Turkey could strike almost anywhere in the Soviet Union. In addition to Thor IRBM's based in England, and 30 “Jupiters” in Italy, one squadron totaling 15 missiles was deployed at five sites near Izmir, Turkey. Nikita Khrushchev feared that the imbalance in missile capability and the proximity of the Turkish based missiles would tempt the US to launch a first strike.

Fidel Castro had his own fears after the Bay of Pigs Invasion in April 1961. First, President Kennedy made little effort to conceal his continued desire to see Castro deposed. Second, Cuban intelligence uncovered documents that described Operation Mongoose, a plan to invade Cuba and overthrow Castro which was scheduled for October 1962. When Khrushchev proposed that the Soviet Union should install missiles in Cuba, aimed at the US, a worried Castro agreed. Construction of the Cuban missile sites began in mid-July 1962 and by August, increased shipping activity between the Soviet Union

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and Cuba had come to the attention of American intelligence. On August 10, the director of the CIA told Kennedy that in his opinion, the Soviets intended to install medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba.

On October 17, a U-2 flight revealed the existence of IRBM missile launch facilities in Cuba that would be able to strike almost anywhere in the continental United States. Four days later, Kennedy announced to the nation that the United States was establishing a “quarantine” around Cuba to prevent the delivery of missiles to Cuba. Kennedy purposely chose the word “quarantine” to describe his naval action rather than “blockade” since under international law a blockade is an act of war.

On October 22, SAC was placed on Defense Condition (DEFCON) 2 and the rest of the military establishment was placed on DEFCON 3.⁵⁰ One hundred thirty-six ICBMs were prepared for launch and SAC crews took over 36 test missiles of various kinds by replacing the Air Force Systems Command and civilian personnel with SAC combat crews.

SAC’s bomber force was dispersed to bases and civilian airports across the United States in accordance with SAC War Plan 440. At civilian airports, SAC Air Police accompanied the aircraft and established security while at Air Force bases existing Air Police personnel were utilized. Amn Ernest Koontz had been on duty with the Air Police at McClellan AFB, California for seven months when six B-47s arrived at the base as part of the dispersal. Koontz and his comrades had been guarding warehouses, but after being briefed by an officer that “we were fixing to go to war with Cuba,” they were loaded on a bus that “took us out to where these airplanes had just landed.”⁵¹ Concertina wire was strung around the bombers and a klaxon was installed in the barracks, but Koontz’s previous duties had not prepared him for this. “We had no idea how to perform security for the aircraft”, he later admitted, “Because we didn’t do none of that kind of stuff.”⁵²

Saturday, October 26, was extremely tense. A U-2 reconnaissance plane on a routine flight in Alaska got lost and strayed into Soviet airspace. The Soviets sent an entire fighter group to intercept the U-2 and American fighters were sent in response. Fortunately, the U-2 was able to leave Soviet airspace without the fighter groups making contact with each other, but over Cuba, a U-2 was shot down. The United States considered this evidence that the Soviets were escalating the conflict, but the shoot down order had come from a local commander without approval from Moscow.

That same day a letter was received from Khrushchev proposing that the Soviets withdraw their missiles in return for a pledge by Kennedy not to invade Cuba. That evening, Attorney General Robert Kennedy visited the Soviet ambassador. When Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin mentioned the Soviet sensitivity to the Jupiter missiles in Turkey, Kennedy suggested that a trade might be possible.

In response to this opening, Khrushchev sent another letter demanding the US withdraw its missiles from Turkey in return for the Soviets pulling their missiles out of Cuba. This exchange favored the United States since the Jupiter missiles in Turkey were

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not as effective as American SLBMs with the same coverage and their location in Turkey was less of a strategically advantageous position than the Soviet missiles in Cuba. It was agreed that the Jupiter missiles positioned in Turkey would be withdrawn in a few months, but that the decision would not be publicly tied to the agreement about Cuba. On November 15, the DEFCON was lowered and on November 21, President Kennedy formally ended the quarantine. The last Jupiter missile—the so-called “Other Missiles of October”—was withdrawn from Turkey in April 1963. It was later said that in October 1962, Kennedy and Khrushchev went eyeball to eyeball and Khrushchev blinked.

Colonel A. T. Learnard led the Air Police during the Cuban Missile Crisis, having replaced Burnham, who took over AFOSI, in June 1962. During Burnham’s tenure, nuclear security was enhanced, but the Air Police had truly become a guard force on the eve of a conflict where they would need to be a combat force. The appointment of a colonel instead of a general officer to the position of director was somewhat ominous since such a reduction in the grade of its functional leader would inevitably result in a loss of influence for the Air Police within the IG hierarchy. Learnard is somewhat of an enigma and even his first name seems lost to history. No biography of him remains and his impact on the career field seems to have been minor even though Air Police involvement in Vietnam increased during his tenure.



Col A. T. Learnard (Air Force photo)

By December 1962 there were almost 12,000 American military advisors in Vietnam, but despite all of the aid and expertise pumped into the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) it was not up to the fight. On January 2, 1963, the ARVN was defeated by a Viet Cong force at the hamlet of Ap Bac. The South Vietnamese refused to advance, failed to coordinate their assaults, and ignored the advice of their American advisors. American Army helicopter transports ferrying in the ARVN troops took heavy losses and one of the American advisors on the field summed up the operation as “a miserable damn performance.”⁵³ Another lamented that, “These people...won’t listen—they make the same mistakes over and over again in the same way.”⁵⁴ The dismal performance of the South Vietnamese at Ap Bac would lead to the dispatch of yet more American advisors and result in a more active US participation in the fighting. As part of the increase in US forces after the Ap Bac debacle, in March 1963, Project Short Spurt detailed 15 additional air policemen and one administrative specialist to temporary duty in Vietnam.⁵⁵

By the summer of 1963, the Catholic Diem had alienated the Buddhist majority of South Vietnam and the Buddhists launched a massive protest against the government, spurred by the self-immolation of a monk on a busy Saigon street corner. Diem

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responded by sending troops into Buddhist temples, rounding up and jailing the dissidents and further alienating the Buddhists.

The Buddhist crisis, along with the failure of the ARVN against the Viet Cong, caused the Kennedy administration to reassess its support for Diem. In the end, it was decided that Diem had to go. While the United States stood by and watched, ARVN officers seized control of the South Vietnamese government on October 31, 1963, and murdered Diem and his brother Nhu in the back of an armored personnel carrier. Kennedy was shocked by the murders since the leaders of the coup had assured the United States that Diem and his family would be given safe conduct out of the country. Diem's overthrow and execution brought instability and for the next eighteen months. During this chaos, the National Liberation Front, supported by North Vietnamese aid and even North Vietnamese regular army troops (NVA), escalated the war.

Less than a month after Diem's execution, Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas. The new President, Lyndon B. Johnson, continued America's support for South Vietnam and by the end of 1963, 16,000 US advisors were in Vietnam. Included in this number were one Air Police officer and 280 enlisted men on temporary duty with Jungle



President Lyndon B. Johnson (White House photo)

Jim and at the air bases at Tan Son Nhut, Bien Hoa, and Da Nang.⁵⁶ The Air Police leadership began to see what was coming and in November a week of live fire weapons training was instituted at the Air Police School's Camp Bullis, Texas, training area.⁵⁷

The reinstatement of weapons training was overdue despite the unusual restrictions on the use of Air Police in Vietnam. Since the VNAF was charged with the mission of providing security at American air bases, only at Tan Son Nhut did the Vietnamese allow the Air Police to actually guard aircraft. At Bien Hoa and Da Nang, Air Police were barred from the flightline and could only provide security for American cantonment areas and supply dumps.⁵⁸ To those on the ground, however, the adequacy of VNAF-provided security always seemed more theoretical than practical. While the number of troops assigned to the defense mission was sufficient, the

VNAF defensive arrangements were haphazard with bunkers, guard towers, and flightline posts manned almost on a whim.

By January 1964, the Air Force in Vietnam began to pay more attention to the security of its operating bases and questioned whether the prevalent Cold War focus on internal security was sufficient to protect bases in an active war zone. Commanders in the field advised their superiors that the existing concept for base security "must be revised and more flexible rules and standards devised for the protection of USAF personnel and equipment in limited war areas."⁵⁹ Thirteenth Air Force made some

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proposals for reform in mid-January to both Headquarters Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) and PACAF, but no action was taken. At the same time, major construction was started at all three US bases to make them capable of supporting fighter and cargo aircraft; signs that the Air Force was settling in for the long haul. The improvements also made the bases more of a threat to the VC and NVA who had up till now ignored them.

In the summer of 1964, Col Charles W. Howe was named Director of Security and Law Enforcement. Howe was a career aviator, having flown 156 combat missions in World War II and another 20 during Korea and was the recipient of the Silver Star, two Distinguished Flying Crosses, and six Air Medals. Howe came to the directorate from command of the 322d Air Division at Everaux, France, and had not a day of provost marshal or police experience. At meetings that included fellow aviators, he was apt to wander off into lengthy discussions of airplanes. One young air police captain visiting Washington asked to meet the new director. “And they said okay,” he recalled. “So I went into his office. And here’s a guy in a civilian suit sitting behind a desk. And the only thing that we had in conversation while I spent maybe fifteen minutes in his office was how he used to fly airplanes between the States and Japan and...all over the world. And it was strictly flying... Never once any conversation about security police.”⁶⁰



Col Charles W. Howe (Air Force photo)

When Howe took over the directorate he became the functional supervisor of 45,000 officers and men or one out of every 16 Air Force members.⁶¹ During the prior two years, however, the Air Police had lost 50 percent of its field grade officer strength primarily through retirements. It was noted that these officers “began their careers during World War II...and the loss of this experience is regretted...,” but the silver lining was the creation of “a most favorable advancement atmosphere for the young officer now entering our ranks,” since he “will have an opportunity, rare in today’s Air Force, for troop command experience and unusually rapid advancement to positions of responsibility. He will find a challenging and rewarding career in Security and Law Enforcement.”⁶²

In June 1964, Howe visited the 3320th Rehabilitation Group to discuss the future of the unit with its commander, Col Leonard Shapiro, and with Col John C. Shumate, the Air Training Command security and law enforcement director. Despite the fact that its return to duty rate was higher than any time in its history, in February, the 3320th had again been recommended for closure, this time by Project Increased Combat

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Effectiveness (ICE), an initiative to have MAJCOMs identify and eliminate activities that were not essential to their missions.

Efforts to close the 3320th were not unusual. In fact, wrote Capt Robert E. Heet in 1963 in an official history of the group, “At least once a year, for the past eleven years an attempt had been made to eliminate the Retraining Group, usually in the guise of a manpower savings, or an economy drive throughout the Air Force.”⁶³ This latest effort under ICE Project #47 was also mostly rebuffed by Air Staff non-concurrences in the recommendation, except for the deputy chief of staff for personnel who supported the closing. Howe and the two colonels determined that the problem lay in the group’s 1951 organizational charter, which failed to set out the command relationships and mission requirements of the 3320th. Howe asked Shumate to draft a new charter.

While Shumate worked on the draft, the Amarillo Technical Training Center got a new commander—Maj Gen Lloyd P. Hopwood. Hopwood believed that he had no authority over the 3320th and questioned this gap in his authority to Maj Gen William K. Martin, assistant DCS/Personnel, HQ USAF. During their meeting, Hopwood and Martin agreed that the current arrangement under which the 3320th reported to the director of security and law enforcement without any intervening headquarters was unsatisfactory. They agreed to recommend that the group be placed under Hopwood’s command and be functionally supervised by the DCS/Personnel at ATC. Lt Gen William S. Stone, the Air Force DCS/Personnel, agreed and pushed for the change which would have put the 3320th under the control of one of the few Air Staff agencies to concur in ICE Project #47’s recommendation. Maj Gen Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., the Air Force’s director of manpower and organization, had no objections, but noted that the Secretary of the Air Force would have to authorize the change and there the matter died.

But it was resurrected quickly. On November 7, the ATC commander, Lt Gen William W. Momyer, forwarded Shumate’s package to HQ USAF with his finding that a change in the charter was not needed. Momyer believed that a new regulation would correct any problems and in the draft regulation he attached to his letter, the group’s human research function and its organic personnel, legal, and chaplain offices were eliminated. Support from these functional areas could be obtained from the technical training center staff Momyer argued. Momyer also directed the 3320th’s capacity to be reduced from 250 to 185 retrainees.

Leighton Dudley, now Howe’s civilian technical advisor on corrections, prepared a response to Momyer’s proposal for the IG, Lt Gen Keith K. Compton. In his comments Compton told Momyer that his proposed AFR 125-4 needed to be rewritten to retain the human research function since it was not duplicated elsewhere in the Air Force. The regulation also needed to recognize that the 3320th was not just another tenant organization on Amarillo AFB, and its legal and chaplain functions were an inherent part of the “therapeutic community” of the group and played a “direct part in a dynamic correctional treatment program.”⁶⁴ In the end the 3320th lost only its personnel function to the technical training center although it remained administratively attached to the group.

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A final effort at closing the 3320th began on November 19, 1964, when the Air Force announced that Amarillo AFB would be closed by the end of June 1968. On December 2, 1964, Maj Gen Davis recommended that the 3320th be closed rather than relocated and that rehabilitation be handled on a decentralized basis. On December 21, General Davis met with Mr. James P. Goode who once again saved the 3320th by informing General Davis that Congress was very interested in the group and that no efforts were to be made to close, alter, or relocate it without his express permission.

The Sixties were a time of trouble and change in the United States particularly in the area of civil rights for black Americans. These were the days when peaceful freedom marches were often met with police and fire hoses and arrests. While legal authority did exist for the military to respond to local authorities' request for military assistance in certain emergencies, when racial disturbances arose, particularly in the South, local authorities were tempted to make calls on nearby bases to help "restore order." In an effort to forestall any improper use of Air Police, Howe reminded the field of AFR 35-78, *Armed Forces Policy Regarding Minority Groups*, and the prohibitions against the military enforcing civil law of the Federal Posse Comitatus Act. On August 11, 1964, Howe sent a letter to all MAJCOMs specifically prohibiting the "use of Air Police or other Air Force personnel...in aiding local authorities in enforcement of racial segregation or other forms of racial discrimination."⁶⁵ "Directors of Security and Law Enforcement are required to establish and maintain liaison with local civil enforcement authorities," Howe wrote, but, "...they must avoid any situation which might even remotely imply that Air Force personnel could be used to assist civil police in matters which are civil in nature."⁶⁶

By 1964, the uniforms and equipment of the Air Police were undergoing their own changes in the interest of professionalism and capability. By late that year, no less than seven uniform combinations were authorized by AFRs 125-7 and 35-10 for wear



AIC Joe Aguilar and typical AP patrol car, Tachikawa AB, Japan, 1963 (Security Forces Museum)

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when performing duties in view of the public. The uniforms ranged from short-sleeved khaki shade 1505s, to bush jackets, to shade 1804 blue shirt and trousers with white boot laces, to blue tunic and trousers, to a particularly fetching yellow raincoat and fireman's boots for inclement weather. All of these combinations were topped off with the distinctive AP visor "wheel hat" with a white cover. In the summer of 1964, a test of a white hat to replace the white hat cover, "long considered unsatisfactory for wear by Air Police," was begun.⁶⁷

That same summer the Air Force began phasing in the M-16 rifle as a replacement for the World War II vintage M-1 and M-2 rifles and carbines and Air Police units were slated to receive the first of these new weapons. Units were reminded to institute a training program on safety and weapons proficiency upon receipt of the new M-16s and the field was warned that, "Due to the extremely high muzzle velocity of the M-16, Air Policemen should not be armed with it until they have demonstrated proficiency in safety and marksmanship with the weapon."⁶⁸

The Worldwide Security and Law Enforcement Conference made note in August 1964 of the improved sensor technology now available and concluded that intrusion detection equipment, or IDE, could replace sentries and offer greater efficiency. This observation would be put to the test in Vietnam which that month had just entered a whole new phase.

On August 4, 1964, North Vietnamese torpedo boats in the Gulf of Tonkin off the east coast of North Vietnam attacked US Navy destroyers gathering intelligence for the South Vietnamese. President Lyndon B. Johnson decided to launch immediate air attacks on North Vietnam in retaliation and asked Congress for a mandate for future military action. On August 7, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin resolution drafted by the Johnson administration and authorizing all necessary measures to repel attacks against US forces, as well as all steps necessary for the defense of US allies in Southeast Asia. As a result, additional combat air craft were sent to the American bases at Tan Son Nhut, Bien Hoa, and Da Nang and this build up of forces now made the air bases very attractive targets for the enemy.

On November 1, 1964, just after midnight, six 81mm mortars set up 400 yards outside of Bien Hoa AB lobbed between 60 and 80 rounds into parked aircraft and troop billets. In just ten minutes, four Americans were killed, 30 were wounded and 20 B-57 bombers were destroyed or damaged.⁶⁹ The attack convinced PACAF commander, General Hunter Harris, Jr., that the VNAF was incapable of protecting US bases and recommended that Marine or Army forces be used around the three bases. Both US Ambassador Maxwell Taylor and MACV commander General William C. Westmoreland rejected this proposal because of the number of troops required and because it would give the Vietnamese the impression that they were no longer responsible for the defense of American bases. While Westmoreland did request that Hunter deploy an additional 300 air policemen for internal security; he did not envision their use for base defense.⁷⁰ Time would show just how clouded the General's vision was.

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- ¹ Quoted in Walter G. Hermes, “Global Pressures and the Flexible Response,” Chapter 27, *American Military History* (Office of The Chief of Military History, United States Army: Washington, DC, 1989), 592.
- ² *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962), 401.
- ³ *The Security and Law Enforcement Digest*, Vol. 1, No. 61-1, 1.
- ⁴ *The Security and Law Enforcement Digest*, Vol. 1, No. 61-1, 1.
- ⁵ *The Security and Law Enforcement Digest*, Vol. 1, No. 61-1, 8.
- ⁶ *The Security and Law Enforcement Digest*, Vol. 1, No. 61-1, 4.
- ⁷ History of the 6th Strategic Aerospace Wing and 6th Combat Support Group 1 – 31 August 1962, Tab 2.
- ⁸ History of the 6th Strategic Aerospace Wing and 6th Combat Support Group 1 – 31 August 1962, Tab 2.
- ⁹ History of the 6th Strategic Aerospace Wing and 6th Combat Support Group 1 – 31 August 1962, Tab 2.
- ¹⁰ History of the 6th Strategic Aerospace Wing and 6th Combat Support Group 1 – 31 August 1962, Tab 2.
- ¹¹ The first tests of the .38 revolver were actually conducted at Parks AFB in 1956. Qualification on the .38 was approximately 90 percent on the first effort as opposed to 55 percent - 65 percent on the .45 (Email Jerry M. Bullock to author, May 19, 2006).
- ¹² Interview of Frank Farris by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret.), February 3, 2005.
- ¹³ History of the Office of the Inspector General, United States Air Force, 1 July-31 December 1961, Vol. II, 3.
- ¹⁴ Lt Col David J. Dean, “The USAF in Low-Intensity Conflict: The Special Air Warfare Center.” *Air University Review*, January-February, 1985.
- ¹⁵ *History of the Department of Air Police Training, Lackland AFB, Texas*, as quoted in Capt Marie Shadden, *The Peacekeepers: Security Police History 1947 – 1982* (Lackland AFB, TX: USAF Security Police Academy, 1983), 66.
- ¹⁶ Capt Marie Shadden, *The Peacekeepers: Security Police History 1947 – 1982* (Lackland AFB, TX: USAF Security Police Academy, 1983), 76.
- ¹⁷ *Security and Law Enforcement Digest*, Summer 1962, 4.
- ¹⁸ *Security and Law Enforcement Digest*, Summer 1962, 11.
- ¹⁹ *Security and Law Enforcement Digest*, Summer 1962, 11.
- ²⁰ *Security and Law Enforcement Digest*, Summer 1962, 11.
- ²¹ Darrel Whitcomb, “Farm Gate.” *Air Force Magazine*, Vol. 88, No. 12 (December 2005).
- ²² Capt Marie Shadden, *The Peacekeepers: Security Police History 1947 – 1982* (Lackland AFB, TX: USAF Security Police Academy, 1983), 65.
- ²³ Statement of Col Rene Rubin, USAF (Ret), in possession of Col James L. Conrad, USAF (Ret).
- ²⁴ Statement of Col Rene Rubin, USAF (Ret), in possession of Col James L. Conrad, USAF (Ret).
- ²⁵ Memo, Dir/S&LE, 13th AF, to Comdr, 2nd ADVON, subj: Staff Assistance Visit—Security and Base Defense, 21 Mar 62 as quoted in Lt Col Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973* (Office of Air Force History: Washington, D.C., 1979), 13.
- ²⁶ Memo, Dir/S&LE, 13th AF, to Comdr, 2nd ADVON, subj: Staff Assistance Visit—Security and Base Defense, 21 Mar 62 as quoted in Lt Col Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973* (Office of Air Force History: Washington, D.C., 1979), 13.
- ²⁷ *Security and Law Enforcement Digest*, Spring 1962, 3.
- ²⁸ Dave Karten, “They Help Guard the Pentagon.” *Airman*, June 1963, 23-24.
- ²⁹ Dave Karten, “They Help Guard the Pentagon.” *Airman*, June 1963, 23.
- ³⁰ Air Force Manual 205-3, *Air Police Security Operations*, 15 February 1963, 1-5.
- ³¹ Wallace Beene, “School for APs Guarding SAC’s Punch.” *The Stars and Stripes*, January 27, 1964, 10.
- ³² Wallace Beene, “School for APs Guarding SAC’s Punch.” *The Stars and Stripes*, January 27, 1964, 10.
- ³³ Air Force Manual 205-3, *Air Police Security Operations*, 15 February 1963, 1-5. Counterforce denotes weapons that are targeted against enemy forces as opposed to countervalue weapons that are targeted against enemy population, economic, and support targets.
- ³⁴ Air Force Manual 205-3, *Air Police Security Operations*, 15 February 1963, 1-6.
- ³⁵ Air Force Manual 205-3, *Air Police Security Operations*, 15 February 1963, 1-6.
- ³⁶ Air Force Manual 205-3, *Air Police Security Operations*, 15 February 1963, 1-6.
- ³⁷ Air Force Manual 205-3, *Air Police Security Operations*, 15 February 1963, 1-8.

- ³⁸ AFM 207-1, *Doctrine and Requirements for Security of Aerospace Systems*, 10 June 1964, 7.
- ³⁹ AFM 207-1, *Doctrine and Requirements for Security of Aerospace Systems*, 10 June 1964, 7.
- ⁴⁰ AFM 207-1, *Doctrine and Requirements for Security of Aerospace Systems*, 10 June 1964, 23.
- ⁴¹ *Security and Law Enforcement Digest*, Winter 1963, 10.
- ⁴² AFM 207-1, *Doctrine and Requirements for Security of Aerospace Systems*, 10 June 1964, 44.
- ⁴³ AFM 207-1, *Doctrine and Requirements for Security of Aerospace Systems*, 10 June 1964, 24.
- ⁴⁴ Interview of Frank Farris by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), February 3, 2005.
- ⁴⁵ Interview of Frank Farris by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), February 3, 2005.
- ⁴⁶ Interview of Frank Farris by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), February 3, 2005.
- ⁴⁷ Interview of Frank Farris by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), February 3, 2005.
- ⁴⁸ Interview of Frank Farris by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), February 3, 2005.
- ⁴⁹ Interview of MSgt Ernest Koontz, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), December 12, 2004.
- ⁵⁰ DEFCONs are phased increases in force readiness ranging from DEFCON 5 (normal peacetime readiness) to DEFCON 1 (maximum readiness). The DEFCON 2 of October 22 remains the highest confirmed DEFCON ever ordered.
- ⁵¹ Interview of MSgt Ernest Koontz, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), December 12, 2004.
- ⁵² Interview of MSgt Ernest Koontz, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), December 12, 2004.
- ⁵³ Neil P. Sheehan, "Vietnamese Ignored US Battle Order" *Washington Post*, January 7, 1963.
- ⁵⁴ Neil P. Sheehan, "Vietnamese Ignored US Battle Order" *Washington Post*, January 7, 1963.
- ⁵⁵ *History of the Department of Air Police and Specialized Training, Lackland AFB, Texas*, 1 Jan – 31 Dec 1963 as quoted in Capt Marie Shadden, *The Peacekeepers: Security Police History 1947 – 1982* (Lackland AFB, TX: USAF Security Police Academy, 1983), 66.
- ⁵⁶ Lt Col Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973* (Office of Air Force History: Washington, D.C., 1979), 14.
- ⁵⁷ Capt Marie Shadden, *The Peacekeepers: Security Police History 1947 – 1982* (Lackland AFB, TX: USAF Security Police Academy, 1983), 85.
- ⁵⁸ Lt Col Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973* (Office of Air Force History: Washington, D.C., 1979), 14.
- ⁵⁹ Quoted in Lt Col Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973* (Office of Air Force History: Washington, D.C., 1979), 14.
- ⁶⁰ Interview of Lt Col Stuart B. Higginbotham, USAF (Ret.) and CMSgt John Renfro, USAF (Ret), by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), 1 March 2005.
- ⁶¹ *Security and Law Enforcement Digest*, Summer 1964, 9.
- ⁶² *Security and Law Enforcement Digest*, Summer 1964, 9.
- ⁶³ As quoted in Dr. Roger G. Miller, *Crime, Correction, and Quality Force: A History of the 3320th Correction and Rehabilitation Squadron 1951-1985* (Randolph AFB, TX: Air Training Command History and Research Office, 1987), 21.
- ⁶⁴ As quoted in Dr. Roger G. Miller, *Crime, Correction, and Quality Force: A History of the 3320th Correction and Rehabilitation Squadron 1951-1985* (Randolph AFB, TX: Air Training Command History and Research Office, 1987), 21.
- ⁶⁵ *Security and Law Enforcement Digest*, Autumn-Winter 1964-65, 3.
- ⁶⁶ *Security and Law Enforcement Digest*, Autumn-Winter 1964-65, 3.
- ⁶⁷ *Security and Law Enforcement Digest*, Summer 1964, 9.
- ⁶⁸ *Security and Law Enforcement Digest*, Summer 1964, 9.
- ⁶⁹ Lt Col Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973* (Office of Air Force History: Washington, D.C., 1979), Appendix 1.
- ⁷⁰ Lt Col Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973* (Office of Air Force History: Washington, D.C., 1979), 18.

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CHAPTER FIVE

VIETNAM: 1965 – 1967

By early 1965 the Air Force's presence in South Vietnam was increasing steadily. Five new bases—Cam Rahn, Phan Rang, Phu Cat, Tuy Hoa, and Chu Lai—were being



US Ambassador Maxwell Taylor and Gen William Westmoreland (National Archives)

built both to support the “Rolling Thunder” bombing offensive against the North that sought to force the North Vietnamese to halt their aggression by gradually escalating the bombing of selected targets and to supply tactical air support for allied forces. The existing air base at Pleiku was also expanded to support the landing of jet aircraft. PACAF had assembled a concept for base security after the Bien Hoa attack cobbled together from JCS Publication 2, Korean War base defense doctrine, MACV

directives, and other sources. While ultimately disapproved because of its reliance on Army and Marine troops for base defense, the concept established as the guiding principle of Air Force base defense doctrine that Air Force security responsibility ended at the base perimeter. MACV, supported by the JCS, still insisted that the VNAF was responsible for the security of these bases.

Even though still publicly wedded to the fiction that the Vietnamese were responsible for base security and defense, in February LTG John L. Throckmorton, the deputy MACV commander, privately recommended to his boss, General Westmoreland, that the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) be landed to secure Da Nang AB from ground attack. With Ambassador Taylor's concurrence, Westmoreland forwarded Throckmorton's recommendation to the JCS and this assessment from the field was instrumental in the Johnson administration's decision to commit US ground forces to Vietnam.¹

On March 7, 1965, the 9th MEB was ordered to land at Da Nang and “occupy and defend critical terrain features in order to secure the airfield...”² The Marines were

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directed to “not repeat not engage in day to day actions against the Viet Cong.”³ The Marines were only the first contingent. On May 5, the Army’s 173rd Airborne Brigade arrived in country to secure the logistics and air bases in the III Corps tactical zone.

The Marines at Da Nang concentrated on defensive operations outside the perimeter, while flight line security was provided by the Air Police contingent attached to the 25th Air Base Group. Early on the morning of July 1, 1965, thirty-three year-old Air Police SSgt Terance K. “Tony” Jensen was checking on his scattered sentries guarding the Da Nang flight line and bringing them hot coffee. Jensen, who first joined the Air Force in 1948, was an almost larger than life character. Ten years earlier, he won a Soldier’s Medal for jumping into the nearly freezing Clinton River near Mount Clemens, Michigan, and saving a girl from drowning. In San Antonio, Texas, he wrestled a mad dog with his bare hands rather than shooting it and risking hitting aircraft on the flight line. While stationed in Alaska, Jensen, an award winning pistol shot, faced down a charging seven and a half foot tall black bear and killed it with a bullet to the head.⁴ It was about 0115 hours when SSgt Jensen in his Dodge truck reached the post where A1C Albert L. Handy, just recently arrived on temporary duty from the 831st APS at George AFB, California, was standing guard.

Handy opened the passenger’s door of Jensen’s truck and Jensen asked how he was doing. Handy reported that it was pretty quiet, got a coffee cup and was reaching for the coffee jug when the thud of a distant mortar was heard and a C-130 transport at the south end of the flightline exploded. Though Jensen and Handy did not know it, attacks had been simultaneously launched against other areas of the base perimeter. Jensen directed Handy to report the attack to the CSC on his radio. As Handy moved away from the truck to retrieve his radio, he saw silhouetted in the flames from the blazing C-130 about 15 VC in black fatigues and camouflaged helmets firing in his direction with automatic weapons. Handy began returning fire on the run.

Jensen also saw the VC and tried to bail out of the truck, but the door may have stuck, and Jensen may have been first hit by enemy fire while still in the truck struggling with the door or soon after he got out.⁵ Handy, sprinting toward the radio at his post, saw Jensen take two or three steps toward the enemy before he fell. Holding the radio in one hand while firing his M-16 at the advancing VC with the other, Handy reported the enemy contact to the CSC. Meanwhile, the painfully wounded Jensen crawled to the rear of his truck and began firing his .38 revolver at the enemy. Jensen and Handy were the only things standing between the attackers and a bunker in which 25 flight line personnel had taken cover from the incoming mortar rounds.

Handy was under heavy fire and heard hand grenades and mortar shells exploding all around. Under the circumstances it was perfectly understandable that his primary thought was to “head for cover” and he later reported that he “dove into his foxhole and came up firing.”⁶ Quickly emptying one clip of ammunition, Handy reloaded and opened fire on three or four VC who had taken cover behind a tent. His fire drove them from their position and they retreated toward the perimeter road. Even though automatic weapons fire was still coming at his position, Handy noticed the VC beginning to fall

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back. Although Handy couldn't see him, the wounded Jensen continued firing at the VC with his revolver and drew fire in return. Some accounts speculate that an enemy guerrilla finally came up behind Jensen and shot him several times in the back, killing him.⁷



Security Police Vehicle damaged during attack on Da Nang AB. While not specifically identified in the official Research Agency report, this may be Sgt Jensen's vehicle. (Air Force Historical Research agency)

The Security Alert Team (SAT), responding to the enemy penetration, pulled up about 100 yards north of where Jensen and Handy were pinned down and then drove off. When it returned and stopped about 50 yards away, Handy rolled out of his foxhole and into a drainage ditch and began running toward the truck as fast as he could, yelling out his name so he wouldn't be a victim of friendly fire. The enemy sappers had by now pulled back, although the mortars outside the base perimeter lobbed two or three more shells into the F-102 and C-130 aircraft cantonment areas.

The VC left behind three destroyed C-130 transports and three destroyed F-102 fighters along with another four damaged. One attacker was captured. Total American losses were two Marines wounded and SSgt Jensen killed in action (KIA). After action reports concluded that, "Immediate resistance by Security Police [*sic*] on duty caused the enemy to attack prematurely and decreased the effectiveness of the enemy actions."⁸

SSgt Jensen was posthumously awarded the Purple Heart and the Silver Star for gallantry for his actions that night on Da Nang's flightline. He left behind a wife and four children.⁹ He was the first of 110 Air and Security Police who would die in South East Asia.

Jensen's death gave added weight to the arguments of those advocating the use of military working dogs in air base security. Jensen's death might have been prevented by

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the early warning canine teams could give, they argued. Air police commanders had been requesting patrol dog teams since the first AP units were deployed to Vietnam, but their requests were turned down because it was believed the dogs could not survive the oppressive heat and humidity of the Vietnamese climate. However, the successful penetration of Da Nang by the enemy along with the often nearly insubordinate efforts of Sgt William B. Moon who had long urged sending dog teams to Vietnam, finally caused orders to be issued to the dog training center at Lackland within 48 hours of the attack to send 40 MWD teams to Tan Son Nhut, Bien Hoa, and Da Nang by July 17 for a 120-day test.¹⁰ Dubbed “Top Dog 45,” the program gained valuable information on tactics and the care and feeding of the dogs in the oppressive environment of Vietnam.

Once Top Dog proved that the canine teams could function effectively and that the dogs could survive in the extreme climate of Vietnam, more dog teams quickly followed. Project Limelight 75 deployed 50 MWD teams and five supervisors in August and Project Limelight 86 later dispatched 49 additional teams.¹¹ By September, 504 MWD team authorizations had been established for ten Air Force installations in Vietnam.¹²

As pioneers, the Top Dog teams met with more than their fair share of challenges. No kennels were ready for the dogs so the handlers had to build them. Like all APs in Vietnam, the dog handlers had to deal with the guard force mentality that had become prevalent with the Cold War and the publication of AFR 207-1. Dog handler Keith Scott was posted to Tan Son Nhut and was surprised to find:

The first real problem we faced was our Air Police Squadron leadership. Non-dog handler types seemed to think we dog handlers were somehow invincible, since we were armed with dogs. We spent the first several nights on our duty posts armed only with the standard .38 revolver and 18 rounds of ammunition. The same amount as we were issued in the states. Our reaction was to loudly protest the order and to round up anything that could be used as weapons to carry on post, to give ourselves any kind of edge we could get. After a few weeks, we won our argument and were issued .30 caliber carbines to carry while on duty.¹³

The dogs were most effective at night and the first few nights were scary, but as Scott came to realize, “the enemy was probably as afraid of us as we were of them. The word was, we were thought of as some kind of supermen to the Viet Cong.”¹⁴

With their acute senses, the dogs provided warning of intruders long before its handler could spot them. When supported by mobile response teams that could rapidly bring additional firepower to bear, the MWD teams were so effective that almost 18 months passed before the enemy was again able to successfully penetrate an air base perimeter.

Just weeks after Jensen was killed defending Da Nang, Secretary of Defense McNamara arrived in the South Vietnamese capital of Saigon to meet with General Westmoreland who presented him with a request for 44 more infantry battalions to be

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deployed to Vietnam in 1965 with an additional 24 to arrive in 1966. Twenty-one of these battalions Westmoreland earmarked for the defense of air bases, to include “establishing a zone enclosing each base and site contiguous to its boundaries, [which] must be defended continuously to a depth and degree of saturation that will serve to prevent enemy penetration or employment of artillery or mortars.”¹⁵ However, under authority granted to him by President Johnson in June, Westmoreland actually began to use these reinforcements to conduct offensive “search and destroy” operations, often leaving the air bases to rely on their Air Police, the VNAF, or the Vietnamese military police (Quan Canh or QC) detachments for defense. For example, the 173rd Airborne Brigade was deployed to Pleiku, far away from its assigned tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) around Bien Hoa air base, between August 10 and September 6 with the result that the VC conducted a successful stand-off attack against the air base on August 23 that damaged 11 aircraft.¹⁶



Gen Hunter Harris, Jr. (Air Force photo)

The Air Force quickly realized that the increasing use of ground units away from the bases they were supposedly responsible for defending left its bases increasingly vulnerable to attack. Since the justification for additional ground troops was the defense of American bases, Air Force leadership asked for a policy that assured the allocation of ground units to air base defense. CINCPACAF Gen Hunter Harris, Jr. informed Air Force Chief of Staff Gen John P. McConnell that in his opinion the “present organization for base defense [is] inadequate, the responsibility unclear, and resources not under centralized control.”¹⁷ Harris recommended to McConnell that he go to the JCS and push for the permanent assignment of ground forces to base

defense under a single commander with sole responsibility for that mission. Harris also believed that the Air Force should consider the formation of “an Air Force security force along the lines of the RAF Regiment.”¹⁸

McConnell agreed with Harris’ recommendation concerning the assignment of ground forces to base defense and promised to take the matter up with the joint chiefs. The JCS, however, was not receptive to McConnell’s overture and supported General Throckmorton’s position that it was inadvisable “to tie down US [Army] troops to defend US air bases against mortar and sneak attack, it costs too much in troops.”¹⁹


In December, General Westmoreland put the issue to bed in a letter to his subordinate commanders, including Lt Gen Joseph H. Moore, 2nd Air Division commander and later commander of 7th Air Force. In his letter, Westmoreland discussed his belief that real security for American forces in Vietnam would come only if the

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enemy was sought, pursued, and destroyed and concluded with his “desire that all service units and all forces of whatever service who find themselves operating without infantry protection or who may find themselves from time to time operating without infantry protection will be organized, trained and exercised to perform...defensive and security functions...”²⁰

The question was never again raised in joint circles and the ground troops, justified by the requirement to defend American bases, were, with the exception of the Marines at Da Nang and Cam Ranh, never used primarily for that mission. Even though friction between many ARVN and VNAF commanders hampered their ability to provide effective air base defense, the United States Army would continue to insist that the Vietnamese were responsible for base defense.

While it was becoming apparent that with few exceptions the Air Police would actually be responsible for air base defense, the law enforcement focus of AP training did not quickly shift to emphasize combat training. Even though over 2,000 APs would be in Vietnam by the end of 1965, combat preparedness training remained limited to M-16 rifle training and perhaps an eight-minute training film on Southeast Asia shown at the Clark AB stopover on the way to Vietnam.



Col Kenneth A. Reecher (Air Force photo)

Col Kenneth A. Reecher replaced Colonel Howe as Director of Security and Law Enforcement on June 28, 1965, and began to increase the efforts on training air policemen for combat. Reecher, a Marylander and World War II B-17 pilot, was reassigned from SAC's 4123rd Strategic Wing to be Learnard's deputy in September 1962.²¹ As a first step in improving combat training Reecher used AP's returning from Vietnam as training cadres to impart their knowledge and experience to trainees. Training on heavy weapons such as grenade launchers was also reinstated. Even so, reliance continued to be put primarily on in-country OJT which proved very difficult in a combat zone particularly when 90 days of the standard 365-day tour was spent just to bring a new troop up to full combat proficiency.

On November 16, 1965, a three-day conference convened at Hamilton AFB, California for the purpose of reviewing AP training. The conferees decided to add to the curriculum of the 3275th Technical School at Lackland AFB a combat preparedness course, course number AZR77150 eventually known just as AZR. The first AZR course opened 10 months later and lasted five days and, while it was better than what previously existed, it was not as good as it should have been. Hampered by limited tactical training

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areas and low budgets prohibited the purchase of required weapons, ammunition, and tactical vehicles for training.

Although AZR was later increased in length, it was never an adequate substitute for a dedicated air base defense school along the lines of the former Parks AFB Air Base Ground Defense School. A1C William “Pete” Piazza attended a three-day long predecessor to AZR at Hamilton AFB, California prior to his deployment to Vietnam in January 1966. The first day he spent on weapons familiarization training in the classroom. The second day, he and his fellow trainees moved to the range to fire the M-16 and M-60 machine gun, but “unfortunately they didn’t have the ammunition, so they just showed us what it [the M-60] was.”²² The third day was scheduled to be spent in sweeping a mock Vietnamese village with instructors acting as the enemy. “The only problem was that it rained all three days,” Piazza recalled. “And the village was under water about three feet. So they couldn’t let us go ... but they showed us what a village looked like. We were on a blue Air Force bus and they said, ‘That’s what a Vietnamese village looks like’.”²³

The 2nd Air Division launched its own program in Vietnam in late 1965 to train in-coming air policemen for combat. The program stressed weapons proficiency, night firing, small unit tactics, fire discipline, and the use of grenades. Additionally, each air policeman was required to fire 600 rounds from his M-16 during his first two months in-country and 100 rounds per month thereafter.²⁴

With the emphasis on air base defense beginning to grow, some Air Force major commands began conducting their own air base defense training. USAFE, for example, exercised its air policemen in defensive operations along with host nation forces. In October 1965, air policemen at Rhein-Main AB, West Germany, conducted a night exercise along with German *Bundeswehr* soldiers of District Defense Command Number 43 (Hanau Sub-Post). The German troops acted as infiltrators, testing the responses of the air policemen and augmentees. The newspaper report on the exercise noted that it was part of an increase in such training Air Force-wide, since “Air Police units have taken up increased responsibilities in Viet-Nam.”²⁵

Communist propagandists made much of the German involvement in the Rhein-Main exercise. East German Radio Free Germany 904 pointed to the exercise as evidence that plans were afoot to send German soldiers to Vietnam and told the soldiers in its audience that “904 can only advise you boys – hands off Vietnam. Don’t let yourselves be misused and cremated.”²⁶

Despite these efforts, AP combat training still fell short. As late as 1967, a DoD study concluded that “the USAF Security Police have no training in the types of infantry tactics useful in base defense before they arrive in Southeast Asia, and there is no standard program set up to provide this type of combat training...when they arrive...”²⁷

While the Air Force did not adopt General Harris’ suggestion for the creation of an RAF Regiment-like organization for the Air Force, the relationship between the Air

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Police and the Regiment did become stronger. When Group Captain D. A. Pocock, the regiment's deputy commander, visited Washington in 1965, he and Air Police representatives discussed air base defense philosophies. Since the RAF Regiment had experience in dealing with Communist insurgents in Malaysia, Air Police leadership eagerly sought the Regiment's informal advice. During Pocock's visit, the groundwork was laid for a formal exchange program to begin in 1966 under which Air Police officers were assigned for two to three years to the RAF Regiment and regimental officers were assigned for the same period to the Air Police—a relationship that continues to this day.²⁸

The Air Police of 1965 remained organized and equipped for internal security not combat operations. AP vehicles were often hand-me-downs and, after 1957, were civilian vehicles not M-type military models which were felt not to be necessary for internal security duties. Unsited for rough terrain, these vehicles required constant maintenance, but since the Air Force had earlier replaced the military auto mechanics in its transportation squadrons with contract mechanics, every AP squadron in Vietnam created an automotive maintenance section manned with its own personnel to keep the vehicles on the road. Replacement parts were stripped from damaged vehicles, obtained through the Army, or even by sending personnel on “shopping” expeditions back to the States.²⁹



Air Police NCO gives direction to the troops at an unidentified SEA air base Research Agency (Air Force Historical Research Agency)

A shortage of even these poor vehicles was a limiting factor on AP operations. An August 1965 Air Staff survey of AP vehicles in Vietnam revealed that thirteen-year-old jeeps were being leased monthly from Vietnamese vendors. One AP officer passing through Tan Son Nhut in August 1965 talked to some of the air policemen stationed there

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and discovered, “their vehicles consisted of two Ford Falcon sedans. That was all they had. Their weaponry was World War II carbines. That’s all they had, and it was a sad situation.”³⁰ By January 1966, AP units in Vietnam had only 94 of the 233 vehicles they were authorized.³¹

In September 1965, the Air Police received their first M-type vehicles since the Korean War when 63 M-151 jeeps were procured. Some of these vehicles were up-armored by units via self-help for use as SAT response vehicles. But a complete changeover from civilian vehicles to military vehicles never occurred and it was not until late 1969 that AP units in Vietnam received armored vehicles in the form of 60 XM-706 armored cars and 30 M-113 personnel carriers.

Improvisation was the order of the day in Vietnam, particularly early on. When the base at Cam Ranh Bay was first established in 1965, one officer described it as a base with “no fence around it, just sand dunes and not much else. And they had rubber bladders of fuel sitting on top of sand dunes...extremely vulnerable. Nobody was guarding them or anything else.”³² Given the lack of physical security measures, the small force of no more than 150 air policemen would have been hard pressed to defend it.

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The APS commander at Cam Ranh, Maj Joseph “Wild Joe” Herring, a veteran of the World War II Office of Strategic Services (OSS), therefore resorted to a time-tested *ruse de guerre*. “He’d take a 6 X 6 truck after we got some in,” one officer explained, “and he’d load about 20 guys in the back of a 6 X 6, go around the sand dune, drop them off, have them run like the dickens over the sand dune to the other side, pick them up, repost them at another sand dune, run them over the sand dune, pick them up, and he did that countless times during a shift.”³³ The trick seemed to work because some intelligence indicated that the VC thought that there were at least 1,500 security policemen at Cam Ranh Bay. “Wild Joe” was credited by some with preventing the infant air base from being overrun just by this simple ruse.

Improvisation, however, evolved into what Lt Col Roger P. Fox, commander of the 377th Security Police Squadron (SPS) at Tan Son Nhut in 1969-1970 and later author of the definitive work on air base defense in Vietnam, dubbed the “Self-Help Syndrome” to make up for the failings in a system that furnished inadequate support for ground

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defense. Fox noted that, “From first to last, self-help in air base defense was a permanent means of plugging the support holes in critical areas such as ground defense intelligence, logistics, and training.”³⁴ An example of the ingenuity and improvisation brought to bear by the troops in the field was that of the young security policeman who wrote his father, a Remington Arms Company representative, and had him send firing pins for the unit’s 12-gauge shotguns after numerous attempts to obtain the pins through normal supply channels had come to naught.

Unfortunately this “make do, can do” attitude often masked the breaks in the system and delayed their repair and therefore the problems never went entirely away. As late as 1970 – 1971 a Security Police squadron commander complained about taking on the responsibilities of other organizations such as motor pool, the repair of perimeter roads and fences, the control of perimeter vegetation and lighting. Since 7th Air Force prohibited the use of Security Police to perform these tasks, the commander lamented that, “we found ourselves constantly facing a choice between compliance with 7th AF policies and getting the job done.”³⁵

But some concrete efforts were underway to enhance air base security in 1965. In November, Colonel Reecher launched Project Safe Look, an effort to develop passive intrusion detection equipment for deployment to thirteen Air Force bases in Vietnam, Thailand, and Korea. Air Force Systems Command was already developing electronic systems for the protection of aircraft and gave \$450,000 to the Air Police to develop other security uses for these systems.³⁶

Sapper attacks seeking to penetrate base perimeters fell off after the July attack on Da Nang and the arrival of K-9 teams, but stand-off attacks using mortars, recoilless rifles and, starting in February 1967, 120mm and later 122mm rockets, continued. On January 25, 1966, Da Nang was hit by a stand-off attack which damaged no aircraft, but did kill 19-year-old A3C James B. Jones of the 6252nd APS as he ran for cover. Jones was awarded a posthumous Bronze Star for valor for the “application of sound judgement [*sic*] and courage” in maintaining “security surveillance over his assigned area of responsibility with complete disregard for his own personal safety.”³⁷ Both Jones and Jensen were later remembered at Da Nang by the Jensen and Jones Memorial Day Room.

Stand-off attacks were relatively safe for the attackers and promised maximum damage for minimum risk and soon became an often deadly feature of life on all of the air bases in Vietnam. The largest stand-off attack of the war occurred shortly after midnight on April 13, 1966, at Tan Son Nhut outside of Saigon. Firing a total of 243 rounds over 20 minutes, the attackers damaged 62 aircraft and killed seven and wounded another 111 American personnel.³⁸

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No air policemen were injured during the attack, but there were some close calls. A2C Richard W. Lindbeck told the 7th *Air Force News* that “When the first rounds came in, I dived into an open Conex...I no sooner got into it before a round went into the box above me and exploded. The noise and shock were terrific. Some shrapnel penetrated [my] Conex.”³⁹



Map showing locations of Air Police and Security Police units in South East Asia (US Air Force)

By January 1966, there were approximately 2,100 air policemen in Vietnam with more being sent to air bases in neighboring Thailand for base security and to train Thai security guards.⁴⁰ In March 1966, the first class of Thai guards graduated from the training course at Korat AB. In addition to Korat, the Air Force would operate major operating bases at U-Tapao, Takhli, Udon, Nakhon Phanom, Ubon, and Don Muang.

As American involvement in Vietnam increased, small but vocal protests against the war began, generally on college campuses where there were large numbers of young

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men subject to the draft. While these protests did not initially impact the morale of those in the fight, by 1965 they were becoming too visible to ignore. On April 17, 1965, 25,000 people attended an antiwar rally in Washington, D.C., sponsored by the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), making it one of the largest protests in US history up to that time. The spring 1966 issue of the *Security and Law Enforcement Digest* published an unflattering examination of the protestors written by the nation's premiere law enforcer, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. In a letter to Marine Lt George M. Connell reprinted in the *Digest*, Hoover hoped "that you and the brave men with whom you serve understand that those who protest, degrade and shame the excellent representation you are making for us do not speak for patriotic Americans. The small, but highly vocal, minority which is staging these anti-Vietnam protest demonstrations is, for the most part, composed of halfway citizens who are neither morally, mentally nor emotionally mature."⁴¹ Hoover advised Connell, the son of an FBI agent, not to "become discouraged over their actions, however, for they are not in the saddle and never have been... [and] are very likely so devoid of real standards that, placed in your position, they would turn and run in the face of battle."⁴² Events would show that Hoover and others seriously underestimated the clout of what he called "halfway citizens."⁴³

Personnel shortages would not be as much of cause for morale problems in this war as they had been during Korea, particularly when the Air Police received the bulk of the Air Force's share of recruits brought in under a Department of Defense program called "Project 100,000." The original impetus for Project 100,000 was the unintended consequence of a 1956 increase in the minimum Armed Forces Qualifying Test scores required for enlistment. Under these new standards fully 33 percent of potential recruits could not meet enlistment requirements, but since the Johnson administration did not want to put the country on a wartime footing and call up the Reserves nor eliminate the existing extensive deferments from the draft, lowering the required test scores seemed the easiest way of getting around this problem and raising troop numbers. Since many of these so-called Category IV recruits, or New Standards Men, were either poor or minority or both, Project 100,000 also had a "Great Society" component in that the military was seen as a way of training and employing these individuals.

While the Air Force had enlisted very limited numbers of Category IV individuals in the past, it found the training failure rate of these personnel, particularly those with a ninth grade or lower education level, to be unacceptably high and resisted further expansion of the numbers of Category IV enlistees. It also wanted to hold on to its basic entrance requirement of a high school diploma. Subscribing to an almost utopian belief that, "a very high proportion of these men would qualify as fully satisfactory servicemen when exposed to the modern instructional techniques used in the Armed Services," in April 1967, DoD lowered the minimum test scores even further and directed the enlistment of Category IV individuals regardless of education levels.⁴⁴

The Air Police were not considered a technical field by Air Force leadership and consequently many Project 100,000 airmen were dumped there. Along with the other problems that came with these men, the career field, whose members had labored for years against the reputation of being not as "smart" as the rest of their Air Force

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comrades, slipped further into that stereotype because of the presence of these recruits in their ranks.

Project 100,000 continued until June 1973 and many more than 100,000 of these less qualified individuals would be enlisted in the Armed Forces. Although some of these men thrived in the military, from the standpoint of overall military efficiency Project 100,000 was a disaster. Most of these recruits could be assigned only to the least technical jobs and disciplinary problems in all of the services increased, and many of the men brought in under the program failed to complete their enlistments due to disciplinary or duty performance problems.

Coincidentally with the birth of Project 100,000 and its accompanying disciplinary problems, the Air Force and Army signed an agreement on July 6, 1966, providing for the assignment of 40 Air Force personnel to the United States Disciplinary Barracks at Leavenworth on a permanent basis. Sgt Ernest Koontz was part of the first contingent to arrive in early 1967. Dubbing themselves “The Forgotten Forty,” Koontz and his comrades were “really disheartened” because they felt they weren’t “well treated by the Army when we first got there.”⁴⁵ Koontz was in charge of the prison’s clothing factory that supplied the suits that, along with \$25.00, every prisoner received when he was released. He was also responsible for supervising the prisoner work details that tended the grounds in the prison cemetery and cleared the forest. Part of his forestry duties included the cutting down and burning of marijuana, the remainder of a World War II hemp farm. Koontz would “take the prisoners out, cut it down, then bring it in for burning,” during which the prisoners “liked to stand downwind...”⁴⁶

The prison also had a large farm attached to it and four to five Air Force personnel were assigned to supervise the approximately 75 prisoners working on the farm, including those tending to the 40 to 50 thousand chickens in the prison’s huge poultry enterprise. The farm also raised large numbers of hogs and the “city slicker” air policeman in charge of them was “frantic” at the prospect of tending them.⁴⁷

The law enforcement side of the house was not entirely ignored as the transition back to a combat force proceeded. A new AFM 125-3, *Air Police Law Enforcement Operations*, was issued on June 1, 1965, to be used for training. Law enforcement training opportunities were also expanded in late 1967 when 100 NCOs each year were approved to attend the Army’s Senior Military Supervisor’s Course at the Military Police School at Ft. Gordon, Georgia. The first class was due to matriculate on August 14.⁴⁸

One illegal activity, marijuana use, was becoming an Air Force problem as its use became more prevalent among young people in general. Security Police in the field were advised that “users of marijuana pose a potential security risk...” and to assist law enforcers in identifying them, the *Security Police Digest* helpfully published a profile:

The typical marijuana user in the United States is usually a person 20 to 30 years of age, idle and lacking in initiative, with a history of repeated frustrations and deprivations, sexually maladjusted (often homosexual), who seeks distraction and escape by smoking marijuana.⁴⁹

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July of 1966 saw Col Donald C. Shultis, a career pilot and World War II veteran reassigned from HQ PACAF where he served as the Director of Intelligence, take over as Director of Security and Law Enforcement from Colonel Reecher. While Reecher had previously served as deputy director, Shultis had had no contact with security or law enforcement prior to taking the top slot.



Col Donald C. Shultis (Air Force photo)

That month also saw General Hunter's recommendation of a year earlier to create an Air Police RAF Regiment-type of air base defense unit revived in a modified form when the 1041st USAF Security Strike Force Test Squadron was activated by USAF Special Order G-42 on July 1, 1966. The formation of such a unit had been recommended by Air Force Inspector General Lt Gen Glen W. Martin who was concerned that the concentration of Air Force assets on relatively few bases resulted in congestion on the bases that made them lucrative targets for attack. This vulnerability required "a greater airbase security capability" and Martin recommended the formation of a model unit "to meet the type of threat to our bases which we encounter in Vietnam and could encounter elsewhere."⁵⁰

The 1041st was to be an elite unit composed of 266 volunteers who would receive special weapons and infantry tactics training and have the mission of evaluating "within an active combat theater the adequacy of the concept, training, equipment and tactics of an unique USAF Security Police organization designed to answer the requirements for security of Air Force installations and resources in a counterinsurgency environment..."⁵¹ Lt Col William H. Wise, Sr., a World War II veteran and former Army Ranger, was named commander of the new unit.

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Group photo of Lt Col Bill Wise and the 1041st leadership in Hawaii in 1966 (Security Forces Museum)

Unlike the AFR 207-1 based static, internal defense doctrine, the test concept envisioned the active defense of airbases by operating outside the perimeter to deny the enemy the approaches necessary to launch attacks against the base. Units like the 1041st were to deploy tactical units to “provide perimeter security and defend against damaging off-base hostile fire emanating from a reasonable distance, enemy small-force ground penetration and supplement internal security as may be necessary.”⁵² The test program was called Operation SAFE SIDE.

To form a training cadre for the new unit, selected individuals were sent to Army Ranger training at Ft. Benning, Georgia; the O’Neil Hand-to-Hand Combat Course at Hurlburt Field, Florida; the Intelligence Analysis Course at Ft. Hollabird, Maryland; the Special Infantry Weapons Course and Weapons Maintenance Course at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; and the Forward Air Controller Course at Wheeler AFB, Hawaii. These men would provide needed training to their comrades at the 1041st’s Schofield Barracks training complex. When quotas for another needed course, the Scout Dog School at Ft. Benning, could not be obtained, the 1041st established its own program at Lackland using three borrowed Army instructors.⁵³ Fifteen handlers were trained in the use of scout dogs trained to silently seek out the enemy and alert the handler without the patrol dog’s aggressive barking that often gave away its position and that of its handler with potentially fatal consequences.

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Training of the 1041st began at the Schofield Barracks training site in early September 1966 and consisted of a fifteen-week, three-phase training program developed by the project training officer Maj Ross F. Purdy. Eight and a half weeks of the course were spent in Phase I training which included blocks of instruction on weapons and demolitions, combat tactics, and counter guerilla operations. Five and one half weeks were spent on Phase II field training followed by a week long Phase III devoted to combat locale orientation. Upon successful completion of training each man was awarded a distinctive piece of headgear—a light blue beret bearing a cloth patch of a falcon clutching a lightning flash.⁵⁴




1041st beret flash (Security Forces Museum)

As organized, the 1041st consisted of a Squadron Section with Royal Australian Air Force Squadron Leader Jim Downie, a former Australian Army commando, attached as Ground Defense Advisor, an Operations Section, and a Support Section. The unit's combat punch was concentrated in three flights. The Close Combat Flight contained three sections of five fire teams each; the Weapons Support Flight was made up of the Mortar Section, Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Section, and Machine Gun Section; and the Observation/Surveillance Flight was composed of an Observation Section, a Test Section, and a Scout Dog Section.⁵⁵ This unique organization, along with the unit's motto "Joined To Fight," told everyone that this was no ordinary Air Police unit.

While the unit was completing its training, several changes took place. First, the unit was redesignated as the 1041st Security Police Squadron (Test) in accordance with the decision of the World Wide Conference in November 1966 to abandon the title of Air Police in favor of the more descriptive "Security Police." The new name was chosen as being "truly descriptive of our function, in that it ties together both the security and police aspects of our responsibilities."⁵⁶ Second, the unit's deployment location was changed from Phan Rang AB to Phu Cat because 7th Air Force felt that the level of enemy activity and more austere base conditions at Phu Cat made it a better test location. Finally, once deployed it was ordered that "under no conditions would the unit conduct tactical operations outside the limits of Phu Cat Air Base..."⁵⁷ This restriction was a major departure from the mission originally envisioned for the 1041st and SAFE SIDE and may have been prompted by the issuance on June 17, 1966, of DoD Directive 5100.1, entitled "Functions of the DoD and its Major Components," that renewed the Army's responsibility for land warfare. The publication of this directive caused some Army officers to complain that the Air Force was treading on their turf with the 1041st and its "outside the fence" concept of operations, and some Air Force officers agreed.

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USAFE Chief of Security Police Conference 1966 (Col Jerry M. Bullock)

This inter-service turf war did not deter the enemy. Shortly after midnight on July 8, 1966, a stand-off recoilless rifle and mortar attack was launched against Binh Thuy AB. Twenty-three-year-old A1C Millard W. Lehman, the 632nd APS armory technician, was off-duty, but, as he often did, he was out and about relieving members of Devil Flight nightshift so they could get some hot food at the chow hall. Lehman had just relieved A1C John Sharp at the southeast entry control point when the gate shack took a direct hit from a 75mm recoilless rifle round and Lehman was killed instantly. After firing about 40 rounds, the attackers melted away without loss. Lehman's comrades later erected a memorial to the quiet young man from Naco, Arizona outside of the base theater where he would watch his favorite shows—Road Runner cartoons and the World War II TV show *Combat!*⁵⁸

The sprawling base at Tan Son Nhut, or TSN, was both a lucrative target and tough to defend, but the 377th SPS under the command of Lt Col Grove C. Johnson did its best. Built by the French in 1920, Tan Son Nhut was home to Saigon's main airport, MACV and 7th Air Force headquarters, and 230 permanently assigned aircraft as well as many transient aircraft of various types. With the base's southern and eastern perimeters abutting the capital's metropolitan areas whose buildings were literally built up against the security fence and along numerous small villages and hamlets hemming it in on the north and west, Tan Son



Lt Col Grove C. Johnson (Joe McNeil)

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Nhut was “engulfed in a sea of humanity.”⁵⁹ Clear fields of fire outside the base perimeter were impossible and the houses around the base provided excellent close in, concealed firing positions for the enemy.

Taking advantage of this defensive weakness and the darkness of night, a VC assault force, later estimated at a strength of 100 men of the 14th VC Battalion, moved up to the base’s western perimeter around midnight on December 4, 1966. After cutting its way through the perimeter fence, a 60-man assault force set up a mortar position while another 40 VC remained near the perimeter as a covering force.

A2C George M. Bevich and his war dog Cubby were the first to detect the strike force as it moved through the tall elephant grass toward the aircraft parking ramps. In accordance with the SSI for his post he reported the contact to Central Security Control and moved in to investigate. In moments Bevich and his dog were killed and the twenty-two-year-old Pennsylvanian became the first dog handler to die in Vietnam. A2C Leroy Marsh and his dog King also detected and reported the enemy force.⁶⁰



A2C George Bevich (377th Security Police Squadron Website)



Capt William C. “Chuck” Henry (377th Security Police Squadron Website)

When the squadron operations officer Capt William C. “Chuck” Henry reached the CSC, Maj Roger P. Fox was already organizing the defense.⁶¹ Quick Response Teams (QRT) were sent racing to the area where Bevich and Marsh had reported contacts. TSgt Olbert H. Hiett, the training NCO of the 633rd SPS at Pleiku who was at Tan Son Nhut to attend a class on the M-16 rifle, reported to CSC and was placed in charge of one of these 15-man QRTs. Later he was ordered to deploy his team to a position on the south perimeter of the base.

Piling out of their truck at about 0115, Hiett’s team took up a position along the perimeter road and quickly came under mortar, RPG, and automatic weapons fire. One RPG round destroyed the team’s vehicle while a barrage of small arms and machine gun fire quickly killed two and wounded nine of Hiett’s QRT. A2C John M. Cole, a “sweet natured and quiet” 20-year-old Philadelphian, was killed next to Sgt Hiett while another Pennsylvanian, 21-year-old Oliver J. Riddle, died 10 yards to Hiett’s left.⁶² Riddle had been in Vietnam less than a week.

“Chuck” Henry was sent out around the base to coordinate defensive activities and at one point was given the task of collecting a force of SPs to reinforce Charlie Sector. Henry managed to assemble a group of about 20 men with the plan of leading

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them across the aircraft parking ramp. “When we started across the concrete,” Henry reported later, “all hell broke loose (unrelated to us) with tracers and automatic weapons fire coming from the MLR [main line of resistance]...I was running across the concrete...and discovered it was very quiet and I was very alone. The other guys had gone back to CSC to come up with a better plan, and later did reinforce the line, but without the running across the open concrete.”

Part of the VC strike force attempted to cross the runway toward the parked aircraft, but were met with withering fire from an SP-manned machine gun bunker. Thirteen of the attackers were killed and the rest dispersed.

Hiett and his team had unknowingly off-loaded directly opposite the VC covering force and were in serious trouble. “The VC poured their fire on our position,” Hiett remembered. “Bullets cracked by both sides of my head, like slapping your hands together, bullets cut the grass on the small knoll that protected me...I flipped on my back with my M-16 in my left hand and my revolver in my right hand. I thought that we would not survive, and I wanted to get as many of them as I could as they ran over us.” But no one came.

Two ambulances did come, however, to pick up Hiett’s wounded. The VC, not known for respecting the Red Cross, curiously did not fire while the wounded were loaded, but once the ambulances moved out the “truce” ended and heavy firing began again. Hiett had only four men remaining and was facing destruction when a jeep with two SP sergeants in full combat gear rolled up in front of the position. Incredibly, one of them asked Hiett where the enemy was. Hiett whispered, “Right there in front of us.” The sergeant replied, “Where?” and Hiett hollered, “Right there, 15 yards in front of you!” The two rolled out of the jeep moments before the VC shot it to pieces and crawled along the road back the way they had come.

The timely arrival of two C-47 gunships and SP reinforcements turned the tide. But after advancing through the grass and finding numerous VC bodies and weapons, the reinforcements moved out, leaving Hiett and his four men to cover the now “secure” area. But the enemy returned and opened fire on an ARVN truck mounting a 20mm gun that had come up to Hiett’s position. A second ARVN gun truck rolled up and was likewise riddled with bullets. Neither of the trucks had fired a shot, but Hiett and an ARVN soldier managed to retrieve a .30 caliber machine gun from one of the shot-up trucks and kept up a steady fire on the VC.

At daylight on the fifth, Hiett’s position, now reinforced by additional SPs, took fire from the rear as surviving members of the VC strike force tried to escape through the fence which wounded another of Hiett’s remaining men. Return fire eliminated the threat and three VC emerged from the grass with hands raised. Around 0930 hours the battle finally ended.

The battle was over, but the fight was not finished. Despite sweeps of the base to collect enemy weapons and search for enemy survivors, some of the VC strike force, cut

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Enemy materiel captured during December 1966 attack on Tan Son Nhut (Security Forces Museum)

off from their exit point in the fence by defensive deployments around the perimeter, managed to take cover in man-high elephant grass in the northwest portion of the base, in an old Vietnamese graveyard, and underground. Dog teams were not used during the daylight sweeps and many of these VC initially escaped detection and at dusk, began creeping toward the base perimeter looking for a way out.

A2C Robert A. “Spanky” Thorneburg and his four-year-old German shepherd Nemo were beginning their nightly patrol when Nemo alerted on some of these concealed VC. Thorneburg released Nemo who went on the attack and the VC opened fire on both man and dog. Thorneburg was seriously wounded in the right shoulder and right arm, but Nemo,

his right eye shot out, continued his attack driving the enemy away and saving Thorneburg’s life. The VC assailants were later hunted down and killed.

“Chuck” Henry was part of a force under the command of Major Fox that had cornered three VC in a patch of grass and bamboo between the existing runway and one under construction. “We poured major small arms fire and threw a bunch of hand grenades into the bush until Major Fox told us to send in three guys to see if the NVA were dead,” Henry wrote later. “...Lt. Jack Howe, an enlisted man whose name I never got, and I went in...but someone fired a slap flare while we were in there, and one of the NVA seriously wounded but not dead opened up on us with his AK-47. Lord knows how many people fired at his muzzle flashes until they stopped, and I know I emptied two magazines and my .38 at the position until I was ready to quit...”

The VC lost 28 dead and four captured in exchange for three Americans killed and 15 wounded, along with three South Vietnamese personnel killed and four wounded. Twenty aircraft were slightly damaged. Westmoreland praised the 377th Air Police Squadron for decimating “a strong infiltration force, inflicting a severe defeat on the



Policing up the battlefield at Tan Son Nhut (Security Forces Museum)



Checking enemy dead after the battle at Tan Son Nhut (Security Forces Museum)

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enemy and making him pay a heavy price for minimum damage inflicted.”⁶³ “Your brave airmen fought with courage and distinction,” Westmoreland told 7th Air Force commander Lt Gen William W. Momyer. “Please pass my hearty congratulations to all concerned.”⁶⁴ PACAF commander General Harris also asked Momyer to extend a “‘well done’ to all concerned.”⁶⁵


Praise didn’t just come from generals. MSgt Robert S. Need, an administrative specialist at 7th Air Force headquarters, wrote a letter to *Air Force Times* thanking TSN’s Security Police and proclaiming “the Air Force security policeman in Southeast Asia...absolutely first in line when it comes to a recognition of heroism among our ranks.”⁶⁶



A2C Melvin W. Bryant and Nemo (Air Force photo)

The praise had its cost. George Bevich was posthumously awarded the Silver Star, John Cole and Oliver Riddle received posthumous Purple Hearts. Henry and Hielt were awarded Bronze Stars for Valor. Three war dogs, Toby, Cubby, and Rebel were also killed during the battle. The wounded Nemo recovered and returned to duty at Tan Son Nhut until he was retired in July 1967; the first time a sentry dog was officially retired. Enroute to his retirement home escorted by A2C Melvin W. Bryant, Nemo received a hero’s welcome at a stopover at Kadena AB, Okinawa, and was met by the base commander and side boys with sentry dogs. “The welcome given the dog,” reported the news release from

Kadena’s 824th Combat Support Group, “was equal to that reserved for four-star generals.”⁶⁷ Nemo spent his retirement in a special kennel at the DoD Dog Center at Lackland AFB, Texas, with his story displayed prominently on a sign affixed to the kennel’s chain link fence. Until his death the battle scarred war dog toured the country as an honored hero recruiting military working dogs.



Memorial to Nemo at DoD Dog Center (Security Forces Museum)

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In January 1967, the 1041st SPS (T) arrived at Phu Cat to begin Operation SAFE SIDE, but they were not the first security policemen to be posted there. That honor fell to Capt Robert M. Sullivan and fifty-three air policemen of the 37th APS, who, along with a contingent of 554th and 555th Civil Engineering Squadron personnel from Phan Rang and Cam Ranh Bay, set up camp adjacent to a Buddhist cemetery on August 1, 1966, to begin construction of the base. Located 120 miles north of Cam Ranh Bay about midway up the China Sea coast in mountainous Binh Dinh province, Phu Cat consisted of a 3,000 foot gravel runway and associated support facilities supporting two C-7 “Caribou” transport squadrons.

Lt Col Wise, the former Ranger, did not like what he found at Phu Cat. The layout of the entire base followed a stateside standard and “did not take into consideration the tactical requirements of ground defense.”⁶⁸ Base cantonment areas were within 20 meters of villages of known enemy sympathizers; the fence line had no relationship to either the base boundaries or defensive requirements; the land seized by the Vietnamese government for the base did not include two prominent hills off of the end of the runway; and POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants) facilities were within small arms range of a nearby pro-VC village.

Even worse, enemy activity indicated that they were preparing for offensive action against the installation as evidenced by the use of indigenous laborers to gather intelligence, the digging of tunnels beneath portions of the base, and the stockpiling of weapons, rice, and ammunition. Wise recognized the need to disrupt these preparations by aggressively dominating the base and actively seeking out enemy weapon, ammunition, and food caches.

Operationally, the 1041st would be responsible for perimeter defense aided by base augmentees, Army forces, and elements of the Republic of Korea (ROK) “Capital Division” while the 37th SPS handled internal security and law enforcement. Both squadrons would report to the base commander through the base director of security police. A coordinated base defense plan was drafted using the format mandated by AFR



1969 photo of Phu Cat flightline gate with 37th SPS headquarters in the background (Security Forces Museum)

207-1, but left something to be desired since “the format used is so tortuous that it is impossible to write a clear and concise plan within the framework.”⁶⁹

The 1041st intended to dominate its tactical area of operations (TAOR) with an active defense utilizing a mobile defense force. To keep the enemy off-balance and unable to discern patterns of defensive activity, round the clock patrolling and surveillance, ambushes, random manning of observation and listening posts, and the ability to immediately respond with additional force would all be utilized

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by the 1041st. This was a departure from the static defense based on fixed positions prescribed by AFR 207-1 and favored by “many security officers at staff and unit level...as a means of defending an air base;” a bias due largely to their experience “which has primarily been devoted to the close-in protection of priority resources in the CONUS and the lack of formal military tactical training.”⁷⁰

The doctrine of active defense that the 1041st was designed to test, however, was somewhat hamstrung by the restrictions contained in a letter Wise received in March from Col Ernest D. Carwile, chief of the directorate of Security Police’s Installation Security Division. In the letter, which confirmed the oral instructions given by Carwile during a February visit to Phu Cat, Wise was forbidden to conduct patrols and ambushes outside the base boundary, his reaction teams could not go beyond the base boundary, and he could not even fire his 81mm mortars and 66mm rockets at targets off base.⁷¹

The men of the 1041st first took the field on January 13, 1967 and January 27 found them under fire for the first time when SPs at observation post ARIZONA were pinned down by small arms fire which ceased when fire was returned. Until May, the unit had engagements with small groups of VC, uncovered tunnels, captured undocumented Vietnamese nationals for interrogation by ARVN intelligence, and disarmed booby traps. On May 3, a 1041st sniper team drew first blood when it killed a VC courier with a shot to the head.

Part of the 1041st mission was to train 37th SPS personnel in combat tactics and on May 21, SSgt Carlos D. Yingst led seven men, including A2C Rutledge and A3C Ruffin of the 37th SPS, on a night ambush. Rutledge and Ruffin were the first 37th personnel to accompany the 1041st on a night ambush and they would do well.

Rutledge and Ruffin set up a position near a river and at around 2130 hours Rutledge heard what sounded like someone splashing through the water. Half an hour later he heard the same sort of noise, this time accompanied by the sound of a voice speaking Vietnamese about fifty feet from where he and Ruffin lay concealed. Soon an armed individual came out of the darkness walking on the trail from the river toward their position. When the figure had advanced to within 15 feet of the American position, Rutledge yelled, “Halt!” As the man brought his US made M-1 carbine to his shoulder, Rutledge knocked him flat with three rounds from his M-60 machine gun. At the sound of the machine gun, two tracer rounds passed over Ruffin’s head from the direction of the river. Sgt Yingst and the rest of the patrol moved up in support and reconnoitered the area by fire and heard three or four grenade explosions from the river area. When quiet returned to the area, the dead VC was searched and his equipment, including two BIC pens, a pack of toothpicks, some peanuts, three M-1 carbine magazines, two US made grenades, and his wallet, were turned over to OSI.

Three days after this ambush, the 1041st ended field operations. During its time at Phu Cat it had captured 71 Vietnamese nationals, six of whom were confirmed as VC, engaged the enemy on eight occasions with three confirmed kills, disarmed three booby traps, and uncovered evidence of 66 intrusions into the TAOR. The unit’s final report

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summarized enemy operations as “low level” and speculated that this was because the transport aircraft at Phu Cat were a low priority. However, the enemy remained active in the area as evidenced by frequent attacks on airfields used by the Army’s 1st Cavalry Division north and west of Phu Cat.

The enemy had been watching Phu Cat and was preparing to turn its attention to its destruction. On May 31, South Vietnamese troops attacked a Viet Cong hideout at An Loi hamlet killing seven VC and capturing weapons and a number of documents. One of the captured documents observed that jet planes had been continuously landing at Phu Cat between May 18 and 19 and also noted the presence of “expert troops (Blue Beret Troops).”⁷² On June 5, OSI reported that information received from a “fairly reliable source” indicated that a VC company intended to attack Army and ROK positions at the south end of Phu Cat on June 6 or 7. The informant reported that the “attack will be coordinated so as to include elements of the 1041st Security Police Squadron.”⁷³ The VC “intent to retaliate against the 1041st Security Police Squadron (T) stems from two previous incidents on Phu Cat Air Base in which 1041st ambush teams killed two VC,” reported the source.⁷⁴ According to the OSI source the VC referred to the 1041st as ‘the expert troops in the blue berets’.⁷⁵ No attack came on the 5th or the 6th, but on the morning of June 11, local South Vietnamese militia and the VC engaged in a firefight on the southern end of the base that drew immediate response teams from the 37th SPS along with elements of the 1041st. By noon the enemy had withdrawn.

On July 4, the SAFE SIDE test ended as the 1041st was airlifted from Phu Cat to Fairchild AFB, Washington. Other security policemen overseas would soon be following the 1041st back to the States; not from Vietnam, but from France. On March 7, 1966 French President Charles DeGaulle, rebuffed in his efforts to secure a larger leadership role in NATO and determined to position France as the leader of continental Europe, wrote to President Lyndon B. Johnson that France was going to make some changes in its relationship with NATO.

In an effort to keep DeGaulle and France as full partners in the alliance, Johnson replied to the French president on March 22 questioning the French leader’s stated conclusion that allied bases on French territory were an affront to French sovereignty. Johnson argued that it was in the interest of both NATO and of France that DeGaulle reconsider his position. It was to no avail. In June 1959 DeGaulle had ordered all NATO nuclear weapons removed from French soil and in October 1966, France officially requested the removal of all NATO troops from France by April 1, 1967. Operation FRELOC, “French Relocation” or “Fast Relocation of Lines of Communication,” depending on the source, was launched to relocate nine American bases in six months. Not all of France was glad to see the Americans go. Near Laon AB, the villagers of Couvron renamed a street the Rue James Smales in honor of a security policeman they befriended.⁷⁶

Using the training provided by the 1041st, the 37th SPS formed Cobra Flight under the command of Capt Frederick C. Heiss. Armed with APCs, intrusion detection equipment, and mortars, Cobra Flight bragged that it was the only active defense SP unit

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Inspection of Cobra Flight by Col Sarter, Lt Col Geier and MSgt Smith in March '69 (Security Forces Museum)

in Vietnam after the 1041st's departure.⁷⁷ “[W]e worked outside the wire. Outside the actual perimeter ... defensive perimeter of the base.” Heiss recalled. “[W]e did not have any static folks. Everything was moving. Moving, night work, and, as Colonel Wise would say, we were going to take the fight out. Because if we could engage them further away from our resources, we could protect our resources better.”⁷⁸ Other commanders in country were, in fact, working to make their

units combat ready and one of these was Lt Col Kenton D. “Kent” Miller, commander of the 3rd SPS at Bien Hoa.

Miller, a former Army infantryman, took command of the 3rd APS in February 1967, replacing the previous commander who was quickly transferred after VC saboteurs penetrated the base undetected and blew up a store of 2,600 napalm bombs. In the men assigned to the “Thundering Third,” Miller believed he had the raw material for a combat security police unit at hand. “The airmen, the NCOs, and the officers,” recalled Miller, “...all wanted to see if they had what it took... And it took me about six weeks to realize that my job is to turn these Cold War sentry guards into some sort of combat airmen. And they wanted to be combat airmen.”⁷⁹

The men were willing, but their combat skills were lacking. Except for some NCOs who were former Army infantrymen or Marine riflemen, the combat training received by the majority of the unit was limited to AZR, which Miller believed was totally inadequate. Proper arms and equipment were also lacking. Miller discovered “We did not have a single crew-serve weapon. [The] M-60 machine gun was the largest weapon we had.... We did have some over and under grenade launchers that attached to the M-16, which hardly any of us could hit a side of a barn with.”⁸⁰ Miller, however, was determined to disregard the “Headquarters Weenies” who in their “wisdom” decided that SPs in a combat zone didn’t require heavy weapons.⁸¹

Miller’s armorer, TSgt Herb Tretter, scrounged some M-79 “Thumper” grenade launchers as well as ammunition and light anti-tank weapons (LAW) from the 173rd Airborne Brigade which was camped near the eastern perimeter of the base. Miller noticed that Tretter always had large supplies of ammunition on hand, but he did not discover until 25 years later that the resourceful sergeant would periodically take a truck to Saigon’s huge ammo dump and “borrow” ammunition. The 3rd also “found” an “abandoned” armored personnel carrier and decided to use it until its rightful owner came looking for it.

Miller established good relations with the troopers of the 173rd and when he discovered they operated a jungle training camp for their soldiers new in country; Miller

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saw a great opportunity to get some combat training for his security policemen. Since Security Police were to remain inside the fence and since it was not yet policy to train SPs in combat tactics, Miller fabricated a mission—what he called “the Lie”—to get some his men into the 173rd’s training camp. The “mission” was to assign volunteers to pull alert duty with the 173rd’s 145th Aviation Battalion and chopper out to the rear of identified enemy mortar sites and “engage or harass them during their retreat.”⁸² Forty security policemen responded to a call for volunteers for the “Eagle Platoon” and received training at the 173rd’s jungle training school. Graduation was a twilight helicopter assault outside the base perimeter, nighttime perimeter defense, and a 6-to 7-hour patrol back to the base where Red Cross “Donut Dollies” met the men. This training would become invaluable a few months later.

Despite Miller’s aggressive training regimen, the restriction of SP base defense operations to inside the perimeter continued to leave Bien Hoa, and other bases, vulnerable to stand off rocket and mortar attacks. On 27 February, A2C Gary L. Fuller of Da Nang’s 366th APS was killed, along with his K-9 Toby and 10 other Americans in the first use of rockets against a US air base by the enemy.⁸³ On May 12, 1967, a massive rocket attack of 189 rounds hit Bien Hoa. One of these rockets hit a 3rd APS hutch, killing A2C Horace A. “Buster” Holbrook and wounding several others. Three days after this attack the 3rd APS was officially redesignated the 3rd SPS.

In August 1967, the 1041st issued its report on Operation SAFE SIDE. The report contained several pages of recommendations for future security units. Among these were recommendations that combat security units be assigned to the office of the inspector general or to Tactical Air Command with certain areas remaining “within the purview of The Inspector General and the Director of Security Police;” that the Air Force’s combat security force should be organized as a wing with three groups with its own training center and air arm of UH-1F “Huey” helicopters providing the ability to “observe, detect, discriminate and destroy...;” and that future combat security units needed to have their own intelligence analysts to gather information and evaluate probable enemy courses of action.⁸⁴ Most revolutionary was the recommendation that combat security forces abandon the officially approved concept of static defense in favor of an active defense that dominated the TAOR “by aggressive means and in a random manner...” thereby preventing rather than reacting to enemy action.⁸⁵

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The report also contained extensive recommendations concerning equipment and personnel. Armed, armor plated M-type vehicles were invaluable, it concluded, and the M-113 APC was particularly well suited for combat security force operations. In the area of tactical communications, the report condemned the commercial radio equipment used for non-tactical purposes in the CONUS as “totally unsatisfactory” and recommended the procurement of “multi-channel, light, durable, climatically adaptable, easily repairable, tactical radios.”⁸⁶ Concerning weaponry, the report found that highly mobile, crew served weapons such as the 4.2 inch mortar and the 5.56mm rapid fire mini-gun, preferably mounted on an M-type vehicle, were “an indispensable requirement...”⁸⁷

To facilitate night operations the report recommended that two Starlight Scope night vision devices be issued to each six-man fire team. The M-16 was found to be suitable for the basic individual weapon, but it was recommended that dog handlers be equipped with the shorter CAR-15 rifle. The report urged the Air Force to find a “suitable replacement, other than the 45 cal pistol...” for the .38 caliber revolver and recommended that each man be equipped with an XM-148 grenade launcher and a supply



M-151 "Jeep" with mini-gun (Security Forces Museum)

of fragmentation, white phosphorous, anti-tank, and smoke grenades.⁸⁸ The report also recommended that all combat security force members be volunteers who met well-defined criteria. The report validated the use of Tactical Security Support Equipment or TSSE developed as part of Project Safe Look and reported that the equipment was “effective in the early detection of unauthorized personnel” and, despite needing “improvement to make it operate at maximum efficiency,” had “a definite place in the inventory of future combat security units.”⁸⁹

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Finally, the test of scout or patrol dogs was proclaimed a success. The patrol dog was found to have a significant advantage over the standard sentry dog because of its “ability to work in conjunction with a fire team...alert in silence, and utilize their inherent animal senses...”⁹⁰

The SAFE SIDE report was quickly acted upon. Just a few months after the report was submitted, the Director of Security Police reported to the field that “the Air Force has approved a proposal for the establishment of similar squadrons which would be organized, trained and deployed as a unit.”⁹¹ While such a major effort would require DoD approval, the Air Force had already used the results of SAFE SIDE to launch an integrated base defense study “to formulate further concepts for the development, direction and control of an integrated base defense concept of operations...”⁹² Whatever was finally decided by DoD and recommended by the defense study, headquarters predicted “some major changes in our overall concepts of Air Force security...” which would result in “a more demanding, important and interesting mission...”⁹³

In an article published in the *Air Force Review* in the summer of 1967, Colonel Shultis stated the case for a new security focus and organization. After reviewing the threat to air bases in Vietnam, Shultis conceded “base security must be a joint effort, with external area defense responsibilities resting on friendly ground forces.”⁹⁴ The Air Force Security Police, while able to cope with limited attacks, was neither equipped nor organized to engage in large-scale ground combat and because of this simple fact, a fact unlikely to change, Shultis argued that the initial requirement for effective air base defense was “for a coordinated, mutual defense effort which will ensure that supporting ground forces provide a reasonable degree of external protection.”⁹⁵ Assuming this initial requirement was met, then the Air Force’s obligation, Shultis argued, was to build an effective fighting force to handle perimeter defense. To reach this end state, several problems had to be addressed.

First, Security Police doctrine had to shift from protecting essential resources on a prioritized basis to protecting the entire base. Second, SP manning standards had to be revised to account for the increased manpower required for whole base protection. Finally, entire units rather than individuals needed to be rotated in and out of theater to preclude the necessity for OJT for combat forces. SAFE SIDE, Shultis explained, was an effort to find solutions to these problems and the outcome of the test “should be the formulation and adoption of a security system which will not only support but also...permit the continuing accomplishment of the Air Force mission in areas where the threat of limited ground attack is an ever present possibility.”⁹⁶


One indication of the shift from security to base defense was the procurement of new weaponry that began in the spring of 1967. Citing experience from Vietnam as demonstrating “a great need for increasing the firepower of Security Police forces, not only in connection with Vietnam-type operation, but also with regard to all types of Security Police activity,” Security Police leadership began several initiatives to procure improved weaponry. One project was the procurement of a new 12-gauge shotgun with a greater spread of shot and larger magazine along with shotgun shells with larger pellets.

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The Oxford Gunsight that projected a small dot of light on the target enabling accurate aiming at night was being tested for fitting to the M-16. A test was also conducted to determine whether a 40mm automatic grenade cannon similar to those fitted to Army “Huey” helicopters could be fitted to a Security Alert Team vehicle and the results obtained from fitting the 80-pound, 450-round per minute electrically operated cannon to an M-151 jeep were promising.⁹⁷

In September 1967, Col Leslie E. Gaskins, deputy chief, Installations Security Division of the directorate of Security Police, visited Security Police units posted at eleven Air Force installations in Vietnam.⁹⁸ Of interest in Gaskins’ report were the observations of Col Dave Duff, the 7th Air Force Security Police chief, concerning the challenges faced by the Security Police in Vietnam. Duff was highly critical of air base defense efforts in the theater and particularly chaffed at the restriction that Security Police defense forces stay within the base perimeter. According to Duff, “all restrictions of Air Force reaction to the base perimeters are Air Force Self Imposed. There is no MACV resistance to our going off-base in defense of our resources consistent with our capability and training.”⁹⁹ In Duff’s opinion, “The time for ideal solutions, tactics and technology...has passed,” but it was still important “to make sure that we profit by our mistakes...We have done little to apply lessons learned in Korea and Lebanon.”¹⁰⁰

Duff was favorably disposed toward the 1041st and was eager to comment on the SAFE SIDE report. He believed that both the 1041st and 7th Air Force had learned from each other, but he did feel that towards the end of the 1041st’s time at Phu Cat, “the unit was trying too hard to prove itself by killing VC’s and that they may have lost sight of



A1C Lonnie Evans mans an observation tower at Na Trang AB in December 1967 (Air Force Photo)

their primary mission – to protect base resources.”¹⁰¹ While the decision was pending on the future of SAFE SIDE, 7th Air Force moved to implement the SAFE SIDE concept in the form of special fast reaction teams. The mission of these teams was to augment other bases during emergencies and equalize the disparities in Security Police manpower caused by the inherent assumption in the manpower standard that all bases faced the same threat. These special fast reaction teams were designed to be highly mobile and Col Duff was contemplating using them to move from base to base on a random schedule so “the VC could never be certain of the exact size of the defense force.”¹⁰²

Duff was also critical of what he considered missions that diverted

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resources from base defense. As in Korea, pilferage was widespread and needed to be “attacked more vigorously so as to force more SP’s for base security.”¹⁰³ Duff also mentioned that the use of security policemen for customs inspections, while not unduly burdensome, was a drain on manpower since the customs program was established under a transportation regulation and its requirements were therefore not considered in the Security Police manpower standard. Since they could not get rid of it, 7th Air Force was working to convert the customs program to a formal Security Police program so additional manning could be obtained to administer the program.

Although some bases in Vietnam had large law enforcement flights – Tan Son Nhut’s, for example, had a strength of 200 – Duff reported to Gaskins that, “Law Enforcement plays a very minor role in the Security Police in this war” with only an estimated six percent of the entire strength of the Security Police in Vietnam involved in that mission. Based on unit reports, the bulk of law enforcement activity seemed to involve traffic violations and curfew and uniform violations.¹⁰⁴

By the end of 1967 the message that a new Security Police force trained and equipped for combat and using active defense tactics was needed to replace the AFR 207-1 Cold War guard force and system of static security was being received and understood by Security Police leadership. The 1041st had paved the way, but Security Police officers in the field recognized the need for such changes before the SAFE SIDE report validated their observations. It was the force that these men trained and equipped without official sanction that would soon undergo a costly test of their combat value.

While the last six months of 1967 saw a decline in enemy operations against American airbases, when the enemy did come APs died. On the night of July 8, 1967, A2C Jerry Moon, a 21-year-old member of the 31st APS from Lanett, Alabama, who arrived in Vietnam on Christmas Day 1966, was manning gun position number 12 on the north perimeter of Tuy Hoa AB. For several nights the VC had probed to base perimeter in an effort to find infiltration routes through the three rows of barbed wire. On this night Moon reported activity in the Vietnamese village opposite his position and called for flares to be launched. In the light of the flares he observed unknown individuals between the second and third lines of wire and opened fire. By the time the SAT reached the scene, Moon was dead from wounds to the head and chest. A blood trail was found leading away from the perimeter indicating that Amn Moon had done some damage and while a search of the nearby village the next morning uncovered small arms and ammunition, no VC were found.¹⁰⁵ “Until that night it was a great adventure,” one of his comrades remembered. “After Jerry’s death it all became quite real to all of us. You might say we all grew up that night.”¹⁰⁶

There were a myriad of ways to die in Vietnam other than at the hands of the enemy. On July 18, 1967, A1C Robert E. Pascoe was killed when the 633rd SPS armory at Pleiku AB exploded. Eight security policemen were awarded the Airman’s Medal for their heroism in rescuing the wounded. The exact cause of the explosion was never determined.¹⁰⁷

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There were no attacks at all against air bases during the month of December 1967 and American forces prepared for Christmas and the accompanying Christmas “truce.” As part of TSN’s civic action program to win “hearts and minds,” the 377th SPS’s sentry dog section hosted a Christmas Eve party for almost 300 Vietnamese children where “gifts, candy, and cake were presented to the children.”¹⁰⁸ That evening, Lt Col Billy Jack Carter, commander of the 377th, had his greetings transmitted to his men over the radio net:

Gentlemen, this is Col Carter. On this [Christ]mas Eve 1967, in these trying times away from your families and loved ones you can stand proud for the part you are playing in the defense of ‘our way of life.’ All your squadron officers join me in thanking you for ‘a job well done’—and we wish you a very sincere MX [Merry Christmas] an[d] HN [Happy New] Year.

Tomahawk 10-36¹⁰⁹

¹ Lt Col Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973* (Office of Air Force History: Washington, D.C., 1979), 19-20.

² Message, JCS to CINPAC, 070-001Z Mar 65, subj: Improved Security Measures in the Republic of Vietnam, as quoted in Lt Col Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973* (Office of Air Force History: Washington, D.C., 1979), 20.

³ Message, JCS to CINPAC, 070-001Z Mar 65 as quoted in Lt Col Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973* (Office of Air Force History: Washington, D.C., 1979), 20.

⁴ Newspaper clipping in Terance K. Jensen folder.

⁵ Account of MSgt Mike Bush, USAF (Ret.), 9 Jul 97, Vietnam Security Police Association Website (http://www.vspa.com/t_jensen-dab-bush-account-1965.htm).

⁶ Statement of A1C Albert J. Handy in Terance K., Jensen folder.

⁷ Account of MSgt Mike Bush, USAF (Ret.), 9 Jul 97, Vietnam Security Police Association Website (http://www.vspa.com/t_jensen-dab-bush-account-1965.htm); Account of Tom Winn, 13 Dec 99, Vietnam Security Police Association Website (http://www.vspa.com/t_jensen-dab-winn-account-1965.htm).

⁸ Terance K. Jensen folder.

⁹ Two of Jensen’s daughters later enlisted in the Air Force as security policemen. Handy was supposedly put in for a Bronze Star medal which he never received. Several accounts say he was returned to George AFB soon after the attack.

¹⁰ Lt Col Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973* (Office of Air Force History: Washington, D.C., 1979), 100.

¹¹ Capt Marie Shadden, *The Peacekeepers: Security Police History 1947 – 1982* (Lackland AFB, TX: USAF Security Police Academy, 1983), 87.

¹² Capt Marie Shadden, *The Peacekeepers: Security Police History 1947 – 1982* (Lackland AFB, TX: USAF Security Police Academy, 1983), 87. Lt Col Roger Fox lists the authorizations for January 1967 at 476 and states this was the peak number of MWD team authorizations during the war (Lt Col Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973* (Office of Air Force History: Washington, D.C., 1979), 102).

¹³ Keith Scott, “Operation Top Dog,” 377th Security Police Squadron Webpage (<http://webpages.charter.net/cepenley/stories/topdog.html>).

¹⁴ Keith Scott, “Operation Top Dog,” 377th Security Police Squadron Webpage (<http://webpages.charter.net/cepenley/stories/topdog.html>).

¹⁵ USMACV Shopping List for the Secretary of Defense, 20 Jul 65, Item 93 in JCS files, 21 Jul 65 as quoted in Lt Col Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973* (Office of Air Force History: Washington, D.C., 1979), 21.

¹⁶ Lt Col Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973* (Office of Air Force History: Washington, D.C., 1979), 24-25.

¹⁷ Message, CINCPACAF to CSAF, 270339Z Aug 65 as quoted in Lt Col Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973* (Office of Air Force History: Washington, D.C., 1979), 26.

¹⁸ Message, CINCPACAF to CSAF, 270339Z Aug 65 as quoted in Lt Col Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973* (Office of Air Force History: Washington, D.C., 1979), 26.

¹⁹ Memo for Record, Colonel Charles E. Kenworthy, Dir/S&LE, subj: External Defense in Depth, 24 Sep 65 as quoted in Lt Col Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973* (Office of Air Force History: Washington, D.C., 1979), 26.

²⁰ Letter, Westmoreland to Commander, 2nd Air Division, Tactical Deployment of US Forces and Defensive Action, December 10, 1965 as quoted in John F. Kreis, *Airfield Ground Defense Roles and Development 1939 – 1975* (Office of Air Force History: Bolling AFB, DC, 1989), 323.

²¹ Lt Col Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973* (Office of Air Force History: Washington, D.C., 1979), 19-20.

²² Message, JCS' Piazza, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), May 2005.

²³ Interview of SMSgt William "Pete" Piazza, USAF (Ret.) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), May 2005.

²⁴ Lt Col Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973* (Office of Air Force History: Washington, D.C., 1979), 88.

²⁵ A2C Dave Perelle, "Air Police Hold Night Training Exercise." *The Gateway*, October 21, 1965, 8.

²⁶ Transcript of Radio Free Germany 904 Transmittings [sic] on the 29th Jan 1966, at 2100 and 2300 hours.

²⁷ *Integrated Air Base Defense Program* (Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., 26 Jan 68), II, 9:1, 9:2 as quoted in Lt Col Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973* (Office of Air Force History: Washington, D.C., 1979), 88.

²⁸ The first two Air Police officers to serve with the RAF Regiment were Lt Col Byron G. Kuhn and Capt George J. Barth from 1966 to 1969 (Wing Commander Richard Avens (RAF, Ret), "RAF Exchange Officers," *Tiger Flight*, Vol. 14, No. 3, 30 (May-June 2005).

²⁹ Lt Col Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973* (Office of Air Force History: Washington, D.C., 1979), 145-148.

³⁰ Interview of Lt Col Stuart B. Higginbotham USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), March 1, 2005.

³¹ Lt Col Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973* (Office of Air Force History: Washington, D.C., 1979), 147-148.

³² Interview of Lt Col Stuart B. Higginbotham USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), March 1, 2005.

³³ Interview of Lt Col Stuart B. Higginbotham USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), March 1, 2005.

³⁴ Lt Col Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973* (Office of Air Force History: Washington, D.C., 1979), 153.

³⁵ Maj Milton R. Kirste, 315 SPS/CC, Phan Rang AB, End of Tour Report, 10 Jun 71 – 31 Mar 72.

³⁶ Capt Marie Shadden, *The Peacekeepers: Security Police History 1947 – 1982* (Lackland AFB, TX: USAF Security Police Academy, 1983), 91 - 93.

³⁷ Citation to Accompany the Award of the Bronze Star Medal (With "V" Device) (Posthumous) to James B. Jones.

³⁸ Lt Col Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973* (Office of Air Force History: Washington, D.C., 1979), Appendix 1.

³⁹ "Air Force Police Describe Actions During VC Attack," 7th *Air Force News*, Vol. 2, No. 15 (April 22, 1966). A Conex was a steel shipping container about eight feet long on each side.

⁴⁰ Strength figure from Lt Col Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973* (Office of Air Force History: Washington, D.C., 1979), 82.

⁴¹ Hoover to Lieutenant George M. Connell, USMC, October 22, 1965, reprinted in *Security and Law Enforcement Digest*, 1966 Spring Edition.

⁴² Hoover to Lieutenant George M. Connell, USMC, October 22, 1965, reprinted in *Security and Law Enforcement Digest*, 1966 Spring Edition.

⁴³ Hoover to Lieutenant George M. Connell, USMC, October 22, 1965, reprinted in *Security and Law Enforcement Digest*, 1966 Spring Edition.

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- ⁴⁴ Booklet, "Project One Hundred Thousand: Characteristics and Performance of 'New Standards Men,' (Office of the Secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) Dec 69), vi.
- ⁴⁵ Interview with MSgt Ernest Koontz, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), December 12, 2004.
- ⁴⁶ Interview with MSgt Ernest Koontz, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), December 12, 2004.
- ⁴⁷ Interview with MSgt Ernest Koontz, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), December 12, 2004.
- ⁴⁸ *Security Police Digest*, 1967 Summer Edition, 5.
- ⁴⁹ *Security Police Digest*, 1967 Fall Edition, 7.
- ⁵⁰ Memorandum, Lt. Gen. Glen W. Martin to Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown, 22 March 1966, 2.
- ⁵¹ OPERATION SAFE SIDE Final Report, Volume I, Prepared by 1041st SPS (T), August 11, 1967, 1-2 hereinafter SAFE SIDE Report.
- ⁵² *Security and Law Enforcement Digest*, 1966 Summer Edition, 3.
- ⁵³ SAFE SIDE Report, Volume I, 2-3.
- ⁵⁴ The beret itself was not unique to the 1041st, having been first adopted by the SAC Elite Guard.
- ⁵⁵ SAFE SIDE Report, Volume I, 2-3, Attachment 10. The only change in this organization came in April 1967 when it was decided to eliminate the Observation and Surveillance Flight and incorporate it into the Close Combat Flight (SAFE SIDE Report, Volume I, 9-2).
- ⁵⁶ *Security Police Digest* (1967 Spring Edition).
- ⁵⁷ SAFE SIDE Report, Volume I, 2-7.
- ⁵⁸ Sgt Duke Windsor, "Binh Thuy Air Base: A1C Millard Lehman" Vietnam Security Police Association Website (http://www.vspa.com/t_lehman-bt-windsor-1966.htm).
- ⁵⁹ Lt Col Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973* (Office of Air Force History: Washington, D.C., 1979), 60.
- ⁶⁰ SMSgt James A. George, "They Work The Night Beat," *The Airman* (October 1967), 46.
- ⁶¹ The following account of the defense of Tan Son Nhut on December 4 through 5, 1966, is primarily based on Olbert H. Hiatt, "Attack on Tan Son Nhut AB 4 December 1966," Vietnam Security Police Association Webpage (http://www.vspa.com/t_bevich-tsn-attack-1-jerome-1966.htm) and W.C. "Chuck" Henry, "Tan Son Nhut's First Ground Attack, Dec 4, 1966" 377th Security Police Squadron Webpage (<http://webpages.charter.net/cepenley/stories/firstattack.html>).
- ⁶² "Six Hundred and Thirty," special supplement to the *Philadelphia Daily News* (October 26, 1987).
- ⁶³ General Westmoreland to Lieutenant General Momyer, Commander 7th Air Force as quoted in *Security Police Digest* (Winter 1966), 2.
- ⁶⁴ General Westmoreland to Lieutenant General Momyer, Commander 7th Air Force as quoted in *Security Police Digest* (Winter 1966), 2.
- ⁶⁵ General Westmoreland to Lieutenant General Momyer, Commander 7th Air Force as quoted in *Security Police Digest* (Winter 1966), 2.
- ⁶⁶ *Air Force Times*, December 27, 1966.
- ⁶⁷ News Release No. 67-7-29, Office of Information, 824th Combat Support Group (PACAF) Kadena AB, Okinawa, 21 July 1967.
- ⁶⁸ SAFE SIDE Report, Volume II, 11-1.
- ⁶⁹ SAFE SIDE Report, Volume II, 11-2.
- ⁷⁰ SAFE SIDE Report, Volume II, 11-4.
- ⁷¹ Memorandum, SAFE SIDE Operating Rules, 10 Mar 1967, 2.
- ⁷² Translation of letter from Xom Ngai to CK11, May 28, 1967, at Attachment 28, SAFE SIDE Report, Volume II.
- ⁷³ Draft report of Special Agent Raymond K. Dickelman, OSI Detachment 5009, 5 June 1967 at Attachment 29, SAFE SIDE Report, Volume II.
- ⁷⁴ Draft report of Special Agent Raymond K. Dickelman, OSI Detachment 5009, 5 June 1967 at Attachment 29, SAFE SIDE Report, Volume II.
- ⁷⁵ Draft report of Special Agent Raymond K. Dickelman, OSI Detachment 5009, 5 June 1967 at Attachment 29, SAFE SIDE Report, Volume II.

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- ⁷⁶ Capt Marie Shadden, *The Peacekeepers: Security Police History 1947 – 1982* (Lackland AFB, TX: USAF Security Police Academy, 1983), 97.
- ⁷⁷ “Unique Unit At Phu Cat,” *Air Force Times*, October 11, 1967, 18.
- ⁷⁸ Interview of Col Frederick “Fritz” Heiss, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), August 2006.
- ⁷⁹ Interview of Lt Col Kent Miller, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), April 1, 2005.
- ⁸⁰ Interview of Lt Col Kent Miller, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), April 1, 2005.
- ⁸¹ Kent C. Miller, “A Lie Revealed” (typescript supplied by Lt Col Miller).
- ⁸² “Eagle Platoon Call for Volunteers,” courtesy of Lt Col Kent Miller.
- ⁸³ Vietnam Security Police Association Website (<http://www.vspa.com/aspprotect/guardmount-vspa-ki-lod-1.asp?WhichPage=2&MyPageSize=500&MYSQL=SELECT+ASPP%5FUsers%2E%2A+FROM+ASPP%5FUsers+ORDER+BY+Notes+ASC&Keyword=>); Lt Col Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973* (Office of Air Force History: Washington, D.C., 1979), Appendix 1.
- ⁸⁴ SAFE SIDE Report, Volume II, 19-1, 19-2.
- ⁸⁵ SAFE SIDE Report, Volume II, 19-2.
- ⁸⁶ SAFE SIDE Report, Volume II, 19-3.
- ⁸⁷ SAFE SIDE Report, Volume II, 19-3.
- ⁸⁸ SAFE SIDE Report, Volume II, 19-4.
- ⁸⁹ SAFE SIDE Report, Volume II, 19-3.
- ⁹⁰ SAFE SIDE Report, Volume II, 19-3.
- ⁹¹ *Security Police Digest*, 1967 Fall Edition, 7.
- ⁹² *Security Police Digest*, 1967 Fall Edition, 7.
- ⁹³ *Security Police Digest*, 1967 Fall Edition, 7.
- ⁹⁴ Col Donald C. Shultis, “Air Base Security in a Limited War Area,” *Air Force Review*, Vol. 28, Number 5 (July –August 1967), 59.
- ⁹⁵ Col Donald C. Shultis, “Air Base Security in a Limited War Area,” *Air Force Review*, Vol. 28, Number 5 (July –August 1967), 59.
- ⁹⁶ Col Donald C. Shultis, “Air Base Security in a Limited War Area,” *Air Force Review*, Vol. 28, Number 5 (July –August 1967), 64.
- ⁹⁷ *Security Police Digest*, 1967 Spring Edition, 8.
- ⁹⁸ Gaskins toured Tan Son Nhut, Cam Ranh Bay, Phu Cat, Da Nang, Dong Ha, Monkey Mountain, Tuy Hoa, Bien Hoa, Phan Rang, Ninh Tuy, and Vong Tau.
- ⁹⁹ “Southeast Asia Trip Report by Colonel Leslie E. Gaskins, USAF in September 1967,” Section I, 1.
- ¹⁰⁰ “Southeast Asia Trip Report by Colonel Leslie E. Gaskins, USAF in September 1967,” Section I, 1.
- ¹⁰¹ “Southeast Asia Trip Report by Colonel Leslie E. Gaskins, USAF in September 1967,” Section I, 1 – 2.
- ¹⁰² “Southeast Asia Trip Report by Colonel Leslie E. Gaskins, USAF in September 1967,” Section I, 4.
- ¹⁰³ “Southeast Asia Trip Report by Colonel Leslie E. Gaskins, USAF in September 1967,” Section I, 1.
- ¹⁰⁴ For example, during the last quarter of 1967 the 377th SPS law enforcement flight issued 593 traffic citations and dealt with 1,012 uniform/curfew violations, by far the highest activities of that quarter (*History of 377th Combat Support Group 1 Oct – 31 Dec 1967*, 72).
- ¹⁰⁵ James H. Goldstein “A2C Jerry R. Moon, KIA, Tuy Hoa, 31st APS, RVN: The night we all grew up...” Vietnam Security Police Association Website (http://www.vspa.com/t_moon-tuy-hoa-goldstein-1967.htm).
- ¹⁰⁶ James H. Goldstein “A2C Jerry R. Moon, KIA, Tuy Hoa, 31st APS, RVN: The night we all grew up...” Vietnam Security Police Association Website (http://www.vspa.com/t_moon-tuy-hoa-goldstein-1967.htm).
- ¹⁰⁷ The eight Airmen honored were TSgt Jose H. Rodriguez, SSgt Harry G. Farringer, SSgt John J. Scott, Jr., A1C Robert W. Miles, A2C Kenneth B. Bell, A2C Robert D. Stendeback, A3C Stephen L. Casey, and A3C William Fastic, Jr. See Robert W. Miles “Pleiku Air Base Armory Explosion,” Vietnam Security Police Association Website (<http://www.vspa.com/pk-miles-airmans-medal-1967.htm>).
- ¹⁰⁸ *History of 377th Combat Support Group 1 Oct – 31 Dec 1967*, 67.
- ¹⁰⁹ Note to Tom for transmission to all posts (Col Billy Jack Carter Papers).

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CHAPTER SIX

VIETNAM: 1968 – 1973

Once the Christmas/New Year's truce in Vietnam ended, an eventful January began. In Vietnam it didn't take the enemy long to renew their attacks on American air bases. During January, Da Nang and Pleiku were each hit twice by stand off attacks that together killed one American and wounded 25 others and destroyed or damaged 53 aircraft.¹ January also saw the 1041st Combat Security Police Squadron placed under the operational control of the Tactical Air Command as Air Force and DoD leadership

continued to study and implement the SAFE SIDE recommendations.



Aerial photo of rocket launching site used for attack on Pleiku AB, January 20, 1968 (Air Force Historical)

Tensions in Korea also escalated that January. On January 21, 1968, a band of thirty-one North Koreans assigned to the 124th Army Unit, 283rd North Korean Army Group, a unit specially trained for guerilla operations in the South, and dressed in Republic of Korea (ROK) uniforms, were intercepted in the northern suburbs of Seoul by the Korean National Police (KNP). In the ensuing firefight, five North Koreans were killed and one captured while the rest headed for the De-Militarized Zone (DMZ) and safety. A total of 34 soldiers, policemen and civilians were killed in the skirmish. The captured North Korean lieutenant confessed that the team had infiltrated into

South Korea for the purpose of destroying Blue House, the South Korean presidential mansion, and killing the South Korean President Park Chung Hee.

Two days later, North Korean patrol boats seized the USS *Pueblo*, a Navy intelligence-gathering vessel, in international waters off the East China Sea off Wonsan. One of the *Pueblo's* crew was killed in the boarding and the remaining 82 were taken prisoner and held captive for over a year. North Korea gambled that the United States, distracted by Vietnam, would not be able or willing to retaliate militarily.

The United States immediately made a show of force via Operation Red Fox, the air component of which was dubbed Combat Fox. Over 200 Air Force combat aircraft were dispatched to Korea while the Navy deployed 35 warships including six aircraft carriers and 400 combat aircraft.

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Bases in Japan also played host to Combat Fox forces. One of these was Itazuke AB where Capt Jay Swander was Chief of Security Police and law enforcement. Itazuke was a forward operating base (FOB) with few aircraft operations, but that would change once the *Pueblo* was seized. Swander, one of only two officers on the base with a top secret security clearance, was tasked to transform the base from a FOB to a MOB (main operating base) within 72 hours. Large quantities of mothballed equipment had to be broken out of storage to support the reconnaissance aircraft due to be stationed there. Swander also received 200 Security Police drawn from various Air Force major commands and he had to “put them together and make them into a unit in seventy-two hours.”² With all the work he had to do, Swander “didn’t sleep much for the next seventy-two hours.”³

Soon the skies around Itazuke were crowded with aircraft in direct contradiction to what the local Japanese were told when the base was initially reactivated. Soon demonstrators appeared, many supported by or members of the radical Zengakuren, the national league of students. The largest demonstration consisted of 2,500 students from Fuchu University and Swander recalled that “there was an awful lot of sophisticated, subtle things that the students would do. They would place razor blades in their shoes and go up and kick at the guards...And so what ...we wound up doing [was] getting riot police from the Japanese prefecture there in Fukuoka and... Instead of having GIs or US forces on the gates we actually put Japanese police in front of our forces.”⁴ In addition to demonstrations at the gates, the demonstrators tried to interfere with military operations. Swander saw them “put real tall poles up at the end of our runways... with flags on them...so that [as] the pilot would be coming in to try to land on the runway... [they] would try to distract the pilots so they’d have an aircraft crash and things of that nature. And it was all designed to get the “Yankees” to go home...”⁵

Swander had a particularly harrowing experience with student demonstrators when an RF-4 “Phantom” reconnaissance aircraft from the base crashed into a building under construction at Kyushi University in Fukuoka. The plane stuck itself in the fifth floor and Swander and his SPs were tasked with securing the crash site. “[W]hen the students found me there with my troops,” Swander remembered, “M-16 rifles, and everything else, securing this area, they rioted.”⁶ Swander was ordered to get out of there and managed to extract everyone except himself, his flight sergeant, and the base operations officer. The students surrounded Swander’s patrol car and for the next five hours, he and the others were trapped. The students tried to blow up the car, they flattened the tires, and they broke out the windows. “[W]e were basically rescued by the Japanese police...dressing up like students in headbands,” said Swander, “...they got themselves wedged in and they pushed away from the car. I told my flight sergeant to gas it, get us out of there. And he drove out of there on four flat tires.”⁷

While the South Koreans pushed for immediate military retaliation against the North over the Blue House and *Pueblo* provocations, the U. S. chose to negotiate. It was not until February 1969, after the U. S. admitted to espionage against North Korea, that the *Pueblo* crewmen were released. The *Pueblo* was retained by the North Koreans as a “war trophy” and is still on display in Worsan harbor. Throughout 1968 the North

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Korean's continued their provocations, including 1,142 attempted infiltrations of South Korea.

On January 30, the annual truce for the observance of the Vietnamese Tet Lunar New Year was due to begin. Although no one knew at the time, after this Tet, things in Vietnam would never be the same.

Tet was the most important holiday in both North and South Vietnam and had no Western equivalent. A 1965 MACV orientation pamphlet for newly assigned troops described it as "combination of All Souls' Day, a family celebration, a spring festival, a national holiday and an overall manifestation of a way of life."⁸ A mutual cease fire had been a feature of the week-long Tet celebration since 1965 and both sides seemingly anticipated a similar decline in military operations for Tet 1968.

But Tet was also a military holiday celebrating the Tet New Year surprise attack by Emperor Quang Trung against Hanoi's Chinese occupiers in 1789. Five days prior to the start of the 1968 holiday, Saigon students celebrated Quang Trung's victory in an event, with anti-American overtones, attended by thousands. In Hanoi, the government proclaimed that the slogan for the impending Year of the Monkey would be "All for complete victory over the US aggressors."⁹

On the home front, the American public was becoming uneasy with the war, with Westmoreland's calls for additional troops, and with the 13,000 US dead since 1961. A September 1967 Gallup poll revealed that 46 percent of respondents believed the war was a mistake versus 44 percent who did not—the first time a poll showed such a majority. On October 21, 1967, 70,000 demonstrators came to Washington, D.C. to "Confront the War Makers." During the demonstration a group of "hippies" led by Abbie Hoffman attempted to "exorcize" the Pentagon by singing and chanting until it levitated and turned orange, thus driving out the evil spirits and ending the war in Viet Nam. Unfortunately for Mr. Hoffman, the building stayed firmly planted and in its original color. While there was as yet no groundswell from the public demanding a withdrawal of the troops, a major setback to American forces could change that and a major setback was just what Ho Chi Minh and his generals were planning for Tet.

In July of 1967 American intelligence noticed that North Vietnamese ambassadors were being recalled to Hanoi and while some analysts speculated that a peace offering was in the offing, the diplomats had actually been recalled to take part in a conference to devise a strategy to turn the tide of the war in favor of the North. The meeting resulted in the "Resolution for a General Offensive and General Uprising" calling for a combination military offensive and popular uprising in South Vietnam's urban areas against the South Vietnamese government. Troops and supplies were secretly moved into position and the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) readied the guerilla fighters of the People's Liberation Front (PLF) or Viet Cong. Saigon along with 39 South Vietnamese provincial capitals and 71 district capitals were targeted for attack.

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The first attack of the battle that “will shake the world” began prematurely at Nha Trang at 35 minutes after midnight, Tuesday, January 30, 1968.¹⁰ Over the next four hours attacks rolled through South Vietnam: Ban Me Thuot, Kontum, Hoi An, Da Nang, Qui Nhon, and Pleiku were all struck. At 0945hrs, the Tet ceasefire was officially cancelled, but Saigon and the surrounding area remained strangely quiet on Tuesday even as fighting raged in the north of the country.

SSgt William “Pete” Piazza of Bien Hoa’s 3rd SPS was on his second tour in Vietnam. Early in the morning of January 31, Piazza, assigned the radio call sign of Defense 5 as the non-commissioned officer in charge of “C” flight resupply, was hauling extra ammunition to the flight’s posts around the base, the busiest airfield in the world. Bien Hoa’s SPs were already manning their defensive positions in response to 7th Air Force’s declaration of Security Alert Condition (SACON) Red because of the fighting raging to the north. Around 0300hrs, Piazza heard the sound of incoming rockets. Within minutes, attacks would also begin at the Army compound at nearby Long Binh, at Tan Son Nhut, and at the American Embassy and the South Vietnamese Presidential Palace in downtown Saigon.

The 3rd SPS commander, Lt Col “Kent” Miller was in the last month of his 12 month Vietnam tour. As the first rockets landed on base he was in bed, exhausted after returning from a trip to Japan. He heard the rockets, but he decided not to go to the bunker outside, figuring he could dive under his bunk if they got too close. But the




Lt Col Kent Miller (left) with his operations officer, Capt Reginald Maisey (Air Force photo from Maisey family collection)

rockets, and then mortars, just kept coming and it dawned on Miller that this might just be the beginning of a ground assault. Grabbing his gear, he scrambled to Central Security Control (CSC) and despite radio problems got the word out to his troops: take cover, but if you see any enemy “make him 10-7 [out of service, e.g. dead].”¹¹ Miller would stay on the radio all through that long, deadly night talking to his troops in his “soothing” voice “like a father talking to a child.”¹² His calming presence on that

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electronic lifeline would be remembered by his young troops as one of the keys to their survival.

Over at Tan Son Nhut, also already in SACON Red, word was received at 0300hrs that the American Embassy compound in Saigon was under attack and twenty minutes later the east end of the base came under mortar attack. Around 0330hrs a Lambretta scooter-taxi pulled up opposite the perimeter fence on the west side of the base between the 051 gate and the 051 bunker, a concrete emplacement left over from the days of French occupation. The security policemen in the 051 bunker watched as the occupants, later identified as sappers from the VC C-10 Sapper Battalion, approached the fence and slid pipes under it. The “pipes” were actually Bangalore torpedoes packed with high explosive, but since the men had not exhibited hostile intent the SPs in the 051 bunker held their fire in accordance with MACV policy.¹³ Once the sappers exploded their Bangalore’s, however, they opened fire killing the sappers and destroying the taxicab.



Map of Tan Son Nhut showing enemy attacks (Air Force Historical Research Agency)

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When the Bangalore's exploded, which tore a gaping hole in the fence, hundreds of VC, augmented by NVA regulars, began pouring through the breach and battering down the 051 gate, pausing only to unleash a barrage of small arms fire against departing Seaboard World Airlines "Freedom Bird" carrying troops on their way home after completing their tours in Vietnam.¹⁴

The attackers were members of the D-16 and 267th VC Battalions along with one battalion from the 271st VC Regiment. These 1,500 men had occupied the new, showcase Vinatexco textile factory on the base's western perimeter across Highway 1 and north of the 051 gate during the evening of January 30 and waited patiently for the assault to begin. As they launched their assault, their remaining thousand or so comrades simultaneously attacked at eight other points around the base perimeter to prevent the defenders from reinforcing the western sector.



Tango 4 (Security Forces Museum)

One hundred yards from Gate 51, high up in a 27-foot tall observation tower called Tango 4, one of 20 such towers ringing the base, A1C Alan D. Tucker had a bird's eye view of the action. At 0333hrs Tucker called into the CSC to report men outside the fence setting up mortars. By 0345hrs he was reporting "thousands...coming on base directly in front of this post!"¹⁵ Throughout the night Tucker would call in the enemy's positions from his perch above the battlefield even as hundreds of attackers flowed around and under his tower, pausing to take an occasional potshot at him. Now Tucker watched as the VC began to blast the 051 bunker with RPG and B40 rocket fire.

Five SPs were fighting from inside the bunker: Sergeants Louis R. Fisher, William J. Cyr, Charles E. Hebron, Roger B. Mills, and twenty-one-year-old Alonzo J. Coggins. The men in the bunker immediately began pouring fire into the onrushing VC who they reported to the CSC were "pouring" from houses and the tree line along Highway 1.¹⁶

Convinced that the assault on the western perimeter at the 051 gate was the enemy's main effort, 377th SPS commander Lt Col Billy Jack Carter began rushing reinforcements to the area and dispatched his operations officer, Maj Carl Bender, and several senior sergeants to the field to coordinate the defense. By 0344hrs, the VC were under heavy fire from a Security Alert Team (SAT), a reserve SAT, three QRTs, two platoons of Task Force 35, a unit of Army cooks, clerks and other support personnel under Carter's command in emergencies, and helicopter gunships from the Army's 1st Aviation Brigade. Coincidentally and fortunately, the

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previous Friday the defense of the 051 area had been used as a war gaming problem for the monthly security exercise.

Since it was a key position for the defense of TSN's western perimeter and since bypassing it would have resulted in leaving a strong position in their rear as they rushed toward the runway, the VC pummeled the 051 bunker with small arms fire, RPGs, and rockets in an effort to eliminate it as a threat. Attempting to reach Tango 4, TSgt Billy M. Palmer and his QRF were quickly surrounded, but managed to escape destruction. Capt Carl B. "Bernie" DeNisio, the 377th weapons system security operations officer, and 1Lt Melvin G. Grover, Jr., the night shift commander, rushed over to the 051 gate area from the north side of the base, but had to abandon their jeep when the enemy opened fire on it. Now they were pinned down by the enemy and helpless to do anything to relieve Echo 37, the call sign of Sgt Fisher and the men in the 051 bunker.



Lt Col Billy Jack Carter (377th Security Police Squadron Website)

As the enemy's overwhelming firepower methodically took its toll on the men in the bunker, Echo 37 made a last transmission to CSC reporting the enemy all around and the defenders low on ammunition. Fisher, Cyr, Hebron, and Mills were all killed.



The 051 bunker after the battle (Air Force Historical Research Agency)

Coggins, alive but wounded, hid among the bodies of his buddies just before VC assault troops swarmed over the bunker and sprayed its interior with AK-47 fire. Coggins, feigning death among the bodies of his comrades on the floor of the bunker, was trampled by enemy troops as they set up to defend against any attempt to retake the bunker.

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Alonzo Coggins was in his own little piece of hell and for the next eight hours he went in and out of consciousness, played “possum,” and prayed.¹⁷

One of the VC triumphantly turned the 051 bunker’s M-60 around to fire into the base in support of his onrushing comrades. In front of them were the runways and aircraft of Tan Son Nhut as well as the headquarters of General Westmoreland, 7th Air Force, and the South Vietnamese Air Force.



A Security Police family: Lt Terry Maisey, Lt Reginald V. Maisey, Jr., and CWO4 Reginald V. Maisey, Sr. (Air Force photo)

The rockets and mortars stopped dropping on Bien Hoa after 45 rounds, but more was to come. At 0320hrs, a K-9 handler radioed the CSC reporting a penetration of the base perimeter in his sector. Lt Col Miller, using the law enforcement desk sergeant’s handheld radio because the rocket attack had knocked out the power to CSC, told the handler to pop a handheld slap flare and see what he could see. After a few seconds Miller heard the stunned handler report, “My God, they are everywhere.”¹⁸ Another K-9 handler and the men posted inside Bunker Hill 10, an old French-built reinforced concrete bunker on the east side of the base, confirmed the penetration and reported that they were exchanging small arms fire with the intruders. Approximately 1,500 enemy troops were attacking the base and to meet them Miller had about 350 SPs and 75 augmentees.

It didn’t take long for Sgt Piazza to hear a radio call to Defense 6 to resupply Bunker Hill 10 where two SPs, Sergeants Neal Tuggle and Marshall Gott, along with SP augmentee A1C Neal Behnke, were fighting furiously. Stopped by sniper fire in an attempt to reach the bunker from the east, Piazza and Defense 6, Sgt James Lee, turned around and managed to reach the position from the west. SSgt Larry H. Sawyer, a QRT leader, also raced his jeep through enemy fire to evacuate any wounded and resupply the defenders with ammunition.

Miller sent the squadron operations officer, thirty-eight-year-old Capt Reginald V. Maisey, the son of an air policeman and on his second tour in Vietnam, to take charge at Bunker Hill 10. “He couldn’t wait to get out there,” Miller noted approvingly.¹⁹ Even though Miller had reinforced the Bunker Hill 10 area, he was plagued by the concern that “the people we were fighting ... that we had taken under fire ... was not the main force. They were just a force to draw our attention, and they were going to really hit us from

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some other place.”²⁰ Because of his uncertainty as to where the main attack would fall, Miller initially sent only a three-man SAT and a nine-man QRT to bolster Bunker Hill 10. Over time thirty to forty men, including a base fire department pumper truck and crew to douse any fires that might start in the elephant grass around the bunker, were drawn into the fighting.²¹

Eight companies of the 274th VC Regiment were attacking the east and southeast perimeter of Bien Hoa and 300 to 500 of these hardened fighters were surging toward Bunker Hill 10 and the flight line beyond it. The defenders of the bunker were taking heavy fire from the enemy and were running low on ammo as Piazza and Lee, driving like hell through a hail of gunfire in their ammunition-laden truck, pulled up to the rear of the bunker. The fire crew, either in response to orders or because the fire here was not one they could hope to extinguish, took their pumper and raced toward the main part of base pursued by RPG rounds that fortunately failed to find their target.²²

Soon after Piazza and Lee arrived, Bunker Hill 10 was hit with a barrage of small arms and RPG fire from north, east, and south. In either an excellent display of marksmanship or by pure dumb luck, the enemy’s first rocket took out Sergeant Tuggle’s M-60 machine gun atop the bunker. The gun tumbled off the bunker and lay useless in the road. “We all looked at each other,” Piazza remembered, “and next thing you know somebody said, ‘Look.’ And everybody looked up, and here’s a B-40 [rocket] round going over the top of Bunker Hill 10 like Superman...and it lands in the elephant grass but didn’t go off. And we all looked at each other, and I think it was Captain Maisey that said, ‘Take cover.’ and everybody took cover.”²³

Sergeant Gott remained on top of the bunker, spraying the area with his M-16 until ordered inside the fortress while Piazza took cover behind the bunker alongside an Army lieutenant from the 145th Aviation Battalion who was supposed to be in the CSC to coordinate helicopter gunship support. The lieutenant was armed with an M-16 with a 40mm grenade launcher mounted under its barrel, but he didn’t know how to use the launcher. As RPGs hit the bunker and the area around it, Piazza, who had displayed a talent with the grenade launcher, asked the lieutenant if he would mind trading weapons.

Bunker Hill 10 was receiving direct hits from RPGs and B-40 rockets as Piazza lined up for his first grenade shot. A VC rocket team had occupied an abandoned QC position out in front of Bunker Hill 10 and Piazza began to trade shots with them. The VC would fire and Piazza would pop out from behind the bunker, launch a grenade in their direction, and duck back behind the bunker in an action Piazza compared to “playing the old cowboy western game where you shoot one shot and then duck and cover...from behind buildings.”²⁴

The VC had fired 13 rockets by the time Piazza lobbed his tenth grenade at their position. Suddenly there was an explosion “and we saw bodies and parts and the blowing up of the position and whatnot. Then a few of us screamed, ranted and raved, jumped up and down, good shooting and all that.”²⁵ Piazza’s last shot exploded in the store of rockets in the enemy position and set them off. Piazza now joined Maisey, Tuggle, Gott,

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and Behneke inside the relative safety of the bunker and joined in firing at the enemy through the firing slits in the concrete wall.

Even though wounded, “Reggie” Maisey seemed “to be everywhere” directing the actions of the defenders both inside and outside the bunker.²⁶ Maisey kept in close radio contact with Miller in the CSC and during one of his radio calls Miller heard Maisey say, “‘Oh, I’m hit’,” Miller recalled, “[but] he just kept on talking and kept telling me what was going on. And then pretty soon I didn’t hear from him anymore.”²⁷ Around 0430, as Maisey was about to go outside to get better radio reception, one of 12 enemy rockets to score direct hits on the bunker exploded against one of the firing slits and the brunt of the blast hit him in the back. In the chaos, smoke, and darkness inside the bunker no one noticed he had been killed until they began tripping over his body. Tuggle and Piazza moved Maisey’s body outside and laid it on the stairs leading to the bunker’s roof. With Captain Maisey dead, Piazza was now in command of the battered and surrounded Bunker Hill 10.

Friendly forces continued to gather to block the enemy waves pouring through the breach in Tan Son Nhut’s 051 gate area. Around 0415hrs a platoon of the ARVN 2nd Services Battalion accompanied by two American advisors made it to within 100 meters of the 051 bunker when they began receiving fire from the emplacement. A soldier was sent forward to determine whether the fire from the bunker was enemy or friendly. When he was shot the platoon engaged the bunker until the VC turned a captured ARVN recoilless rifle on them and wounded another ARVN soldier and one of the US advisors. At the same time, one of Carter’s SATs reported it was pinned down by heavy fire 20 meters southwest of the 051 bunker. Since it was clear that the enemy was in possession of position, Major Bender, “in one of the hardest decisions I’ve ever made,” called in an air strike on the 051 bunker. “I had to assume they were all dead,” Bender explained.²⁸

Bender was conspicuous directing defensive operations on the runways and taxiways and even drew blood himself by killing eight of a ten-man VC column one by one by methodically shooting the last man in line each time they rose from the elephant grass to move. After having shrugged off slight shrapnel wounds, Bender was finally knocked out of the fight by fifty-four shrapnel wounds from an exploding mortar round. While waiting for the ambulance, the seemingly indestructible Bender prevented a potential blue-on-blue firefight between SPs and advancing Vietnamese paratroopers and when no ambulance showed up, the iron major drove himself to the dispensary even though bleeding profusely and unable to use his right leg.

Carter was using everything he had to respond to threats all around the base perimeter including an assault on the MACV Annex. He was assisted by Lt Col Luu Kim Cuong, commander of the 33rd VNAF Air Wing who brought a force of Vietnamese staff officers, QCs, service troops, and National Police to the fight. Hard pressed, Carter needed some heavy duty lethality and requested helicopter gunship support, but was turned down because enemy and friendly forces were too close together and in the darkness the pilots were unable to distinguish friend from foe. Three light tanks from South Vietnamese Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky’s personal protection force

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commanded by the Tan Son Nhut Sensitive Area commander, VNAF Maj Phung Van Chieu, did rumble up at around 0500hrs and begin firing at the enemy crowded around the 051 Gate. Within 15 minutes, however, enemy RPGs destroyed two of the tanks and caused the other to retreat. Chieu was wounded in the exchange and evacuated. Lt Col Cuong was also wounded in the fighting. By now an entire reinforced VC battalion had penetrated the western perimeter and was maneuvering to flank Carter's outnumbered blocking force.

In and around Bien Hoa's Bunker Hill 10, Piazza and his men continued to engage the attackers. Peeking around the south side of the bunker, Piazza spotted a large group of enemy troops heading toward the F-100 parking ramp and reported it to the CSC which vectored Huey and Cobra gunships from the 145th Aviation Battalion to the target. As the choppers strafed the enemy force, the rounds came so close to the bunker that Piazza had to jump inside to avoid being hit.

Since the field of view through the bunker's firing slits was too restricted to get a good view of the action in the darkness, Piazza and his men stepped outside. An AC-47 "Spooky" gunship was dropping flares to light up the battlefield and the SPs around the bunker sent up their own slap flares. In the flickering light Piazza tried to fire at the passing enemy with M-148 and M-79 grenade launchers, but they failed to fire since the firing pins were jammed so far down they could not hit the primer in the round. Tuggle and Piazza then climbed on top of the bunker to spot and report enemy movements to the CSC and direct fire on them. Piazza noted that the VC and NVA were "going through in their brand new uniforms and with their AK-47s going right past us, not even firing at us."²⁹ Having surrounded Bunker Hill 10, they were on the way to other objectives.

By bypassing Bunker Hill 10, the enemy subjected themselves to an intense crossfire from the bunker and other defenders. Even so, they managed to penetrate as far west as the engine test stand which was within 50 yards of the aircraft parking area. A counterattack against the test stand launched from Bunker Hill 9 managed to retake the position, but it had to be abandoned after helicopter gunships mistakenly strafed the recaptured position.

By 0515, Billy Jack Carter's defenders at TSN were running short on ammunition and a hasty resupply effort was organized to keep them on the firing line. The enemy had penetrated 600 meters into the base along a 300-meter front, but the defensive line was holding and the penetration grew no larger. At 0523hrs artillery was cleared to fire at the base of the enemy penetration west of Highway 1 and the cannon's high explosive shells, augmented by 81mm mortar rounds from the 2nd Services Battalion, prevented further reinforcement of the enemy penetration inside the fence. Hard pressed, but holding their own, Carter's forces inside the perimeter needed some help and the cavalry was literally on the way.

The 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division was already on alert for a possible relief mission to Tan Son Nhut. When the call came, the 3rd's commander, LTC Glenn K. Otis, ordered his armored cavalry Troop C, under the

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command of CPT Leo B. Virant, to leave its camp at Chu Chi and race the twenty miles down Highway 1 to TSN. After tearing down the highway with Otis overhead in his command helicopter spotting VC ambushes and pinpointing enemy positions, Troop C slammed into the rear of three VC battalions attacking the air base at around 0600hrs.



Virant's cavalry in action outside Tan Son Nhut (Army photo)

Initially caught by surprise and sent reeling by the cavalry's attack, the VC quickly recovered and began to pummel Captain Virant's command after catching it in an ambush sprung from a row of houses along Highway 1 just north and west of TSN's 051 gate. Blasting away at Virant's armored

column with RPGs, the VC destroyed about one-third of the armored vehicles and seriously wounded Virant in the head. However, the sudden appearance of Troop C in their rear did disrupt the enemy attack on the base and troopers from the destroyed vehicles continued to fight from a ditch alongside the highway and divert the attention of the enemy, but they were rapidly running out of ammunition, time, and men.

Observers in Tower 1 reported the battle between Virant and the VC to Central Security Control and Carter decided to take advantage of the disruption caused by Troop's C attack by launching his own counterattack against the enemy inside the base perimeter. Two companies of the 8th ARVN Airborne Battalion, at Tan Son Nhut only because their transport to Khe Sanh had failed to appear, had struck the enemy inside the fence line about the same time Virant hit the rear of the North Vietnamese attackers, but were repulsed. Shortly after 0630hrs Carter launched a more coordinated counterattack using the Vietnamese paratroopers and American forces and launched from positions south, north, and east of the enemy. After advancing approximately 100 meters through "fierce resistance," the counterattack bogged down and Carter was forced to go over to the defensive and call for artillery and helicopter gunship support.³⁰

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A humorous take on where Lt Col Carter's command post was during the battle (Billy Jack Carter Papers)



SECURITY CONTROL, TO MOBILE 51 AND
TOMAHAWK..... WHAT'S YOUR 10-9?
CARTER

Having lived through a harrowing night, “Pete” Piazza and the men around Bunker Hill 10 were relieved when dawn finally came. Capt Martin E. “Marty” Strones, C Flight commander, posted Piazza and four other SPs on top of the bunker to observe the battle going on outside the base. This battle was being fought between the enemy and the Army’s 101st Airborne Division’s, 2nd Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment, which had been brought in at dawn by helicopter, and Troop A of the 9th Infantry Division's, 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry, which had run the Highway 1 gauntlet. In a fight lasting most of the day, the Army cut off and ejected the attackers from the eastern end of the airfield. Troop A lost two APCs in the fighting and its lone tank took 19 hits and lost two crews, but was still operational when the battle was over.

With the attackers cut off from further reinforcement, Strones turned his attention to eliminating the now isolated enemy inside the perimeter. The deepest enemy penetration on Bien Hoa was to the arming/de-arming shack where the armorers would station themselves to make sure the bombs and guns on aircraft ready to depart on combat missions were armed and correctly loaded. The wooden shack and its personnel bunker made for a strong position. Another strong enemy position was centered on the engine test stand which was “virtually a fortress” since it was reveted and the engines and related test equipment afforded the enemy ample cover.³¹ The third major VC/NVA position consisted of a reinforced squad hiding in the elephant grass around the east end of the runway.

The test stand was assaulted first. Strones and an SP sergeant led the attack and swept it clear of the enemy “in an exchange of hand grenades.”³² Sadly, A1C Edward G. Muse, an SP augmentee, was killed in the assault. The arming/de-arming pad was taken on next. Since the Americans did not possess any heavy weapons, the Quan Canh

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brought up a 57mm recoilless rifle and trained it on the pad where one VC with a rocket launcher could be seen in the open. After a QC call to surrender over a loudspeaker went unheeded, helicopter gunships strafed the position and the recoilless rifle turned the wooden armorer's shack into splinters. As the VC fled the position, they were shot down.




After destroying the enemy positions at the test stand and de-arming pad, Strones and 2nd Lt John A. Novak led sweeps through the area to flush out hidden infiltrators. The terrain provided the enemy excellent cover and often the security policemen were forced to charge pockets of resistance. As they were flushed from cover, the enemy reacted differently. "Some stood and fired," the after action report recorded, "others ran, many attempted to hide; some of the wounded attempted to throw grenades as the security police approached, and one committed suicide rather than surrender."³³ Some mortar and rocket rounds were fired at the SPs in a "feeble attempt" to cover the enemy withdrawal, but when the sweep ended four hours later, 139 enemy bodies were counted between the perimeter fence and the de-arming pad.³⁴ Twenty-five prisoners were taken. Piazza and his men at the bunker did their part by lighting the elephant grass in front of the bunker on fire with slap flares and capturing two VC who popped up with their hands in the air as the blaze reached their hiding places. Although enemy stragglers were still being hunted down two days later, the battle for Bien Hoa AB was essentially over. Miller and

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the “Thundering Third” lost two killed and ten wounded, but had held the base against a determined enemy attack until Army forces could arrive.

Piazza and the men at Bunker Hill 10 were finally relieved around 1800 hours, but not before having to endure another scare. After the destruction of the enemy at the de-arming pad, the QC recoilless rifle crew set up their weapon on top of Bunker Hill 10. As the battle outside the base was winding down, an Army M-60 tank and a platoon of soldiers advanced down the road toward the bunker and Piazza was alarmed to see the



Bunker Hill 10 after the battle. Note the RPG hits (Security Forces Museum)

tank stop and turn its turret and train its gun on the bunker. Piazza and his men had no direct communication with the tank, but they were in contact with CSC and now they were “screaming in our radios, telling the Army to go back in to their base. Because they’re aiming at us and we don’t want to get blown up.”³⁵ Piazza was particularly concerned that, “If they mistake a QC ...for a [North] Vietnamese, we are dead in the water.”³⁶ After some breathless moments, the tank commander got the word and the tank and its infantry support withdrew. Miller later angrily ordered the QCs out of the area altogether because, “We can’t tell the difference between the good guys and the bad guys.”³⁷

As at Bien Hoa, the fighting on Tan Son Nhut continued into the daylight hours. Around 0730, B Troop and the remaining platoon of C Troop, 3/4 Cavalry entered Tan Son Nhut’s 055 gate “at the northwest tip of the base, sped down the perimeter road, and hit the Viet Cong from the north.”³⁸ Captain DeNisio, now mobile again, used his radio

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to aid C Troop in their fight along Highway 1 by calling in air strikes against the enemy in the Vinatexco factory that obliterated the building. In conjunction with B Troop's assault, Carter's stalled counterattack got underway again with artillery and helicopter gunship support and slowly pushed its way toward the western perimeter of the base. By 1100hrs. the only enemy strongpoint remaining was the heavily damaged 051 bunker. As the assault forces closed in, the steel door of the battered bunker opened and to the amazement of the attackers, out staggered a dazed and bloody Alonzo Coggins. Coggins drifted down the perimeter road and was pulled to safety into a bunker south of the 051. Of his almost miraculous survival Coggins would later say that, "God placed angels around me to get out of the hell I went through."³⁹ Why Coggins was released rather than killed remains a mystery.

Under fire from the bunker, the 377th's TSgt Bernard C. Gifford, who was a pretty accurate grenade thrower on the range, moved along the perimeter fence to a position where he might be able to hurl a grenade through the bunker's doorway. Gifford threw two grenades, letting them cook-off in his hand before throwing so they would burst in mid-air in the doorway, but missed. He then shed his flak jacket and helmet like he did on the training range and on the third throw hit the target. Immediately the surviving VC ran out of the bunker with their hands on their heads and at 1219 hours the 051 bunker was declared secure. Gifford, in need of a smoke to calm down after the engagement, pulled out an unopened pack of Salem cigarettes from his pocket only to find them soaked and ruined by his own sweat.⁴⁰

While the fighting in and around Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa was fierce, the battle that drew the most attention from the folks back home was the attack on the U. S. Embassy compound in Saigon. Although the lion's share of the fighting fell to a hodgepodge force of Army military police from the 716th MP Battalion and the embassy's Marine Security Guards (MSG), Air Force security policemen also played a little known role.

A 16-man team from the VC C-10 Sapper Battalion began the attack on the embassy at 0247 hours on the morning of the 31st. After blasting a hole through the wall surrounding the compound and killing the two MPs on guard duty, the VC assaulted the Chancery with AK-47s and RPGs in an effort to break into this main embassy building. Inside, three MSGs--two in the lobby and one on the roof of the six-story building--were the only armed guards on duty and the VC were knocking on the Chancery's huge teak doors with bullets.

As word of the assault spread, American forces began to converge on the embassy compound. Among those responding was A3C Terry Carr of the 377th SPS. Carr, along with seven or eight other SPs from units throughout Vietnam, was assigned to the Combined Studies Division of MACV. While their primary duty was to train Nung tribesmen as guards, the SPs also escorted embassy payrolls from the bank to the embassy and provided security for VIPs. Carr's office was in the Norodom consulate compound within the walls of the embassy.

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Carr was sleeping off the effects of some Tet New Year's partying when he and his housemates were awakened at around 0300hrs and told to gear up and load up into a waiting jeep and pickup truck. The windows in Carr's quarters were rattling from the force of distant explosions as he grabbed his .38 caliber revolver and M-1 carbine. The vehicles pulled up in front of US Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker's residence where they were met by Leo G. Crampsey, chief of the embassy security.⁴¹

Ambassador Bunker had already been evacuated to a safe house by the time Carr arrived and Crampsey quickly briefed them on the situation. The ambassador was safe, he told them, but attacks were taking place at the Saigon radio station, the air bases, and the embassy. Carr initially manned a defensive position at the ambassador's residence until everyone was cleared out and was then assigned to a rescue mission to retrieve some VIPs from a hotel in the city and return them to the ambassador's compound for evacuation. "So we drove through Saigon during a firefight." Carr recalled. "We had to go through the firefight at the radio station, where the ARVN was trying to get the radio station back, to pick up the civilians. We got to the hotel where they were at. We loaded up three or four people and had a breakneck trip back to the ambassador's compound..."⁴²

Carr and the other SPs were then sent to reinforce the counterattack on the embassy compound. Making their way up Thong Nhut Street, they passed a bullet riddled Citroen with the Vietnamese driver dead at the wheel, both car and driver shot to pieces by MPs when the driver ran from a roadblock. Carr also saw members of the MSG detachment dead by the gate that the VC had initially forced their way through. Just the evening before, on his way to his quarters after duty, Carr had "talked to the Marines that were guarding the compound. I knew them well and talked to them every day. I came back the next morning and they were dead in the foreground there. Shot in the entryway."⁴³

Under sniper fire, Carr and the others crossed the street and linked up with a couple of MPs by the embassy compound front gate who were shooting at the sappers inside. The MPs told the SPs that the whole place was "overran" and that MPs from the 716th were on the way. Carr and the others decided to go around to the Norodom Compound and "see if we could take care of things from there and help, you know, get in that side. So we started our little war right there."⁴⁴

One or two VC were in the consulate building, but Carr recalled, "we...took care of them."⁴⁵ Then Carr and his comrades joined some Marines atop the roof of the office of the special assistant overlooking the embassy compound and began shooting. When MPs rammed the main gate of the compound open with a jeep, Carr and the others left the roof and moved into the embassy compound. Carr noticed "there were bodies scattered all over the place."⁴⁶

Nineteen VC bodies, including those of three embassy drivers, one of whom had been the ambassador's personal driver and was found dead with a pistol shoved into his belt and an AK-47 by his side, were counted inside the embassy compound walls.⁴⁷ Five

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soldiers and Marines were killed and 15 wounded in the fight for the embassy. General Westmoreland visited the embassy while the bodies of the VC sappers were still strewn about and while he briefed reporters news cameras captured the scene. A3C Terry Carr stood behind him next to an MP. For Carr and his buddies, “That was our little slice of history.”⁴⁸

Other 377th SPs were out and about in Saigon’s deadly streets during the Battle for Saigon. SSgt Robert L. Ruth was part of a team that went into the city to evacuate unarmed officers and airmen from BOQs and BEQs in the city to the relative security of the base. “We ran numerous convoys to evacuate those people,” Ruth recalled.⁴⁹ At one billeting site, the team pulled up with a bus and Ruth was grabbed by a sergeant who “had big tears running down his cheeks as he hugged my neck and thanked us for getting there.”⁵⁰ All Ruth wanted to do was get him on the bus before they started to draw enemy fire.

The failed assaults on Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa cost the enemy dearly. Before they stopped counting, airmen from the 377th SPS counted 962 enemy bodies inside and immediately outside the TSN perimeter. Based on the count and the number of bodies seen but not counted, the squadron reported an estimate of 1,200 enemy dead.⁵¹ In



Mass grave for enemy dead at Tan Son Nhut (Security Forces Museum)

exchange for these losses, the attackers managed to slightly damage 13 aircraft and destroy a cargo trailer, a house trailer, and four Conexes full of paint. Four security policemen were killed and 11 wounded. Task Force 35 lost two dead; the ARVN and VNAF troops engaged lost 29 dead and 15 wounded. C Troop counted 350 more bodies in and around the hamlet along Highway 1 where both sides had fought so fiercely. The shattered C Troop suffered casualties of 12 dead and 48 wounded while B Troop lost three dead and 17 wounded.⁵²

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VC soldier captured at Bien Hoa (Air Force Historical Research Agency)

At Bien Hoa a total of four Americans were killed in action. Security Police casualties were two dead, including the augmentee Muse, and 10 wounded. One hundred thirty-nine enemy soldiers were killed inside the base perimeter and 25 taken prisoner. Another 423 VC were killed outside the fence by the 101st, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and ARVN. OSI reports indicated that between January 31 and February 2, the enemy lost 1,184 killed and 99 captured in the Bien Hoa area. A total of two aircraft were destroyed by the attackers with another four heavily damaged.⁵³

Praise for the defenders of Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa came quickly. The 377th received accolades from MACV and a Presidential Unit Citation. The “Thundering Third” received letters of appreciation from 7th Air Force, the 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing, and one from the 3rd Combat Support Group commander expressing his “sincere appreciation and deep gratitude for the tremendous acts of heroism and for the outstanding job accomplished in an unyielding manner while under heavy pressure.”⁵⁴ Miller passed these letters on to his troops along with his own praise for the “Thundering Third and Augmentees.”



F-100 fighter and fuel truck destroyed during Tet attack on Bien Hoa AB (Air Force Historical Research Agency)

1. You defeated the enemys [sic] largest ground attack ever against a



Enemy weapons captured by 3rd SPS at Bien Hoa (Air Force Historical Research Agency)

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USAF base. You took more prisoners and killed more enemy than any Security Police Squadron ever has.

2. The issue was never in doubt and I know you stand ready and waiting to do it again.⁵⁵

The 3rd TFW commander publicly praised his security policemen in the official daily bulletin and noted that though there were many heroes that night, “if any group deserves special praise it is the men who defended this base; the members of the 3rd Security Police Squadron, the augmentees, the QC, and the crews of the 145th Aviation Battalion. We all owe these men a vote of thanks and our deepest sympathy for their losses.”⁵⁶ On March 29 the combat support group commander forwarded the



Carter and the men of the 377th in formation to receive honors for their stand at TSN (Col Jerry M. Bullock)

commendation of MACV, adding that, “Each man at Bien Hoa Air Base is aware that he owes a debt, which can never be repaid, for the heroic action performed by the men of the 3rd Security Police Squadron.”⁵⁷ There would, however, be no Presidential Unit Citation for the 3rd SPS.⁵⁸

There were many heroes that day. Billy Jack Carter submitted a total of 142 of his men for decorations. Bender, DeNisio, Palmer, Coggins, Tucker, Cyr, Fisher, Hebron, Mills, 1Lt George Ingalsbie, and two others were awarded Silver Stars.⁵⁹ Twenty Bronze Stars with “V” for valor were also awarded. Carter received the Legion of Merit for his leadership “in stopping the main hostile assault force on the west end and preventing the base from being overrun.”⁶⁰

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Strones, Piazza, Sawyer, and SSgt Eddie S. Nigh received Silver Stars for their performances at Bien Hoa. Second Lieutenant Novak and twelve others received Bronze Stars with “V”s. Kent Miller, angry at the military bureaucracy that forced him to meet a massed attack without the proper weapons and with troops without the proper training, filed his report and boarded a flight for home. He received no medal for his role in saving Bien Hoa.

Because of his “supreme courage and undaunted leadership,” Capt Reggie Maisey was nominated for the Congressional Medal of Honor.⁶¹ The Medal of Honor was disapproved and the Air Force Cross was awarded instead; with its award Maisey became the first non-aviator to receive the nation’s second highest decoration. In 1972, the then Security Police headquarters building at Bolling AFB, D.C., was named in his honor.

The recognition they received came as a surprise to some. Nine days after the battle, “Pete” Piazza was told to put on his best uniform and report to wing headquarters. What happened after he got there was completely unexpected. “[A] few minutes later up pulled a staff car with four stars flying,” Piazza recalled. “And Gen William Momyer, 7th Air Force commander, gets out...They have a ceremony and he presented me with the Silver Star.”⁶² Piazza was interviewed by 7th Air Force public affairs and a great fuss was made about him receiving the decoration from Momyer himself. In a letter to his mother a few days later Piazza wrote, “Would you believe [*sic*] that I am a hero well they say I am but I just did a job.”⁶³



Capt Maisey’s parents at the dedication of the Maisey Building (Air Force photo from Maisey family collection)



“Pete” Piazza receives the Silver Star from Gen William Momyer (Air Force photo)

What Piazza failed to appreciate was that the defense of Bunker Hill 10 was already becoming the stuff of legend. On February 5, the 3rd TFW “Short Bursts” newsletter described the defenders as a “gritty group of men” and quoted Captain Strones who said, “There is no doubt in my mind that Bunker Hill 10 bore the brunt of the VC attack. It was sort of

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like the Alamo out there. The men refused to give up.”⁶⁴

There was a downside to being a hero, whether a reluctant one or not, as Piazza learned when he returned to his hooch after the ceremony. His roommate asked him where he had been and Piazza showed him the Silver Star on his chest, “And that was the first slap in the face I got,” a shocked Piazza remembered. “Because it wasn’t that he said to me, Hey, good job, Pete. Nice...He said, Where in the hell is mine? I did the same thing you did, if not more. And over the next six to eight years it was more like I was a leper child than anything else. A lot of officers, a lot of NCOs, a lot of airmen thanked me. But a small percentage of my career field felt that I didn’t do anything, shouldn’t ever deserved it...”⁶⁵

Those who fought were rightfully proud of their combat prowess and showed it off. SSgt Charles Hudgel of the 377th SPS went as far as to set up a museum in which the spoils of war—captured enemy weapons, uniforms, flags, and equipment—were displayed.⁶⁶ A1C William K. Kastner, a security policeman assigned to 2nd Air Force, took this idea to the next level and submitted an AF Form 1000 on May 1, 1968, as part of the Air Force suggestion program, suggesting that a Security Police museum be established to preserve and chronicle the history of the entire Security Police career field.

The Tet offensive took some time to sputter out. Rocket and mortar attacks on American air bases continued throughout February. On February 4, Bin Thuy was struck by mortars and A1C Gary B. Midkiff of the 632nd SPS was killed by shrapnel while evacuating personnel from a ground approach radar trailer near the flight line. TSN was hit by rockets 17 times during the last two weeks of February, including one attack by 60 122mm rockets in the early morning of February 18th. At Da Nang AB, A1C John J. Kopfer of the 366th SPS was killed in a mortar attack on February 24 and on February 28 a rocket attack on Bien Hoa killed fourteen Americans including Sgt James Boyd of the 3rd SPS.⁶⁷ Efforts to dislodge the enemy remnants from some cities, including Saigon, lasted into March.

Despite its initial successes, Tet was a horrendous tactical defeat for the North Vietnamese. Between 30,000 and 40,000 VC and NVA regulars were estimated to have been killed. Tet was a strategists’ dream come true since, to the pleasure of the American and South Vietnamese generals. The elusive Viet Cong had come out of their jungle and mountain hideaways to be killed wholesale in the streets of the cities as a result of massive attacks on allied positions and installations. Tet destroyed the VC as an effective fighting force and afterwards more and more reliance was placed on regular NVA troops to do the fighting. Giap was supposedly devastated at the outcome of the offensive; not only did his forces fail to seize and hold their objectives, the anticipated “General Uprising” of the South Vietnamese people against their government never came to pass. In fact their allegiance to their often corrupt and inefficient government may have actually been strengthened by the massacres of thousands of the South Vietnamese intelligentsia in cities such as Hue by VC and NVA troops. What Giap didn’t fully appreciate in his post attack disappointment was the power of television and its ability to influence the American public.

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The Vietnam War was the first of America's wars to play out in American living rooms. Television network news anchormen posted the casualties everyday like box scores and now these pundits decided that they and the American people had been lied to by the military and the White House. The Johnson administration had pledged that the war was going in America's favor. In a speech to the National Press Club in late 1967 as part of a coordinated administration effort to bolster public opinion in favor of the war, Westmoreland assured the assembled reporters that there was a "light at the end of the tunnel."

The massive attacks of Tet, however, did not seem to be the actions of a foe on the verge of defeat. While the extent to which MACV was caught unaware is still the subject of debate, there was no question that the American public was surprised and shocked by the Tet Offensive. They had seen TV pictures of VC in the American embassy compound, of the house-to-house fighting that devastated the beautiful city of Hue, and of the Marines besieged at Khe Sanh and to them these were not the images of American troops battling a defeated enemy. The public began to suspect that someone wasn't telling them the truth about what was happening in Vietnam. The media reinforced this suspicion and, before the final results of the Tet Offensive were even in, declared a defeat for the US.

Most influential in this regard was CBS Evening News anchorman Walter Cronkite, "the most trusted man in America." Cronkite had gone to Vietnam in February and had seen the body bags filled with American dead, the attacks upon VC holdouts in Saigon, and the fierce fighting in Hue. He came to a conclusion that he shared with his audience, against the advice of CBS executives, on February 27, 1968. At the end of his newscast that evening, Cronkite declared:

We have been too often disappointed by the optimism of the American leaders, both in Vietnam and Washington, to have faith any longer in the silver linings they find in the darkest clouds...To say that we are closer to victory today is to believe, in the face of the evidence, the optimists who have been wrong in the past. To suggest we are on the edge of defeat is to yield to unreasonable pessimism. To say that we are mired in stalemate seems the only realistic, yet unsatisfactory, conclusion. On the off chance that military and political analysts are right, in the next few months we must test the enemy's intentions, in case this is indeed his last big gasp before negotiations. But it is increasingly clear to this reporter that the only rational way out then will be to negotiate, not as victors, but as an honorable people who lived up to their pledge to defend democracy, and did the best they could.⁶⁸

Cronkite's statement has been seen by some historians as the beginning of the end of US involvement in Vietnam. After watching the telecast, President Johnson supposedly said, "If I've lost Cronkite, I've lost middle America."⁶⁹ To make matters worse, on March 10 the press reported that Westmoreland was going to request an additional 206,000 American troops to exploit the enemy's Tet defeat, but the American public, however, concluded the extra troops were needed to recover from a massive American defeat! Public opinion turned decidedly against the war after Tet. Partly

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because of this loss of popular support, and because of the strong showing made by Democratic anti-war presidential candidate Senator Eugene McCarthy in the New Hampshire Democratic primary, Johnson told the American people on March 31st that he would not seek a second term as president.

For the Security Police, Tet was a turning point as well. The fierce combat of Tet hastened the transformation of the Air Force Security Police units, particularly in Southeast Asia, from “‘police departments’, which had the added duty of providing security for Air Force installations, to quasi combat infantry units which provide only limited police-type services.”⁷⁰ Gone was the image of the security policeman as a military cop in a white hat armed with a .38 riding in a patrol car, replaced now with the helmeted, flak-jacketed, Air Force infantryman armed with an M-16 and mounted in an APC.



One of the new breed: Sgt Gladstone Shaw (Col Ed Johnson)

Some valuable lessons were learned during the Tet attacks. First, the assumption that the enemy would not or could not launch massed ground attacks against air bases was proven wrong. It was also clear that if large enemy forces massed against air bases, the Army could not deal with these forces well away from the base perimeter. Since large scale assaults were now a known threat, the Security Police needed to have the arms and equipment to deal with them and both Carter and Miller urged that Security Police squadrons be equipped with mortars, heavy machine guns, recoilless rifles, and armored personnel carriers. Carter observed that, “the Viet Cong assault battalion which hit the west end [of TSN] was superior to the defense forces not only in numbers but firepower” and that when the 051 Bunker was captured the squadron “had nothing heavy enough to destroy the bunker...”⁷¹ Miller also noted that more Starlight night vision scopes, ground radar, and better perimeter lighting were needed. Both commanders stressed the need for multi-channel radios to be able to communicate with multiple points on the perimeter and for better communications with helicopter gunships.

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The commanders also joined in urging the creation of free fire zones around air bases in order to engage attackers well away from the base perimeter accompanied by an official shift in Security Police doctrine away from the close-in protection of critical resources to a perimeter focused defense. They also concurred in the conclusion that had their squadrons not already been in Condition Red, the battles would have been even more costly. Since units could not permanently remain at the highest alert level, it was essential that QRTs and SATs be strong enough and mobile enough to quickly respond to attacks.

The amount and quality of the pre-attack intelligence received was also the subject of criticism. Miller complained that, "The VC used a village approximately 100 meters off the southeast perimeter [of Bien Hoa] as a staging area...Yet, absolutely no information was received that any such VC organization was in the immediate vicinity. At the present time no faith can be placed in intelligence gathering organizations."⁷²

Harsh words were used by both officers to describe the shortcomings of the VNAF personnel involved in base defense. "All security plans and procedures should be undertaken with complete disregard for VNAF security forces...they cannot be depended upon," was Miller's verdict.⁷³ Carter concluded that "the squadron could not afford to rely on Vietnamese personnel planning for perimeter defense," noting that "the Vietnamese on the 051 gate just north of the point of penetration failed to fire on the attacking force and apparently deserted their position."⁷⁴

Just how the Security Police at TSN and Bien Hoa managed to blunt and then repel an enemy that outnumbered and outgunned them given these inadequacies was summed up by Lt Col Miller years later. "Everybody just did what the hell they were supposed to do," Miller explained. "The SATs went to the areas that were being taken under fire. Reaction forces came from back at the barracks area, and they went to Bunker Hill 10 or they went to the other areas that were being [hit]... I bet I didn't give more than six orders during the whole four-hour battle..."⁷⁵ He also praised the support he received from the Army 145th Aviation Battalion's helicopter gunships admitting that, "If it hadn't been for that aviation battalion...we'd have been in a lot worse straits than we already were."⁷⁶ "Pete" Piazza believed "the training we had gone through for months had proven to be our secret weapon."⁷⁷

Despite the fact that the Security Police squadrons had mounted a successful defense against a threat they were not trained and equipped to confront, Miller was puzzled by the seeming lack of interest in hearing about it by the SP hierarchy. It was not until August that Miller and Carter were summoned to Washington to brief the headquarters on the battle. "[T]he battle was in January. And that's the first ... the only time that anybody ever asked me any questions about it," Miller later recalled.⁷⁸

Tet had put a scare into the Air Force and even though the Combat Security Police (CSP) program would not receive official approval from the chief of staff and secretary of the Air Force until July 1, 1968, because of an urgent request from 7th Air

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Force for more combat Security Police units in Vietnam, the 1041st (T) was redesignated



7th AF SP staff poses in front of office in 1968 (Col Jerry Bullock)

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821ST COMBAT SECURITY POLICE SQUADRON

821st CSPS Insignia (Security Forces Museum)

the 82nd Combat Security Police Wing (CSPW) under the command of Lt Col Orange D. Steffy, and on March 8, 1968, the wing was sent to Schofield Barracks, Hawaii to establish a training site for two CSP squadrons. The 821st Combat Security Police Squadron (CSPS) was formed, received an accelerated six-week training course and was deployed to Phan Rang AB on April 13, 1968, under the command of Lt Col Roger P. Fox. A second unit, the 822nd CSPS, was also formed and trained at Schofield. After the training of the 822nd CSPS was complete, the 82nd CSPW and the USAF Combat Security Police School were transferred to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, where a third squadron, the 823rd, was trained.

As envisioned by Air Force planners, the 82nd CSPW was to furnish Security Police forces “specifically trained and equipped for an installation defense role” that would provide “flexible...forces capable of swift world-wide deployment to provide base security in depth...”⁷⁹ But, it was stressed, this “security in depth” “will commence at the perimeter of our bases moving inward...Off installation operations will still remain

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the responsibility of agencies appropriately designated by the Department of Defense” (emphasis in original).⁸⁰

Some of the volunteers for the 82nd were disappointed at the on-base restriction. One of these volunteers, 1st Lt Michael Creedon, complained that Safeside had sold the concept of “highly trained, highly skilled officers that go off base and do all this other stuff. And so we were over in Hawaii training to do all this stuff. And we never got to do it.”⁸¹ Lt Col Fox, the 821st commander, was also disappointed by the continuing dependency on the Army or South Vietnamese forces for defense outside the base perimeter. “I just don’t like the idea of having to depend on the Army for the defense of our air bases,” he told an interviewer. “If there is ever a question of choosing between the loss of Army resources and Air Force resources, I have no doubt which they would choose to defend.”⁸²

Nor did the 82nd and its squadrons deploy *en masse* to Vietnam to take over the defense of any vulnerable bases. Instead, because of manpower ceilings that restricted the number of permanently assigned personnel in Vietnam, all of the CSPSS were assigned to Vietnam on six-month temporary duty tours and augmented the permanent party Security Police squadrons. A rotational system was established where one squadron would be deployed to Vietnam while the remaining two were stateside for training and refitting.⁸³

The 821st headquarters would be at TSN and portions of the 821st would be parceled out to Phan Rang, Bien Hoa, and Bin Thuy. When it arrived in country in April 1968 the 821st brought with its own intelligence section that issued weekly intelligence summaries, the latest in TSSE to field test, new tactical concepts developed by the RAF Regiment, and an attitude. Highly motivated and highly trained, many of the 821st airmen thought of themselves as hired guns brought in to protect the “villagers” from bloodthirsty “bandits,” just like Yul Brynner and “The Magnificent Seven;” but the “villagers,” now veterans of Tet, didn’t need any “protection.” They might have special training, but the 821st had not been under fire, had not beat back swarms of VC, and they and their “tiger stripe” camouflage did not impress the men who had. Col Shultis fully recognized this problem and after an inspection tour of bases where Combat Security Police had deployed, reported to the Inspector General:

The first squadron of Safeside in Vietnam reflected certain serious deficiencies in training and orientation for their peculiar situation in Vietnam. The Security Policemen who were already there and were successfully defending the base resented the Safeside people who apparently had been led to think they were better than the others. Thus, due to their serious attitude problem the first squadron was shunned and frustrated.⁸⁴

By the time of Shultis’s inspection tour in September 1968, however, he believed that, “These initial problems...have been overcome by the succeeding Safeside squadron which was more fully trained and better indoctrinated than the first.”⁸⁵ “Thus,” Shultis

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reported, “the Wing Commanders had nothing but praise for Safeside” and saw it as “a well trained, mobile force filling a big gap in Vietnam.”⁸⁶

Shultis was determined that the problems that plagued the initial deployment of the 821st would not be repeated and as part of what he believed was a necessary attitude adjustment to make them less cocky he stripped the Combat Security Police of their distinctive blue berets. This did not go over well with the troops and they requested the berets be reinstated. Shultis did not agree. The request for the blue berets “should be viewed in light of the sad experience of the first squadron,” Shultis explained. “It was too different and acted as though it were better than anyone else...It was disliked, ostracized, laughed at and thus reduced in effectiveness...”⁸⁷ “There is merit in the view,” Shultis continued, “that Security Policemen, and that includes Combat Security Policemen, should not dress distinctively, should be very much part of the Air Force in all ways...That is now my personal view and recommendation, although I must confess to having originally asked for and acquired the blue beret for the experimental 1041st Safeside squadron.”⁸⁸



Members of the 821st CSPS at Phan Rang AB, South Vietnam (Security Forces)

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35th SPS enlisted barracks at Phan Rang, South Vietnam March 1969 (Security Forces Museum)

Although the later Combat Security Police personnel were more readily accepted, particularly as the Tet veterans rotated home, rancor against them remained. As late as April 1969 a senior Security Police NCO at Phan Rang wrote in his end of tour report: “There are a lot of professional officers, NCOs and Airmen in the CSPS; however, I believe they are the biggest farce since the ending of the so-called “Short Spurt Program.” These personnel are no more proficient, if as much, than ‘regular’ Security Policemen assigned to the 7AF bases, therefore [they] can only be considered as extremely high paid augmentees.”⁸⁹

The sergeant’s observations concerning SAFE SIDE as augmentees, while brutally frank, were shared by others. MSgt George O. Futch, Jr. of Binh Thuy’s 632nd SPS noted that he “helped sell this concept in the Alaskan Air Command upon the inception of the Safeside program,” but, he observed, “this is not the concept presently used and Safeside has become the fill-in for unit manpower shortages.”⁹⁰ That this was true had an impact on the morale of the combat security policemen. Lt Col Kalman D. Simon, commander of the 823rd CSPS, reported that, “Overall, our use in RVN leaves a lot to be desired. The most frequent complaint from the men was the fact that they had been through months of strenuous training and were never allowed to demonstrate their capability. This, of course, is true and it took constant prodding to motivate the squadron.”⁹¹

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One prescient captain saw the seeds of the whole SAFE SIDE concept's downfall in the restriction of the CSPSs to on-base operations and their consequent transformation into "high paid augmentees." Capt Stephen A. Canavera had served at Bien Hoa with the 3rd SPS and Bien Thuy with the 632nd and as he left Vietnam in September of 1968 he made an important observation. "The concept under which 'Safeside' was established is a sound one," Captain Canavera wrote in his end of tour report, but:

"Safeside" is not being employed in Viet-Nam as an external defense unit, and it is unlikely they will in any future conflict. If the concept of Safeside is not to "die on the vine," they will have to be employed as intended, at this time. It is doubtful that, failing to establish the Safeside role of external defense in this conflict, the concept will survive after the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam...Therefore, proper employment of Safeside, now seems the only means to justify maintaining the unit for any future conflict. Failing in this, the concept will die as the "Combat Air Policeman" died after the Korean conflict.⁹²

Canavera had no idea how accurate his prediction would be. On December 31, 1969, the 82nd CSPW along with the 822nd and the 823rd CSPS were inactivated in a cost cutting move by Tactical Air Command. The 821st soldiered on in Vietnam at reduced strength and without personnel specially trained at Ft. Campbell until it too was inactivated in February 1971.

Given how Safeside was deployed, "regular" Security Police still bore the brunt of and the primary responsibility for air base defense and after Tet the training offered in air base defense skills was reexamined. Some bases began their own training programs and they were not limited to just Security Police and their augmentees. In March 1968, Bien Hoa launched "Operation Minuteman" with the goal of providing 10 hours of weapons and combat skills training to all base personnel not already committed in support of combat operations or as Security Police augmentees. Within 60 days of the start of the training, all of which was conducted by the 3rd SPS training section, over 2,200 officers and airmen had been trained and by the first of November an additional 1,100 had received the training.⁹³



Twinkle Site 3 mortar pit on east perimeter of Bien Hoa AB, 1970 (Col Ed Johnson)

Seventh Air Force also took a hand in training. In April a mortar school staffed by the 821st CSPS was established at Phu Cat to provide training that had previously been provided by the Army. In September, the 7th Air Force Weapons,

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Small Unit Tactics and Mortar School was opened at Phan Rang. In February 1970, the mortar school was relocated to Phan Rang, thereby consolidating 7th Air Force weapons training at one base. In July, 7th Air Force also set minimum training requirements for all Security Police assigned or attached to 7th Air Force as well those personnel assigned to augment the Security Police.⁹⁴

Attention was also given to the formal training courses conducted stateside by Air Training Command. In December, a Security Police Training Conference was held at Lackland AFB, Texas. According to input received at the conference from 7th Air Force, the biggest deficiency in the training given to personnel prior to assignment to Vietnam was the amount of training given. "Security Policemen in Southeast Asia are the combat infantrymen of the USAF," the 7th Air Force Chief of Security Police noted, yet while the Army "is required by law to give an infantryman twenty-two weeks of specialized training prior to assigning him to Vietnam; the USAF expects a Security Policeman to do the same basic job...with ten days of generalized training" (emphasis in original).⁹⁵

In an effort to keep the AZR course responsive to 7th Air Force needs, training on the 90mm recoilless rifle, 50 caliber machine gun, and the 66mm light anti-tank weapon (LAW) was added. Training on the employment and use of certain items of Project Safe Look TSSE, including the Multipurpose Concealed Intrusion Detector (MCID), the Balanced Pressure (Detection) System (BPS), the AN/GSQ Intrusion Detector System, and three types of tactical radars was also added to the curriculum. The addition of these weapons and TSSE to the course required increasing the length of the course from nine to fifteen days although that change would not take effect until June 1970.



Lt Col John B. Welch, 31st SPS commander, and an ROK officer inspect an impact crater after the May 1968 mortar attack on Tuy Hoa AB (Air Force Historical Research Agency)

The enemy was not going to wait for better trained security policemen. Between March 1, 1968, and the end of the year, seventy stand off attacks were made on U. S. air bases.⁹⁶ Sappers attacked Tuy Hoa AB twice during the spring and summer; once on April 1 in an attack that caused no casualties on either side and again on July 29. The attack on the 29th took Lt Col Robert B. Welch, Jr.'s 31st SPS by surprise. It was not

until the enemy B-40 rockets and satchel charges began exploding among the base's aircraft that anyone knew they were there. Recovering from their surprise, SPs cut the sappers off from their escape route and killed all nine of them.



One of nine VC sappers killed during the July 29, 1968, attack on Tuy Hoa AB (Air Force Historical Research Agency)

Investigation revealed that the VC had cut through the perimeter fence between two machine gun positions that were unmanned due to lack of personnel and made their way almost halfway down the airfield without being detected. Two aircraft were destroyed and another two heavily damaged and four airmen were wounded in the attack.




C-130 destroyed by enemy sappers during July 29, 1968 attack on Tuy Hoa, AB (Air Force Historical Research Agency)

The sapper attack on Tuy Hoa revealed a change in enemy tactics and a weakness in the SP defensive structure adopted after Tet. Prior to Tet, air base defense was based on a three-ring concept. The first ring along the base perimeter was generally made up of widely spaced observation towers and bunkers augmented by SATs. The middle ring consisted of sentry dog teams. The close-in ring was placed to protect vital resources from sabotage and was the strongest ring. After Tet's mass attacks, emphasis shifted from the close-in ring to the outer ring in what some referred to as an "egg shell" defense.⁹⁷ But by then the enemy had already abandoned mass attacks in favor of using small teams of sappers that relied upon stealth to penetrate the base perimeter and inflict the maximum damage possible on critical resources. Under the "egg shell" defensive structure, if these sapper teams managed to penetrate the perimeter, there was not much

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standing between them and the base's aircraft. This is what happened at Tuy Hoa and the attack there prompted a change to a "balanced defense" concept that placed equal emphasis on all rings.

A Typical Air Base Defense Sector



Typical air base defense sector (Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973*)

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Even as the Air Force fine tuned its defensive doctrine inside the base perimeter the inability of free world military forces (FWMF) to effectively respond to threats gathering outside that perimeter continued to be a problem that was not easily solved. A primary limiting factor on FWMF operating outside the perimeter was the requirement that before engaging the enemy, the permission of the local Vietnamese province chief had to be obtained. Col Albert Feldman, 7th Air Force chief of Security Police, condemned this requirement as “militarily unacceptable” since it resulted in “unnecessary delay in bringing punitive action to bear.”⁹⁸

One way to minimize the impact of this political constraint on tactical operations was to detect the enemy early and preferably far from the base to gain time for the necessary permissions to be obtained. To do this, security policemen took to the air. Flying in helicopters or fixed wing observation aircraft, security policemen observed the perimeter and the so-called “Rocket Belt” extending some 11,000 meters out from the perimeter. By seeking out enemy supply routes, possible rocket launch sites, bunkers, and troop concentration areas, these flights succeeded “in making the enemy’s operations more costly and hazardous than he had anticipated.”⁹⁹

These reconnaissance flights could also be hazardous for the SPs involved. Little did SSgt William K. Kastner suspect when he suggested the establishment of a Security Police museum that he would hold a special place in the history to be preserved there. On March 16, 1970, Kastner became the first Air Force security policeman to win the Distinguished Flying Cross. Kastner was flying as an observer on an intelligence mission searching for mortar emplacements, rocket launching sites, or evidence of enemy troop movements around Da Nang when his aircraft was damaged by ground fire. Although seriously wounded, Kastner “continued to record and relay vital intelligence data which was later used as the basis for a successful operation in the area by friendly forces.”¹⁰⁰

The threat to US air bases was also mounting in neighboring Thailand. After increasing their attacks on Thai security forces, Communist insurgents turned their attention toward the American bases. At 2225 hours on the night of July 26, 1968, an estimated 25 armed intruders mounted an attack on American forces based at Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB).¹⁰¹ After shooting down a Thai security guard who had spotted them and was about to give the alarm, the attackers ran down the taxiway toward two F-4 “Phantoms” and a parked C-141 “Starlifter” aeromedical aircraft on stand-by for a Sentinel Echo mission to evacuate three wounded American pilots the North Vietnamese had promised to release. Because of this special mission, the C-141 had tighter security than that normally provided at the Thai air bases, including Sgt Johnson of the 432nd SPS as close-in sentry, Thai Guards between the taxiway and base perimeter, and a special QRT posted close by. The two F-4s were guarded by maintenance crews.

One of the attackers penetrated as far as the tail of the 141 where he was killed by Johnson. Another made it to within 20 yards of the aircraft before he too was killed by

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Johnson. Yet a third determined intruder sprayed two vehicles parked by the left wing tip with bullets, crossed in front of the nose to the right side of the “Starlifter” and lobbed one satchel charge under the aircraft and pitched another onto a mobile power unit. The first charge ignited fuel dripping from a previously damaged engine on the aircraft.

Leaving the C-141 on fire, the enemy sapper then sprinted down the taxiway toward the F-4s, pausing along the way to throw a satchel charge into an SP QRT truck, before throwing an explosive charge into the tailpipe of an F-4. When no explosion followed, the bomb thrower reappeared from the darkness and threw another satchel charge into the tailpipe. After this one went off, he ran through the grass alongside the taxiway and at a point midway between the F-4s and the C-141, headed toward the perimeter and disappeared.

A SAT pursued the attackers as they retreated toward the perimeter, but was pinned down by heavy fire until a QRT arrived in the area. The SAT then continued its pursuit, but failed to make contact with the enemy.

The infiltrators were in the area of the aircraft for 20 minutes before withdrawing and had killed one American, in addition to the Thai Security Guard, and heavily damaged the C-141, moderately damaged the F-4, and slightly damaged an HH-43 helicopter engaged in fighting the fire on the C-141.

A study of air base defense in Southeast Asia by the 82nd CSPW concluded that “it is apparent that lessons learned in Vietnam with respect to the task of air base defense have not received sufficiently energetic application in...Thailand.”¹⁰² Efforts to bolster air base defense operations in that country were underway, however. In March, 55 dog teams had been sent to Thailand to help defend air bases and start a K-9 program for the Royal Thai Air Force.¹⁰³ By May 1969, approximately 1,600 security policemen and 300 sentry dogs were stationed in Thailand.¹⁰⁴

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Air Police at main gate U-Tapao RTAB (Dave Broeker)

In June, General Westmoreland was named Army Chief of Staff and was replaced as MACV commander by General Creighton W. Abrams, a tanker whose mastery of armored warfare in World War II had drawn praise from Gen George S. Patton, Jr. himself. Abrams, a more taciturn officer not prone to making overly optimistic pronouncements, took command at a time of extreme turmoil in the United States. Civil rights activist Martin Luther King, Jr. and presidential hopeful and darling of the anti-war movement Senator Robert Kennedy were both assassinated that year and race riots and fights between anti-war and pro-war activists broke out in the streets of many cities. Men burned their draft cards and women burned their bras. Everyone seemed to be protesting something or someone. The country was so divided and so violent that some pundits openly wondered whether a civil war was in the offing.

In response to the increasing incidents of civil disturbances, AFM 355-1 was published creating "Garden Plot," a plan under which 20 percent of the CONUS based Security Police were allotted to assist civilian police departments in controlling civil disturbances.¹⁰⁵ On March 20, 1969, AFM 125-4, *Civil Disturbance and Riot Control*

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Training, was published to establish training standards and guidelines for troops assigned to Garden Plot duties.¹⁰⁶

Also in June, as if to highlight the ascendancy of the combat mission, the Director of Security Police and Law Enforcement at all levels of command was re-titled the Director of Security Police. There was still a need for law enforcement, however, and this need grew as new recruits reported to Air Force units worldwide. Many of these troops had been exposed to the ever growing, increasingly radical opposition to the war at home and had no great desire to serve in the Air Force, but had enlisted to avoid being drafted into the Army. One Security Police officer noted that the Air Force was a “microcosm of society” where the attitudes and conduct of the men reflected those of society in general.¹⁰⁷ Many officers believed that there was a reduction in the quality of the troops as the war went on and this became particularly noticeable by 1969. Drug use, disobedience, and a general lack of respect for superiors became more common.



107 pounds of marijuana seized during a routine baggage check on 8 July 1969 at U-Tapao RTAB, Thailand (Security Forces Museum)

Law enforcement efforts began to be more focused on the problem of illegal drug use with particular emphasis on curbing the use of the “drug of choice”—marijuana. In late 1968, because of incidents of marijuana use at Rest and Recuperation (R&R) centers in Hong Kong and Australia, MACV instructed Armed Forces Customs to establish a system for body searching all E-4s and below returning to Vietnam from R&R.¹⁰⁸ By the late summer of 1969, marijuana detection dogs were being tested at TSN to inspect the

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civilian airline terminal, the Camp Alpha R&R processing center, the post offices, and the storage area for baggage being sent out by troops departing the country at the end of their tours.¹⁰⁹ The use of drugs spread nevertheless and it was a problem not confined to enlisted men. Rumors spread in early 1970 that the colonel commanding the transportation squadron at TSN was apprehended for smoking marijuana with his troops in the VNAF officer's club.¹¹⁰



Lt Col Canty P. Chambers, 377th SPS, presents gifts to the headman of Tan Qui I, Thanksgiving 1968 (Air Force Historical Research Agency)

1968 was also a presidential election year. As anti-war activists fought police in the streets outside, the Democratic Party national convention meeting in Chicago nominated moderate Senator Hubert H. Humphrey as the party's candidate for President of the United States. Humphrey would take on the Republican candidate, former Vice President Richard M. Nixon. Nixon campaigned on a "law and order" platform appealing to an America tired of riots and violent protests while also assuring voters he had a "secret plan" for getting the United States out of Vietnam. Humphrey initially avoided attacking the war and campaigned on a platform of putting back on track LBJ's "Great Society" social programs that had been derailed by the war. But dogged by anti-war protestors, Humphrey finally began criticizing President Johnson's policies in Vietnam and began to gain ground on Nixon. It was a close election, but in the end, Nixon won.

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American forces entered January 1969 with memories of the bitter fighting of the previous year and anticipated a repeat during the upcoming Tet New Year holiday. Between January 10 and 22, Bin Thuy, Da Nang, and Pleiku were hit by rocket and mortar attacks that killed four Americans and wounded 39. Phan Rang AB had been alerted by MACV that a coordinated sapper and stand-off attack was possible between 18 and 22 January, but by the 23rd, military intelligence estimated the probability of an enemy attack against the base as “low” or “minimal.”¹¹¹ Even so, the 35th Tactical Fighter Wing commander, Col Frank L. Gailer, Jr., kept the base at Security Alert Condition (SACON) Yellow based on a “gut feeling.”¹¹²

Capt Garth Wright, Weapons System Security Officer for the 35th SPS, was asleep on 26 January when someone told him that the base perimeter might have been breached. Used to such rumors, Wright shrugged it off until the squadron intelligence officer came in confirming that a penetration had taken place. Wright rushed to CSC where his commander, Lt Col Donald E. Reeves, confirmed that a dog team had alerted on unknown individuals near observation tower Juliett 4 (J-4) on the southeast perimeter. At 0032 hours a firefight began with the intruders during which a dog handler was shot in the groin and in the right foot. Reeves sent Captain Wright along with two, three-man SATs to reinforce the J-4 sentries. Facing a hostile force of unknown size, Reeves also activated the emergency recall plan. To defend the base he would have available 444 SPs, 102 augmentees, and 53 men from the 821st CSPS.

Wright and his men, reinforced by ten dog teams, found the VC in heavy brush between J-3 and J-4, but an attempt to flank them was repulsed by heavy fire. In response to a report by tower J-4 of eight individuals on the perimeter fence, Reeves sent Maj William H. Powell, Jr., the squadron operations officer, along with a 12-man QRT and an additional three-man SAT to the area at 0041 hours. The 35th SPS Heavy Weapons Section also deployed two XM-706 armored cars mounting .50 caliber and M-60 machine guns, a jeep-mounted rapid firing 20mm mini-gun to hose down the perimeter, and two recoilless rifle teams to suppress enemy fire from outside the perimeter fence. Within the next half hour, 84 security policemen, airmen from the 554th Civil Engineering Squadron (Red Horse), and 31 ROK infantry were also in place to block any enemy flanking maneuvers from the ends of the runways or any advance on the C-123 revetment area which seemed to be the focus of the sappers.

With Powell and his men in place, Wright resumed his sweep toward the J-3 and J-4 towers. A radio call from a bunker near J-3 alerted him to the presence of VC near tower J-3 hiding behind a knocked out XM-706. Wright formed a crescent with the four dog handlers he had with him and began to move through the brush. Someone from inside the bunker yelled, “They’re right out there!” and Wright saw the top of someone’s head not ten feet away.¹¹³ Two bursts from his M-16 dropped the man.

Wright moved to examine the body; the dead man had a grenade in his hand and sacks of grenades tied around his waist. A warning from one his men caused Wright to spin around to his left and see a VC rising from the brush less than five feet away with his AK-47 trained on Wright’s head. Wright squeezed the trigger of his M-16 twice

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Enemy sapper killed during attack on Phan Rang AB (Air Force Historical Research Agency)

without results—a cartridge was jammed between the bolt and the chamber. Throwing the M-16 down, Wright was grabbing for his .38 when the VC shifted aim toward an oncoming dog team. Unable to decide who the greater threat was, the guerrilla swung his weapon back and forth between Wright and the dog until the dog handler shot him dead. Around the body lay grenades, three AK-47 magazines, a B-40 rocket, and an explosive charge on a long pole meant for jamming into aircraft engines.

Moving back to the road connecting J-3 and J-4, one of Wright's dog handlers spotted a VC armed with a B-40 rocket and launcher in the bushes along the road. The handler pointed him out to the others, who yelled, "Well, don't just talk about it, shoot him!" He did. The dead man was also armed with a belt of grenades and a satchel charge.

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By now enemy had been sighted at various points around the perimeter and fire was being received from outside the perimeter in Bravo sector in the south and to the west in Golf sector. A little past two in the morning the sentry at J-5 shot a sapper who exploded as the bullet hit his satchel charge. SACON Red was implemented and 18 Royal Australian Air Force Air Fields Defense Guards from RAAF Number 2 Squadron moved into rifle pits along the south perimeter road. Mortar rounds now began dropping on the base and at 0215hrs an F-100 was hit by a mortar round and its exploding 500-pound bombs also destroyed another F-100 parked nearby. At around 0300hrs, more mortar and rocket rounds hit the base. Shortly after 0400hrs, the ROKs conducted an external sweep of the perimeter from the Beach Road Gate to the hamlet of Ga Ba Lap



XM-706 damaged by B-40 rocket during attack on Phan Rang AB (Air Force Historical Research Agency)

and back while ROK artillery and AC-47 “Spooky” gunships attacked suspected mortar launch positions. At 0545 the SACON was downgraded to Yellow and although sporadic small arms fire continued until 1105 hours, there were no further major clashes.

Sixteen enemy dead were counted and one wounded prisoner was taken. The prisoner reported that his unit, the H-13 Sapper Company, had been in the area for eight months and had probed the base defenses four times before the attack. The sole allied KIA was one MWD, the last MWD killed by the enemy in Vietnam, although 16 men were wounded, including six security policemen.¹¹⁴ Sixty-six mortar rounds and six rockets had hit the base destroying two aircraft and damaging fifteen.¹¹⁵

Credited with “extraordinary coolness under fire” and with preventing “hostile forces from overrunning the base,” Capt Garth A. Wright became the second security policeman to be awarded the Air Force Cross.¹¹⁶



Capt Garth A. Wright (Air Force photo)

The Tet holiday was actually celebrated from February 17 to 19, 1969, but even then the enemy launched no concerted attacks even close to the level of Tet 1968.


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Between February 22 and 25, there was a flurry of attacks on American air bases with 11 attacks over the period, but with the exception of a sapper attack on Phu Cat on February 22 that did no damage, all of the attacks were rocket and mortar stand-off attacks. These attacks did kill one American and wound 16, but damaged no aircraft.¹¹⁷ An attack on Bien Hoa on February 23 was intended to be a combined sapper and stand-off attack by the 1st Battalion, 275th Regiment, 5th VC Division and elements of the U-1 Sapper Battalion. But the attack was poorly coordinated and what was intended to be a full scale assault on Bien Hoa and Long Binh never really got going.¹¹⁸

Although rocket and mortar attacks, generally on a small scale, would continue unabated, what would be the last sapper attack of 1969 occurred on April 16 at Phu Cat and resulted in one American wounded and one attacker killed with no damage to any of the base's aircraft. A milestone of sorts was reached on May 22, 1969, when a stand-off attack on Phan Rang marked the 200th attack on an American air base in Vietnam since November 1964. These 200 attacks had killed 120 Americans, destroyed 76 aircraft and severely damaged another 217.¹¹⁹ On June 7, 1969, A1C Joel C. Loftis of the 35th SPS was added to the count when he was killed by shrapnel from a VC rocket while reading a letter from home outside of his quarters at Phan Rang AB.

On July 17, 1969, Ubon Royal Thai AFB was attacked for the first time when sappers penetrated the perimeter and set satchel charges in two C-47 aircraft, a mobile ground control unit, and a radar unit. The elephant grass was so tall that the sappers were not spotted and were moving toward the perimeter to escape when A1C Kenneth D. O'Dell and his dog, Schaefer, detected them and opened fire. In the exchange of fire, O'Dell and Schaefer were both wounded. The two C47's were damaged and the radar shack destroyed. No enemy casualties were found.¹²⁰

After the attack, both the Americans and Thais focused on Ubon's defense; the elephant grass was cut, new bunkers and mortar pits were constructed, double rows of concertina wire were strung, and heavy weapons, APCs, and XM-706 armored cars were procured.



Among the tools for air base defense gleaned from experience were plywood forms to be filled with sand to make fighting positions... (Air Force Historical Research Agency)

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Numerous reports and papers had attempted to capture the lessons gleaned from the Security Police's air base defense experience in Southeast Asia. Prefab bunkers, armored towers, locally designed *fougasse* generators that spewed fire over wide areas, new tactics, better command and control, and more efficient employment of heavy weapons were all products of combat experience that needed to be documented. One paper, "Security Police Lessons Learned, Republic of Vietnam 1968 – 1969," attempted to capture these lessons so they would not be lost as personnel transferred out of Vietnam and was basically a "do it yourself" guide to the nuts and bolts of airbase defense offering practical advice on a wide variety of subjects.¹²¹

Another report, "Air Base Defense in SEA," prepared by the 82nd CSPW focused more on doctrine and organization and made some recommendations that would later see implementation.¹²² The report recommended that JCS Publication 2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, be clarified to assign specific responsibilities for the local defense of air bases. The authors recommended the "compilation and publication of conceptual and doctrinal guidance for USAF air base defense...completely separate from the provisions of AFM 207-1."¹²³ They reiterated that Security Police squadrons assigned to air bases in hostile areas had to be distinguished from the basic SP squadron and be provided with an organizational standard that maximized the integrity of squad and platoon-sized formations. One novel recommendation was that Army infantry officers be assigned to the staff of the base Chiefs of Security Police (CSP) to coordinate the activities of the Security Police with those of the external defense forces and to advise the CSPs on tactics and defensive techniques. While the Combat Security Police provided mobile, trained forces to deploy in emergencies, the authors of the report stressed the need for mobility planning and a doctrine that allowed for the quick deployment of trained follow-on forces. Finally, the report recommended a reshuffle of the Security Police function from under the Air Force IG to the director of operations or even the creation of a separate staff agency.



...and concrete guard towers to withstand RPGs (Air Force Historical Research Agency)

One of the report's recommendations was implemented before the report was even published when AFM 206-1, *Local Ground Defense of US Air Force Bases*, was issued on June 30, 1969. Although PACAF had published a manual for SP operations in limited war environments a year before, here for the first time was an official Air Force publication geared to providing "information and guidance...for base commanders in planning, preparing for, and conducting local ground defense operations."¹²⁴ The

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manual's four chapters covered the Air Force concept for local ground defense, the organization of the ground defense force, planning for ground defense, and weapons, combat skills, techniques, and tactics. No longer would ground defense be a mission often done in spite of Air Force directives, but rather one that was now to be performed in accordance with Air Force approved guidance. Not only did the manual provide official guidance for air base defense activities, it provided authority for actions that before had been based on necessity not requirements.

The authority for the air base defense mission, JCS Publication 2, was also examined. A May 1969 study concluded that, "There is, as a matter of JCS principle or doctrine, no conflict of roles and missions in the fact that the USAF provides security forces to provide local ground defense for its bases. In fact, the USAF is charged with the responsibility to do so by the guidance contained in JCS Pub 2."¹²⁵

Other changes were implemented based on prior experience. One of these was the replacement of always aggressive sentry dogs whose barking when they discovered the enemy revealed the presence of both dog and handler, by scout or patrol dogs who were aggressive only on command and alerted upon the enemy in silence. Even though the original SAFE SIDE test of these dogs two years earlier had proven successful, it was not until August 1969 that the first patrol dog classes began at Lackland and the sentry dog classes were phased out. By October, patrol dogs also trained to sniff out marijuana were being tested at McChord and Travis AFBs in California.

Another change for the better occurred when a Security Police officer was assigned to the Air Force Military Personnel Center (AFMPC) in August 1969. The Security Police career field had been plagued from its inception by a philosophy that anyone could do it and assignments of completely inexperienced officers to important Security Police positions were still being made. One of these officers, Maj Wayne C. Collins, assigned as the 3rd SPS operations officer at Bien Hoa in February 1968, blasted this system in his end of tour report in January 1969:

I came to Vietnam as a security police officer with no idea of what a security police officer was supposed to do. I was taken from another career field, given no training and shipped to one of the most important bases in Southeast Asia where I was responsible for the protection of over 5000 lives and millions of dollars in vital equipment. Even though the base and I have survived so far, I still believe the assignment was a mistake. It could have been a tragic mistake.¹²⁶

It was primarily to prevent such assignments in the future that an SP officer was assigned to AFMPC, but it was also recognition that the Security Police field was a technical field and that SP billets should be filled from the pool of trained security policemen.

However, this reasoning did not apply to the "Top Cop" job and this, some officers believed, had an impact on retention of qualified SP officers. One officer noted that "six of the seven Colonels assigned to the Security Police Directorate [*sic*] had little or no experience in the security police field. Not only do career security police officers resent this...I believe assigning the majority of senior officers in the Directorate [*sic*]

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from other career fields is detrimental to the career field.”¹²⁷ This officer also believed that, “Some program must be instigated to recruit and keep highly qualified officers in the security police field. The caliber of many of our officers is sub-par...Many of our excellent young security police officers are transferring to other career fields or leaving the service.”¹²⁸ Their reasons for leaving varied, he noted, but many of them cited the fact that the head of their career field was often not a professional security policeman as a “large contributing factor.”¹²⁹

By 1969, most of the pieces for an effective Air Force air base defense organization had finally come together. Four years after the first sapper attack on Da Nang, the essential elements of manpower, equipment, training, doctrine, and tactics were all in place--just in time to be dismantled.



President Richard M. Nixon (White House photo)

On July 24, 1969, President Nixon finally revealed his “secret plan” for getting America out of Vietnam when, while enroute to Guam, he told reporters aboard Air Force One that the United States would seek to reduce its military involvement in Asia and encourage the “Asianization” of conflicts on that continent. Dubbed the “Guam Doctrine,” but better known as the “Nixon Doctrine,” it was the result of a combination of public pressure to get out of Vietnam, Nixon’s determination to uphold his campaign pledge to “withdraw honorably” from Southeast Asia, and his desire to take advantage of a split between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. In Vietnam the Nixon Doctrine would give rise to the policy of “Vietnamization” to be implemented via gradual reductions in US troop strength and increased

training and equipping of South Vietnamese forces with the goal of enabling them to defend their country with minimal American support.

When Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird visited Vietnam in March 1969, American forces had reached their peak strength of 543,000. Under Vietnamization, 60,000 troops, including 20 percent of American combat forces, were to be removed by the end of the year. Peace talks with the North Vietnamese were underway in Paris and this coupled with Vietnamization was a clear signal to the troops that the U. S. would be pulling out of Vietnam.

By the last quarter of 1969, preparations for turning a larger share of the air base defense mission to the VNAF were underway. Seventh Air Force’s plan for the Vietnamization of air base defense was to train a cadre of VNAF personnel who would then train others. The 377th at Tan Son Nhut reported during this period that, “The squadron operations section became increasingly involved in the planning for ‘Vietnamization’ during the period especially in the area of training.”¹³⁰ Security Police

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officers and NCOs held meetings with their VNAF counterparts to establish training standards and to determine the areas where the squadron could be of most assistance. The squadron increased the number of joint posts and patrols and made plans for intensive small arms training of VNAF instructors. The 377th expected that the "...training of Vietnamese base defense personnel would become a major activity for the squadron."¹³¹

North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh died on September 2, 1969, at the age of 79 and his embalmed body was placed on display in a granite mausoleum copied from Lenin's tomb in Moscow. His death, however, did not diminish North Vietnam's dedication to its goal of reunifying Vietnam by force. His successor, Le Duan, publicly read Ho's will in which he encouraged his people to fight on.

America's resolve, on the other hand, was failing. On November 15, 1969, an estimated 250,000 people gathered in Washington to protest America's involvement in Vietnam. The morality of America's fighting men was now even being put in question by the criminal actions of a few. On November 24, charges that Army LT William L. Calley was responsible for the massacre of over 100 civilians at the village of My Lai Vietnam in March 1968 were referred to trial by general court martial.

On February 1, 1970, Col Robert E. Blauw replaced Col Don Shultis as Director of Security Police in the office of the Air Force Inspector General. Blauw was a World War II B-17 pilot and had also flown 41 missions over Vietnam in B-52 bombers as commander of the 4133rd Bomb Wing (Provisional) in 1969. Although he had served as inspector general of 15th Air Force, he had no Security Police experience. However, Blauw's new deputy, Col Marshall A. Cook, had served most of his 28 years in the Air Force in Security Police billets. On a personal level Blauw was "very disappointed" to be leaving a flying job, but recalled being "thrilled with the fact that... I'm going to go to a new job and a new career field."¹³² Even though this was his "first experience...with non-rated people" Blauw found he was accepted despite his lack of SP experience and was surrounded by "very young, energetic, young people... [who] wanted to do their best."¹³³



Col Robert E. Blauw (Air Force photo)

In March 1970, to increase promotion opportunities, and perhaps in recognition of the ascendancy of the air base defense mission and also to facilitate the accession of women into law enforcement, the decision was made to divide the Security Police career field into two separate Air Force specialties effective January 1971.¹³⁴ Since 1947, security policemen had been fungible and were used interchangeably in security or law

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enforcement under one Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC). With this change, there was now a security specialty (811XX) and a law enforcement specialty (812XX). The separate specialty code for corrections personnel was abolished in this reorganization. Not everyone believed this split was an improvement and one senior Security Police colonel feared a “loss of flexibility in utilization of personnel.”¹³⁵ At least in retrospect, Blauw too thought the split was a bad idea since the two fields “overlap one another.”¹³⁶

Splitting the career field on paper did precipitate an actual split among security policemen and it did not take long for the inevitable “that’s not my job” attitude to manifest itself. It was evidently a significant enough problem for Colonel Blauw to remind the field that, “we are all charged with the responsibility of enforcing law and order, and protecting USAF resources. Let’s not use the trite excuse ‘that’s law enforcement’s job’ or ‘that’s security’s responsibility’ ... We are all Security Policemen—we must remember that...”¹³⁷

President Nixon had committed himself to ending American involvement in Vietnam, but not at the sacrifice of South Vietnam, and he continued to authorize military operations designed to create a more secure military situation, reasoning that the sooner the overall military situation stabilized the quicker U. S. troops could be withdrawn. The American people had a hard time distinguishing between such necessary operations and those that were seen to be “widening the war.” Such was the case with the incursion into Cambodia. On April 30, 1970, Nixon announced to a national TV audience that American troops had moved into Cambodia to attack Communist border sanctuaries that were being used for attacks into South Vietnam. Calling the joint US-South Vietnamese operation “indispensable,” some 32,000 American and 48,000 South Vietnamese troops captured large caches of supplies in Cambodia, but most of the Communist forces had already withdrawn from these areas.

Despite the military necessity for this operation, protests against this perceived expansion of the war erupted across the country. On May 4, four student protesters at Ohio's Kent State University were shot and killed by National Guardsmen in what became known as the Kent State Massacre. On May 8, construction workers in hard hats from the World Trade Center and other construction sites attacked about 1,000 anti-war protestors, some of whom were waving Viet Cong flags and burning American ones at the base of George Washington’s statue on New York City’s Wall Street. On May 20 approximately 100,000 “Hard Hats” and their supporters demonstrated in New York's Wall Street district in support of US policy in Vietnam and Cambodia while people in adjacent office buildings showered them with tickertape.

Regardless of what the public perceived, Vietnamization was proceeding rapidly. On February 5, the 7th Air Force Directorate of Security Police published the Air Base Defense Supervisors Guide which provided detail on planning, organizing, conducting, and evaluating base defense and security operations.¹³⁸ It became the primary guide for training VNAF Base Defense Groups.

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Security Police units in Vietnam were spending more and more time training their Vietnamese counterparts. In the first quarter of 1970, eleven VNAF NCOs had been trained as instructors by 377th SPS personnel at TSN and by the end of March these instructors were training VNAF Base Defense Group personnel in small arms, small unit tactics, radio procedures, munitions, and guard mount procedures. Except for a disregard for weapons safety, 377th SPS inspectors rated the training as satisfactory. On March 20, the 377th turned over 16 posts to the Vietnamese and proposed to replace SPs with VNAF personnel in bunkers, on SATs, in armored cars, and in observation towers. The objective of these turnovers was “to simultaneously reduce USAF manning requirements, maintain the existing security posture and provide on-the-job training for the Vietnamese ‘replacements’.”¹³⁹ At the same time the 377th was easing out of air base defense, it had to beef up resource protection. On March 25 a resources protection flight was established to “curtail the high theft rate of unprotected USAF resources on base.”¹⁴⁰

The enemy provided some breathing room for training the VNAF security forces. While there were a total of 18 attacks on USAF air bases in Vietnam during the first quarter of 1970, with the exception of one sapper attack at Phan Rang which caused no casualties or damage, they were all stand-off attacks. Tan Son Nhut was not attacked at all during those three months.¹⁴¹

On January 13, 1970, however, Ubon RTAFB was again attacked, but the base leadership was ready, having received an intelligence report alerting them of the planned attack. The intelligence was accurate and 363 armed personnel were waiting for the guerrillas. Shortly after 0200hrs, a mortar crew at Kilo-87 reported taking fire. At Kilo-85, Amn Larry Bridges’ MWD King, alerted on five or six sappers inside the perimeter fence and Bridges and the enemy opened up on each other simultaneously. Bridges released King and the enemy sappers split up. In front of Echo-36 near the northeast perimeter fence, a huge explosion occurred as an SP scored a direct hit with an M-79 grenade launcher on an explosives-laden sapper. The sapper disappeared in the blinding flash and only his scalp hanging on the concertina wire and one of his legs were later found.¹⁴²

Within five minutes of the start of the attack, Thai Army forces began converging on the base perimeter, but the sappers were already inside the perimeter and four of them were sprinting across the runway toward the AC-130 “Spectre” gunships parked on the ramp. The enemy heading toward the parking ramp had by now lost the cover of darkness as SP 81mm mortar illumination rounds and barrel flares along the perimeter turned night into day and they were engaged by a SAT jeep mounting an M-60 machine gun. From his post east of the “Spectre” ramp, dog handler Sgt Thomas Cartwright, Jr. released his dog Jody and opened fire on the four sappers with his M-16, wounding one of them. The remaining sappers turned their fire on Cartwright and wounded both him and Jody. SAT team jeeps soon closed in on the three remaining sappers and killed two of them. By 0224hrs all sappers spotted inside the perimeter had been killed.¹⁴³

After the smoke cleared five enemy sappers were dead, one killed only 20 yards from the parked aircraft. Four other intruders were believed to have escaped. Another

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body found was that of King. The dog, though wounded, had pursued the enemy across the runway and after being wounded for the second time, continued to crawl after the enemy until he was unfortunately killed by a QRT that mistook him for a hiding enemy sapper.¹⁴⁴ Sgt Cartwright and Jody both received Purple Hearts from the wing commander.

One upside to Vietnamization was that Air Force SP units were able to obtain combat equipment no longer needed by the Army. By early 1970, for example, Security Police squadrons in Vietnam had 30 tracked M-113 APCs and 60 of the fast, four-wheeled XM-706 armored cars in their inventories because, while Army requirements went down, the levels of production remained unchanged.

As Air Force operational units were withdrawn or consolidated at other bases and as Vietnamization transferred the primary responsibility for air base defense back to the South Vietnamese, the Security Police presence in Vietnam began to shrink. Nha Trang was one of the first bases affected as major Air Force units were withdrawn in



Security Police M-113 APCs and XM-706 armored cars at Bien Hoa, 1970 (Col Ed Johnson)

accordance with 7th Air Force Program Action Directive (PAD) 69-101. With only one Air Force operational unit remaining and their mission now limited to close-in protection of operational resources, the 14th SPS was deactivated and the remaining 32 security policemen were assigned to the 327th Combat Support Squadron.¹⁴⁵

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Other realignments quickly followed. On March 15, 1970, Pleiku's 633rd SPS was deactivated and replaced by the Security Police Section, 6254th Air Base Squadron. By June 30, 1970, Pleiku's SP authorizations were programmed to drop from 282 to 60.¹⁴⁶ On October 12, 1970, President Nixon announced that another 40,000 U. S. troops would be pulled out of Vietnam by Christmas. By October 31, 1970, the storied "Thundering Third" at Bien Hoa was gone, replaced by the 6251st SPS. On November 1, VNAF base defense troops took over the positions that the 3rd had held so gallantly during Tet '68.¹⁴⁷

As it reduced its air base defense responsibilities in Vietnam, the Security Police picked up missions at home. On September 11, 1970, President Nixon, in response to the rising number of airliner hijackings, authorized the use of Federal guards, including military ones, on commercial airliners.¹⁴⁸ The military contribution was dubbed "Project Grid Square" and began in October. Grid Square placed 800 Army MPs and Air Force SPs on commercial airline flights. The members of this Air Transportation Security Force were designated as Special Deputy United States Marshals and were therefore unofficially christened "Sky Marshals."¹⁴⁹ The use of military guards was short lived and by May 25, 1971, they were replaced by Customs Security Officers.

Just as after Korea, law enforcement began to increase in priority as air base defense waned and money slated for base defense was diverted to policing. Also, the focus of law enforcement shifted once more from response and investigation to crime prevention. For the first time, Air Force law enforcement had access to the nationwide criminal database of the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) to help identify individuals with prior criminal records and to input information on military offenders and deserters.

A new regulation for the Security Police customs function was also published in 1970 establishing the responsibilities of installation commanders and standards of training for those Security Police personnel who were designated and sworn in by the Treasury Department as customs inspectors.¹⁵⁰ To assist in training these military inspectors, the Treasury Department's Bureau of Customs issued a "Guide for Military Personnel Authorized to Perform the Function of U. S. Customs Inspector."



SP performing a customs inspection (Security Forces Museum)

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The security of deployed Air Force resources was not entirely disregarded even as air base defense began to take on a lower priority. In November 1970, AFR 125-32 was published establishing the Security Police Elements for Contingencies program. This program, known as SPECS, was the SAFE SIDE concept reincarnated on the cheap. Even though the Security Police were required to support Air Force deployments worldwide, with the deactivation of the 82nd CSPW, there were no deployable Security Police units organized, trained, and equipped to provide local ground defense, weapons system security, and law enforcement for deployed forces. Neither was SPECS designed to establish any; rather it sought to “provide a capability to rapidly assemble and deploy



SSgt Gerald B. London briefs Security Police Element for Contingencies (SPECS) team members as they prepare to simulate deployment from Reese AFB, Texas (Security Forces Museum)

Security Police contingency forces from within the normal security forces at U. S. Air Force bases.”¹⁵¹ MAJCOMs were tasked to designate personnel from their existing Security Police squadrons for SPECS provisional units and provide the necessary equipment and specialized training.

As the drawdown of U. S. forces in Vietnam continued, it began to give rise to fears among those left in country of being the last man killed and morale began to deteriorate throughout the Air Force in Vietnam. The Security Police were not unaffected and disciplinary problems, drug use, and racial confrontations began to increase.

The Security Police had more than its fair share of new recruits or first-termers. Maj Milton R. Kirste, commander of the 315th SPS at Phan Rang, noted that at one point during his tenure as commander that “495 of this unit’s 555 enlisted authorizations were filled by first termers.”¹⁵² Lest this 9 to 1 ratio of first-termers to old timers be considered an aberration, Kirste pointed out that the percentage of first-termers was close to 85 percent his entire one-year tour in command. Kirste attributed this situation to the personnel policy of the Air Force, which was based upon an assumption as old as the career field itself. “Because our initial training costs are lower and our need for significant numbers of technically capable careerists is less than in some ‘more demanding’ career fields,” Kirste speculated, “personnel planners have determined it more prudent to man the security police field with greater numbers of lower ranked and experienced, and consequently lower paid, enlisted men.”¹⁵³

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More troubling was the clear conflict he noticed between these new men and the careerists in the unit. “Commonly heard words like ‘lifer’ and ‘Maggot’ bear this out,” Kirste reported with dismay. “It is ‘in’ among the first termers to be anti-establishment, and therefore, anti-lifer.”¹⁵⁴ Developing these young men to assume greater responsibilities was almost a losing cause, since it was “equally as ‘in’ to avoid the supervisory responsibilities normally identified with careerists.”¹⁵⁵ Of course the rift between “first-termers” and “lifera” wasn’t helped when orders such as the one on shower etiquette issued by the 377th SPS operations officer requiring enlisted men to “Salute when you recognize an officer even though you both, officer and non-commissioned officer, are nude” were published!¹⁵⁶

This anti-establishment attitude began to manifest itself in a deadly way as troops tried, and sometimes succeeded, to kill or injure their superiors. This practice originated among the even more dissatisfied draftees in the Army and became known as “fraggina” because the attempt often took the form of pulling the pin and tossing a fragmentation grenade into an officer’s hutch. It was not just an Army phenomenon; the Phu Cat Security Police squadron commander’s office was “fraggina” with a grenade by a discontented black airman.¹⁵⁷

The previously professional performance of essential combat duties also began to deteriorate. Some combat posts took on the appearance of college dorm rooms instead of fighting positions. A walking tour of the defensive positions at Tan Son Nhut in the spring of 1971 revealed jury rigged reclining seats, ponchos spread out for napping, and “a magazine of crossword puzzles (about half completed), several ‘girly’ magazines, a joke book, two novels and an empty can of beer.”¹⁵⁸

Another factor chipping away at morale was the tensions between blacks and whites in America that had increased steadily throughout the 1960’s. Black discontent with the status quo became more militant particularly after Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination in 1968. These stateside tensions were exported to Vietnam. “The biggest problem we had there [Phu Cat],” one SP officer confessed, “was the black airmen at that time. We had a lot of fraggings in the country at that time where the blacks were having a hard time with the leadership. They didn’t want to be a part of the war... And we had... an awful lot of leadership challenges... to keep from a fractionalization of the unit between the blacks and the whites.”¹⁵⁹

Burdened by discrimination, agitated by militant groups such as the Black Panthers, and feeling they had no way to redress their grievances within the system, American blacks had on more than one occasion violently struck out at the white “establishment.” Such a strike against the “man” happened at Travis AFB, California.

Saturday, May 22, 1971, was a “particularly hot, muggy day” at Travis and many junior airmen, both black and white, were lying on blankets in the shade of their barracks and drinking beer to keep cool.¹⁶⁰ The base commander, Col John E. Blake, noticed these airmen but wasn’t uneasy with what they were doing; it was, after all, a hot Saturday afternoon. That all changed when Blake received a call from Maj Harold L.

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Womack, his chief of Security Police, who reported that there was some real trouble in the barracks area. It all started, according to Womack, when a verbal confrontation between some blacks and whites escalated when a white airman displayed a pistol he had hidden under a newspaper. The black airmen, bitter that some other blacks had recently been tried by court-martial and jailed for assault, demanded that the white airman with the pistol be made an example of.

Blake and Womack tried to talk to them but, according to Blake, “They called me every filthy name they could think of and accused me of all the bad things that have happened to Blacks since the beginning of history...”¹⁶¹ As they dispersed, Blake believed he had calmed them down, but as they made their way back to their barracks, according to Blake, they “beat the hell out of a White guy for no reason at all...”¹⁶²

Things quickly went from bad to worse. An incident at the NCO Club that evening resulted in injuries to the club manager, who was black, and several whites including one who was struck in the face with a fence picket. Some white airmen were cornered by black airmen at a BX facility known as the Snake Pit and the SPs were called out. The rioters, among whom were some security policemen, began to shove the SPs and Blake ordered the apprehension of the ringleaders.

At that point the wing commander, Brig Gen Ken Moore, stepped in and tried to reason with them, believing that his presence might end things. But the malcontents were “absolutely insulting” to him.¹⁶³ Finally cleared from the Snake Pit, about thirty of the more vocal of them congregated on the baseball diamond. Blake, with Moore’s approval, told his deputy to apprehend them all and the ball field was ringed with Security Police in riot gear prepared to go in and carry out the order. But Moore changed his mind and decided to go there himself and read them the riot act. They dispersed and with the exception of some minor altercations in the barracks, the night passed relatively uneventfully.

The next day information reached Blake that there was going to be a gathering at the dining hall that might portend conflict. Blake went to the dining hall to talk to the malcontents, but they moved instead to the Snake Pit and drove everyone out. Blake placed his SAT teams on alert and went inside and ordered a hamburger. A white Women in the Air Force (WAF), who for some reason was hated by the black WAFs—Blake thought it was because she may have dated black airmen—was also in the Pit and became the object of verbal abuse. Sugar bowls started being smashed on tables and Blake and the WAF left.

Further efforts to talk with the rioters, including those made by a black officer, were unavailing and the wing leadership decided to give into the demands of the rioters to send the apprehended ringleaders to McChord AFB, Washington, for trial, since they believed they could not get a fair trial at Travis. Blake was ordered to make arrangements to fly them out and an offer was even extended to the rioters to take one or two of their representatives along to make sure the prisoners were not abused. Not

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satisfied with these concessions, the rioters decided that they would free their comrades themselves and began to move toward the confinement facility.

Womack set up a “skirmish line” to block the rioters, who now numbered between 70 and 110, both male and female, while the prisoners were loaded aboard the flight to McChord. “The Security Police did one hell of a job. Blacks and Whites alike,” Blake recalled. “And the Blacks were under particularly tough pressure from their own kind to let them break through the line. They held their ground. They didn’t let them through... [The rioters] had bounced against the skirmish line and were throwing rocks at them.”¹⁶⁴ By the time some semblance of order was re-imposed on May 26, 135 airmen had been apprehended and 70 civilian police officers were called in to maintain order in base areas of concurrent jurisdiction.¹⁶⁵ This was the first, but not the last, occasion on which security policemen would face off against their own discontented comrades.

The Travis riots led to some unease concerning the image portrayed by the security policemen confronting the rioters. The law enforcement patrolman’s standard equipment was not sufficient for confronting rioters, but the only alternative was to turn out in full combat gear with steel helmet, flak jacket, and M-16 looking like he was ready to kill, not contain, the rioters. Two months after the Travis riots, a Worldwide Security Police Uniform Conference was held at Robins AFB, Georgia. Among the changes recommended by the conference was the adoption of the riot control helmet with clear plastic face shield then in use by civilian police forces. The conference also recommended the procurement of 36-inch riot control batons, the adoption of the shotgun as the standard riot control weapon, and a back pack chemical agent fogger for dispensing riot control agents.¹⁶⁶



Institutional changes came rapidly to the Security Police field in 1971. First, Colonel Blauw appointed CMSgt John Renfroe to be the first Chief Master Sergeant of Security Police, a position whose creation Renfroe advocated as a means to have someone at headquarters who could answer the questions enlisted troops in the field might have enlisted man-to-enlisted man. Renfroe’s duties as chief master sergeant were to advise the director “on all matters affecting the health, welfare, morale, and discipline of all Security Policemen in the USAF and [to] specifically advise the director on NCO and airmen matters.”¹⁶⁷

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A second and more far reaching change began in September 1971 when, in a test supervised by Lt Col Jerry Bullock and MSgt Bobby L. Whittington, six female airmen were recruited to enter into law enforcement training at Lackland AFB. The six pioneers were trained like their male counterparts and after all six successfully completed training the Air Force became the first of the military services to utilize women for law enforcement duties.¹⁶⁸ These six would figuratively take the



Female Security Policeman on patrol in early 1970s (Security Forces Museum)

places of six security policemen from Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota's 821st Combat Defense Squadron who died in a helicopter crash on October 9, 1971.¹⁶⁹

When Col Bob Blauw took over as director he discovered that while the rank and file of the career field was generally dedicated and energetic, "Their training was poor, and there didn't seem to be much training once they got in a job and on a base."¹⁷⁰ Starting in 1972, the Security Police took some additional important steps toward more effective utilization and management of its personnel. First, the long-time practice of assigning men straight from basic training to Security Police units without first attending Security Police training via a direct duty assignment was ended. The law enforcement and security AFSCs became Category A "training required" and now units would receive trained security policemen rather than untrained airmen.¹⁷¹

The second change affected the officers of the career field when the Palace Badge program was instituted at Air Force Military Personnel Center (AFMPC). Palace Badge was "a program to improve the career management of officers in the Security Police and Office of Special investigations utilization fields..."¹⁷² Palace Badge would handle career development, overall management of SP and AFOSI officers, seek to identify problems and inequities in the officer force, manage all officer assignments, and select officers for training course attendance. Two Security Police officers, Maj Carl B. DeNisio and Capt William D. Doran, were assigned to the Palace Badge office.

Finally, Blauw addressed the qualifications for entry into the career field by working hard to increase the number of individuals with at least a high school diploma. Blauw stressed that the lack of diploma did not mean those Airmen "were not intelligent ... they were, but they just didn't have some qualifications that we would like to have had."¹⁷³

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Vietnamization continued on schedule. The Marines, except for some small contingents, had been withdrawn. The last Army combat troops were scheduled to be gone by August 1972, leaving only 43,000 Air Force personnel in country. Nixon had decided that airpower would be the predominant American force in Vietnam and believed that it and the South Vietnamese ground and air forces, which had been flooded with American equipment, could hold back the North Vietnamese. The President's assumption would be tested that spring.

On March 30, 1972, North Vietnamese Gen Vo Nguyen Giap launched 125,000 men supported by tanks and artillery into South Vietnam. Unlike the Tet Offensive of 1968, Giap's Easter Offensive made almost no use of the Viet Cong and was a largely conventional attack dependent upon roads for the movement of tanks and artillery. Strung out along these roads, the North Vietnamese columns made excellent targets and the US strategy was to decimate the attack from the air and starve it for supplies by bombing its supply lines. USAF aircraft were rushed into the theater and by the end of June the number of combat aircraft increased from 1,153 to 1,426 including an additional 119 SAC B-52s. In one month, 3,000 sorties were flown against enemy targets. Nixon also authorized the bombing of Hanoi and the mining of the port of Haiphong as part of Operation Linebacker I.

Despite pitched battles around Hue, Quang Tri, Kontum, and An Loc, the gateway to Saigon, the North Vietnamese offensive ran out of steam in late May and by early June Giap was withdrawing his forces to the northern part of South Vietnam. South Vietnamese President Thieu did not support continuing the American efforts at the Paris Peace talks as long as Communist troops remained in his country. President Nixon, however, was determined to get out of Vietnam. He was willing to sign an armistice with Hanoi that left North Vietnamese troops in the South by offsetting the strategic advantage that gave Hanoi with quicker and larger shipments of supplies to the Thieu government along with continued USAF air support.

The doctrine and forces used to protect those remaining American air bases had radically changed. By mid-1972 practically all air base defense responsibilities in Vietnam had been transferred from the Security Police to the VNAF. In February, the 7th AF WSUT School closed. By June, heavy weapons training with the .50 caliber machine gun and the 90mm recoilless rifle were both dropped from the training curriculum at Lackland. The 820th CSPW was long dead, replaced by the SPECS program, and in June SPECS got its first operational test in Operation CONSTANT GUARD.

Constant Guard involved the deployment of SPECS troops and equipment primarily from Kadena AB, Okinawa, Offutt AFB, Nebraska, Altus AFB, Oklahoma, McChord AFB, Washington, and Holloman AFB, New Mexico, to Takhli Royal Thai AB, Thailand. At Takhli, the troops built defensive bunkers along the base perimeter and worked with the Thai forces to establish security for arriving American forces.¹⁷⁴

Despite the withdrawal of American combat forces and the prospect of a peace agreement between the United States and North Vietnam, attacks against American air

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bases in Southeast Asia did not cease. In 48 separate attacks a total of 754 rocket and mortar rounds slammed into the air bases in Vietnam in 1972.

In January, U-Tapao Air Base in Thailand was the target of an attack by three enemy sappers armed with grenades and satchel charges that damaged a B-52. In the early morning hours of June 4, 1972, a single intruder was killed in an exchange of fire with a SAT and Thai guard forces at Ubon AB. It was later discovered that eight sappers had been spotted near the perimeter, but only the one penetrated the base. Why the others sent their comrade alone to his death was not known.¹⁷⁵

Udom was attacked by sappers on October 3, 1972. The attack failed and for their “rapid response, effective combat tactics, and courageous aggressiveness” that “denied the enemy completion of their assigned mission and prevented damage to vital Air Force resources,” both the 432nd SPS and the 2nd Company, 4th Battalion, Royal Thai Security Guard Regiment received the Air Force Outstanding Unit Award with Combat “V” Device for their actions on October 3.¹⁷⁶

The primary air base defense problems as American forces drew down, particularly in Vietnam, were how to integrate those Security Police forces that remained with their Vietnamese counterparts and how to deal with the lack of American ground troops for external defense. At Da Nang, the last Army unit pulled out in August and with their departure, a new base defense concept was designed and implemented by the 6948th Air Base Wing. Under this new concept, Air Force and Army aircraft available for base defense were organized under an aviation coordinator. Security Police posts were relocated to provide enhanced security for strategic areas on the base and one helicopter was placed on alert to respond to Security Police needs. The Security Police also implemented the “Compound Defense System” “consisting of an expanded radio network, bunkers and a trained augmentee force...[that] provided an ‘island within an island’ concept, providing an adequate defense capability if area and perimeter defenses failed.”¹⁷⁷

On the perimeter, Security Police mortar teams provided illumination for isolated locations on the perimeter. Dog teams patrolled the areas between the ARVN bunkers and two QRTs were formed to respond to hot spots and set up ambushes. Base defense was also augmented by the use of AC-119K “Stinger” gunships to attack known enemy positions in the “Rocket Belt.” The base leadership, while admitting it was “conjecture” on their part, “believed that the effectiveness of the base defense posture prevented enemy ground attacks during the period, while the air armada was responsible for the suppression of a high percentage of the attempted rocket attacks.”¹⁷⁸ But not all the rocket attacks were thwarted. Between July 8 and December 26, 1972, 256 rockets hit Da Nang killing four U. S. personnel and destroying seven buildings, three vehicles, and two aircraft.¹⁷⁹

Sitting on a target as the war wound down took a toll on morale. In an effort to boost morale, Da Nang began “Desperation Airlift, Incorporated” using an old C-47 transport to fly troops to Singapore, Hong Kong, and Thailand for a little R & R. “The

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chance to get away from Da Nang,” the wing reported, “if only for a day or two, had a tremendous impact on improving the morale of wing personnel. Desperation Airlift became one of the biggest morale boosters on base.”¹⁸⁰ However, even Desperation Airlift could not solve some of the base’s other problems.

Like many of the remaining bases in Vietnam, Da Nang was grappling with drug abuse and racial tensions. The wing reported that drug abuse was “a significant problem” and attributed it to “acceptance of drug use, social unrest, the overall base environment, and the availability of drugs in the local area...”¹⁸¹ A Drug Abuse Control Committee was established and it initiated the “Velvet Glove/Baseball Bat” program.¹⁸² The “Velvet Glove” was used to assist those who desired rehabilitation, now the official policy of the Air Force as opposed to discharging drug abusers, while the “Baseball Bat” came into play to “fully punish drug abusers refusing rehabilitation.”¹⁸³ To identify drug users, the Air Force’s urinalysis testing program, Operation Golden Flow, was utilized. The wing Social Actions Office, an Air Force-wide drug abuse and equal opportunity treatment office created in response to the Travis riots, conducted a three-hour Drug Abuse Education Seminar weekly.

Drug use exacerbated another problem; that of racial confrontation. The base noticed a sharp rise in Equal Opportunity Treatment (EOT) cases, a “rash” of Congressional complaints, and a number of “interracial fights” that began over some other issue, but quickly turned racial as spectators entered the fray choosing sides along racial lines.¹⁸⁴

In both of these problems, the Security Police squadron unfortunately led the way. One security policeman high on heroin was killed in a jeep accident while another, who was rumored to be a “druggie,” committed suicide a month later. Eleven members of one flight refused to give urine samples as part of Golden Flow testing and were extremely hostile to medical personnel at the testing site. The Airmen requested a meeting with the wing commander and at the meeting expressed a mistrust of their supervisors. Wing leadership determined that while all of its squadrons had similar problems, “The Security Police Squadron seemed the only squadron on base that was near exploding” and that “drastic, visible, immediate action was required to restore stability to the Security Police Squadron.”¹⁸⁵

The problems plaguing the 6948th SPS were not uncommon among those forces remaining in Vietnam. Bereft of a mission that promised victory, these men were left to fight a rearguard action in a lost cause. Affected by the permissive society born in the ‘60s, they mistrusted and often ignored authority, but they still did their jobs. Maj Milt Kirste, commander of the 315th SPS, summed them up along with their predecessors when he wrote about his men at Phan Rang AB in his end of tour report:

Should anyone ever decide to record the accomplishments of the USAF..., he will find it necessary to devote a chapter to the role of the security police and base defense forces. We were asked to do something most of us had never done before, and did it well. We were required to acquire new knowledge and skills, and we succeeded. We were asked to be the base’s soldiers—her infantrymen,

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mortar men, and armored forces—and soldiers we became. The stereotype of the guy in the white hat giving a ticket was replaced by a troop in “cammies,” standing in a tower...Even though that troop preferred to wear a “go-to-hell” hat, his hair long, and a mustache beneath his nose, and perhaps even believe there was nothing right with the establishment he was working for, when the chips were down, it was that troop who, along with the guys on his left and right, responded to the challenge. We can all be proud of the contribution these troops made to the reputation and honor of our career field.¹⁸⁶

At the Paris Peace Talks, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger presented North Vietnamese lead negotiator Le Duc Tho with a list of 69 changes the Thieu government desired to the draft agreement that had been tentatively reached in October 1971. Confronted with these changes, the North Vietnamese walked out and President Nixon issued an ultimatum to the North Vietnamese giving them 72 hours to return to the table or else face renewed bombing of the North. When the North Vietnamese failed to respond, Nixon ordered the beginning of Linebacker II, the bombing of Hanoi and associated targets, on December 11, 1972.



For the next twelve days, 121 B-52s dropped thousands of tons of bombs on Hanoi and Haiphong. Vietnamese anti-aircraft crews fired over a thousand SAM missiles, downing 15 of the huge bombers and ten other aircraft. Despite the losses, Linebacker II succeeded in forcing the North Vietnamese back to the peace talks on January 8 and by the following day, Kissinger and Le Duc Tho resolved all remaining differences. President Thieu

was personally assured by Nixon that the United States would continue to support South Vietnam with money, materiel, and air power, but only if he signed on to the agreement. Thieu reluctantly accepted the peace agreement, even though it allowed North Vietnamese troops to remain in South Vietnam, but bitterly called its terms "tantamount to surrender" for South Vietnam. For their work in bringing the Vietnam War to an end, Kissinger and Le Duc Tho were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace prize for 1973. Le Duc Tho turned his prize down.

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On January 23, 1973, President Nixon announced that a peace agreement had been reached that would "end the war and bring peace with honor." Four days later Lt Col William B. Nolde became the last of 58,167 Americans to die in Vietnam. Of these, 1,741 were Air Force combat deaths, including 10 security policemen.¹⁸⁷ Another 100 SPs died of non-combat causes. On January 27, the 7th Air Force News carried a banner headline announcing "PEACE DECLARED!!!" along with the news of former President Johnson's death from a heart attack. On January 29 the Paris Peace Accords went into effect to the ringing of church bells across the United States. The withdrawal of most of the remaining American forces accelerated as the first of over 500 American POWs were released beginning in March.



South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu
(National Archives)

The last men of the sole remaining Security Police squadron in Vietnam, the 377th, departed Tan Son Nhut on March 29, 1973.¹⁸⁸ At 1130 hours, the law enforcement desk sergeant made a final entry into the blotter that seemed to foresee the future of South Vietnam: "Relief: All Security Police personnel departed this station at this time. FINI THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM."¹⁸⁹

¹ Lt Col Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973* (Office of Air Force History: Washington, D.C., 1979), Appendix 1.

² Interview of Col Jay A. Swander, USAF (Ret) by Col James L. Conrad, USAF (Ret), January 23, 2005.

³ Interview of Col Jay A. Swander, USAF (Ret) by Col James L. Conrad, USAF (Ret), January 23, 2005.

⁴ Interview of Col Jay A. Swander, USAF (Ret) by Col James L. Conrad, USAF (Ret), January 23, 2005.

⁵ Interview of Col Jay A. Swander, USAF (Ret) by Col James L. Conrad, USAF (Ret), January 23, 2005.

⁶ Interview of Col Jay A. Swander, USAF (Ret) by Col James L. Conrad, USAF (Ret), January 23, 2005.

⁷ Interview of Col Jay A. Swander, USAF (Ret) by Col James L. Conrad, USAF (Ret), January 23, 2005.

⁸ Don Oberdorfer, *Tet! The Turning Point in the Vietnam War* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1984), 70.

⁹ Don Oberdorfer, *Tet! The Turning Point in the Vietnam War* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1984), 72.

¹⁰ Don Oberdorfer, *Tet! The Turning Point in the Vietnam War* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1984), 75.

¹¹ Interview of Lt Col Kent Miller, USAF (Ret.) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), April 1, 2005.

¹² Interview of SMSgt William "Pete" Piazza, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), May, 2005.

¹³ History of the 377th Security Police Squadron January – March 1968, Chapter III, 8.

¹⁴ Charles E. Penley, "Twenty Seven Feet" (Vietnam Security Police Association Webpage <http://webpages.charter.net/cepenley/stories/27Feet.html>).

¹⁵ "Tan Son Nhut Air Base Security Police History" (SF Museum).

¹⁶ Briefing, "Y [sic] C ATTACK ON TSN 31 JAN 68 (TET OFFENSIVE)," Carter Papers (AFHRA).

¹⁷ Sig Christenson, "Sole survivor of Bunker 051 gets due honor," *San Antonio Express News*, February 12, 1999.

¹⁸ Interview of Lt Col Kent Miller, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), April 1, 2005.

¹⁹ Interview of Lt Col Kent Miller, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), April 1, 2005.

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- ²⁰ Interview of Lt Col Kent Miller, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), April 1, 2005.
- ²¹ William "Pete" Piazza. "A Hard Days Night," 3. (Typescript in possession of the author)
- ²² William "Pete" Piazza. "A Hard Days Night," 3. (Typescript in possession of the author)
- ²³ Interview of SMSgt William "Pete" Piazza, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), May, 2005.
- ²⁴ Interview of SMSgt William "Pete" Piazza, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), May, 2005.
- ²⁵ Interview of SMSgt William "Pete" Piazza, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), May, 2005.
- ²⁶ Chaplain Captain Donald J. Sheehan, "Uncommonly Brave," *8AF Security Police Digest*, 1 July 1968, 11.
- ²⁷ Interview of Lt Col Kent Miller, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), April 1, 2005.
- ²⁸ Sig Christenson, "Sole survivor of Bunker 051 gets due honor," *San Antonio Express News*, February 12, 1999.
- ²⁹ Interview of SMSgt William "Pete" Piazza, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), May, 2005.
- ³⁰ History of 377th Combat Support Group, 1 January-31 March 1968, Volume II, Combat Operations After Action Report, Attachment 1.
- ³¹ History of the 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing, 1 January-31 March 1968, Volume III, Tab 10, Combat Operations After Action Report, Attachment 2, 2.
- ³² History of the 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing, Volume III, Tab 10, Combat Operations After Action Report, Attachment 2, 2.
- ³³ History of the 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing History, Volume III, Tab 10, Combat Operations After Action Report, Attachment 2, 2.
- ³⁴ History of the 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing, Volume III, Tab 10, Combat Operations After Action Report, Attachment 2, 3.
- ³⁵ Interview of SMSgt William "Pete" Piazza, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), May, 2005.
- ³⁶ Interview of SMSgt William "Pete" Piazza, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), May, 2005.
- ³⁷ Interview of Lt Col Kent Miller, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), April 1, 2005.
- ³⁸ History of the 377th Security Police Squadron January – March 1968, Chapter III, 11.
- ³⁹ Sig Christenson, "Sole survivor of Bunker 051 gets due honor," *San Antonio Express News*, February 12, 1999.
- ⁴⁰ Keith W. Nolan. *The Battle for Saigon: Tet 1968* (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 2002), 89. Nolan's excellent book is the best narrative of the battles of Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa as well as the attacks on Long Binh and the US Embassy.
- ⁴¹ Interview of Dr. Terry Carr by Col. Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret.), November 22, 2005. Carr names the man he met as Mr. "Bill Cramsey," but it was more than likely Leo Crampsey.
- ⁴² Interview of Dr. Terry Carr by Col. Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), November 22, 2005.
- ⁴³ Interview of Dr. Terry Carr by Col. Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), November 22, 2005.
- ⁴⁴ Interview of Dr. Terry Carr by Col. Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), November 22, 2005.
- ⁴⁵ Interview of Dr. Terry Carr by Col. Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), November 22, 2005.
- ⁴⁶ Interview of Dr. Terry Carr by Col. Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), November 22, 2005.
- ⁴⁷ Keith W. Nolan. *The Battle for Saigon: Tet 1968* (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 2002), 115.
- ⁴⁸ Interview of Dr. Terry Carr by Col. Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret.), November 22, 2005.
- ⁴⁹ Keith W. Nolan. *The Battle for Saigon: Tet 1968* (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 2002), 150.
- ⁵⁰ Keith W. Nolan. *The Battle for Saigon: Tet 1968* (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 2002), 150.
- ⁵¹ *History of the 377th Security Police Squadron January – March 1968*, Chapter III, 13.
- ⁵² Keith W. Nolan. *The Battle for Saigon: Tet 1968* (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 2002), 92.
- ⁵³ History of the 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing, Volume III, Tab 10, Combat Operations After Action Report, Attachment 2, 4.
- ⁵⁴ Letter of Appreciation from Col Lee McClendon to Lt Col Kenton D. Miller, 9 February 1968.
- ⁵⁵ Letter of Appreciation to The Thundering Third and Augmentees from Lt Col Kenton D. Miller, 9 February 1968.

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- ⁵⁶ Official Daily Bulletin No. 29, Headquarters 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing.
- ⁵⁷ Letter of Commendation, 3rd Combat Support Group, 29 Mar 1968.
- ⁵⁸ Why the 377th and its commander were decorated while the 3rd and its chief were not has never been explained. Clearly the fighting was fierce at both bases and the performance of both units was superb. Perhaps higher headquarters never received a clear understanding of the extent of the enemy attack on Bien Hoa or perhaps they became focused on the 377th's efforts because MACV and 7th Air Force had front row seats for the battle at TSN. Whatever the reason, it is a snub that still continues to resonate with the veterans of the Bien Hoa battle.
- ⁵⁹ Coggins's decorations were mailed to him during his six months of hospitalization after the battle and it was not until thirty-one years later that his bravery was recognized by a formal awards ceremony at Lackland AFB, TX.
- ⁶⁰ Extract of Legion of Merit to Lt Col Billy J Carter (Col Billy Jack Carter Papers).
- ⁶¹ Citation to Accompany the Award of the Air Force Cross (Posthumous) to Reginald V. Maisey, Jr. (LSP Personnel-4 File, SF Museum).
- ⁶² Interview of SMSgt William "Pete" Piazza, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), May, 2005.
- ⁶³ Letter to Mrs. Gilda Piazza, February 11, 1968 (Courtesy of William Piazza).
- ⁶⁴ "Short Bursts," Volume III, Number 42, January [sic] 5, 1968.
- ⁶⁵ Interview of SMSgt William "Pete" Piazza, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), May, 2005.
- ⁶⁶ History of the 377th Security Police Squadron October –December 1968, 8.
- ⁶⁷ The after action report on the Bien Hoa attack stated: "On 28 Feb 68 many lives were saved due to the fine efforts of the security policeman posted on the northeast perimeter of the air base (Able-10). This airman sited the launchings and immediately transmitted a warning...seconds prior to rocket impact." (Summary of 3rd Combat Support Group After Actions Report, 7 March 1968, prepared by the Corona Harvest Project Office, 82 Combat Security Police Wing, 9 December 1969).
- ⁶⁸ Walter Cronkite's "We Are Mired In Stalemate Broadcast," February 27, 1968 (<http://faculty.smu.edu/dsimon/Change%20--Cronkite.html>).
- ⁶⁹ This comment has been attributed to Johnson but has never been traced to the source.
- ⁷⁰ "Air Base Defense in SEA 1 January 1965 – 31 March 1968, 1 November 1969," x.
- ⁷¹ History of the 377th Security Police Squadron January – March 1968, Chapter III, 16.
- ⁷² History of the 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing, Volume III, Tab 10, Combat Operations After Action Report, 7.
- ⁷³ History of the 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing, Volume III, Tab 10, Combat Operations After Action Report, 7.
- ⁷⁴ History of the 377th Security Police Squadron January – March 1968, Chapter III, 20.
- ⁷⁵ Interview of Lt Col Kent Miller, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), April 1, 2005.
- ⁷⁶ Interview of Lt Col Kent Miller, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), April 1, 2005.
- ⁷⁷ "Hard Days Night," 4.
- ⁷⁸ Interview of Lt Col Kent Miller, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), April 1, 2005.
- ⁷⁹ *Security Police Digest*, Winter-Spring Edition, 1968, 10.
- ⁸⁰ *Security Police Digest*, Winter-Spring Edition, 1968, 10.
- ⁸¹ Interview of Col Michael Creedon, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), 24 January 2005.
- ⁸² U. S. Air Force Oral History Interview, Lt Col Roger Fox, 18 August 1969.
- ⁸³ According to Dr. John W. Brokaw, historian of the Air Force Security Police Association, the unit deployed to Vietnam was always designated the 821st even if the men in it came from the 822nd or 823rd. There are, however, end of tour reports in the AFHRA archives from deployed commanders using their actual unit designations.
- ⁸⁴ Trip Report – Col Donald C. Shultis, Director of Security Police, TIG, 30 September 1968, 3
- ⁸⁵ Trip Report – Col Donald C. Shultis, Director of Security Police, TIG, 30 September 1968, 3.
- ⁸⁶ Trip Report – Col Donald C. Shultis, Director of Security Police, TIG, 30 September 1968, 5.
- ⁸⁷ Trip Report – Col Donald C. Shultis, Director of Security Police, TIG, 30 September 1968, 7.
- ⁸⁸ Trip Report – Col Donald C. Shultis, Director of Security Police, TIG, 30 September 1968, 5. Shultis's view on distinctive dress was very much the Air Force view as exemplified by the wearing of specialty badges. Until the 1990's only aircrew, Judge Advocates, and medical personnel had uniform badges that identified their specialties.
- ⁸⁹ End of Tour Report, SMSgt Raymond Turner, 4 Apr 69.

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- ⁹⁰ End of Tour Report, MSgt George O. Futch, Jr., Apr 69.
- ⁹¹ End of Tour Report, Lt Col Kalman D. Simon, 12 Sep 69.
- ⁹² End of Tour Report, Capt Stephen A. Canavera, Sep 68.
- ⁹³ *Security Police Digest*, Fall-Winter Edition, 1968, 16.
- ⁹⁴ 7th Air Force Regulation 50-5, *Security Police Training*, 10 July 1968.
- ⁹⁵ “An Air Training Command Activity Input to Project Corona Harvest on Technical Training Support of SEA [Southeast Asia], 1 April 1968 – 31 December 1969, 2 October 1970.
- ⁹⁶ Lt Col Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973* (Office of Air Force History: Washington, D.C., 1979), Appendix 1.
- ⁹⁷ End of Tour Report, Col Albert Feldman, 7th AF Director of Security Police, June 1970, 6.
- ⁹⁸ End of Tour Report, Col Albert Feldman, 7th AF Director of Security Police, June 1970, 6.
- ⁹⁹ End of Tour Report, Col Albert Feldman, 7th AF Director of Security Police, June 1970, 9.
- ¹⁰⁰ Citation to Accompany the Award of the Distinguished Flying Cross to William K. Kastner. Security Police Capt William Jackson also appears on a list at the SF Museum as a recipient of the DFC, but no further information has been found concerning the award.
- ¹⁰¹ The following account is based upon *Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report: Attack on Udorn 26 Jul 68 Special Report*.
- ¹⁰² “Air Base Defense in SEA 1 January 1965 – 31 March 1968, 1 November 1969,” 1-191.
- ¹⁰³ “Sentry Dog Force Shipped to Thailand,” *Air Force Times*, April 3, 1968.
- ¹⁰⁴ Memorandum, “Air Base Security (RVN, Thailand, Korea), 28 May 1969.
- ¹⁰⁵ Capt Marie Shadden, *The Peacekeepers: Security Police History 1947 – 1982* (Lackland AFB, TX: USAF Security Police Academy, 1983), 109.
- ¹⁰⁶ Specific requirements for Security Police involvement in Garden Plot were eliminated in late 1971 (*Security Police Digest*, Number 1, 1972, 11).
- ¹⁰⁷ Interview of Col Michael Creedon, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), January 24, 2005.
- ¹⁰⁸ History of the 377th Security Police Squadron October –December 1968, 15.
- ¹⁰⁹ History of the 377th Security Police Squadron July –September 1969. In April 1971 the MWD School at Lackland began training five German shepherds in its first class for marijuana detection dogs (USAF News Release No. 71-3-28, April 8, 1971).
- ¹¹⁰ Interview of Col Michael Creedon, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), January 24, 2005.
- ¹¹¹ Combat After Action Report, Phan Rang AB, RVN, 26 January 1969, 3.
- ¹¹² Combat After Action Report, Phan Rang AB, RVN, 26 January 1969, 4.
- ¹¹³ Capt Gary A. Guimond, “Clean Sweep of the Enemy,” *Airman*, July 1970, 34.
- ¹¹⁴ Lt Col Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973* (Office of Air Force History: Washington, D.C., 1979), 104.
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- ¹⁸⁶ Maj Milton R. Kirste, 315 SPS/CC, Phang Rang AB, End of Tour Report, 10 Jun 71 – 31 Mar 72.
- ¹⁸⁷ *Air Force Magazine*, Vol.87, No. 9, September 2004, 57. Most lists show a total of eleven Security Police combat deaths, however, A1C Paul W. Anthony, who appears on all such lists was actually a cryptographer with the Electronic Security Service’s 9624th Security Squadron.
- ¹⁸⁸ The 377th squadron commander, Lt Col Bill Luckett, was the last SP to leave Vietnam.
- ¹⁸⁹ Page of 377th SPS desk blotter on display at SF Museum, Lackland AFB, Texas.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

THE HOLLOW FORCE YEARS: 1973 – 1980

The draft was set to expire on June 30, 1973, but the need for recruits had dropped to the point where Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird cancelled it five months early on January 27. The Army, down from a peak wartime strength of 1,500,000, mustered 800,000 by mid-1973 and was transitioning from a predominately conscript force to an all-volunteer force. When James R. Schlesinger took over the reins of the defense department in July 1973, the United States military budget had dropped by one-third since fiscal year 1968 and its percentage of total government outlays was the lowest since 1941. Schlesinger wanted to arrest this precipitous decline and begin increasing the defense budget.

Nixon and Schlesinger embraced a doctrine of flexible response particularly since the Soviet Union had reached a point of near parity in nuclear weapons and both men had grave doubts about the strategy of mutual assured destruction which relied on massive nuclear attacks against an enemy's cities and industrial areas. Schlesinger believed that a credible strategy of nuclear deterrence required fulfilling several conditions. First, it was essential that the United States maintain an essential equivalence with the Soviet Union in nuclear force effectiveness. Second, US strategic nuclear forces must be a highly survivable force that could be targeted against an enemy's economic base in order to deter attacks against US population or economic targets. Third, the US needed to establish a fast-response force that could act to deter additional enemy attacks. Finally, the US needed to establish a range of capabilities sufficiently strong to convince all nations that the United States was equal to its strongest competitors.

With the improvement in the accuracy of American warheads it was now possible to selectively target enemy missile facilities and minimize, as far as was possible with nuclear weapons, collateral damage. By 1974 with the issuance of Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) 5, American missiles began to be retargeted from Soviet urban centers to Soviet missile facilities as part of a counterforce strategy. In 1972, the United States ratified the Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with the Soviet Union which ensured that each side would remain vulnerable to the other's missiles by limiting anti-ballistic missile defense sites to two per nation. At the same time, both sides agreed to a reduction in their strategic nuclear arsenal via the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I). Overlaying all of this was Nixon's goal of détente with the Soviet Union based on the assumption that the existence of the Communist superpower was a given and that cooperation rather than confrontation was the best way to deal with that reality. Nixon had already sought to drive a wedge between the Soviets and the Communist Chinese by becoming in February 1972 the first American president to visit China and by formally recognizing the Red Chinese government of mainland China.

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Because conventional forces were an essential element in the deterrence posture of the United States, Schlesinger wanted to reverse what he perceived as a dangerous downward trend both in US conventional force strength and that of its allies in Europe. Schlesinger focused much of his attention on NATO and pressured the European defense ministers to strengthen their conventional capabilities. In his discussions with NATO leaders, Schlesinger promoted the concept of burden-sharing, urged qualitative improvements in NATO forces, including equipment standardization, and lobbied them to increase defense spending to up to five percent of their gross national product.

At home Schlesinger, became a vigorous advocate of much larger defense budgets, but he had little success. For fiscal year (FY) 1975, Congress provided \$86.1 billion, compared with \$81.6 billion in FY 1974. In FY 1976, the amount went up to \$95.6 billion, an increase of 3.4 percent, but after accounting for inflation, this was slightly less than the defense budget for FY 1955. Two things conspired against Schlesinger's efforts to bolster the defense budget. First, the country and Congress were tired of war and spending more money on the military was not a popular cause. Second, Schlesinger was a member of an embattled, weakened administration.

In June 1972, five men were arrested for breaking into the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate Hotel in Washington, DC, and by October the FBI had connected the burglars to the Committee to Re-Elect the President or CREEP. In the absence of any proof that the President had any knowledge of the break-in and in the face of a weak Democratic candidate, Senator George McGovern, Nixon nevertheless won reelection in a landslide. But by the summer of 1973 with the resignations of top Nixon aides in connection with the scandal and the defection of White House Counsel John Dean who testified at Congressional hearings on the Watergate scandal that he had discussed the cover up of the scandal with the President on numerous occasions, the stage was set for a showdown between Congress and the President.

On June 19, 1973, Congress passed, by a veto proof majority in both houses, the Case-Church Amendment forbidding any further US military involvement in Southeast Asia, effective August 15, 1973. The fate of South Vietnam was now sealed. Less than a month later, the Senate Armed Services Committee opened hearings into the secret bombing of Cambodia that had been ordered by Nixon in 1969. At the hearings Schlesinger revealed for the first time that 3,500 raids had been conducted against NVA positions in Cambodia to protect American troops. The extent of the secret campaign angered many in Congress and calls for the President's impeachment were heard for the first time. On August 15, 1973, in accordance with the Case-Church Amendment, American bombers completed their final wartime mission over Indochina.

To reassert what it saw as its war making powers under the Constitution and to constrain Presidential power to commit American troops to combat, Congress on November 7, 1973, passed the War Powers Act which required the President to obtain Congressional approval within 90 days of sending American troops abroad.

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Of all the services, the Air Force came out of Vietnam much less scarred by the experience than the Army and Navy which suffered severe morale problems and a lack of confidence.¹ This was partly because the Air Force was convinced that had it been properly utilized, it could have ended the war by airpower alone. Since it felt no need to reassess its way of making war, the Air Force focused on continuing the process of force modernization that the war had interrupted.

The Air Force's leadership assessed the growing Soviet conventional and nuclear threat and the operational lessons of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War within the framework of their existing doctrine. Consequently, a new air superiority fighter, improved electronic countermeasures to thwart air defense systems, more and better high technology weapons like laser and electro-optically guided bombs, a more survivable ICBM, and a new bomber to replace the aging B-52 were on the Air Force's wish list. Therefore, "for the Air Force, the early 1970s were less a time of trauma and soul searching than they were of seeking to maintain and upgrade the organization's capacity to play a vital role in the nation's defenses."² Since for the leadership of the Air Force the largest challenge was fighting a nuclear or conventional war as part of NATO, they focused their attention on building a force that could cope with such a major conflict, reasoning that any lesser conflicts could be dealt with adequately by an Air Force prepared for battle in Europe against the Warsaw Pact.

For the Air Force's Security Police force, the end of the war brought some inevitable refocusing away from the air base defense mission and toward resource protection and law enforcement. This refocus actually began in January 1971 with the creation of a working group "to review the Aerospace Security System for determination of its application and effect in today's society."³ The working group reported that the existing security system had evolved from the garrison policeman of the 1940's to the hybrid system of close-in security and air base defense developed in Vietnam. Throughout this evolution, however, the working group found that "there was a neglect of the functions loosely grouped under the term law enforcement."⁴

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Security for VIPs was also a mission. Here a member Ken Greene of the 81st SPS honor guard salutes Queen Elizabeth during her visit to RAF Bentwaters (Security Forces Museum)

The security system in place in the early 1970's focused on protecting high priority resources from an assumed threat of a saboteur attack on the nation's nuclear forces coordinated with an enemy nuclear strike. The working group concluded that this system had "proved effective and conceptually [was] sound," but a new threat had arisen since 1968 as "a violence prone, militant element...surfaced in...society" that attacked symbols of authority with the military a "prime target."⁵ To meet this new threat without decreasing the protection of priority resources the working group concluded that "it has been made painfully clear that we must increase our efforts beyond the priority security areas."⁶

There were several challenges to making this needed adjustment, however. First, while the threat to high priority resources was recognized by Air Force leadership and provided the justification for a fully-manned security force, this new threat was not fully appreciated and because of this the Security Police "will continue to be plagued by the difficulty of justifying our position in the law enforcement or cantonment [*sic*] area protection."⁷ Part of the problem, the working group reported, was the fact that while the security force was protected from draconian personnel cuts by being tied to the combat force, the law enforcement side of the house was part of base operating support (BOS) and was therefore "vulnerable to every arbitrary reduction in force strength that comes along."⁸ For a new resource protection program to work effectively, the Security Police

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needed to sell the concept “that the protection of cantonment [*sic*] area is in effect the first line of defense and guards the approaches to the combat forces on alert.”⁹

Another hurdle to a revamped resource protection program was internal. While the working group advised that their program could work in either the existing split career field or with a single AFSC force, until the ongoing arguments over the organization of the Security Police ceased, “progress on the program is very difficult.”¹⁰ The working group urged that the challenges it identified be dealt with quickly since they “are sorely needed changes to our security system” and the time was “ripe for this evolution” since the Security Police field was “riding the crest of a wave of support for security police activities unprecedented in the history of the Air Force.”¹¹

While the challenges noted by the working group would take time to solve, Colonel Blauw was working to enhance the prestige and effectiveness of the law enforcement career field immediately. On July 1, 1973, the law enforcement branch of the Installations Security Division was formed at HQ USAF with Lt Col Jerry Bullock as its chief. With law enforcement now recognized as the means of meeting the new threat posed by “criminal militant and disruptive elements,” the creation of a law enforcement branch at the headquarters “gives the law enforcement function the recognition it has long deserved.”¹²



A large part of law enforcement was enforcing installation traffic regulations (Security Forces Museum)

The new branch was another step toward the goal of creating a professional police force and it was hoped that the new branch would “enhance the status and prestige of the Air Force Security Police by providing direct liaison with civil police agencies...; improve the overall image of our Air Force police force; and...integrate the security police women into the program.”¹³

And more women were on the way. In August 1973, the first female dog handler graduated from the Department of Security Police Training’s Military Dog Studies Branch and two more women, Airmen Shelia Dugan and Rickie M. Thompson, successfully completed the Patrol Dog Handler’s Course in early 1974.¹⁴ In the last six months of 1973, a total 178 WAF enlisted women graduated from the basic law enforcement course. The department of Security Police training at Lackland reported, “The assimilation of female personnel into the Department of Security Police Training courses has had no significant effect. They have received the same training as male personnel without need of important modification of curricula or training techniques.”¹⁵

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On December 20, 1973, 2Lt Sally Kucera graduated from the Security Police officer's basic course and became only the second Security Police qualified WAF officer in Air Force history. Lieutenant Kucera, (later known as Colonel Ulebacker) had been recruited by the Air Force personnel shop and was in training before Colonel Blauw was even aware she was coming to the career field. Under the WAF organization then existing, after graduation she was assigned to the WAF squadron at Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota, with attachment to the 44th Security Police Group.¹⁶

The assimilation of women into the career field did provide some challenges. One revolved around uniforms. In August 1973, a white version of the standard female felt beret was authorized for female security policewomen to distinguish them and complement the white hats worn by the men, but as Lieutenant Kucera recalled:

...there wasn't...proper gear for us, and there weren't proper uniforms...we had a short sleeve blue shirt...and dark blue pants that fit about like riding breeches. And the shirt wasn't long enough to tuck in the pants and stay when you wore a gun belt with your pouches for your...ammo...it was a number of years before they authorized the women to wear men's fatigues.¹⁷



Lt Sally Kucera (later known as Colonel Ulebacker) front and center with Col Billy Jack Carter and other senior leaders (Col Jerry M. Bullock)

But the primary challenge to integrating women into the career field was changing the attitude of some of the men. Lt Kucera, as an example, had been performing missile convoy commander duty for almost a year when she was told that she could not perform

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that duty since it was a combat duty and women were barred from combat. Fortunately for Lt Kucera and the future of women in the Security Police, she was mentored by senior Security Police NCOs at Ellsworth who saw her as a fellow SP who just happened to be a woman.¹⁸ Nonetheless, women in the career field were treated differently and by early 1975 the 198 women in the field were barred by AFR 125-1 from responding to calls in the male dormitories or from serving in detention facilities even though corrections duty had been opened to them.

Women in the Security Police remained a novelty for some time. Five years after Lieutenant Kucera entered the career field another female SP reported for duty at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico. 2Lt Mary Kay Reeves, newly commissioned from Miami University of Ohio's ROTC program, drove up to the gate and inquired of the gate guard where the law enforcement desk for the 1606th SFG might be located. The troops were well aware that a woman officer was due to join their ranks and even though she had not identified herself, the guard replied, "Well, you must be Lt Reeves."¹⁹ Reeves then had to "run the gauntlet" on the way to the LE desk and "had to walk through a quadrangle of dormitories where all the cops were. And there were people just hanging out the windows looking at me. And I'm walking up and I'm looking at all these people and saying, 'Oh, what have I gotten myself into?'"²⁰

The ascendancy of law enforcement did not mean that preparations for air base defense were neglected. In April 1973, "Gallant Hand 73" brought SPECS personnel from nine TAC bases together as a squadron for the first time. The 175 man squadron under the command of Maj Kenneth Fadal of Holloman AFB, New Mexico, assembled at Lackland's Medina Base for refresher courses in tactics, fortifications, the use of flares, and familiarization with the operation of various M-type vehicles. Early in the morning of April 23, the squadron departed Medina in a convoy of 31 vehicles enroute for the Army base at North Fort Hood, Texas. At Fort Hood, the squadron was deployed to defend the Longhorn Landing Strip from attack by Army Green Beret aggressors. For the next two nights the SPECS squadron beat back probes, small unit attacks, and one mass attack by the aggressors, and ENDEX on the morning of April 25 found "the SPECS forces still in firm control of the area."²¹ Headquarters was pleased with the results of the exercise and concluded that, "The exercise emphatically proved that 175 men, properly trained and equipped, could become a well-organized local ground defense unit in a very short time."²² By January 1974, a five-week long SPECS training course, reduced from its original nine weeks to save money and modeled on Army Ranger training was in place and all Security Police, even those not assigned to SPECS, received some air base defense training.²³

One problem facing the Security Police as it made the transition from war to peace was its lack of field grade officers. This dearth of field graders became particularly acute when Colonel Blauw established a goal of having every Security Police squadron in the Air Force under the command of a field grade officer by the end of 1973.²⁴ This problem would only be solved by the use of rated officers.

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As in the past, peace reduced the Air Force's need for pilots and navigators, but, wanting to keep these highly trained airmen "to meet the increased rated requirements which occur in the first phases of a combat contingency," the Air Force banked them by assigning them to non-rated jobs.²⁵ The program was called the rated supplement, or TOPLINE, program and sought to assign 6,600 pilots and 3,000 navigators to non-rated positions by the end of fiscal year 1973. Seventy-one of these officers were to go to the Security Police.²⁶ Many in the rank and file of the non-rated career fields affected by TOPLINE saw the rated supplement program as evidence of the Air Force's belief that rated officers were superior to non-rated officers and that wearing silver wings, derisively referred to as the "universal management badge" by non-rated personnel, qualified the wearer to do anything.

By late 1973, 33 of the Air Force's 111 Security Police squadrons were commanded by rated supplement officers. Of the 33 lieutenant colonels commanding squadrons, 20 were rated supplement officers while 13 of the 56 majors commanding SP squadrons were TOPLINE officers. Rated supplement officers were less prevalent as chiefs of security police with only five of 43 being rated officers.²⁷ While there was some dissatisfaction among non-rated Security Police officers with TOPLINE because of the perception that these "flyboys" froze "real" security policemen out of command billets, the verdict of the Palace Badge career managers on the rated supplement was generally favorable:

In our opinion rated supplement officers have been an overall asset to the career field. They have not only relieved some of our senior field grade manning problems, but have assumed very responsible and challenging jobs within the career field. In most cases, they have not only accomplished these jobs very satisfactorily, but they have infused into the job new ideas and vitality. It is our general opinion that their integration into our field has been an advantage which we have effectively used and that their entry is not a threat to the careers of our officers nor a threat to the status of our profession.²⁸

While many of its field grade officers might not be career security policemen, the appointment of Col Billy Jack Carter of Tan Son Nhut fame as director of law enforcement and security in December 1973 marked the first time the head of the career field was a career security policeman. Carter started his Air Force service as an aviation cadet in 1943 and served as a B-17 navigator until 1945. After the war, he graduated from the University of Wichita and served with the Wichita Police Department and as an investigator with the Treasury Department until recalled to active duty in 1950. Carter served in numerous Security Police assignments, including two years as Blauw's deputy, before being tapped to replace Blauw,



Col Billy Jack Carter (Air Force photo)

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effective December 1, 1973. During his tenure, Blauw had built upon the favorable reputation the Security Police gained in Southeast Asia to successfully implement changes in recruitment, assignments, and training that resulted in a more qualified, trained, and professional force.

By January 1974, 40,000 men and women were assigned to the Security Police, making it the largest police force in the country.²⁹ That January, the Air Force introduced the tri-deputy organization for its operational wings. Under the tri-deputy system, the wing commander had three deputy commanders, one each for operations (DCO), maintenance (DCM), and resources (DCR). Under this organization, the Security Police were assigned to the combat support group under the deputy commander for resources making it the only operational unit assigned to the combat support group.

By 1974, the recommendations of the 1972 resources protection working group also began to receive some serious attention prompted by increasing SECDEF and JCS concern about terrorist attacks on nuclear weapons storage facilities and nuclear armed aircraft. Terrorism against American military targets had been increasing in the early 1970s. On May 11, 1972, the US Army headquarters in Frankfurt, West Germany, was attacked with a car bomb by the Red Army Faction, resulting in the death of one serviceman and the wounding of thirteen others. Later that month three servicemen were wounded in a Red Army Faction car bomb attack against the Army's Heidelberg, West Germany, headquarters. To counter this rising threat the Air Force set a goal of instituting "practical security measures against the possibility of terrorist attack, sustainable over a programmed period, without inordinate expenditure of men and money."³⁰

To meet this goal some changes to the existing concept of nuclear weapons security would be required. Close-in security of storage facilities and alert facilities would have to be augmented by "an assured capability for detecting an intruder(s) at the perimeter as well as at the storage structure" made up of intrusion detection sensors, more fences and towers, better communications with response forces, changes in perimeter lighting, more firepower for security forces, armored vehicles, bunkers, and fighting positions.³¹ By October, Security Police training de-emphasized combat skills by eliminating courses implemented to address the threat in SEA to focus instead on counterterrorist techniques.³² These changes would be time consuming and expensive, but Security Police leadership was committed to keeping "the impetus we have gained in modifying our security programs to cope with the new terrorist threat. That threat will be with us for a long time."³³

Strategic Air Command was of course the focus of the most attention in the nuclear weapons security area. While SAC's security was generally tight, breaches did occur. In July 1969, SAC was embarrassed by a young boy who managed to gain access to an alert B-52 and spent the better part of a day playing with the controls and a .38 caliber revolver.³⁴ Within days, CINCSAC Gen Bruce K. Holloway appointed a committee on aircraft security headed by Brig Gen Paul N. Bacalis, commander of the

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14th Strategic Aerospace Division at Beale Air Force Base, California, to examine the causes of the breach.

In August the Bacalis committee reported that the failure in security was due to a combination of factors including manpower shortages, long duty hours and poor duty conditions for the security forces, the lack of sensors, and failing to close aircraft hatches.³⁵ Corrective actions were underway when the reality of Middle Eastern terrorism emerged in September 1972 with the killing in Munich, Germany, of Israeli Olympic athletes by Palestinian Al-Fatah terrorists. Closer to home an explosion at Kincheloe AFB and the discovery of a “sabotage device” in a fuel tank at K.I. Sawyer AFB, both in Michigan, caused CINCSAC Gen John C. Meyer to task Brig Gen Woodrow A. Abbott to head a Security Evaluation Committee to take yet another look at SAC security.³⁶ Changes affecting all of DoD began to be implemented in SAC including the “15 in 5” standard that required a round the clock ability to respond to any incident threatening American nuclear forces with 15 men within 5 minutes.³⁷

The “15 in 5” requirement would be implemented by the formation at each WSA of two, four-man fire teams armed with rifles, machine guns, and grenades backed by the remainder of the security force as a ready reserve. These so-called Response Forces would be on constant patrol and in the event of an intrusion alarm would rush to the area, engage the intruders and either eliminate them or maintain contact until the reserve force arrived. Implementation of the response force concept would require an additional 3,600 security policemen which were authorized in January 1977 and would be in place by the end of that year.³⁸

Coincidentally with SAC’s internal review of its security, the importance of air base ground defense was reemphasized in August by the publication of AFR 206-2, *Local Ground Defense of US Air Force Installations*, which reaffirmed the importance of, and for the first time recognized the role of, the Security Police in the “external area” outside the base perimeter. In recognition of this renewed emphasis, all security policemen, but not women, either attended air base ground defense (ABGD) training at Lackland or received that training as part of their home unit training. ABGD training also became a prerequisite for any overseas assignment.³⁹ To facilitate home unit training a new course, Combat Skills/Terrorist Threat Training (CS/TTT), was begun in January 1975 to train the trainers.⁴⁰ In October the chief of staff focused high-level Air Force attention on ABGD training by declaring it “the most important training problem in the Air Force today.”⁴¹

Around the same time a new AFR 125-37, *USAF Resources Protection*, was published. The new regulation increased the emphasis on resource protection by making it a commander responsibility versus a Security Police responsibility. To assist the commander the regulation established the Base Resources Protection Council made up of the base leadership to establish resource protection policy and security requirements. The mission of the Security Police in this new program was to advise the council, monitor alarm systems, and provide armed response if needed.

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In August 1974, the embattled Nixon presidency came to an end. Already badly damaged by the October 1973 resignation of Vice President Spiro T. Agnew under charges for corruption dating to his time as governor of Maryland and under threat of



President Gerald R. Ford (White House photo)

impeachment himself for high crimes and misdemeanors arising from the Watergate scandal, Richard M. Nixon resigned the presidency on August 9. Vice President Gerald R. Ford, plucked from his Congressional seat to replace Agnew, was sworn in as the 38th President of the United States. One of the Democratic controlled Congress' first acts after Ford took office was to begin to renege on Nixon's promise to support South Vietnam by appropriating only \$700 million in aid to the Thieu government, resulting in severe shortfalls for the South Vietnamese military.

In late October a Security Police conference was called to discuss the still controversial issue of the split career field. In its report, the conference addressed some of the major criticisms of the split and revisited the reasons for the decision to split the

career field into security and law enforcement AFSCs.

The major criticism from the beginning was that the split career field resulted in a loss of flexibility in assignments. The conferees, however, noted that “the historical truth is that even under the combined AFSC, personnel were, in fact, specialized as either law enforcement or security specialists.”⁴² This “de facto specialization” resulted in security personnel being tested for promotion on a large number of law enforcement duties that they had never performed which caused a “disproportionate” number of promotions to go to law enforcement personnel.⁴³ Since there was no way to tell from an individual's personnel printout where his experience lay, it also resulted in many law enforcement personnel, particularly mid-level NCOs, being assigned to SEA to air base defense or weapons security duties that they had never performed. These were the primary reasons for the splitting of the career field in 1971.

The conferees also exposed a dirty little secret behind the loss of flexibility objection. “Too often, the arguments for more flexibility in duty assignment at the unit level boiled down to a desire to use law enforcement duties as a ‘carrot’ for exceptional performers in security,” the conference reported. “Conversely, poor performers, overweight individuals, and discipline problems would be relegated to security duties.”⁴⁴ It probably was not a well-kept secret since one officer quickly noticed during his first assignment that, “almost all the troops wanted to be in L[aw] E[nforcement] [and] we had the pick of the troops in LE. If they screwed up in LE they were sent to security. And if they did well in security they were rewarded with an assignment to law enforcement.”⁴⁵

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Those lucky airmen assigned to law enforcement could expect better promotions and less onerous duties which confirmed for the troops their perception that security was not as valued or rewarding as law enforcement. Aggravating the morale problem among security personnel was the fact that when the career field split, the minimum score on the Airman Qualification Test was raised for law enforcement because of the more varied and numerous tasks performed by law enforcement personnel. This had the effect of carrying over into the restructured career field the feeling among security troops that they were second class citizens, compounded now with a belief that they were not considered as bright as their comrades in law enforcement.



But things were changing, the committee, noted. With the advent of more specialized requirements in each field, law enforcement and security were becoming more specialized. Law enforcement personnel were required to be familiar with crime scene protection, confrontation management, community relations, investigations, and the tightening laws on interrogations, searches, and arrests. Security forces, on the other hand, were transforming from static guards to operators of sophisticated electronic security equipment and active armed responders to a variety of threats. These changes offered a security specialist “more demanding and rewarding duty while at the same time removing him from the harsh weather exposure which has traditionally plagued security duties.”⁴⁶

Morale among the security side of the house was no longer a problem, the conferees confidently declared, and pointed to the increased retention rate among security first termers and the fact that 70 percent of the enlistees in security had specifically volunteered for that duty.

Inputs from the MAJCOM Directors of Security Police (DSP) on the issue were invited and considered by the conferees and these officers were not unanimous in their opinions. In an August 21, 1974, letter attached to the conference report, Col William D. Myers, the SAC Director of Security Police, wrote: “As the largest single user of Security Police resources we feel that the size of the command survey [9,427] and its overwhelming call for a single AFSC is highly significant. We feel that the survey results are indicative of the desires of security policemen of all ranks in every command. To this end, we again urge strongly that the career field be restructured to reflect a single AFSC with shredouts appropriate to our needs.” Representing the opposite view was Air Training Command whose DSP, Col Hugh R. Shannon, informed IGS by letter on August 9, 1974, that, “This directorate strongly opposes the reinstatement of a single AFSC for Security Policemen and are amazed and dismayed that serious consideration is being afforded such a proposal.”

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The conference found that, “The basic problems causing the discontent within the security police were...managerial and not structural,” so despite Strategic Air Command’s objections, ATC’s view prevailed and the conference recommended that the career field remain split, but that the AFSC for corrections be deleted and a special duty identifier (SDI) be used instead.⁴⁷

On December 13, 1974, the war in Vietnam again made the news as North Vietnam violated the Paris peace treaty and tested American resolve by attacking Phuoc Long Province in South Vietnam. In compliance with the Congressional ban on all US military activity in Southeast Asia, President Ford responded with diplomatic protests but no military force. Emboldened by the lack of an American military response, North Vietnam's leaders met in Hanoi to form a plan for final victory in South Vietnam.

The new year of 1975 opened for the Security Police with an incident at Minot AFB, North Dakota, that showed both that the rosy picture painted of security force contentment by the career field review conference was not entirely accurate and that the Security Police still had a race relations problem to deal with.

On January 14, three African-American missile security specialists failed to report for duty. Two days later, 25 black airmen barricaded themselves inside the base dining hall, but violence was avoided when the installation commander agreed to meet with them. They had many complaints.

Some of their complaints involved Minot in general. The black airmen felt trapped in Minot in a community they saw as hostile with insufficient housing and recreation opportunities open to blacks. Most of their complaints, however, revolved around being security specialists. They lived in old, often decrepit dormitories, their vehicles were old and often unheated, and they received little cooperation from other units on base in performing their duties. But mostly they disliked and resented their brethren in law enforcement. As blacks they complained that law enforcement personnel were brutal and even used dogs on them. As security specialists they believed that they were made to see themselves as inferior to law enforcement specialists who had nicer uniforms, more training, and generally better duty conditions.

Although written off as a breakdown of discipline in the Security Police group, the incident highlighted complaints that were not uncommon and made it clear that the improved morale of security specialists reported by the career field review conference was not universal.⁴⁸ After the Minot incident, however, conditions would continue to improve for both blacks in the Air Force and for security specialists.

One response to the Minot and Travis racial incidents was the creation of Tactical Neutralization Teams (TNT). TNTs were conceived as small, specialized units to support riot control formations and would be deployed to “capture mob leaders and protect the riot control formation from gun fire.”⁴⁹ Their use was included in a revision to AFR 125-12, *Response to Disorders*.⁵⁰ The first TNT class graduated from the Security Police Academy training program in April 1977 under the new name of Emergency Services

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Team (EST), a change done so as not to offend civilian sensibilities with such a militant name and to deceive opponents into believing that their mission was to restore essential base services rather than neutralize them.⁵¹

After the shock of Minot, the Security Police embarked on a year of changes, challenges, and death. The first of many changes came on March 17 when Colonel Carter was replaced as director of Security Police by Maj Gen (select) Thomas M. Sadler.⁵² With Sadler's appointment the "Top Cop" was a general officer for the first time since 1962, but as Sadler was a career aviator, once again the head of the Security Police was an officer who had never been a security policeman. The Air Force inspector general, Lt Gen Donald G. Nunn, undoubtedly expressed the opinion of many of the Security Police's officer corps when he announced, "I'm only sorry that Colonel Billy Jack Carter couldn't have been given a two-step promotion and taken over as your first two-star head cop. A more professional officer and competent guy couldn't be found."⁵³ Gen Nunn also predicted that even though Sadler was from the operational side of the house, "His assignment represents an important milestone in terms of a career progression step for all security police officers...it is clear that the door has swung open and that professional security police officers will soon be competing strongly in the general officer arena. That is not only inevitable, in my judgment, but desirable, and I personally look forward to the day when it is a reality."⁵⁴



Maj Gen Thomas M. Sadler (Air Force photo)

Sadler, a native of Canton, Ohio, enlisted in the Army Air Forces in 1943 and flew 35 combat missions as a B-17 gunner. After his discharge in December 1945 he attended the University of Alabama until 1948 when he rejoined the Air Force as an aviation cadet. A transport pilot, Sadler flew 300 combat missions during the Korean War and served as a forward air controller in Vietnam. When named Security Police director he was serving as commander of the 437th Military Airlift Wing at Charleston AFB, South Carolina.

Sadler was surprised by his selection to head the Security Police, but was told by the Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen David C. Jones, that he "didn't feel like the security forces were receiving the attention they should have from the rest of the people in the Air Force. That our air police at that time were being...looked on as well, they are there but they are not there. An air policeman rarely had priority as far as support was concerned."⁵⁵

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Jones wanted Sadler to change this situation, and to give him the authority to do so he implemented an organizational change that had long been sought as the Security Police directorate was detached from the inspector general's organization and elevated to the Special Staff of the Air Force Chief of Staff.⁵⁶ As part of this change, the director of Security Police became the Chief of Security Police (CSP). For the Chief of Staff, the realignment meant he had direct access to his "top cop" and more visibility into law enforcement and security issues. For the CSP it meant a "seat at the table" along with the 16 other senior staff members, affording him an opportunity for direct input into decisions affecting the career field. For the career field the change was recognition of its importance to the Air Force as its "best defense against rising crime rates and terrorist attacks against [its] more sensitive weapons systems."⁵⁷ As the headquarters moved out from under the IG it also physically relocated from the Forrestal Building on Washington's Independence Avenue to the Maisey Building at Bolling AFB.



Gen David C. Jones (Air Force photo)

Sadler would need all of his new influence because he had taken over a force in crisis. "[W]e didn't have enough supplies," Sadler recalled. "The police were using hand-me-down equipment.... Had beat-up old pickup trucks. They were ...low on the totem pole. Short three hundred and something second lieutenants. We hadn't had a senior NCO promotion in close to eight years. Staff sergeants coming up on their twentieth year in the service...Retiring as staff sergeants."⁵⁸ His challenge was changing the way things had been to the way they should be.

Sadler was not shy about shaking things up to better the lot of his cops. The night he drove onto Bolling AFB to take up his new duties, he noticed the gate guard was clad in a thin windbreaker in the chill March air. When questioned, the guard told the General this was the heaviest jacket he was issued. Sadler immediately phoned the base commander and the SP flight commander. "Jackets," Sadler told them. "We don't have them... You will get them" and they did.⁵⁹

Sadler would preside over many changes in the career field all with the goal of making things as they should be. One of the first changes was the replacement of the white hat with the blue beret in March 1975. Although approved during Carter's tenure, the beret was one of several efforts to improve both the image and the morale for the Security Police implemented or initiated by Sadler. The berets were dark blue with an enameled metal MAJCOM crest and were soon complemented by a short Air Force blue

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jacket designed especially for the Security Police. At the same time the khaki shade 1505 uniforms were replaced by blue trousers and light blue shirts.



Head gear in transition: Two law enforcement personnel practice entry techniques; one in a beret, the other in white hat cover. (Security Forces Museum)

By year's end Gen Jones also approved a Security Police qualification badge. Originally suggested by a security policeman at Patrick AFB, Florida, in the mid-1960's, the badge was designed by the Army Institute of Heraldry in 1971 and featured the Air Force eagle surrounded by a sunburst and wreath. The badge came in three classes: basic (two years SP service); senior (7 years); and master (15 years). The senior classification was indicated by the addition of a star surmounting the sunburst and that of master by a star surrounded by a wreath.⁶⁰

Sadler's goal of improving the image of the Security Police was advanced by the new, distinctive berets and jackets, but he also wanted to change public attitudes toward the security policeman or woman in the field and several programs were instituted to make the police less threatening and more liked by the personnel and families working and living on the Air Force's bases. In March 1974, the Air Force instituted the Crime Stop and Friendliest People on Base campaigns and in 1975, Sadler took things one step further and launched the Police Are Lovable or PAL program. The goal of PAL was to portray a softer image of the Security Police and, in Sadler's words, "to constantly remind ourselves of how we seem to others—the perceived notion."⁶¹ While perhaps a worthwhile effort, the premise of the PAL program and its somewhat juvenile, blue beret-wearing yellow "Smiley Face" logo did not go over well with some senior officers and they tended to give only lip service to the program. Sadler noticed this and cautioned the field that programs to change the perception people had of the police "will only be as good as the interest and sincerity of those charged with their implementation."⁶² The self-image of the Security Police was definitely helped by the decision in June 1975 to stop the practice of issuing SP shields at the beginning of a shift and retrieving them at the end. From now on each shield was permanently issued to its wearer and was worn at all times when in uniform.

Sadler even commented on the selection of gate guards at bases as part of his focus on the Security Police image. Sadler's point was that little attention was paid to the gate guard unless something was wrong and then he or she became the focus of attention. In addition to performing an important security function, the gate guards were the face of the base and "the first and oftentimes the most indelible impression that the general public has regarding the military is from the image presented by the gate guard."⁶³

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Because of this, Sadler advised squadron commanders to select for this duty only personnel who met high standards of “courtesy, appearance” and exhibited an “ability to follow standard procedures.”⁶⁴

The start of General Sadler’s tenure coincided with the end of the Republic of Vietnam. Since the United States had made it clear that the fate of its former ally was no longer a concern, in March the North Vietnamese launched an offensive with the goal of conquering South Vietnam. North Vietnamese Gen Van Tien Dung commanded around 200,000 troops that infiltrated into the south in violation of the Paris peace agreement. His first objective was Ban Me Thuot, a city in the Central Highlands and the linchpin of South Vietnam’s defenses. If the city fell, Dung could cut the country in half. On March 10, he attacked with three divisions supported by tanks and although the two reinforced regiments of the ARVN 23rd Division fought well, Ban Me Thuot fell two days later.

South Vietnamese President Thieu panicked and ordered the evacuation of his troops in the Central Highlands and they plunged into the stream of refugees heading south along Route 7B. As the throng of refugees and soldiers took to the highway packed in buses, trucks, tanks, and civilian vehicles the NVA 320th Division kept up constant attacks, killing an estimated 40,000 civilians and ARVN soldiers. Renegade ARVN troops in search of loot added to the slaughter by firing on the refugees. Thieu’s ill-advised withdrawal resulted in the loss of six provinces, two ARVN divisions, and more than a billion dollars in supplies and equipment. With the Central Highlands captured, Dung turned north and occupied Pleiku and Kontum on March 18.

Thieu was still convinced that the United States would come to the rescue and decided that if he could hold certain coastal cities, including Da Nang, as well as Saigon, it would give the Americans time to bring their forces to bear and negotiate a settlement between North and South. He would hold out and wait for the time “when the B-52s would return.”⁶⁵

By March 24, Hue had been captured and almost two million refugees were surrounded in Da Nang. The city fell on March 29 after only some 50,000 of the refugees escaped. Qui Nhon fell on March 31 followed by Nha Trang and Cam Ranh on April 3. The speed of South Vietnam’s collapse surprised even the North Vietnamese and Gen Dung set a goal of conquering the South by Ho Chi Minh’s birthday on May 19. Dubbed the “Ho Chi Minh Campaign,” Dung’s slogan for the final offensive was “Lightning speed, daring, and more daring.”⁶⁶

By early April, Dung’s forces were shelling Bien Hoa and on April 9 a 15-day battle erupted around Xuan Loc, 37 miles northeast of Saigon. On April 12, the United States evacuated 276 Americans from Phnom Penh, Cambodia, in yet another sign that the Americans had finished with Southeast Asia. Thieu fantastically clung to the hope of American intervention until April 21 when he resigned in favor of the aged Tran Van Huong who quickly ceded power to Gen Duong Van Minh. Known as “Big Minh,” the general had been behind the 1963 assassination of then-President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother. On April 23 Xuan Loc fell, opening the way to Saigon, and President Ford in a

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speech at Tulane University declared that the war in Vietnam “is finished as far as America is concerned.”⁶⁷

US Ambassador Graham A. Martin was lobbying Washington for assistance for the South Vietnamese and therefore delayed ordering any evacuation of American citizens and South Vietnamese who had assisted the Americans. Nevertheless, an informal evacuation was underway by early April. On April 4, using giant C-5 “Galaxy” transports, “Operation Babylift” began flying Vietnamese orphans out of Tan Son Nhut. Disaster struck on the first day when an explosive decompression of a C-5 flown by Capt Dennis Traynor blew out an aft cargo door severing the control cables to the tail surfaces. Traynor, using only the engines and the ailerons for control, fought to bring the crippled Goliath to within five miles of TSN where he made a controlled crash, which despite his heroic efforts, killed 206 of the 382 souls aboard. In spite of this tragedy, “Babylift” went on and by the time it concluded on April 14 approximately 2,600 children had been rescued.

On April 5, the 13th Air Force commander decided to put Security Police from Clark AFB’s 3rd SPS aboard future evacuation flights. Thereafter, two fully armed SPs rode shotgun on each flight and five more flew into TSN on the first flight of the day and out on the last to comply with the congressional prohibition against stationing American combat forces in South Vietnam.⁶⁸ By April 21, the flights had become so frequent that there was no first or last flight since operations continued around the clock and 36 Security Police were sent to Tan Son Nhut in temporary duty status to provide security.

The SPs, along with some Marine guards from the Defense Attaché Office (DAO), worked 12-, 16-, or sometimes even 18-hour shifts providing security screening and preventing saboteurs or stowaways from boarding the aircraft.⁶⁹ In an effort to avoid the appearance that combat troops were being dispatched to Vietnam even temporarily, the SPs had been sent in without weapons and had to borrow weapons from the Marines. By April 29, TSN was under fire by NVA artillery and rockets and even renegade VNAF pilots. Ambassador Martin visited the base that day and, convinced that it was no longer safe for fixed wing aircraft, initiated Operation Frequent Wind which shifted the evacuation to the embassy and the DAO Compound at TSN, using helicopters.

As the last of the evacuation aircraft departed early on April 30 and North Vietnamese rockets pounded the base, the SPs herded the remaining evacuees under the concrete abutments supporting the abandoned base swimming pool. By 0800 all the refugees were gathered under this make shift shelter and the 30 SPs assisted with the evacuation of the remaining government employees and embassy personnel.

At the DAO compound another 400 people awaited evacuation and 1Lt Richard Coleman and nine SPs were dispatched to assist. At the compound the SPs were involved in a firefight with desperate ARVN paratroopers who tried to force their way into the compound to be evacuated. In one of the last American combat actions in the war, SPs killed a sniper who was hampering the evacuation. At 1830 hours the last of the evacuees at the compound along with Lieutenant Coleman and his detachment boarded

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an Air Force CH-53 helicopter and were flown to the USS *Midway*. At the height of the evacuation effort, 320 security policemen were involved in Vietnam and on the receiving



North Vietnamese Army troops capture Tan Son Nhut, April 30, 1975 (www.svnaf.net)

end of the refugee flow at Andersen AFB, Guam, where an approximately 75,000 refugees were processed.⁷⁰

At 0458 hours on April 30, Ambassador Martin boarded a CH-46 helicopter at the embassy and flew out to the Navy ships waiting offshore. At 0753 the last helicopter to leave Saigon took off with the embassy MSGs aboard. Hundreds of South Vietnamese who had been promised evacuation were simply abandoned. Later that day a North Vietnamese tank burst through the gates of the South Vietnamese Presidential Palace and at 3:30 that afternoon President Minh, now a prisoner, broadcast a two-sentence surrender message on the radio. South Vietnam was erased from the map of the world and the conduct of its one-time ally in its final hours made a mockery of Nixon's plea, "Let historians not record that when America was the most powerful nation in the world we passed on the other side of the road and allowed the last hopes for peace and freedom of millions of people to be suffocated by the forces of totalitarianism."⁷¹

As if in compliance with President Eisenhower's often maligned Domino Theory, which predicted that the fall of one Southeast Asian country to Communism would result

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SS *Mayaguez* (Navy photo)

in the fall of others like a line of dominos, that April another Communist movement, Cambodia's brutal Khmer Rouge, triumphed in Southeast Asia. On May 12, the new Khmer Rouge government flexed its muscles and seized the US merchant ship SS *Mayaguez* as it steamed in international waters off of Cambodia. The Cambodians alleged the ship was a US spy ship gathering intelligence in waters claimed by Cambodia and towed the *Mayaguez* to an anchorage near Kho Tang Island 40 miles off of the Cambodian mainland and imprisoned the 39 civilian crew members.

Informed of the ship's seizure, President Ford was determined both to avoid another *Pueblo* situation and, so soon after the abandonment of South Vietnam, show any further American weakness in the region. He would give diplomacy a try, but he immediately ordered plans drawn up to recapture the ship if necessary. Ford asked the Chinese to intercede, but when their efforts failed to secure the release of ship and crew, Ford ordered the military to find and recapture the ship.

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The President wanted the operation to proceed quickly and since they were facing a tight timetable, commanders in the Pacific sought out the most readily available troops. Already on standby in Thailand were Air Force Security Police “Eagle Pull” units ready to go into the Phnom Penh airport to provide air base ground defense during the evacuation of American personnel from Cambodia. On the afternoon of May 13, 13th Air Force headquarters asked Security Police units at the Thai bases how many “combat assault” Security Police could be made available.⁷² At 1800 hours 13th Air Force directed the 56th SPS at Nakhon Phanom RTAFB (NKP) to place a 53-man team on standby as well as 200 SP from the four other squadrons in Thailand. The 388th SPS at Korat also received a tasking, but strangely, 13th Air Force had requested a Commando Above Alpha law enforcement team armed only with .38 caliber revolvers instead of the more heavily armed Commando Above Bravo security team.⁷³ Evidently the plan was to have these lightly armed, untrained SPs, along with others from U-Tapao RTAFB, rappel from helicopters onto the deck of the ship and recapture it while Marines enroute from Okinawa would assault Cambodian forces on Kho Tang Island. When the commander of the 388th, Maj Frank Martin, questioned the tasking of a law enforcement team for a combat mission he was basically told to shut up and sit down by 13th Air Force.⁷⁴ An Air Force spokesman later confirmed that “there was some consideration given to using air force [*sic*] security police to retake the ship because nobody else was available.”⁷⁵

At 2000 hours PACAF issued the deployment order and the NKP SPs boarded CH-53 “Super Jolly Green Giant” helicopters belonging to the 21st Special Operations Squadron for the flight to the staging area at U-Tapao. At 2030 hours the first helicopter, call sign Knife 01-3, took off with 23 personnel on board including 18 SPs. Approximately an hour and a half later, Knife 01-3 crashed 37 miles west of NKP with the loss of all on board. The cause of the crash was later determined to be a missing sleeve in an overhauled main rotor blade.⁷⁶

The loss of part of the Security Police assault force and the arrival at U-Tapao of a battalion-sized Marine assault force from Okinawa caused a change in plans and the SPs were cut from the mission entirely. According to a Bangkok newspaper the Security Police were “upset about the crash and the marines [*sic*] preempting their part in the mission. In fact, disagreements became almost violent.”⁷⁷



56th SPS personnel aboard Knife 01-3 (Air Force photo)

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The Marines, carried by helicopters from the 21st SOS and supported by Air Force close air support, assaulted Kho Tang Island, where the *Mayaguez* crew was thought to be imprisoned, on the morning of May 15. Expecting only light resistance, the Marines were surprised to find almost 200 heavily armed Khmer Rouge who shot down three helicopters and damaged two others in the assault force. Meanwhile, in a show of American resolve Navy jets from the aircraft carrier *Coral Sea* struck targets on the Cambodian mainland.

As the Marines battled Cambodian forces on the island, the destroyer *Harold E. Holt* landed a force of Marines, sailors, Air Force explosive ordnance disposal experts, and six volunteer civilian Military Sealift Command sailors to operate the ship, aboard the *Mayaguez*.⁷⁸ Finding no one on board, the ship was quickly secured, the American flag raised, and by 10:45 a.m. the *Mayaguez* was under tow by the *Holt* as the civilian volunteers worked to raise steam.

Meanwhile, off of Kho Tang, a fishing boat flying a white flag cautiously approached the destroyer USS *Wilson*. On board the boat was the crew of the *Mayaguez* just released by their Cambodian captors. By noon they were back aboard the freighter.

With both of the operation's objectives achieved, the Marines on Kho Tang were ordered to withdraw. When the Cambodians saw that the Marines were withdrawing, they attacked and the evacuation was conducted under intense fire. The last Marines were not taken off of Kho Tang Island until that evening.⁷⁹ Eighteen marines and airmen were killed and another 50 were wounded in the battle of Kho Tang Island.

Since the deaths of the 18 security policemen occurred early in the operation, and since the crash had, according to an unidentified Air Force spokesman, only a "tenuous connection" to the *Mayaguez* operation, the 18 dead security policemen were long listed as having died in a training accident although all were awarded posthumous Bronze Stars with a "V" for Valor.⁸⁰ One can only speculate on what would have been the result if these men, organized primarily for law enforcement, had been actually used in assaulting what was believed to be a heavily defended ship from the air. Certainly, as one student of the affair said, "US military forces then, and now, are specialized to do what they do best...To use them otherwise is unwise."⁸¹ Major Martin was convinced that had his untrained, lightly armed SPs been used to assault the *Mayaguez* "it would not have been a pretty sight..."⁸²

The Chief of Staff had already focused attention on the challenges of training a combat ready ABGD force and the *Mayaguez* incident emphasized that mobility and readiness to deploy were key to meeting worldwide threats to American interests, so in the fall of 1975 efforts were made to increase the output of Lackland's ABGD training course. An organizational change in July had transformed the Directorate of Security Police Training at Lackland into the Security Police Academy and now the ATC DCS for Technical Training asked the Air Force Military Training Center (AFMTC) at Lackland to evaluate its capability to support increased numbers of students in the academy's security specialist and ABGD training programs.

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AFMTC commander Maj Gen John P. Flynn replied that, “Without additional resources, the increased program will require a degree of extra effort which is not wise to sustain for a long time.”⁸³ Obtaining additional instructors was only one of the resource problems mentioned by AFMTC—classroom facilities at Camp Bullis would have to be obtained and over \$690,000 in additional funding would be required for supplies. “In short,” General Flynn concluded, “Lackland can do it but we need support.”⁸⁴

The addition of the new Combat Skills/Terrorist Threat Training (CS/TTT) course also taxed the facilities at Camp Bullis. The facilities at Bullis were meant to be temporary and the billeting and messing arrangements were not up to ATC standards. More importantly, “Many of the training areas have POL storage, runways and ammunition dumps simulated by signs or other markers” which resulted in “a decided lack of realism...” for ABGD training.⁸⁵ The use of these mock airfields also skewed terrorist threat training toward traditional air base defense “which implies that anti-terrorist training is principally oriented toward air commando/search and destroy conditions reminiscent of Southeast Asia...our view is that the training should be in response to terrorists and dissidents seizing buildings, weapons and hostages on largely urbanized complexes. Camp Bullis does not condition trainees for this situation.”⁸⁶

Improving the Bullis facilities would require a large expenditure and before ATC pursued this, the command wanted the Air Force to determine whether other locations with the proper facilities might not serve the purpose better. In regards to antiterrorist training, ATC felt that interservice training at an Army or Marine Corps installation might be a good option to pursue.⁸⁷

Since the Army owned and used Camp Bullis for its own tactical training, it also



Air Base Defense flight preparing to move out on maneuvers at Camp Bullis in 1984. This end-of-course drill gave students the opportunity to apply learned combat skills. (Security Forces Museum)

had an interest in improving the realism of the training facility. After lengthy discussions between the two services, it was agreed to establish realistic facilities to enhance ABGD training. The new facility, known as Victor Base, was available for use in October 1976

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and from then until 1987 the Security Police would be the largest single user of Camp Bullis.⁸⁸

By April 1976, ABGD training was replaced by the combat skills/terrorist threat training (CS/TTT) program. CS/TTT was more geared toward small unit tactics, search and clear operations, and other counterterrorist techniques instead of ABGD's bare base defense focus. In May 1976, a Base Defense Conference convened in Washington decided that because of the shift in focus from base defense to antiterrorism, the existing Base Defense Flights would be replaced by response elements and perimeter elements.⁸⁹



Gen Sadler visits the troops (Col Jerry M. Bullock)

When General Sadler took the reins as CSP, he announced that his goals were to improve the working environment, obtain better equipment, ensure quality training, and foster “the impeccable image we wish to achieve for all who wear the badge.”⁹⁰ One way to achieve a better working environment, particularly for the security side of the house, was to eliminate as many of the dull, uncomfortable sentry posts as possible by replacing men with electronic sensors. A system of integrated electronic sensors had proved itself during the “SAFE” programs initiated in 1972 and HQ USAF/SP confidently reported to the field, “There is no longer any doubt in our minds that sensors can do a better job of detecting than men.”⁹¹ By expanding the use of sensors, headquarters promised, “we can relieve our sentries from exposure to the cold, heat, rain, and boredom which are problems in many of our detection posts.”⁹² So confident was the leadership that these changes would be warmly welcomed by the “Ramp Rats” that they declared, “We hear your applause back in Washington.”⁹³

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The life of a close boundary sentry had not improved over the years and life on the flight line was much the same as it had been for 20 years. Amn Mike Hazen, who had been trained at Lackland in law enforcement, arrived at K. I. Sawyer AFB, Michigan, in 1973 and was put out on the KC-135 tanker ramp as a sentry, equipped with an M-16, orders to “make sure no bad people got to the plane,” and an old dial telephone in an ammo can with instructions to call if he needed anything.⁹⁴ The only problem was that no one ever showed him where to plug in the telephone. The shifts were twelve hours long, but seemed longer since the only supervision or communication was often with a passing blue pickup truck. Hazen later swore that his “first supervisor [in the Air Force] was a blue truck.”⁹⁵ “The blue truck would drive by twice a shift,” Hazen observed, “and you’d never know who was inside and they’d roll the window a couple of inches [and] yell out, “You need anything?”⁹⁶ The “blue truck” also fed Airman Hazen. On one of its drive-bys a hand would hold out a box lunch—a “bag nasty”—that was so “raped and pillaged before they gave them to the lowest ranking airmen” that it was a year before Hazen found out that there was supposed to be more in the box than a “slimy meat sandwich.”⁹⁷

Even though the sensors were coming, it would not happen overnight and until then Hazen and his fellow “Ramp Rats” would stand their posts in heat, cold, rain, and snow—and leave their career field in droves. In an effort to stem this exodus, in May 1975, SAC began a test program at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, to replace close-in sentries with more frequent vehicle patrols. Unfortunately for the sentries, a more comprehensive test at Castle AFB, California, begun in June 1976 convinced SAC that foot patrols were better and, except around KC-135 tankers, the sentries continued on post. SAC did, however, institute a program that rotated sentries between foot patrol, vehicle patrol, and guard shelters every 30 minutes in extreme weather conditions. In another effort to make life more bearable for the long suffering “Ramp Rats,” Sadler requested DoD to rescind the prohibition against guards at nuclear sites from listening to private radios and in February 1976 DoD agreed with certain exceptions.

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90th Missile Security Squadron, F. E. Warren AFB, Wyoming, and the tools of their trade (Security Forces Museum)

Technology was not infallible and when it broke men had to fill the breach. At SAC Minuteman bases, these breaches were filled by Camper Alert Teams or CATs. SAC's Minuteman missile wings were concentrated at six bases with each wing controlling 150 to 200 ICBMs located at remote launch facilities sometimes as far as 160 miles from the base. Each of these launch facilities was protected by electronic sensors and physical barriers and when the sensors failed, a two-man Security Police CAT was dispatched from the base to the site to provide security until the sensors could be repaired.

The CAT vehicle was similar to those seen on any weekend in parks and campgrounds nationwide—a camper mounted on a pickup. The two team members lived on-site in the camper for anywhere from two to three days and were equipped with weapons, ammo, “foil pack” TV-type dinners, water, and, in winter, a survival kit. CATs covered a lot of miles; in one quarter the CATs of the 321st SPG at Grand Forks were

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dispatched 80 times, driving 107,636 miles and using 13,910 gallons of gasoline.⁹⁸ Once on site, the life of a CAT member was little better than one of the “Ramp Rats.” While one slept or relaxed, the other patrolled the launch facility in whatever weather nature came up with. It was “a lonely and monotonous job...” one observer noted with a sense of irony, which “never has been and never will be a picnic.”⁹⁹

Sadler’s position on the special staff gave him the influence past directors had lacked and he used this power to obtain funding for some long overdue equipment. In 1976 the first “real” police cars were ordered to replace the often worn out base taxis and beat up pickup trucks assigned to the Security Police. Painted blue and white, these sedans had heavy duty suspensions and were specially outfitted for law enforcement operations. The Air Force was authorized to purchase 320 of these new patrol cars per year for the next three years.

To keep abreast of new commercially available police equipment and test it for SP use, a specialized activity, the Security Police Equipment Monitoring Activity or SPEMA, was set up at Air Force Logistics Command in October 1975.¹⁰⁰ In its first year of existence, SPEMA handled the procurement of 1,210 M-60 machine guns and 1,725 M-203 grenade launchers for use in guarding nuclear WSAs, an inkless fingerprint system, telescopic sights for M-16 rifles, and various electronic sensing devices for testing.¹⁰¹

In August 1976, the Air Force also authorized the Security Police to design and procure a new armored vehicle to replace the XM-706. The design effort began on December 16, 1977, and resulted in the “Peacekeeper,” a lightly armored, wheeled vehicle designed to provide protection from small arms fire for convoy escorts and SATs, which was to be delivered to units in early 1980.¹⁰²

The computer age was just beginning in 1975 and the Security Police were at the forefront of efforts to use the power of the computer to enhance efficiency. In June work began on designing a computer system to compile base crime statistics and to better connect Air Force law enforcement with the National Crime Information Center (NCIC). Called the Air Force Law Enforcement Terminal System (AFLETS) it was tested at five bases during Project BASE-TOPS and after the test an initial version of the system was submitted for Air Staff approval in November.¹⁰³ At the same time, another computerized system, the Security Police Automated Management System or SPAMS, was also proposed. SPAMS was designed to automate the supply function, computerize records and forms, and facilitate communication between USAF/SP and the squadrons in the field.¹⁰⁴

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Both AFLETS and SPAMS suffered teething problems, many of which were due to fiscal constraints and with the difficulty of keeping up with rapidly improving computer technology, so it would be several years before each was ready to be fielded Air Force-wide. But once the first version of SPAMS came on line in July 1976 it had an



Wang word processor, 1979 (Col Jerry M. Bullock)

unintended effect. As each new and improved version of the system came online it was difficult or impossible to retrieve records from the earlier systems so the historical record of the Security Police began to disappear. As one historian of the career field observed, “Here, sad to say, began the loss of historical documentation...; what made the making of records easier, made their ultimate loss just as easy.”¹⁰⁵

As the responsibilities of the Security Police increased, its manpower could not keep up and maintaining sufficient numbers of personnel was another challenge faced by Sadler. One way to deal with the “man” power problem was to increase the use of “woman” power and late in 1975 Sadler requested Chief of Staff Gen David C. Jones to authorize a test program to bring women into the security field. While he chose to ponder this request further, Jones did authorize the abolition of the 15 percent ceiling on the reenlistment of first termers so that now any first term enlistee who desired to reenlist in the Security Police could do so.¹⁰⁶

Jones also approved increasing Security Police manning by 250 slots and authorized the “directed return” of 100 staff sergeants who had cross-trained to another AFSC to be involuntarily transferred back to the Security Police career field. Later another 25 to 35 Air National Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserve (AFRES) senior enlisted Security Policemen were authorized to volunteer for active duty. With the

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additional personnel came additional promotion quotas—100 to Staff Sergeant and a 50 percent increase in the number of Senior Master Sergeant and Chief Master Sergeant promotion opportunities.¹⁰⁷

Two hundred additional personnel authorizations had been added as a result of Colonel Carter's earlier approval to implement the shift supervisor or shift commander program beginning in January 1975. This program was designed to give young Security Police officers some leadership and management experience early in their careers, but it met unexpected criticism from senior NCOs who perceived it as a way to hide inexperienced rated officers while adding another layer of needless bureaucracy.¹⁰⁸

The shortages of active duty manpower also caused more attention to be paid to the equipment and training of ANG and AFRES Security Police units. The post-Vietnam animosity toward the military which held down active duty enlistments caused the Air Force to start looking at the long ignored "weekend warriors" as valuable members of the Air Force family rather than poor relations. Over time this "Total Force" concept would see better training and equipment and more responsibilities given to the ANG and AFRES in all areas, setting the stage for the almost total integration of active, Guard, and Reserve forces that would occur in the 1990's.

The AFOSI was suffering from manpower shortages that resulted in OSI making the final decision to share the investigative role, particularly in anti-drug operations, with the Security Police. In December a revised AFR 125-31 was published that allowed base commanders to use either Security Police or OSI investigators. For the first time, SP investigators were authorized to wear civilian clothes and carry concealed weapons as the OSI had long done.

By August 1975, changes were also being implemented in the Air Force corrections program. A recently concluded study of the 3320th Retraining Group at Lowry AFB, Colorado, found that inadequate screening of retrainees had resulted in many unsuitable candidates being sent to the group; that the disciplinary rates at the 3320th exceeded those of other Lowry units; and that the return to duty rates from the program had plummeted to 33 percent since 1970.¹⁰⁹ Based in part on these statistics, the study concluded that the 3320th was no longer cost effective and recommended its inactivation. If it were not inactivated, then the report concluded, serious changes were required.

The conclusions and recommendations of the study were a shock to the Corrections Division in the Maisey Building headquarters, but the Air Force was not yet willing to give up on the 3320th, so on August 5, 1975, the first phase of a two-phase program of changes began. The first phase implemented tougher screening policies for candidates for rehabilitation to ensure that only those suitable for rehabilitation were assigned to the 3320th. In December, the second phase reorganized the 3320th, implemented individualized retraining programs, and physically relocated the Special Training Squadron into the 3320th complex. These changes saved over \$2 million per year in operating costs. In June 1976, the 3320th Retraining Group was redesignated the

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3320th Corrections and Rehabilitation Group and in November of that year the drug abuse rehabilitation program at Lowry was closed, base stockades were closed and replaced by regional confinement facilities, and the on-base rehabilitation program was expanded and became a unit, as opposed to a Security Police, responsibility. These changes reduced the number of retrainees sent to the 3320th and as the population stabilized at around 200, the group was redesignated as a squadron effective March 1, 1977.¹¹⁰

The pace of change continued into the bicentennial year of 1976. In that year, *Time* magazine reflected what would be the greatest change to Security Police when it recognized twelve Women of the Year. Additionally, this year was “The Year of the Woman” in Air Force Security Police. In June, women were no longer identified as WAFs and by the end of the year, 1,279 enlisted women would become members of the Security Police force. While still only representing 3.77 percent of the 33,910 total Security Police force, the number of women had increased six fold since early 1975.¹¹¹

Women had made great strides in the Security Police, having been accepted into law enforcement, confinement and corrections, and as dog handlers. By late 1975 the first all-female MWD exhibition team had been formed by the 3rd SPS at Clark AFB, Philippines. Nine women, A1C Rosa Siller, A1C Jenny Wood, A1C Cindy Sessoms, A1C Sherry Shapiro, A1C Paula Dondeville, A1C Joyce Ries, A1C Linda Anderson, A1C Strawberry Jones, and A1C Carla Emcing formed the team and by early 1976 had made the cover of the *Security Police Digest*. By the time they were profiled in the



Security Police guard mount, 1974 (Col Jerry M. Bullock)

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Digest, the women had performed before over 20,000 people and the base was receiving an average of 15 requests for appearances each month. The kennel chief at Clark proclaimed them to be “the finest precision demonstration team he [had] seen in 19 years as a ‘dog man’.”¹¹²



Clark AFB all-female MWD demonstration team. Left to right, all A1C: Strawberry Jones—Catcher; Rosa Siller—Gray; Jenny Wood—Kurt; Cindy Sessoms—Buffy; Paula Dondeville—Pic; Sharry Shapiro—Spanky; Carla Emcing—Bullet; Joyce Rries—Patches (not shown); Linda Anderson—Catcher. (Security Forces Museum)

The one obstacle women had not managed to overcome was assignment to the security specialty, but that also was about to change. In March 1976, three female officers—1Lt Pamela Krauss, 2Lt Noreen Alberico, and 2Lt Patricia Schafer—became the first women to graduate from the demanding Air Base Ground Defense Course proving that women could “hack” the training regimen. Based on their success, in November a test program for women in the security field was finally begun. One hundred women were selected to attend security specialist training and the 90 who graduated were assigned to Nellis AFB, Nevada; Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota; Barksdale AFB, Louisiana; and Osan AB, Korea. As part of the test their performance was compared against 100 randomly selected male security recruits over the next 18 months.



First female class to graduate from the Security Specialist Course, February, 1977. Back row (L to R): AB Joan Sullivan, AB Margaret Wilson, AB Judi Golden, AB Emily Cooke, AB Jeanie Kennedy, AB Theresa Overholt, AB Valerie Chinn, AB Margaret McAlanan (?), AB Thelma Sands, AB Sherry Thompson (LE specialist attending ABGD training), AB Carla Rieger, Amn Sandra Szumanski, AB JoD (?) Hoogstra, AB JoDee Schmidt, Amn Teresa Knapper, AB Chris Voyles. (Security Forces Museum)

One of these Airmen, Sandra Szumanski, was assigned to Nellis AFB, Nevada, where she was assigned to a security flight whose flight chief looked on the women “as airmen. He didn't see men and women.”¹¹³ Szumanski appreciated his attitude because it helped overcome some of the grumbling by the men in the flight “that there's a woman; I'm going to wind up having to carry her gear.”¹¹⁴ “Nope, no, you didn't;” Szumanski proudly recalled, “you never had to carry mine.”¹¹⁵

The test wrapped up on April 1, 1978, and concluded that women could perform the duties of a security specialist, but had a higher attrition rate than men (39.2 percent v. 15.6 percent), a higher failure rate for physical weaknesses (19 percent v. 6.1 percent), and suffered a 33 percent higher rate of emotional disturbance than men.¹¹⁶ It was also observed that success or failure depended upon the attitude of supervisors, peer pressure, and general squadron management as much as it did on the individual capability of the women.¹¹⁷ Although HQ USAF/SP recommended that the career field be opened to females, the Air Force DCS/Personnel decided otherwise and the career field remained closed to women. “I always thought we did a good job,” Szumanski recalled. “And...if it failed, it was because society was not ready to see women go out and be put in hostile situations. And I can't fault them for that. That's the way we were raised. But I don't think it was because we couldn't do the job.”¹¹⁸ The participants in the test program were allowed to retrain or separate from the Air Force.¹¹⁹ Amn Szumanski cross trained into law enforcement and spent nearly 22 years on active duty, retiring as a senior master sergeant.¹²⁰

These women pioneers would take their place in Security Police history and on April 29, 1976, that history was given a home when the chief of staff formally approved the establishment of the Security Police Museum at Lackland AFB, Texas. The following month, MSgt William K. Kastner, NCOIC of the Social Actions drug and alcohol abuse rehabilitation section at Chanute AFB, Illinois, read the announcement of the museum's approval in the base newspaper with great interest. Recognizing the implementation of his suggestion from eight years earlier, Kastner notified the suggestion program monitor at Chanute of his earlier suggestion to establish a Security Police “Hall

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of Fame” and soon a letter was received from the Air Force Office of Security Police (AFOSP) stating, “There is no objection at this Headquarters to recognize the suggestion of MSgt William K. Kastner on 1 May 1968 as the ‘suggestion of record’ for the establishment of a Security Police Hall of Fame...”¹²¹ Kastner received \$250 from the Air Force Suggestion Program for his suggestion and observed in a plug for the suggestion program, “I didn’t think I’d be given credit for being the founder of the museum, but now I have been and I’ve got a lot of confidence in the suggestion system.”¹²²

Kastner may have been officially acknowledged as the “founder” of the museum, but the title of “father” goes to retired Col Albert Feldman. The museum started life as a display in the lobby of the Security Police Academy’s Femoyer Hall originally dedicated by General Sadler and AFMTC commander Lt Gen Andrew P. Iosue on March 23, 1977, but Feldman and others had something grander in mind. The Security Police Museum Foundation was incorporated with Feldman as its president and it quickly launched fund raising efforts to construct a dedicated museum at Lackland. At the same time, AFOSP canvassed the field, encouraging donations of “uniform and equipment items, trophies, plaques, notable documents, pictures, unit emblems, films and tapes of historical significance...”¹²³ Donations of both flowed in from the foundation’s 220 members and Security Police squadrons worldwide and by 1979, \$82,000 had been raised to construct a 2,350 square foot building and fill it with exhibits.¹²⁴



Security Police Museum, Lackland AFB, Texas (Air Force photo)

Events on the Korean peninsula would attract the nation’s attention that bicentennial summer. Tensions had been high between the two Koreas throughout the 1970s as South Korea’s efforts at opening lines of communication with the goal of eventual peaceful reunification with the North broke down in 1973. Then, in both 1974 and 1975, North Korean infiltration tunnels were discovered beneath the Demilitarized Zone. In 1976, South Korea and the United States held their first joint Team Spirit exercise designed to evaluate and improve the interoperability of the ROK and US forces. During the exercise, forces in South Korea were augmented by US Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force units from outside the ROK. North Korea responded to Team Spirit by

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issuing a communiqué condemning the exercise as a dress rehearsal for war against the North.

With tensions running high, two US Army officers led a South Korean work detail into the DMZ at Panmunjom on August 18, 1976, to trim a poplar tree that blocked the view from an American watch tower near the “Bridge of No Return” linking the two Koreas. The detail was confronted by about 30 North Korean troops who on command of their officer attacked and killed the two Americans with axes taken from the work detail. Both sides mobilized their forces and Security Police from Kadena AB, Okinawa, and Mountain Home AFB, Idaho, were mobilized to assist their counterparts at Kunsan and Tagueu Air Bases in South Korea.¹²⁵

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger supported bombing the North. President Ford, however, decided that American response would be limited to chopping down the tree. In what was probably the most expensive landscaping in history, Operation Paul Bunyan supported the lumberjacks with a heavily armed platoon, 27 helicopters, and B-52 bombers flying along the DMZ. On the morning of August 21, 1976, ROK and American troops felled the tree and replaced it with a small monument bearing the names of those killed and injured. The North Koreans did not challenge the action and within an hour the operation was complete.



President Jimmy Carter (White House photo)

In January 1977, James Earl “Jimmy” Carter, Jr. was sworn in as President of the United States. A Naval Academy graduate and former governor of Georgia, Carter was a cipher at the national level and won the election against Gerald Ford in part because of the continuing Watergate scandal fallout and Ford’s pardoning of the disgraced Nixon. The country looked to the new president for the moral leadership they felt had been lacking in the Nixon and Johnson administrations.

During the presidential campaign Carter had criticized the defense spending levels of the Ford administration and promised cuts in the range of \$5 billion to \$7 billion. Once he took office, Carter had his SECDEF, Dr. Harold Brown, propose amendments to President Ford’s proposed FY 1978 defense budget that effectively cut it by almost \$3 billion. While Brown and Carter focused on the strategic nuclear forces, conventional force readiness began to decline because of personnel shortages and inadequate funding for training and equipment. The brunt of the military budget cuts fell on the Army and Navy, but the Air Force was not immune. On June 30, 1977, Carter cancelled the B-1 “Lancer” supersonic bomber that had been in development since 1965 as a replacement for the aging B-52.

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The continuing post-Vietnam atrophy of American conventional forces was acceptable to Carter since his foreign policy was based on his belief that American power should be exercised sparingly and that the United States should avoid military interventions as much as possible. Carter believed in the supremacy of international law and wanted the United States to promote universal human rights and, since under his vision the United States would deal openly with the world from the moral high ground, he also sought to “reorganize” the nation’s clandestine intelligence service. His new Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Stansfield Turner, reorganized the CIA’s clandestine service and eliminated by his own count 820 officers, many of them paramilitary specialists, from the agency in what became known as the “Halloween Massacre” of 1977. At the same time, the Army’s premier counterinsurgency and clandestine paramilitary force, the Special Forces or Green Berets, would shrink from over 9,000 in 1971 to about 2,000 troops. While still recognizing the Soviet Union as an adversary, Carter focused on improving relations with it in hopes that a relaxation of Cold War tensions might ensue. These beliefs and hopes would be sorely tested by world leaders not nearly as idealistic as he.

One of Carter’s first actions was to fulfill a campaign promise to withdraw American troops from South Korea where President Park Chung Hee, who seized the presidency in a 1961 coup, exercised almost dictatorial powers since the adoption of a new constitution in 1972. On March 9, 1977, Carter announced that US ground combat forces would be gradually pulled out of South Korea over a four- to five-year period. When MGEN John Singlaub, chief of staff of US Forces Korea, objected to Carter's plan, Singlaub was recalled and relieved of his post on May 21.

Carter’s actions strained US-South Korean relations. On July 13 a riot broke out at Kunsan AB, South Korea. The 8th SPS responded quickly and effectively and 11 SPs received the Air Force Commendation medal for their actions.¹²⁶ The following day, in an object lesson that the situation in Korea remained volatile, an Army CH-47 helicopter was shot down after it strayed into North Korean airspace. Three crewmen were killed and the injured pilot taken prisoner and released after 57 hours in captivity. To calm President Park, Secretary Brown visited Seoul on July 25 and handed the South Korean president a letter from Carter assuring him of America’s commitment to defend South Korea. Nevertheless, over 3,600 combat troops were withdrawn from South Korea before Congress forced a hold on further redeployments.

In June 1977, General Sadler was picked to command MAC’s 21st Air Force headquartered at McGuire AFB, New Jersey. By using his ability to navigate the Air Force bureaucracy he enhanced the stature of the Security Police’s careerfield as a special staff agency. Gen Sadler oversaw what were probably the most profound changes in the career field since 1947. While many of his initiatives were aimed at enhancing morale within the Security Police, Sadler also was astute enough to realize that cultivating respect for the career field within the Air Force created allies and supporters. General Sadler more than proved his commitment to the Security Police, its mission, its people, and its future. Above all he had “awakened the world...to the cops.”¹²⁷

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Sadler was replaced by another “outsider” in June 1977—Bronx native and Korean and Vietnam War fighter pilot Brig Gen William E. “Earl” Brown, Jr. Brown was the first African-American head of the career field. Brown was the base commander at Andrews AFB, Maryland, when tapped as CSP and he was surprised by the assignment, although he chalked it up to his work with the Security Police in receiving distinguished visitors, securing Air Force One, and the Air Force’s “emphasis on spreading operational fellows like myself out into other career fields so we’d have a better view of how to manage the overall Air Force.”¹²⁸ Brown was able to accompany Sadler on a few trips to visit units in the field before taking over and he came to the job with Sadler’s advice that “if you take care of the people, the people will take care of the mission” as his guide.¹²⁹

As an outsider to the career field Brown did have to gain acceptance and he credited his senior



Then Brig Gen William E. Brown, Jr., and then Col William R. Brooksher (SAC/CSP) talking to staff (Air Force photo)

enlisted advisor CMSgt Robert J. McLaurine for helping him establish credibility and reaching that goal.¹³⁰ “He was my credibility,” Brown admitted, “and I listened very carefully to him.”¹³¹ So impressed was Brown with his chief that he recalled years later that “if someone had started out to build a professional security policeman, he’d wind up looking like CMSgt Bob McLaurine.”¹³²

In his first message to the field Brown noted the great strides the career field had made in the previous two years and reminded everyone that “our job is now to capitalize on these improvements and to continue the momentum.”¹³³ He ended with a challenge “to each of you, wherever stationed, to approach your job with determination and the desire to excel.”¹³⁴

Down in Texas the personnel at the DoD Dog Center at Lackland were showing determination in rising to the challenges created by a new demand for their product and implementing new initiatives to meet that demand. From a Vietnam War high of 4,000 dogs under the center’s management, by fiscal year 1974 it had procured and trained a total of only 688 dogs. The majority of them were patrol or sentry dogs with only 92 patrol-narcotic detection and 58 patrol-explosive detection dogs trained that year.¹³⁵

But as demand for military dogs decreased demand from other Federal agencies increased. The Departments of Justice, Transportation, and Treasury all requested dogs

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from the center. Justice funded a program to train patrol-explosive detection dogs and handlers for 20 metropolitan police departments. The Federal Aviation Administration required explosive detection dogs for use at airports nationwide and the Bureau of Customs obtained dogs from the center for its own narcotics detection dog training program. From an initial requirement of ten dogs, by 1977 customs had a requirement for 162 dogs from the center. These dogs screened more than 80,000 vehicles, 11 million pieces of mail, and approximately 6 million units of cargo. Their efforts resulted in the seizure of drugs with an estimated street value of over \$192.5 million.¹³⁶

By 1977 the Air Force had 1,483 military working dogs in the field. While the majority of these were German Shepherds, the number included some seemingly unlikely breeds fielded under the “small dog” test program. In 1976 the dog center procured six Cairn Terriers, six Beagles, six Miniature Schnauzers, and six Smooth Hair Fox Terriers to be trained as explosive detector dogs.¹³⁷



Big men with little dogs (Security Forces Museum)

The premise of the small dog program was that they were cheaper to procure and maintain than larger breeds and could enter confined spaces easier than their larger counterparts. Two classes of small breed explosive and narcotic detector dogs were graduated and evaluated in the field for six months.¹³⁸ While the results of the evaluation were generally satisfactory, the program was eventually cancelled.¹³⁹

The Security Police response to overseas crises remained centered around SPECS designated forces and starting on October 11, 1977, the entire force, with the exception of the Homestead AFB, Florida, contingent, was put through a month-long test at Eglin AFB, Florida during JCS exercise Bold Eagle 78. The 1st SPECS Squadron under the command of Lt Col Stocker was under the operational control of the Army 82nd Airborne Division. Their performance surprised the paratroopers, promoting the commander of Army Special Forces to give them the thumbs up stating “they did quite well for Air Force troops”.¹⁴⁰

Not everyone was as satisfied. Col Jerry Bullock was sent by AFOSP to observe Bold Eagle 78 and his report highlighted some training and equipment inadequacies that needed attention. First, the SPs had no secure voice communications capability to talk to the Army and had to borrow VRC-46 radios from the Army. Second, with flights spread thin over a 1,000-meter area, unattended electronic sensor capability would have enhanced the ability to construct a defense in depth. Finally, Bullock believed that the

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uncertainty concerning fields of fire and poor fire discipline he observed among the troops was due to the fact that ABGD training was still inadequate.¹⁴¹

Bullock observed that the SPECS officers and NCOs were inadequately trained and seemed unsure of how to conduct defensive planning and exhibited uncertain leadership. He also noted that Bold Eagle 78 was only the fourth time in seven years that SPECS contingents had been exercised as a squadron.¹⁴² Part of the solution to the leadership problem was a test program with the Army which saw 16 Air Force SPECS officers sent to Ft. Benning, Georgia, to the Basic Infantry Officer's Course and a contingent of NCOs to the Basic Infantry NCO Course also at Benning.¹⁴³

By the time Colonel Bullock submitted his report, Commando Bead, a survey of air base ground defense requirements worldwide, was underway and would find that in Korea alone the Security Police would need to provide a defense to Air Force installations sufficient to withstand up to 100,000 North Korean commandos.¹⁴⁴ All

MAJCOM CSPs were clamoring for additional funding and manpower for ABGD and this time the demands were backed by officers outside of the Security Police.



TSgt Edward Tolly sites in his M-16 prior to the 1977 Security Police marksmanship competition (Air Force photo)

Commando Bead resulted in a major overhaul of PACAF ABGD organization and forces. A base defense branch was formed at HQ PACAF and the PACAF Heavy Weapons School, providing initial and recurring training on the .50 cal. machine gun, the 81mm mortar, the 90mm recoilless, and 40mm grenade machine gun, was opened at Clark AB. Lt Gen James D. Hughes, CINC PACAF, directed that effective July 1, 1979; Korean-based SP units develop a time-phased ABGD posture that would build up local base defense forces in response to escalating threats.¹⁴⁵

PACAF also implemented several initiatives to acquire personnel and resources and established milestones for ABGD improvement in PACAF Program Action Directive "Commando Bead." A new operations plan, OPLAN 206, was drafted calling for the pre-positioning of War Reserve Material (WRM) munitions and vehicles in Korea. The number of MWD teams was increased and heavier weapons and tactical vehicles were deployed on a routine basis. Defensive positions and command

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and control facilities were beefed up and the WARSKILL program was altered to provide over 200 trained personnel for ABGD.¹⁴⁶

When explaining his support for the formation of the RAF Regiment, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill derided the RAF's past reliance upon the army for air base defense and said derisively that air bases should be the "stronghold of fighting air-ground men, and not the abode of uniformed civilians in the prime of life protected by detachments of soldiers."¹⁴⁷ The Air Force Wartime Skills Project (WARSKILL) was the US Air Force's half-hearted effort to implement Churchill's vision.

WARSKILL was implemented in late 1977 and was meant to "provide all Air Force personnel with a wartime skill."¹⁴⁸ Under the program, various functional areas whose workloads increased during wartime, such as Security Police, civil engineering, medical, and aerial port units, were to be augmented by personnel from career fields whose workload was not as much affected by wartime operations. Starting January 1, 1978 each Air Force member was given a wartime AFSC (WAFSC) in addition to their primary AFSC. For many the two AFSC's were the same, but for others their wartime AFSC might be Security Police or some other area requiring wartime augmentation.

Those selected to be WARSKILL augmentees for Security Police would receive training to the WARSKILL three-level using a modified version of the SP specialty training standard and be given a wartime AFSC of 81132. The first batch of WARSKILL augmentees was expected to finish training by March 31 with the full program for Security Police augmentees to be phased in over a two-year period. The Security Police had long relied on augmentees during wartime and welcomed the more formal WARSKILL program. "Centralized direction in the form of a WARSKILL regulation," the headquarters opined, "and long-term identification of trained augmenters through designation of a WAFSC, combined with standardized training using lesson plans developed by the Security Police Academy, should result in the best augmenters we have ever had."¹⁴⁹

By the end of 1978, 2,700 "WARSKILL" had been trained as SPs. While the training went smoothly, problems arose with integrating traditional augmentees who came from all career fields and could be used at anytime the base commander saw fit, with WARSKILL personnel who came from selected career fields and could be used only under special circumstances. This distinction unnecessarily complicated base defense planning.

As did Sadler before him Brown, too, would preside over a major change in the organization of the AFOSP, but he would be more acted upon than acting in this change. One of President Carter's campaign promises was to cut the size of the White House staff and when he reduced his staff by 25 percent, he asked his department secretaries to do the same.¹⁵⁰ The request flowed down the chain and Air Force Chief of Staff Gen David C. Jones decided that the Air Force would comply, in part, by transferring some functional area staffs out of the Washington, D.C., area. One of those staffs would be the Air Force Office of Security Police.

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Brown was “skeptical about moving away from the headquarters where the decisions were going to be made, where the conversations took place and the staff meetings in the morning would be held” and leaving only a small detachment in Washington, but set about finding a new home for himself and his staff.¹⁵¹ Lowry AFB, Colorado, and San Antonio, Texas, were considered before settling on Kirtland AFB, New Mexico. Kirtland was selected because of the availability of office space, its proximity to Sandia National Laboratory, Los Alamos, and the field headquarters of the Defense Nuclear Agency.¹⁵²

Along with the unwelcome move came an even more unwelcome realignment of AFOSP’s position on the Air Staff that placed the Security Police under the Air Force Inspector General once again. The plan would move AFOSP and AFOSI to Kirtland to create the Air Force Inspector General Activity Center or AFIGAC reporting to the commander of the IG safety center at Norton AFB, California. To many senior SP officers who had welcomed the move out from under the IG, this was the unkindest cut of all. A suggestion that the SPs realign under the Air Force operations directorate was rejected and Brown took a pragmatic approach to the whole thing, reasoning, “[W]hen things are going to change, there are several approaches. One, you can ignore it and the change will happen anyway. Two, you can oppose it, and you might just get run over. Three, you can embrace the change and try as much as you can to shape it to your own maximum benefit. And that was the approach that I asked the staff members to take... It’s going to happen, fellows. Let’s do the best we can with it.”¹⁵³

AFOSI, on the other hand, opted for Brown’s second approach and opposed the relocation, arguing that they couldn’t move out of Washington and remain effective. Lt Col Jay Swander, who was working the SP move to Kirtland, recalled that AFOSI “used their green stamps and their blue stamps and their anti-terrorism buttons and any others they had to say we can’t leave the national capital region because we’ve got to stay close to the guys with... NSA, DIA, and CIA... So they drug their feet and never left.”¹⁵⁴ On the other hand, the Security Police staff pulled up stakes and moved to Kirtland between July and December 1978.¹⁵⁵

The AFIGAC organization was quickly disbanded as unworkable and SP headquarters reclaimed its title as the Air Force Office of Security Police with the CSP reporting directly to the Air Force IG. While the CSP reported to the IG organizationally, the office was a separate operating agency of the air staff. However, its key players including the CSP were now thousands of miles from the place where decisions were made and the contingent left behind in Washington was often forced to make decisions without the time to properly coordinate with the leadership at Kirtland. The staff’s ability to respond to fast moving events at the Pentagon was also compromised and the informal network so important to effective staff work within the walls of the five-sided building was weakened.

While acquiescing to the move, Brown had no intention of being cut out of the decision making process by having to filter everything through the IG. He knew Gen

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Jones from a previous assignment together and took the position that, “If I felt there was something of real significance, I knew I could always go directly to Gen Jones with it. So from that standpoint I felt, although going away from the headquarters was not maybe the thing that I would choose for us to do, I felt that it would not be too great a handicap. If there were something of real importance, I could get it to the right people.”¹⁵⁶

In early 1978, before the move to Kirtland AFB, something of real importance came up when investigative journalist Joseph Albright revealed that by posing as a fencing contractor he was able to penetrate security around two weapons storage areas including one at Mather AFB, California. According to Albright in late 1977 he came “within a stone’s throw of our...nuclear weapons” while “riding about five miles an hour in an Air Force pickup truck...driven by my only armed escort with one pistol, and both hands on the wheel...No one had searched me or inspected my bulky briefcase, which was on my lap.”¹⁵⁷ Albright also obtained through the mail “blueprints” showing the layout of the storage area including two unguarded gates through the innermost security fence and the procedure for disabling the alarm system. He later was sent a revised set of plans that depicted “the wiring diagram for the solenoid locking system for the B-52 alert area.”¹⁵⁸ Although Albright posed no threat to the weapons, the fact that he was able to penetrate and obtain information on the weaknesses of what were supposed to be some of the most secure areas in the world were used by nuclear disarmament advocates as evidence of the possibility that nuclear weapons might fall into the hands of terrorists.

According to one Security Police officer “the whole Air Staff went tilt” over what came to be known as the Albright Affair.¹⁵⁹ A nuclear weapons security review group was formed with Col Bernie DeNisio as chairman and then Maj Jay Swander as recorder. Since the Security Police were responsible for weapons storage area security, the Albright Affair focused lots of negative attention on them “that forced us to ... to look at...how we did business.”¹⁶⁰

Swander saw a lot of changes for the better come out of the group, one of the most important of which was the appointment of Col Milt Kirste as the first mission area monitor for nuclear weapons security. As mission area monitor, Kirste became the single point of contact for nuclear weapons security matters and the Security Police, Swander observed, now “began to get some inroads into funding security-related stuff because we had a voice now actually sitting on one of the boards [saying] yea or nay on security items. We never had that before.”¹⁶¹ Based on Kirste’s initial success, the Security Police successfully argued their way onto other headquarters boards making funding decisions that affected its areas of responsibility.

Brown’s successor as chief of Security Police and commander of the Air Force Office of Security Police at Kirtland was Brig Gen



Brig Gen William R. Brooksher (Air Force Photo)

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William R. Brooksher, the SAC chief of Security Police. Brooksher, a native of Turkey, Arkansas, was not a career security policeman, but neither was he an aviator. Instead he was a “mustang,” a former enlisted man who received his commission through the Officer Training School in 1953 after three years as an enlisted clerk typist. Brooksher had spent his career as an Air Force officer primarily in the Air Weather Service and in SAC as a missileman and moved to the SAC CSP job from Minot AFB, North Dakota, where he had been commander of the 91st Strategic Missile Wing. Since he was selected for promotion to brigadier general while serving as the SAC CSP, Brooksher was technically the first serving security policeman to be promoted to flag rank.

On October 1, 1978, Brooksher formally took over a force with problems. In one of his first columns in the *Security Police Digest* he noted with alarm, “Recently, there has been a rash of incidents of security police criminal involvement, especially in drugs.”¹⁶² Such criminal activity reflected adversely upon the entire Security Police force and impacted the regard that the Air Force and civilian community had for the “security police as trustworthy, respectable, law-abiding citizens who should be “above the standard.”¹⁶³ Seeing a threat to the hard-won stature of the career field, the general condemned those whose actions threatened this image, explaining, “There is no more repugnant act by a security police man or woman than to disregard the creed of this profession and, even worse, cast aspersions on the trustworthiness of the entire police force.”¹⁶⁴ He lay the problem at the feet of leadership by pointing out that a common denominator in these incidents was a lack of “24-hour supervision” and failure to motivate the young troops to accept the challenges of the profession. “Those who cannot accept the challenge,” he warned, “do not belong in the career field.”¹⁶⁵

The vast majority of Brooksher’s men and women were up for the challenge and many went above and beyond the call. When 913 followers of cult leader Jim Jones committed mass suicide after the murder of California Congressman Leo J. Ryan and his party on an airport runway at Port Kaituma, Guyana, on November 19, 1978, the decaying bodies were retrieved from the tropical heat by the military, including volunteers from Charleston AFB’s 437th SPS.

Dedication to duty would not by itself cure the career field’s ills. Retention rates for the Security Police continued to be low and disciplinary problems high, so on October 4, 1979, General Brooksher launched Peacekeeper 80, a sweeping initiative to improve the living and working conditions of the Security Police. The goal of Peacekeeper 80 was to “make the Security Police career field into a profession and its people into an elite corps.”¹⁶⁶ The goal was important, according to Brooksher, because “misconduct by Security Police is incompatible with our mission; those responsible for enforcing the law cannot violate it; [and] those responsible for security, especially nuclear security, cannot be dulled or incapacitated by drugs, alcohol or inattention.”¹⁶⁷ To implement Peacekeeper 80 Brooksher established a task force at his headquarters and at each MAJCOM and the SP Academy with the threefold mission of “innovation, evaluation and acceleration”¹⁶⁸ To stress the importance placed on the program Brooksher starred in a video for distribution to the field explaining the initiative. Peacekeeper 80 also marked the first use of what would become the official nickname of the Security Police—The

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Peacekeepers.¹⁶⁹ Brooksher chose the name because “our job was to keep the peace in the world and the peace on our bases. So peacekeeping is really our business.”¹⁷⁰

Brooksher also continued Sadler’s efforts to improve the lot of the unsung “Ramp Rat.” One of his goals as CSP was “getting rid of that guy standing on the nose of that B-52. I hated that. I hated it for the guy that had to do it. I thought it was not a very good system.”¹⁷¹ While he was never able to fully reach that goal he did seek to make the security troops feel appreciated and went out of his way to show his regard for their services. “I knew that I was having some success,” he later recalled, when “the word came back that the law enforcement guys are bitching because they don’t get the attention the security guys got. I told them the worm has finally turned and that’s where I want it turned. I want everybody in this business to understand they are important doing what they do.”¹⁷²

While Brooksher was generally supportive of continuing the initiatives begun by General Sadler to improve the morale, image, and capabilities of the Security Police, the Police Are Lovable campaign was one program he disliked “intensely.” The new chief believed that PAL “sent the wrong message. Police aren’t lovable. Hopefully they are professional....If you’re professional and you do your job, you will be loved.”¹⁷³ Brooksher ordered that all the beret wearing “Smiley Faces” be taken down. “I don’t ever want to see one,” he growled.¹⁷⁴

Brooksher also sought to improve and refine the capabilities of the Security Police and soon after taking charge he ordered Capt Hunter Look to review the TNT/EST training program. Brooksher was concerned that the image of the teams was becoming “cowboy” and believed that there should be less emphasis on “sexy” high profile operations and more on small unit tactics.¹⁷⁵ Look’s report, issued late the next year, called for an expansion of the basic EST from four to five men while a new curriculum focusing on built-up area tactics was written for the training course by TSgt Chalma L. Sexton, Jr. ESTs were now to be trained for supporting hostage negotiation situations, like the civilian police Special Weapons and Tactics Teams (SWAT), and not for riot control. The first class using the new doctrine and tactics was graduated early 1980.¹⁷⁶

The Security Police Academy formed its own EST from among its instructors starting in 1978. Organized by Sergeant Sexton, the team consisted of three tactical elements, a negotiation element, a field supervisor, and an officer in charge. The academy EST also later assumed responsibility as Lackland’s EST.

Army MPs attended the EST course in March 1979, about the same time a hostage situation arose at nearby Ft. Sam Houston. The hostage taker had already killed an MP and had barricaded himself in a building when the Ft. Sam Provost Marshal called the academy EST for help. The situation was resolved through negotiation, but the EST gained a reputation within the Army as a unit of high professional and tactical competence.¹⁷⁷ It would not be the last time the academy/Lackland EST would be called upon.

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By late 1979, President Carter's less than muscular, human rights-based foreign policy was resulting in unintended consequences. In January 1979, the Shah of Iran, who had been in power since 1941, was overthrown. His brutal repression of demonstrations against his rule had alienated his western allies and Carter, while recognizing the strategic importance of having a friendly Iranian government covering the vital Straits of Hormuz through which tankers carrying much of the world's supply of crude oil sailed, but sickened by the Shah's brutal repression of his people, vacillated. Despite the urgings of his National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, that the United States intervene to stabilize Iran, Carter opted to let the Shah fall. The Shah's Prime Minister, Dr. Shapour Bahktiar, who had forced the Shah into exile, tried to restore order by dissolving the secret police, releasing political prisoners, promising free elections, and by allowing the Ayatollah Seyyed Ruhollah Khomeini, a powerful Shia Muslim revolutionary cleric to return from exile in France.

Bahktiar, however, did not reckon with Khomeini's own desire for power. Khomeini, allegedly with support from the CIA which feared that a Communist government controlled by the neighboring Soviet Union might take power and dominate Iran's oil fields and the Straits of Hormuz, proclaimed an Islamic revolution. The revolution rejected a democratic government and gave birth to the Islamic Republic of Iran, founded on a hard line, fundamentalist interpretation of Islam with the Koran as the source of all law. Khomeini was named the chief spiritual leader and elected the Supreme Leader for life. To prove his anti-Communist bona fides, and to eliminate a strong source of opposition to his theocratic state, the ayatollah carried out mass executions of Communists soon after he came to power.

But Khomeini was no friend of the United States which he considered an apostasy and the "Great Satan." Many Iranians were angered by the United States' past support of the Shah. When Carter admitted him to the US in October for cancer treatment at Wilford Hall Medical Center at Lackland AFB, Texas, that anger manifested itself. On November 4, 1979, Iranian "students," perhaps without Khomeini's advance approval, stormed the American Embassy in the capital of Tehran and seized 53 American diplomats and citizens. In exchange for the hostages, the "students," actually members of or controlled by the Khomeini's Revolutionary Guard, demanded that Carter rescind his order freezing Iranian assets in the United States, apologize to the Iranian people for interference in the internal affairs of Iran, and that he return of the Shah to Iran to stand trial. Carter refused the demands and a long stand off began.

The Shah remained at Wilford Hall until December and during his stay the SP Academy/Lackland EST assisted the Secret Service, AFOSI, and the 3700th SPS in providing security as part of what was designated Operation Eagle. Using a distributed area defense, the security forces intercepted 34 persons attempting to see the Shah, discovered a primitive letter bomb, and organized a confrontation management

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contingent to deal with a rumored march of Iranian students from Houston.¹⁷⁸



SP Academy/Lackland EST during Operation Eagle (www.securityforcesestpastandpresent.blogspot.com)

ESTs were designed to be fielded for short periods, but Operation Eagle showed that they might be used in long term operations where they would require augmentation. Brooksher saw the need for a deployable “Super EST” to provide needed augmentation to base ESTs.¹⁷⁹ At Brooksher’s urging, the Air Force IG, Lt Gen Howard Lane, wrote to ATC commander Gen Benjamin O. Davis, Jr. on April 2, 1980, highlighting the need for “a specially equipped, highly trained tactical response force that could be deployed on short notice to assist commanders beyond local capability.”¹⁸⁰ Lane proposed using the SP Academy EST as this deployable response force. Davis agreed and Lackland’s EST responsibility was transferred to the 3700th SPS to free the academy team for its new mission. Renamed the Air Force Special Emergency Service Flight, the academy EST was reorganized into six, four-member ESTs capable of conducting tactical assault operations in support of base ESTs.

President Carter faced an entirely new challenge when on December 27, 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan ostensibly to stabilize its Marxist government and enable it to resist assaults by Islamic guerrillas. The Soviets deposed President Hafizullah Amin who was murdered in the Tajbeg Palace allegedly by the Afghan Revolutionary Committee. Carter, who had previously approved covert assistance to the

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Afghan Islamic opposition forces, appeared very surprised that the Soviets would actually invade a neighboring country. In retaliation he directed a US boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics, embargoed grain shipments to the Soviet Union, and increased aid to the guerrillas, including \$40 billion to establish guerrilla training camps in Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan. Islamic fundamentalists from throughout the Middle East and elsewhere flocked to the camps for training to fight a *jihad*, or holy war, against the Soviets. Among these fighters was a tall Saudi Arabian named Osama bin Laden.

The 1979 Security Police Worldwide Symposium became the forum for an SP/OSI workshop to discuss and enhance the working relationship between Security Police Investigators (SPI) and AFOSI agents. The symposium endorsed several recommendations. Among these were the proper wear of the AF Form 688, Security Police Investigator Credential; continued use of the Army Military Police Investigator Course; and continuing the practice of allowing base commanders to authorize SP investigators to wear civilian clothes and chiefs of security police to authorize the use of unmarked vehicles on a case-by-case basis.¹⁸¹

The workshop also resulted in agreement in other areas. SPI was prohibited from conducting surveillance operations in drug abuse cases and it was reiterated that, “Security police do not investigate [drug] ring and dealers cases.”¹⁸² SP investigators were also prohibited from using paid informers, but were encouraged to “develop informal sources of information...willing to assist in investigations.”¹⁸³

The most important outcome was a general burying of the hatchet between SP and AFOSI. “Security police investigators and OSI agents are not competitors; they form the Air Force investigative team” and the Air Force needed “cooperation and teamwork to get maximum efficiency out of its limited investigative resource.”¹⁸⁴

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In January 1980, as part of the seemingly unending quest to obtain more manpower to meet its expanding mission, AFOSP began Palace Balance to bring in cross trainees from other career fields. It was not a popular move with those already in the field since many of these cross trainees were in supervisory grades yet had no SP



General Brooksher and AFOSP staff, 1980 (Col Jerry Bullock)

experience and the influx of these personnel was perceived as reducing promotion opportunities. Brooksher defended the program against such charges noting, “We look for three qualities in our new NCOs: leadership ability, managerial skills and technical expertise. If we get the first two, we can teach the third.”¹⁸⁵ As evidence of the validity of this premise he pointed to the success of the rated supplement officers in the field. On the issue of promotions, Brooksher explained that promotion quotas were based on the number of personnel serving in a particular grade so the higher the number the higher the quota. “Thus,” he explained, “NCOs from other career fields will enhance our leadership capabilities and promotion opportunities.”¹⁸⁶ AFOSP itself gained personnel with the addition of 32 authorizations from the transfer of the Air Force Security Clearance Office to AFOSP.¹⁸⁷

In addition to new personnel, new equipment was also on the way. In March 1980, another contract was anticipated to be awarded for 280 Plymouth “Volare” police sedans to join the 520 already delivered. That same month delivery of the first of the 405 Cadillac Gage “Peacekeeper” armed response/convoy escort vehicles contracted for in 1979 was expected.¹⁸⁸ Plans were also underway to procure a security patrol vehicle to replace the pickup trucks used to support weapons system security operations.

In the fall of 1980 the “Peacekeeper” began field testing. There were some problems. The 321st SPG at Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota, reported that in cold weather the vehicle windows defrosted slowly and the heater did not warm personnel in

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the rear of the vehicle. Other problems reported were “limited visibility, extreme interior engine noise, loss of traction on hard gravel and wet-icy roads and...the vehicle tended to drift when the speed was decreased.”¹⁸⁹ The 321st did, however, approve of the vehicle’s “excellent fields of fire” and the machine gun turret’s ability to provide “excellent cover at all ranges.”¹⁹⁰

Since the end of the Vietnam War the United States military had struggled to reconstitute itself while confronted with a nation and a Congress that had other priorities. Defense spending was simply inadequate and the armed services had deteriorated into an unprepared force with ships that were unable to sail, aircraft that could not fly, weapons disabled by shortages of spare parts, many personnel unsuited for service, and inadequate operational training. Army Chief of Staff Gen Edward “Shy” Meyer informed President Carter that the post-Vietnam cuts in the defense budget coupled with recruiting problems had left only four of the Army’s 16 active duty divisions ready for combat. Carter had, Meyer told him, an Army that was a “hollow force” that appeared ready on the outside but was incapable of effective operations. The Reserves were even worse off. Hollow or not, Carter would have to rely on these forces as he launched the most high profile military gamble of his presidency and the resulting failure of this mission was seen by many as confirmation of Meyer’s analysis.

Frustrated by the continued captivity of the American hostages in Tehran and with the public demanding action, Carter reluctantly authorized a military operation to free them to begin on April 24, 1980. In the works for five months, Operation Eagle Claw was “a two-day affair with a great many moving parts and very little room for error--one of the most daring thrusts in US military history.”¹⁹¹ After flying special operations forces, including Army Rangers, Special Forces and the elite, top secret Army Delta Force, to a desert airstrip (Desert One) aboard USAF C-130s, the plan called for the rescue force to transfer to Marine RH-53 helicopters and fly to another airfield (Desert Two) near Tehran. After locating and rescuing the hostages, the helicopters were to fly from Desert Two to Manzariyeh Air Base where everyone would board the C-130s for the flight to safety. Unfortunately, nothing worked as planned.

Enroute to Desert One the aircraft flew though unexpected sandstorms and while all of the C-130s made it, two of the eight helicopters had to turn back. Another one had mechanical problems at Desert One. The mission needed a minimum of six helicopters, but now had only five. Carter, who had reserved the right to cancel the mission at any point, issued the abort order. But the worst was yet to happen. As one of the Marine helicopters lifted off, it drifted into a C-130 loaded with a huge fuel bladder for refueling the helicopters and both aircraft exploded killing five Air Force crewmen and three Marines. The remaining helicopters were abandoned and the dead were left behind. The triumphant Iranians released photographs of the destroyed C-130, the abandoned helicopters, and the burned bodies of the dead as evidence of America’s, and Carter’s, impotence.

That same month another small nation thumbed its nose at the United States as Cuban dictator Fidel Castro, in an effort to relieve internal dissent over inadequate

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housing and a declining Cuban economy, opened the Cuban port of Mariel for anyone who desired to leave Cuba. Some 125,000 people, including over 2,000 criminals and mental patients shipped out by Castro, descended upon Florida in anything that would float. President Carter decided not to turn them back and the United States established camps to house the “Marielitos” while they were processed. Air Force Security Police, in one of the increasing number of humanitarian missions they would perform, provided security at “Camp Libertad” at Eglin AFB, Florida from May to September.

The rising threat of terrorism also struck the Security Police when, on November 15, 1980, Sgt William C. Herrington was killed by terrorists near Incirlik, Turkey. Herrington and another security policeman were on their way to work when four terrorists surrounded his vehicle as he was backing out of his driveway and pumped over 50 rounds into the vehicle. Herrington was struck 17 times and died in the hospital. Herrington’s companion was able to escape. Four suspects were apprehended and at their trial said their plan was to kill the first American they saw that day. They were convicted of murder and executed by the Turks.¹⁹²

1980 was a presidential election year and Jimmy Carter was running behind the Republican candidate, former California governor and Hollywood movie actor, Ronald Reagan. Saddled with a reputation for indecisiveness, the continued Iranian hostage crisis, the debacle at Desert One, and his failure to check Soviet expansion into Afghanistan, Carter was fighting for his political life. The American economy was a further drag on his chances. In 1979, because the Iranian Revolution interrupted that nation's production of petroleum, gasoline prices increased 60 percent. The inflation rate that stood at 6.8 percent in when Carter took office had risen to 12.4 percent by 1980. Unemployment and interest rates were high while investment, savings, and productivity declined.

To the American people Carter seemed powerless to affect events at home or abroad and his often pessimistic pronouncements concerning the country’s future failed to inspire confidence in his leadership. In stark contrast to the lackluster Carter, the charismatic, confident Reagan exuded an air of decisive leadership and promised to restore America’s confidence and its economy. In the November election Reagan decisively defeated Carter, carrying every state except Georgia and Minnesota, the home states of Carter and his running mate Walter Mondale, West Virginia, and Hawaii and garnering 489 electoral votes to Carter’s 49. The “Reagan Revolution” was about to begin.

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³ “Resume: Proposed Resource Protection Program,” 1972 Worldwide Security Police Conference, 1.

⁴ “Resume: Proposed Resource Protection Program,” 1972 Worldwide Security Police Conference, 1.

⁵ “Resume: Proposed Resource Protection Program,” 1972 Worldwide Security Police Conference, 2.

⁶ “Resume: Proposed Resource Protection Program,” 1972 Worldwide Security Police Conference, 2.

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- ⁸ “Resume: Proposed Resource Protection Program,” 1972 Worldwide Security Police Conference, 4.
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- ¹² *Security Police Digest*, Number 2, 1973, 7.
- ¹³ *Security Police Digest*, Number 2, 1973, 7.
- ¹⁴ *Security Police Digest*, Number 1, 1974, 15-16.
- ¹⁵ Semi-Annual Historical Report, Department of Security Police Training, 15 (1 July 1973 – 31 December 1973).
- ¹⁶ Semi-Annual Historical Report, Department of Security Police Training, 14 - 15 (1 July 1973 – 31 December 1973); Interview of Colonel Sally Uebelacker (nee Kucera), USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), January 21, 2005.
- ¹⁷ Interview of Colonel Sally Uebelacker (nee Kucera), USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), January 21, 2005.
- ¹⁸ Lt Kucera went on to marry Bob Uebelacker an Air Force pilot, retired from the Air Force as a colonel, and became a lawyer.
- ¹⁹ Interview of Brig Gen Mary Kay Hertog by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), September 15, 2006.
- ²⁰ Interview of Brig Gen Mary Kay Hertog by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), September 15, 2006.
- ²¹ *Security Police Digest*, Number 2, 1973, 11.
- ²² *Security Police Digest*, Number 2, 1973, 11.
- ²³ Capt Marie Shadden, *The Peacekeepers: Security Police History 1947 – 1982* (Lackland AFB, TX: USAF Security Police Academy, 1983), 176.
- ²⁴ *Security Police Digest*, Number 1, 1973, 15.
- ²⁵ *Security Police Digest*, Number 1, 1973, 15.
- ²⁶ *Security Police Digest*, Number 1, 1973, 15.
- ²⁷ *Security Police Digest*, Number 3, 1973, 16.
- ²⁸ *Security Police Digest*, Number 1, 1973, 16.
- ²⁹ *Security Police Digest*, Number 2, 1974, 10.
- ³⁰ *Security Police Digest*, Number 1, 1974, 5.
- ³¹ *Security Police Digest*, Number 1, 1974, 5.
- ³² *Security Police Digest*, Number 1, 1974, 5.
- ³³ *Security Police Digest*, Number 4, 1974, 14.
- ³⁴ SAC Position Paper, “Deputy Chief of Staff, Security, Past, Present and Future,” 1988, 1.
- ³⁵ SAC Position Paper, “Deputy Chief of Staff, Security, Past, Present and Future,” 1988, 1.
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- ³⁹ Jerry M. Bullock, *Air Force Security Police* (Paducah, KY: Turner Publishing, 1996), 43.
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- ⁴² “Report of the Security Police Field Structure Review Conference, 21 – 25 October 1974, Attachment 1, 1.
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- ⁴⁵ Col Howard King, “A Personal Perspective of the History of the United States Air Force Air Police and Security Police” (unpublished).
- ⁴⁶ “Report of the Security Police Field Structure Review Conference, 21 – 25 October 1974, Attachment 1, 5.
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- ⁴⁸ Capt Marie Shadden, *The Peacekeepers: Security Police History 1947 – 1982* (Lackland AFB, TX: USAF Security Police Academy, 1983), 138.
- ⁴⁹ Letter from CMSgt Chalma L. Sexton, Jr. to SSgt John S. Bandy, 18 April 1994.
- ⁵⁰ Dr. John W. Brokaw, “Air Force Police—A History (LXXIII)” *Tiger Flight*, Volume 14, Number 6 (November-December, 2005), 19.
- ⁵¹ Undated Security Police history timeline by Col Matt Matecko (USAFR) in possession of author.
- ⁵² The parenthetical “select” indicates an officer selected for promotion, but who has not yet assumed or “pinned on” the new grade.
- ⁵³ *TIG Brief*, No. 6, Vol. XXVII, 28 March 75, 2. Carter retired from active duty on June 1, 1975 and died on Christmas Day 1984. In 1994, Carter Hall, an 89,000 square foot training facility at Lackland AFB was dedicated to his memory. The Colonel Billy Jack Carter award given to “to the individual judged to have made the most significant contribution to protecting Air Force personnel or resources during the calendar year” was also named in his honor (AFI 36-2848 (1 April 2001)).
- ⁵⁴ *TIG Brief*, No. 6, Vol. XXVII, 28 March 75, 2.
- ⁵⁵ Interview of Maj Gen Thomas M. Sadler, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), June 13, 2005.
- ⁵⁶ HQ USAF Special Order GA-12, 5 March 1975. A move of SP from the IG to the commander’s special staff had previously been tested at 22nd Air Force and at Military Airlift Command in 1970 – 1971 (see Capt Marie Shadden, *The Peacekeepers: Security Police History 1947 – 1982* (Lackland AFB, TX: USAF Security Police Academy, 1983), 224 – 225).
- ⁵⁷ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 1, 1975, 6.
- ⁵⁸ Interview of Maj Gen Thomas M. Sadler, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), June 13, 2005.
- ⁵⁹ Interview of Maj Gen Thomas M. Sadler, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), June 13, 2005.
- ⁶⁰ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 3, 1975, 13. In 1994 the security police qualification badge was renamed the law enforcement occupational badge and, after substituting a globe to symbolize the Air Force’s global mission for the sunburst, was worn by the Security Police, Combat Arms Training and Maintenance (CATM), and the AFOSI.
- ⁶¹ *Security Police Digest*, Number 2, 1976, 3.
- ⁶² *Security Police Digest*, Number 2, 1976, 3.
- ⁶³ *Security Police Digest*, Number 3, 1976, 15.
- ⁶⁴ *Security Police Digest*, Number 3, 1976, 15.
- ⁶⁵ Walter J. Boyne, “The Fall of Saigon,” *Air Force Magazine*, Vol. 83, Number 4, April 2000, 3.
- ⁶⁶ Walter J. Boyne, “The Fall of Saigon,” *Air Force Magazine*, Vol. 83, Number 4, April 2000, 7.
- ⁶⁷ Walter J. Boyne, “The Fall of Saigon,” *Air Force Magazine*, Vol. 83, Number 4, April 2000, 8.
- ⁶⁸ Capt Marie Shadden, *The Peacekeepers: Security Police History 1947 – 1982* (Lackland AFB, TX: USAF Security Police Academy, 1983), 142.
- ⁶⁹ Two of the DAO Marines, Corporal Charles McMahon and Lance Corporal Darwin Judge, were killed in a rocket attack on the compound on April 29 making them the war’s final American combat deaths.
- ⁷⁰ Capt Marie Shadden, *The Peacekeepers: Security Police History 1947 – 1982* (Lackland AFB, TX: USAF Security Police Academy, 1983), 144.
- ⁷¹ Speech of November 3, 1969.
- ⁷² History of the 13th ADVON (1 Jan – 30 Jun 75), 7.
- ⁷³ Interview of Brig Gen Frank K. Martin, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret) and Col James L. Conrad, USAF (Ret), June 8, 2005.
- ⁷⁴ Interview of Brig Gen Frank K. Martin, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret) and Col James L. Conrad, USAF (Ret), June 8, 2005.
- ⁷⁵ “US Confirms Post Story,” *Bangkok Post*, May 23, 1975.
- ⁷⁶ Historical Data Record, 21st Special Operations Squadron, 1 April 1975 – 30 June 1975. The 18 security policemen killed were TSgt Jackie D. Glenn, SSgt Gerald A. Coyle, SSgt Faleagafulu Ilaoa, Sgt Jimmy P. Black, Sgt Bobby G. Collums, Sgt Thomas D. Dwyer, Sgt Bob W. Ford, Sgt Gerald W. Fritz, Sgt Gregory L. Hankamer, Sgt Michael D. Lane, Sgt William R. McKelvey, Sgt Robert W. Ross, A1C Darrell L.

Hamlin, A1C David A. Higgs, A1C Dennis W. London, A1C Robert P. Mathias, A1C Edgar C. Moran III, and A1C Tommy R. Nealis (Memorial Service Program, NKP Royal Thai AFB, no date).

⁷⁷ “The Truth Behind the Mayaguez Incident,” *Bangkok Post*, May 21, 1975.

⁷⁸ “Capture and Release of SS Mayaguez by Khmer Rouge forces in May 1975,” US Maritime Service Veterans Webpage (<http://www.usmm.org/mayaguez.html>).

⁷⁹ At least one source indicates that three Marines were inadvertently left behind. In 1999, a DoD investigation determined that two of them were captured and executed and the third was killed while trying to steal food from the Khmer Rouge. (“Capture and Release of SS Mayaguez by Khmer Rouge forces in May 1975,” US Maritime Service Veterans Webpage (<http://www.usmm.org/mayaguez.html>)).

⁸⁰ “US Confirms Post Story,” *Bangkok Post*, May 23, 1975.

⁸¹ SMSgt Browning (NFI), “Background Paper on the Mayaguez Incident: An Enlisted Perspective of a USAF Security Police Tragedy,” 15 Apr 92.

⁸² Interview of Brig Gen Frank K. Martin, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret) and Col Jim Conrad, USAF (Ret), June 8, 2005.

⁸³ Letter, Maj Gen John P. Flynn, AFMTC/CC to Brig Gen Daryle E. Tripp, DCS/Technical Training, HQ ATC, 22 July 1975.

⁸⁴ Letter, Maj Gen John P. Flynn, AFMTC/CC to Brig Gen Daryle E. Tripp, DCS/Technical Training, HQ ATC, 22 July 1975.

⁸⁵ Memorandum from HQ ATC/TT to USAF/DPP, HQ USAF/SP Subject: Security Police Training, 12 Aug 75.

⁸⁶ Memorandum from HQ ATC/TT to USAF/DPP, HQ USAF/SP Subject: Security Police Training, 12 Aug 75.

⁸⁷ Memorandum from HQ ATC/TT to USAF/DPP, HQ USAF/SP Subject: Security Police Training, 12 Aug 75.

⁸⁸ “Camp Bullis, San Antonio, Texas” (<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/camp-bullis.htm>).

⁸⁹ Dr. John W. Brokaw, “Air Force Police—A History (LXXI)” *Tiger Flight*, Volume 14, Number 4 (July-August 2005), 19.

⁹⁰ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 1, 1975, 5.

⁹¹ Known as Safe Ramp in SAC, Safe Look in PACAF, and SAFE Nest in USAFE; *Security Police Digest*, Issue 1, 1975, 15.

⁹² *Security Police Digest*, Issue 1, 1975, 15.

⁹³ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 1, 1975, 15.

⁹⁴ Interview of Col Mike Hazen, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret) and Col James L. Conrad, USAF (Ret), January 23, 2005.

⁹⁵ Interview of Col Mike Hazen, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret) and Col James L. Conrad, USAF (Ret), January 23, 2005.

⁹⁶ Interview of Col Mike Hazen, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret) and Col James L. Conrad, USAF (Ret), January 23, 2005.

⁹⁷ Interview of Col Mike Hazen, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret) and Col James L. Conrad, USAF (Ret), January 23, 2005.

⁹⁸ History 321st Security Police Group January – March 1981, Volume No. 1, 8.

⁹⁹ *Security Police Digest*, Number 3, 1976.

¹⁰⁰ *Security Police Digest*, Number 1, 1976.

¹⁰¹ *Security Police Digest*, Number 1, 1976.

¹⁰² *Security Police Digest*, Number 1, 1980.

¹⁰³ Dr. John W. Brokaw, “Air Force Police—A History (LXIX)” *Tiger Flight*, Volume 14, Number 2 (March – April 2005), 19.

¹⁰⁴ ¹⁰⁴ Dr. John W. Brokaw, “Air Force Police—A History (LXIX)” *Tiger Flight*, Volume 14, Number 2 (March – April 2005), 19.

¹⁰⁵ Dr. John W. Brokaw, “Air Force Police—A History (LXXII)” *Tiger Flight*, Volume 14, Number 5 (September- October 2005), 19.

¹⁰⁶ Dr. John W. Brokaw, “Air Force Police—A History (LXX)” *Tiger Flight*, Volume 14, Number 3 (September- October 2005), 17 - 18.

¹⁰⁷ Dr. John W. Brokaw, “Air Force Police—A History (LXX)” *Tiger Flight*, Volume 14, Number 3 (September- October 2005), 17 - 18.

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- ¹⁰⁸ Capt Marie Shadden, *The Peacekeepers: Security Police History 1947 – 1982* (Lackland AFB, TX: USAF Security Police Academy, 1983), 223-224.
- ¹⁰⁹ Dr. John W. Brokaw, “Air Force Police—A History (LXX)” *Tiger Flight*, Volume 14, Number 3 (May-June 2005), 18.
- ¹¹⁰ Dr. John W. Brokaw, “Air Force Police—A History (LXX)” *Tiger Flight*, Volume 14, Number 3 (May-June 2005), 18.
- ¹¹¹ Capt Marie Shadden, *The Peacekeepers: Security Police History 1947 – 1982* (Lackland AFB, TX: USAF Security Police Academy, 1983), 136.
- ¹¹² *Security Police Digest*, Issue 1, 1976, 4.
- ¹¹³ Interview of SMSgt Sandra Szumanski, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), August 9, 2005.
- ¹¹⁴ Interview of SMSgt Sandra Szumanski, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), August 9, 2005.
- ¹¹⁵ Interview of SMSgt Sandra Szumanski, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), August 9, 2005.
- ¹¹⁶ Dr. John W. Brokaw, “Air Force Police—A History (LXXVI)” *Tiger Flight*, Volume 15, Number 2 (March- April 2006), 18.
- ¹¹⁷ Capt Marie Shadden, *The Peacekeepers: Security Police History 1947 – 1982* (Lackland AFB, TX: USAF Security Police Academy, 1983), 137.
- ¹¹⁸ Interview of SMSgt Sandra Szumanski, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), August 9, 2005.
- ¹¹⁹ “Women in the Security Police,” Air Force Security Forces Webpage (http://afsf.lackland.af.mil/Heritage/History/heritage_women.htm).
- ¹²⁰ Interview of SMSgt Sandra Szumanski, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), 9 August 2005.
- ¹²¹ “Kastner Earns Recognition As Founder Of SF Museum” Chanute AFB *Wings*, November 19, 1976.
- ¹²² “Kastner Earns Recognition As Founder Of SF Museum” Chanute AFB *Wings*, November 19, 1976.
- ¹²³ *Security Police Digest*, Number 3, 1976, 15.
- ¹²⁴ The new museum was dedicated in November 1979 by San Antonio Mayor Lila Cockrell and Chief of Security Police Brig Gen William R. Brooksher.
- ¹²⁵ *Security Police Digest*, Number 2, 1976.
- ¹²⁶ Capt Marie Shadden, *The Peacekeepers: Security Police History 1947 – 1982* (Lackland AFB, TX: USAF Security Police Academy, 1983), 194.
- ¹²⁷ Interview of Brig Gen William R. Brooksher, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), March 17, 2005.
- ¹²⁸ Interview of Lt Gen William E. Brown, Jr., USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), June 2006.
- ¹²⁹ Interview of Lt Gen William E. Brown, Jr., USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), June 2006.
- ¹³⁰ McLaurine was the first to hold the title of Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Chief of Security Police, his predecessors (CMSgts John Renfroe, Jr., Howard E. Redd, and Billy Weathington) were the Chief Master Sergeants of Security Police.
- ¹³¹ Interview of Lt Gen William E. Brown, Jr., USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), June 2006.
- ¹³² Interview of Lt Gen William E. Brown, Jr., USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), June 2006.
- ¹³³ *Security Police Digest*, Number 2, 1977, 3.
- ¹³⁴ *Security Police Digest*, Number 2, 1977, 3.
- ¹³⁵ “The Evolvment of the Air Force DoD Dog Program and Detachment 37” (RCS: HAF-CVA (AR) 7101 Kelly Air Force Base, Texas: September 1979), 23 (SF Museum).
- ¹³⁶ “The Evolvment of the Air Force DoD Dog Program and Detachment 37” (RCS: HAF-CVA (AR) 7101 Kelly Air Force Base, Texas: September 1979), 24.
- ¹³⁷ “The Evolvment of the Air Force DoD Dog Program and Detachment 37” (RCS: HAF-CVA (AR) 7101 Kelly Air Force Base, Texas: September 1979), 24.

- ¹³⁸ The dogs were tested at McChord, Myrtle Beach, Little Rock, Sheppard, Loring, Carswell, Fairchild, Whiteman, Edwards, McGuire, March, Charleston, and Scott AFBs and at Karamursel AS, Turkey.
- ¹³⁹ Dr. John W. Brokaw, "Air Force Police—A History (LXIX)" *Tiger Flight*, Volume 14, Number 2 (March- April 2005), 19.
- ¹⁴⁰ Col Jerry M. Bullock, "JCS Bold Eagle 78, After Action Report, 20 Dec 77" cited in Capt Marie Shadden, *The Peacekeepers: Security Police History 1947 – 1982* (Lackland AFB, TX: USAF Security Police Academy, 1983), 202.
- ¹⁴¹ Col Jerry M. Bullock, "JCS Bold Eagle 78, After Action Report, 20 Dec 77" cited in Capt Marie Shadden, *The Peacekeepers: Security Police History 1947 – 1982* (Lackland AFB, TX: USAF Security Police Academy, 1983), 202.
- ¹⁴² Col Jerry M. Bullock, "JCS Bold Eagle 78, After Action Report, 20 Dec 77" cited in Capt Marie Shadden, *The Peacekeepers: Security Police History 1947 – 1982* (Lackland AFB, TX: USAF Security Police Academy, 1983), 202.
- ¹⁴³ Dr. John W. Brokaw, "Air Force Police—A History (LXXVII), *Tiger Flight*, Vol. 15, Number 3 (May-June 2006), 17.
- ¹⁴⁴ Capt Marie Shadden, *The Peacekeepers: Security Police History 1947 – 1982* (Lackland AFB, TX: USAF Security Police Academy, 1983), 202.
- ¹⁴⁵ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 3, 1980, 5.
- ¹⁴⁶ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 3, 1980, 5.
- ¹⁴⁷ Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. 3, *The Grand Alliance* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950), 776-77.
- ¹⁴⁸ *Security Police Digest*, Number 1, 1978, 8.
- ¹⁴⁹ *Security Police Digest*, Number 1, 1978, 9.
- ¹⁵⁰ Email Mr. George Pasuer to Mr. Bruce Kilgore, February 11, 2000.
- ¹⁵¹ Interview of Lt Gen William E. Brown, Jr., USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), June 2006.
- ¹⁵² Interview of Col Jay A. Swander, USAF (Ret) by Col James L. Conrad, USAF (Ret), January 23, 2005.
- ¹⁵³ Interview of Lt Gen William E. Brown, Jr., USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), June 2006.
- ¹⁵⁴ Interview of Col Jay A. Swander, USAF (Ret) by Col James L. Conrad, USAF (Ret), January 23, 2005.
- ¹⁵⁵ Email Mr. George Passeur to Mr. Bruce Kilgore, February 11, 2000.
- ¹⁵⁶ Interview of Lt Gen William E. Brown, Jr., USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), June 2006.
- ¹⁵⁷ Lloyd J. Dumas, "Human Fallibility and Weapons," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 36, Number 9 (November 1980) as quoted in Amory B. Lovins and L. Hunter Lovins, *Brittle Power: Energy Strategy for National Security* (Andover, Mass: Brick House Publishing, 2001), 147.
- ¹⁵⁸ Lloyd J. Dumas, "Human Fallibility and Weapons," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 36, Number 9 (November 1980) as quoted in Amory B. Lovins and L. Hunter Lovins, *Brittle Power: Energy Strategy for National Security* (Andover, Mass: Brick House Publishing, 2001), 147.
- ¹⁵⁹ Interview of Col Jay A. Swander, USAF (Ret) by Col James L. Conrad, USAF (Ret), January 23, 2005.
- ¹⁶⁰ Interview of Col Jay A. Swander, USAF (Ret) by Col James L. Conrad, USAF (Ret), January 23, 2005.
- ¹⁶¹ Interview of Col Jay A. Swander, USAF (Ret) by Col James L. Conrad, USAF (Ret), January 23, 2005.
- ¹⁶² *Security Police Digest*, Number 2, 1978, 3.
- ¹⁶³ *Security Police Digest*, Number 2, 1978, 3.
- ¹⁶⁴ *Security Police Digest*, Number 2, 1978, 3.
- ¹⁶⁵ *Security Police Digest*, Number 2, 1978, 3.
- ¹⁶⁶ *Security Police Digest*, Number 1, 1980, 5.
- ¹⁶⁷ *Security Police Digest*, Number 1, 1980, 5.
- ¹⁶⁸ *Security Police Digest*, Number 1, 1980, 5.
- ¹⁶⁹ Brooksher first saw the title "The Peacekeepers" on a series of posters designed by Ms. Kari Fielder, the public affairs officer for the Chief of Security Police and liked the title so much he adopted it as the nickname of the Security Police (William R. Brooksher, "How the Peacekeepers Got Their Name" in Jerry M. Bullock, *Air Force Security Police, Volume II*, 36).

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- ¹⁷⁰ Interview of Brig Gen William R. Brooksher, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), March 17, 2005.
- ¹⁷¹ Interview of Brig Gen William R. Brooksher, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), March 17, 2005.
- ¹⁷² Interview of Brig Gen William R. Brooksher, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), March 17, 2005.
- ¹⁷³ Interview of Brig Gen William R. Brooksher, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), March 17, 2005.
- ¹⁷⁴ Interview of Brig Gen William R. Brooksher, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), March 17, 2005.
- ¹⁷⁵ Letter from CMSgt Chalma L. Sexton, Jr. to SSgt John S. Bandy, 18 April 1994.
- ¹⁷⁶ Letter from CMSgt Chalma L. Sexton, Jr. to SSgt John S. Bandy, 18 April 1994.
- ¹⁷⁷ Capt Marie Shadden, *The Peacekeepers: Security Police History 1947 – 1982* (Lackland AFB, TX: USAF Security Police Academy, 1983), 203.
- ¹⁷⁸ Capt Marie Shadden, *The Peacekeepers: Security Police History 1947 – 1982* (Lackland AFB, TX: USAF Security Police Academy, 1983), 204.
- ¹⁷⁹ Letter from CMSgt Chalma L. Sexton, Jr. to SSgt John S. Bandy, 18 April 1994
- ¹⁸⁰ Quoted in Capt Marie Shadden, *The Peacekeepers: Security Police History 1947 – 1982* (Lackland AFB, TX: USAF Security Police Academy, 1983), 204.
- ¹⁸¹ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 3, 1980, 12.
- ¹⁸² *Security Police Digest*, Issue 3, 1980, 12.
- ¹⁸³ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 3, 1980, 12.
- ¹⁸⁴ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 3, 1980, 12.
- ¹⁸⁵ *Security Police Digest*, Number 1, 1980, 4.
- ¹⁸⁶ *Security Police Digest*, Number 1, 1980, 4.
- ¹⁸⁷ History of the Air Force Office of Security Police, 1 Jan 1988 thru 31 Dec 1988, Volume II, Supporting Document II-1.
- ¹⁸⁸ *Security Police Digest*, Number 1, 1980, 6.
- ¹⁸⁹ History 321st Security Police Group January – March 1981, Volume No. 1, 9.
- ¹⁹⁰ History 321st Security Police Group January – March 1981, Volume No. 1, 9.
- ¹⁹¹ Mark Bowden, “The Desert One Debacle,” *The Atlantic Magazine Online* (http://iran.theatlantic.com/interactive_article_page_1.html).
- ¹⁹² *The Officer Down Memorial Page* (<http://www.odmp.org/officer/6437-security-policeman-william-c.-herrington>).

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CHAPTER EIGHT

THE END OF THE COLD WAR: 1981 – 1990

Twenty minutes after Ronald Wilson Reagan finished taking the oath of office as the 40th President of the United States on January 20, 1981, the Iranians, embroiled since the previous September in a vicious war with Saddam Hussein's Iraq and in need of one less enemy, released their American hostages. The settlement of the crisis negotiated through the Algerian government called for the release of billions of dollars in Iranian assets in the United States frozen on Carter's orders. The timing of the release until after Reagan's inauguration was seen by many as a final affront to Carter, whom the Iranians despised.



President Ronald W. Reagan (White House photo)

President Reagan graciously asked his predecessor to travel to Rhein-Main AB, West Germany, to personally welcome the hostages home after their flight from Iran. The 435th SPS at Rhein-Main quickly set up procedures for crowd control, German police liaison, Secret Service liaison, and motorcade security for the trip to the Wiesbaden military hospital. Additional manpower was supplied by the Security Police squadrons at Zweibrucken, Spangdahlem, Ramstein, Bitburg, Hahn, and Sembach Air Bases and the Army's 42nd Military Police Group.¹

On January 21, after 444 days in captivity, the former hostages were welcomed as heroes by former President Carter, former Vice President Mondale, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, and a host of other dignitaries. The hostages were quickly transported to Wiesbaden where the 7100th SPS provided round the clock security.² A national embarrassment and agony was over, but the rise of Islamic fundamentalism as a threat was just beginning.

Much of Reagan's inaugural speech that January Tuesday was devoted to the nation's economic woes and the rising Federal deficit. But Reagan was a dedicated Cold Warrior and he had this warning for America's chief adversary, the Soviet Union:

As for the enemies of freedom, those who are potential adversaries, they will be reminded that peace is the highest aspiration of the American people. We will negotiate for it, sacrifice for it; we will not surrender for it—now or ever. Our forbearance should never be misunderstood. Our reluctance for conflict should not be misjudged as a failure of will. When action is required to preserve our national security, we will act. We will maintain sufficient strength to prevail if

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need be, knowing that if we do so we have the best chance of never having to use that strength.³

It is likely that this passage was dismissed as inaugural posturing by the Kremlin; if so they underestimated Reagan's resolve and failed to appreciate that the days of containment and détente were over because Ronald Reagan intended to destroy Communism in general and the Soviet Union in particular. His plan was uncomplicated. "Here's my strategy on the Cold War," he once told someone. "We win, they lose."⁴ So confident was he of freedom's victory over tyranny that only two months after surviving an assassination attempt by a deranged John Hinckley, Jr., Reagan told an audience at Notre Dame University, "The years ahead will be great ones for our country, for the cause of freedom and the spread of civilization. The West will not contain Communism; it will transcend Communism. We will not bother to denounce it; we'll dismiss it as a sad, bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages are even now being written."⁵ Communism, he predicted, in a speech before the British House of Commons would be left on the "ash heap of history."⁶

Reagan's strategy was a reincarnation of Eisenhower's Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's "roll back" strategy that advocated confronting and pushing back Soviet influence in the world. The Reagan Doctrine would rely primarily upon overt aid to those resisting Soviet domination in the Middle East, South America, and elsewhere, but Reagan did not discount the possibility of direct American military intervention when needed. By 1983, the Reagan Doctrine was encapsulated in National Security Council National Security Decision Directive 75 which proclaimed that a central priority of the US in its policy toward the Soviet Union would be "to contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism" particularly in the developing world. The directive also noted that, "The US must rebuild the credibility of its commitment to resist Soviet encroachment on US interests and those of its Allies and friends, and to support effectively those Third World states that are willing to resist Soviet pressures or oppose Soviet initiatives hostile to the United States, or are special targets of Soviet policy."⁷

Politicians and experts on all sides disagreed with Reagan's analysis and as the depth of his resolve became clear they attacked his policy toward the Soviets as dangerous, destabilizing, and unrealistic. No President had ever seriously set a goal of defeating Soviet Communism and the prevailing opinion for years had been that the United States could coexist with it and contain its spread, but it could not defeat it. Reagan's confidence, however, was based on what he perceived as the broken Soviet economic system and he and his advisors were convinced that in an all out arms race, the Soviets would not be able to keep up. Faced with a choice between guns or butter the Soviet people would demand butter and what Reagan branded the "evil empire" would collapse from within.⁸

To provoke this Soviet crisis, Reagan and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger sought to dramatically increase defense spending to fill the "hollow force" and expand and modernize America's armed forces. In their first funding request to Congress, Reagan and Weinberger submitted a supplemental defense appropriation of \$7

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billion for FY 1981 along with a proposed increase of almost \$26 billion over Carter's FY 1982 defense budget proposal. Military pay was dramatically increased to attract qualified volunteers, equipment was upgraded and modernized, and a concerted effort made to restore military morale and exorcise the ghosts of Vietnam.

General Brooksher's Peacekeeper 80 program had already begun to increase morale and discipline within the Security Police force and he told the field in early 1981 that, "We've made impressive progress providing better equipment, facilities, training, and, in general, an improved quality of life. Most importantly, our young policemen have displayed a dedication to the concept of an elite force that the 'nay-sayers' said we would never see!"⁹ In support of his optimism Brooksher reported that Personal Reliability Program (PRP) disqualifications which stripped an SP of his ability to carry weapons had dropped from 4,646 in 1979 to 1,924 in 1980; the number of identified cop drug abusers declined from 1,027 to 957 during that period; and reenlistments in the security field rose from 20 percent to 26 percent.¹⁰

Discipline in the Security Police was seen as harsh by some in the Air Force and Brooksher's emphasis on enforcing high standards seemed to make it even more draconian. One commander explained that high standards were demanded and enforced because "every airman wearing the shield of a Security Policeman has...the authority and responsibility to perform a law enforcement and security mission with nearly total discretion... [and] Vesting airmen with this awesome responsibility...does require detailed guidelines and strictly enforceable policies."¹¹ While airmen in other career fields might do what they liked on their off-duty time, for an SP, "Once the shield goes on, it doesn't come off. On duty, the shield is worn as a uniform item. Off duty, it becomes an attitude."¹²

Although when approached by the RAF Regiment commander early on in his tenure to discuss air base ground defense, Brooksher had to confess "I really...didn't know what he was talking about," he soon became a forceful advocate for a robust Security Police ABGD capability and many commanders shared his concerns.¹³ There was support among some of these officers for an "RAF Regiment" for the Air Force and two dedicated air base defense flights were in fact fielded with great success; unfortunately, they were the only two such flights in the entire Air Force.¹⁴ Two more flights, the 101st and 102nd Air Base Defense (ABD) Flights, were established by the Texas Air National Guard at Biggs Army Airfield near El Paso and additional ABD flights were planned for the Air Force Reserve starting in FY 84.¹⁵ Brooksher also obtained funding beginning in 1981 for the Air Base Ground Defense Program which sought to address shortcomings in air base defense both overseas and stateside by training and equipping 187 forty-four-man defense flights.¹⁶ He also sought to identify and focus on the threat to his air bases since the air base ground defense organization was wasting resources "fiddling around with everything from taking on the 13th Russian shock army to capturing a little old lady in tennis shoes."¹⁷

Perhaps with Mr. Churchill's admonition concerning air base defense in mind, Brooksher advocated that all "nonessential" base personnel be trained for a role in base

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defense. Years later, when this had still not been done, he expressed his frustration and his opinion that, “everyone in uniform...ought to be prepared to fight and have at least the rudimentary training and skills for doing so” and frankly stated that he “didn’t really care when the enemy special forces showed up whether a fully combat qualified SP or a part timer killed him. I just wanted it to happen promptly on his arrival.”¹⁸

Brooksher also recognized that air defense was a necessary component of base defense and that this was another responsibility of the Army that it had failed to adequately perform. Since what few anti-aircraft missiles the Army had were deployed to protect its own installations, it was obvious to Brooksher that this was another mission the Air Force, and probably the Security Police, would have to take on. While he recognized the need, Brooksher did not rush to pick up that responsibility unless the Air Force formally took on the mission and provided the necessary manpower and equipment to do it. Although in 1984 PACAF formed “Stinger” shoulder-fired missile equipped Security Police air defense teams in the 8th SPS at Kunsan and the 51st SPS at Osan, Korea, the Air Force never officially assumed the air defense mission as part of air base defense.¹⁹

Brig Gen Bill Brooksher retired from the Air Force effective September 1, 1981. In addition to his efforts to create a disciplined, professional force, Brooksher continually sought and fought to improve training, equipment, and manning. While progress had been made in all these areas, by the time of his retirement he was disappointed that they were still below what he believed was optimum.²⁰ Overall his tenure as “Top Cop” was a success and nearly 25 years later one officer praised him as a “thinker and planner [whose] legacy is still being felt in the career field.”²¹



Brooksher’s replacement was Col Larry J. Runge. Runge was a 1958 graduate of the University of Missouri and was commissioned through its ROTC program. Originally slated to become an intelligence officer, Runge upon reporting for active duty at Beale AFB “went down to personnel the first morning and was told that they didn’t need any more intelligence officers. But they surely needed some Air Police officers.”²² Even though a perhaps reluctant recruit, Runge excelled as an air policeman and had a reputation as a “fast burner,” having been promoted three times below the primary promotion zone and making full colonel with only 15 years of service. Runge was a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and had served in Vietnam. But from his first day as CSP he labored against the perception among some that he was “an interim... just somebody filling the chair until...whoever the chief was got there.”²³ This perception

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caused him some difficulties in gaining support for various initiatives, particularly at the MAJCOMs, and made it almost impossible for Runge to make any lasting changes.

Along with that of the rest of armed forces, Runge's attention as CSP was drawn to the growing threat of terrorism. In his first "From the Chief's Desk" column in the *Security Police Digest* he noted that for security policemen "the world has become a more dangerous place."²⁴ Alluding to the January 11th attack upon Muñiz Air National Guard Base in Puerto Rico by Macheteros separatist group commandos that destroyed 11 A-7 "Corsair II" aircraft worth approximately \$45 million, Runge noted that terrorists had "targeted the US military, literally declaring war on us."²⁵ Unmentioned by Runge, but well known by his readers, were the August bomb attack by the Red Army Faction on Ramstein AB, West Germany, that injured twenty Americans and the unsuccessful rocket attack in September by the same group upon the staff car carrying the commander of USAEUR.

No less a personage than retired Gen Curtis LeMay, a perennial competitor at the annual Security Police marksmanship competition, had urged in 1979 that, "The Security Police should establish an elite force...specially trained in antiterrorist capabilities. You will need the entire spectrum of talent and capability from helicopter assault to scuba diving, and more important than [anything] else, you must train each and every day! If most of the foreign countries can do this, there is no reason in the world we can't..."²⁶ While Runge's vision did not go that far, he did note that six security policemen were going to be enrolled in every Army Ranger Course and those who survived would "number among the world's best trained soldiers."²⁷ In addition, Runge noted that, "If we are to defeat our terrorist enemies, every security police man and woman will have to dedicate himself or herself to the effort...The one thing a terrorist can't cope with is an alert, suspicious policeman."²⁸

In November 1981, the annual Security Police marksmanship competition was expanded into a competition testing the full panoply of combat skills. Held at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, the Security Police Combat Competition, or "Peacekeeper Challenge," saw Security Police teams representing all Air Force major commands, the RAF Regiment, the Canadian Defense Forces, and the Royal Australian Air Force going head-to-head in marksmanship, tactical, and MWD competitions.²⁹

Runge proclaimed that the "competition proved more successful than any of us thought possible" and noted that much of this success was due to the first use of the newly developed multi-integrated laser engagement system (MILES).³⁰ MILES allowed for more realistic



Airman in MILES gear. Black "bumps" on helmet and straps on chest are receivers for registering laser "hits." (Air Force photo)

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training by registering “hits” between opposing forces in tactical exercises. Gone was the war game umpire who sometimes subjectively designated who was a casualty, replaced now by a dispassionate electronic system that couldn’t be fooled and couldn’t be argued with.

Additional combat training was provided at Nellis AFB, Nevada’s, Silver Flag Alpha site, beginning in 1981. Modeled on TAC’s “Flag” exercises such as Red Flag for tactical fighter pilots, Silver Flag was to provide realistic ground defense training. Two sites, Silver Flag Alpha in the west to simulate a desert warfare environment and Silver Flag Bravo in the east to provide a more European terrain, were planned; however, only Alpha was ultimately constructed.³¹ Although constructed by Tactical Air Command to primarily train its own Security Police force, SPs from throughout the Air Force also trained at the Silver Flag Alpha site.

Security policemen got a chance to demonstrate their ground defense skills from February 13 to April 26, 1982, during the annual Team Spirit exercise with the South Koreans. Over 100,000 South Korean and 55,000 American troops, including Security Police, from Hawaii, Okinawa and the continental United States participated in the exercise. The North Koreans made their usual demand that the exercise be cancelled and as usual the demand was rejected.³²

On March 1, 1982, a change in leadership came to AFOSP as Brig Gen (select) P. Neal Scheidel replaced Runge as chief of Security Police, commander of the Air Force Office of Security Police, and Air Force Inspector General for Security. The forty-six-year-old Scheidel was a native of Nebraska who joined the Air Force as an air policeman after his graduation from Stanford University in October 1959. He spent his entire career in the air/security police career field and when he pinned on his star on Christmas Eve 1982 became the first career “cop” ever promoted to general officer rank.



Brig Gen P. Neal Scheidel (Air Force photo)

CMSgt Robert McLaurine also retired from the Air Force that spring after serving as Senior Enlisted Advisor for five years and three CSPs and was succeeded on April 1, 1982, by CMSgt John T. Adkins. Adkins, a recognized expert in crime prevention, came to the job from the AFOSP Operations Division at Kirtland. He and Scheidel would have to face the challenges of molding the Security Police into a force capable of supporting the muscular strategy of the Reagan Administration.

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The Reagan Doctrine and the administration's aggressive strategy to confront the Soviets and win the Cold War enlarged the mission of the Security Police. One of the new weapons systems scheduled to be deployed in Europe to counter the threat of Soviet SS-20 multiple warhead, reloadable IRBMs, was the BGM-109G



BGM-109G "Gryphon" Ground Launch Cruise Missile (GLCM), Hill AFB, Utah (Air Force photo)

"Gryphon" Ground Launch Cruise Missile or GLCM. Deployment of the nuclear capable GLCM, along with the Army "Pershing II" nuclear missile, was agreed to by NATO in 1979 as part of a "dual track" approach to solving the problem of the SS-20. The political track was an ongoing effort to engage the Soviets in serious talks aimed at curbing the intermediate range nuclear forces of both sides, while the military track would be the NATO deployment in Europe of hundreds of GLCMs and Pershing IIs unless Moscow agreed to halt and then reduce deployment of the SS-20.

GLCM was a modified version of the Navy's Tomahawk sea launched cruise missile. Development began in 1977 and resulted in a weapons system consisting of 21-foot-long missiles stored in protective aluminum canisters loaded onto Transporter Erector Launchers



GLCM Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) (Air Force Magazine)

Erector Launchers (TEL), giant 78,000-pound M.A.N.

(Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nuernberg) diesel tractor trailers. By early 1981, the GLCM subsystems were being tested for deployment. From February 27 to March 23, 1981, the security subsystem underwent testing at Camp Bullis, Texas.³³ On July 1, 1981, the 868th Tactical Missile Training

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Squadron at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona, became operational and served as the source of trained crews to staff the forward deployed wings.³⁴ Many of the GLCM personnel were former ICBM missileers and many found the mobility of the GLCM a source of excitement compared to the countless hours sitting in an underground missile silo.

A new Security Police organization and new tactics would be needed for GLCM security. At each GLCM base, the missiles and supporting vehicles were stored in huge underground, hardened facilities in the GLCM Alert and Maintenance Area or GAMA. The GAMA was secured in accordance with AFR 207 series directives combining the requirements of a quick reaction area (QRA) and a Weapons Storage Area (WSA) within the same fenced compound.³⁵ A major difference between the GAMA and usual WSA security was that one-third of the GAMA security force was made up of host nation forces. In the United Kingdom the RAF Regiment supplied the host nation contingent while in Italy the elite Carabinieri were selected by the Italian government.³⁶

The GLCM Dispersal Flight consisted of 16 missiles, 44 security policemen, 19 maintenance personnel, four launch control officers and 22 vehicles. When so ordered the flight would proceed to pre-surveyed, concealed locations to erect and prepare the missiles for firing. During exercises, the flight never went to its actual operational site. Dispersal flight security was based on the AFR 206-2 distributed area defense doctrine and in the field the Security Police assigned to the flight reported to the flight commander who in turn reported to the wing DCO/Operations, transforming the Security Police from support to operational assets. Each GLCM was assigned a Security Police Group comprised of a Security Police Squadron and Missile Security Squadron.³⁷ The SPS handled day-to-day security and law enforcement for the base while the MSS was responsible for GAMA and dispersal flight security.

Training of security policemen in GLCM security began in July 1982 with the 30-day-long Security, Survivability, Safety (S³) field deployment at Camp Robinson, Arkansas. In January 1983, the same security force that participated in the S³ deployment reassembled for the Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (ITO&E) of the GLCM at Fort Lewis/McChord AFB, Washington. The ITO&E was designed as a 30-day “model mission” and utilized the actual GLCM hardware including launch control centers (LLCs), TELs, and Chevrolet K-10 “Blazers” as interim security vehicles. The IOT&E resulted in some adjustment in tactics, but confirmed the overall security concept of operations.³⁸ A total of 1,500 security policemen were projected to be needed for GLCM security.³⁹

The first GLCM wing, the 501st Tactical Missile Wing (TMW), stood up at RAF Greenham Common, United Kingdom, in July 1982 and was declared operational the following year. Over the next five years additional wings were based at Comiso AB, Italy (487th TMW, June 1983), Florennes AB, Belgium (485th TMW, August 1984), Wueschheim AB, West Germany (38th TMW, April 1985), RAF Molesworth, United Kingdom (303rd TMW, December 1986), and Woensdrecht AB, Netherlands (486th TMW, August 1987).

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The growing anti-nuclear weapons movement did not regard these new weapons as a counter to the threat of the Soviet Union's SS-20 intermediate-range missiles targeted at them. Instead they were a “terrifying sign of the Western alliance's determination to be able to fight and win a nuclear war, if necessary.”⁴⁰ “They don't add to our security, but [they] increase our insecurity,” asserted Bruce Kent, the head of Britain's Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.⁴¹ The Soviets encouraged this sentiment and the NATO countries that had agreed to accept the missiles came under great domestic pressure to reverse course.

Of all of the European protestors those at the Greenham Common peace camp, also known as the Greenham Common Ladies, were probably the best known. The ladies and others, who lived outside the gates of Greenham Common for years, were a constant pain in the neck to base officials. Well organized, they had a camp newsletter and even a protest songbook with hits such as “Brazen Hussies,” “There's A Hole In Your Fence,” “Take the Toys Away From the Boys,” and the ever popular “The Chief of Police,” sung to the tune of the child's rhyme “The Duke of York.”⁴²

The ladies always seemed to know when GLCM units would be leaving the base to practice launch deployments on the Salisbury Plain and tried to lie down in the road in front of the convoy or pelted the vehicles with eggs and paint. As one wing officer said, “We had to 'protester proof' the vehicles” which involved wiring the vehicles' gas caps shut to prevent the introduction of “foreign material” and protecting sensitive parts of the vehicles from the hail of paint bombs.⁴³



Greenham Common ladies camp (Air Force photo)

Sometimes the ladies actions were more aggressive such as an incident where 22 of the protestors stole an Air Force bus and drove to the GAMA security fence which they claimed to have cut through.⁴⁴ The Security Police and the British Ministry of Defense Police were the primary opponents of the protestors and anything the ladies could get their hands to help discredit the police became part of their arsenal in that

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battle. Somehow they obtained Lt Col David P. Mill's end of year report for the 501st SPG for 1985 and circulated it underlining in his list of the year's accomplishments the entry "we hit one peacewoman with a vehicle" as supposed evidence of the bloodthirstiness of the Security Police.⁴⁵ By November 1984, it was claimed that 2,013 arrests had been made at Greenham Common and that it had cost the Newbury Council over £9,000 to evict the women from their camps on a daily basis.⁴⁶ It was without exaggeration that AFOSP called the GLCM security mission "probably one of the most difficult with which the security police field has ever been challenged."⁴⁷

The Air Force reorganized in 1982 by standing up a new major command. On June 21, the Air Force officially announced its decision to form Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) with headquarters at Peterson AFB, Colorado, effective 1 September. The establishment of AFSPC marked the culmination of a long effort to create a separate military command for space operations. As early as November 1957, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Thomas D. White had declared that the Air Force "must win the capability to control space."⁴⁸ Space Command grew quickly as the following year Strategic Air Command passed to Space Command operational responsibility for a worldwide network of more than twenty-five space surveillance and missile warning sensors.

A new command and new weapons systems such as GLCM, along with security for the soon to be fielded MX ICBM which was estimated to require another 3,700 security policemen, resulted in an FY 82 requirement for nearly 10,000 men and women, or one out of every six Air Force recruits, to be trained by the Security Police Academy.⁴⁹ However, the schoolhouse was experiencing an unacceptable 9.2 percent attrition rate from the Security Specialist Course and a 10.4 percent washout rate in the Law Enforcement Specialist Course that threatened its ability to meet this daunting training requirement.⁵⁰

To lower the attrition rate, academy commandant Col Carl DeNisio proposed to the Air Force Military Training Center commander, Lt Gen Spence Armstrong, that Wilford Hall Medical Center assign a clinical psychologist to the academy to "assist...in predicting through possible screening procedures the type of individual who we should be recruiting and training to become security policemen."⁵¹ While Armstrong understood the reasons for DeNisio's proposal, he wanted two questions answered: Couldn't this screening be done during the enlistment process and would basic trainees "game the test" to get reclassified from security police?⁵² DeNisio retired that October and it is unclear from the surviving records whether his proposal was ever implemented.

At least one psychological study of Security Police trainees was underway during 1982. Dr. Preston Abbott of Abbott Associates was contracted by the Defense Nuclear Agency to conduct a Security Police behavioral study aimed at validating a concept to align Security Police into tactical fire teams with leadership supplied by sergeants. The purpose of this alignment was "to improve morale and operations by instilling a sense of belonging and responsibility in our young peer-level supervisory personnel."⁵³ Dr.

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Abbott visited the Security Police Academy on at least two occasions that year to interview trainees and gather data for his study.

Beginning in late 1982, the Security Police undertook a comprehensive study of its wartime and peacetime responsibilities and duties. In the past, Security Police manning and resources had been based on peacetime requirements with little long range wartime planning. In September, Scheidel formed a task force headed by Col Hart J. Guenther to address the fundamental problem that the Security Police was “not organized in peacetime to fight a war.”⁵⁴ The main threat in wartime was identified as Soviet Operational Maneuver Groups (OMG) with the capability to make deeper penetrations into rear areas with heavier forces. Once behind the lines these OMGs were capable of seizing air bases.

Based on the study, a plan of action was developed that by FY 1989 would “place the necessary emphasis on our mission of base defense, and then adjust for peacetime needs.”⁵⁵ This emphasis would necessarily result in units with an organization “configured more to a fighting unit with peacetime duties” rather than the other way around.⁵⁶ In addition to unit organization, improvements in training and equipment were also part of the action plan that, as Col Guenther noted, applied the principle of “Organize in Peace as for War.”⁵⁷ However, despite several manpower studies seeking to establish a manpower standard for the Security Police that tied manning to wartime conditions and mission factors such as terrain and the area to be defended rather than one based upon numbers of aircraft and other resources to be protected, the Security Police remained without a wartime manpower standard into the 1990’s.⁵⁸

Deployments of Security Police personnel away from their home station to defend and secure Air Force personnel and resources began to increase as the Reagan administration implemented its strategic goal of containing and ultimately defeating Communism worldwide. In June 1982, Pamerola AB, Honduras, was constructed to contain the threat to other Central American countries posed by the Marxist Sandista government of Nicaragua. By 1983, a force of over 1,100 Americans was assigned to Pamerola as part of Joint Task Force (JTF) Bravo. The primary mission of the task force was to support United States military exercises and to demonstrate the resolve of the United States to support Honduras against the Nicaraguan threat. Confronting Nicaraguan Marxism would have a price paid in lives. On January 22, 1985, a C-121 “Caribou” transport went down off the coast of Honduras, killing all 21 aboard. Among the dead were four security policemen.⁵⁹

While ABGD might be the “primary mission of the security police...nuclear security remains our number one peacetime priority,” noted General Scheidel in early 1983.⁶⁰ Improvements were underway in the nuclear security area, the most important of those probably being changes in the way nuclear weapons had traditionally been stored. For years nuclear weapons were stored in aboveground “igloo”-type structures guarded by sentries and alarms and these facilities needed security upgrades. As a short term fix, “access delay components” such as deadbolts on storage unit doors, barriers shielding the doors from armor piercing rounds, securing devices for weapon trailers while in storage,

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and smoke generators to fill a storage unit with smoke in the event of a break-in were installed.⁶¹ In addition, better fences, lighting, hardened facilities and vehicles, new sensors, and increased manpower were all fielded to “create an extremely formidable security system...at every base which possesses nuclear resources.”⁶²

A long term fix was the Weapon Storage and Security System (WS³) funded for construction in Europe. The WS³ was a vault system placed underground within the hardened shelter for the aircraft that would carry the weapon. This arrangement would “provide better security and survivability for the weapons” according to AFOSP and save Security Police manpower by incorporating closed circuit cameras, alarms, and other electronic security systems.⁶³ AFOSP believed that underground storage was the wave of the future and promised that they were “working on an underground storage system using state-of-the-art equipment.”⁶⁴

Even though the threat posed by terrorists was high and the resources to provide a formidable nuclear security program were deployed, many units were failing their nuclear surety inspections for deficiencies ranging from inoperable sensors with no measures to compensate for their loss to failure to meet required response times. “The majority of the errors,” AFOSP declared, “are the result of a lack of supervisory involvement—other matters have been placed ahead of nuclear security!”⁶⁵ Security Police commanders were directed to examine their nuclear security program “and make sure that the recent unfavorable trend is reversed.”⁶⁶



Combat arms training on the M-16 (Security Forces Museum)

While the force may have had its problems, a lack of manpower was not one of them. After being perennial beggars for manpower for years by 1983, all Security Police specialties—security, law enforcement, and dog handlers—were manned in excess of 100 percent.⁶⁷ In fact, the career field had too many technical sergeants and rumors spread that some number of them would be involuntarily cross-trained to different AFSCs. Chief Adkins confirmed that there were overages and that retraining would be inevitable for some, but stressed that he and General Scheidel would resist any forced retraining of non-volunteers.⁶⁸

Even more manpower was added to the career field on June 1,

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1983, when an organizational change placed the 732 Combat Arms Training and Maintenance (CATM) personnel at Air Force bases worldwide under AFOSP and Smalls Arms Marksmanship Training was redesignated as Combat Arms Training.⁶⁹

By 1983 the civil war in Lebanon between Christian, Muslim, Palestinian militias, and Israeli and Syrian forces had been raging for eight years. In a “peace” agreement brokered in August 1982 by US Ambassador Phillip Habib, Israel, which had invaded Lebanon to eliminate Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) fighters in the country, agreed to pull back from the Lebanese capital of Beirut and the PLO agreed to evacuate to Tripoli, Tunisia. As part of a multinational peacekeeping force, 1,800 United States Marines of the 1st Battalion, 8th Marine Division were stationed in Beirut with their headquarters at Beirut International Airport. Contingents from France, Italy, and the United Kingdom also occupied parts of the city. Although neutral, the peacekeepers had increasingly become the targets of the various Muslim and Christian militias still fighting in and around the city. On April 18, in a sign of escalating violence against Americans, the US Embassy in Beirut was bombed, killing 63 people. This death toll was trifling compared to what was to come.

Around 6:20 on the morning of October 23, 1983, a yellow Mercedes-Benz delivery truck turned down an access road leading to the Marine headquarters compound at Beirut International. After circling a parking lot, the driver accelerated, crashed through a barbed wire fence around the parking lot, ran by two sentry posts manned by sentries armed only with pistols, rammed through a gate, and crashed into the lobby of the Marine headquarters building. As the truck came to a stop the suicide bomber inside, a member of the Iranian-backed Hezbollah, triggered a bomb equivalent to 12,000 pounds of TNT. The explosion collapsed the four-story cinder-block building, crushing to death many inside. Almost simultaneously, an identical attack occurred against the barracks of the Third Company of the French Sixth Parachute Infantry Regiment. At the Marine headquarters 241 American servicemen died while 58 paratroopers were killed at the French barracks. This was the deadliest single-day death toll for the United States Marine Corps since the Battle of Iwo Jima in World War II.

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SSgt Richard Babilacqua and his MWD at the Corniche Checkpoint, Beirut, Lebanon, 1984 (Security Forces Museum)

There was no serious retaliation for the Beirut bombing from the United States and the Marines were moved to ships offshore where they could not be targeted. On February 7, 1984, the order was given for the Marines to withdraw from Lebanon. Middle Eastern terrorists saw this withdrawal as a victory and a sign of American weakness and Islamic terrorist activity against Americans accordingly increased.

Despite the loss of life in Lebanon and the rise of Islamic terrorism, often funded by the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Reagan administration was not diverted from its goal of destroying Communism and aggressively confronting its expansion. Consequently, events on the tiny Caribbean island of Grenada, a former British colony, had drawn the administration's attention.

On March 13, 1979, the New Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education, and Liberation (New Jewel) movement ousted Sir Eric Gary, Grenada's prime minister, in a nearly bloodless coup and established a people's revolutionary government headed by Maurice Bishop. Bishop's Marxist-Leninist government established close ties with Cuba, the Soviet Union, and other Communist-bloc countries and the Reagan administration was particularly concerned that Bishop was allowing Cuba to construct a military-grade airport using Cuban military engineers. That concern heightened when the Grenadian Army, controlled by former Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coward, seized power in a coup and murdered Bishop on October 13, 1983. The violence of the coup and Coward's hard-line Marxism deeply troubled neighboring Caribbean nations and the safety of nearly 1,000 American medical students studying at Grenada's St. George's Medical Center added to the administration's concern over events on the island. The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States and Grenada's Governor-General Sir Paul Scion, the Queen's

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representative on the island, soon requested American help to combat the growing influence of Cuba and other Communist countries on the island.

At dawn, on October 25, 1983, American Marines, Army Rangers, Navy SEAL commandos and elements of the 82nd Airborne Division invaded Grenada in Operation Urgent Fury. The Marines attacked the airport at Pearls by helicopter and achieved almost total surprise. The Army, transported by C-130s of the Military Airlift Command to Port Salinas, was not as lucky and the initial assault



American wounded being loaded aboard a C-141 during Operation Urgent Fury (Air Force photo)

force had to parachute at low altitude when it was discovered that the runway had been blocked by construction equipment. The small Grenadian army along with Cuban soldiers and workers who were constructing the airport at Point Salinas, put up an unexpectedly fierce resistance, but were eventually overwhelmed by the more than 7,000 troops in the invasion force. By November the leaders of the military government were arrested, and a smorgasbord of international Communists—Cubans, Russians, North Koreans, Libyans, East Germans, and Bulgarians—had been rounded up and put in a detention camp.

Air Force Security Police from several MAC units participated in Urgent Fury and provided security for Air Force assets at Roosevelt Roads Naval Air Station in Puerto Rico and at Pearls and Port Salinas airfields on Grenada. MAC also deployed its Volant Scorpion team from Little Rock AFB, Arkansas, under the command of Capt Lawrence R. Lane. Volant Scorpion, later designated the 1314th Ground Combat Readiness Evaluation Squadron, was specially trained in air base ground defense.⁷⁰ Captain Lane also served as commander, US Air Force Ground Defense Force. Among the other duties performed by the Security Police in Operation Urgent Fury were overseeing the evacuation of Soviet diplomats and non-combatants and guarding nearly 700 Cuban prisoners until they were transported to the island Barbados for repatriation.⁷¹ By

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December 1983 all US troops were withdrawn from Grenada, as a caretaker government organized by Governor-General Scion took over.

Urgent Fury had uncovered flaws in joint planning and operations including incompatible communications equipment and a lack of clear understanding of the limits of their authority on the part of several senior commanders. “Jointness” became the order of the day and the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 codified a more “purple” Pentagon and resulted in the most extensive reorganization of the Department of Defense since 1947.⁷²

Even before Goldwater-Nichols, the Army and Air Force sought to establish an interservice relationship to facilitate joint operations between the two services. The result of this effort was the Memorandum of Agreement on US Army-US Air Force Joint Force Development Process signed by the Army and Air Force chiefs of staff on May 22, 1984.⁷³

Two of the 31 initiatives in the agreement directly affected the Security Police. Initiative 8 (Initiatives on Air Base Ground Defense) of the agreement required that the Army and Air Force develop a joint service agreement providing for Army units to provide air base ground defense outside the base perimeter and for the operational control of Army units performing the ABGD mission by the appropriate air component commander. The agreement required the Air Force to transfer Air Force Reserve manpower authorizations to the Army if the Air Force ABGD requirements exceeded Army capabilities and that the two services develop joint procedures for rear area security. Initiative 9 (Initiative for ABGD Flight Training) mandated the development of a joint service agreement for the Army to provide initial and follow-on training for Air Force security flights.

General Scheidel responded to concerns concerning the future of the ABGD mission by assuring the field that, “For the near term, Air Force Security Police will continue to have a very important role in ABGD” since the Air Force would “retain sole responsibilities for internal base defense and primary responsibility for external defense until the Army determines and fields its force structure.”⁷⁴

Demonstrating the continued importance of ABGD to the Security Police, that summer AFOSP for the first time hosted an ABGD exercise. Held at Camp Robinson, Arkansas, from July 9 through 19, Safe Defender One exposed 450 SPs to what they would have to do if called upon to defend an air base. The exercise, directed by AFOSP operations chief Col Robert F. Hartman, was designed to “provide hard information to Air Force security police leaders on their readiness to perform the mission of protecting and defending national resources.”⁷⁵ The participants, representing eight major commands and AFOSI, were generally pleased with the experience and praised the realism of the exercise. Hartman was also satisfied with Safe Defender One and based on the skills he saw exhibited at Camp Robinson believed, “our security forces would provide a formidable deterrent to any potential aggressor, anywhere...”⁷⁶

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Defense against terrorism and force protection began to rival that of traditional ABGD on the list of Security Police priorities. This new importance was in response to the escalation of terrorist attacks against Americans and American facilities. Since the bombing of the Marine headquarters in Beirut, a Navy officer had been shot by the November 17 terrorist group in Athens, Greece, when his car stopped at a traffic light; the American Embassy in Kuwait was targeted by Iraqi Shia Muslim terrorists who attempted to destroy the building with a truck bomb; Army BGEN James Dozier had been kidnapped from his home in Verona, Italy, by Italian Red Brigades terrorists and held for 45 days until Italian special forces rescued him; William Buckley, the CIA station chief in Beirut, Lebanon, had been kidnapped by the Iranian backed Islamic Jihad (Hezbollah) and was tortured and executed by his captors; 18 American servicemen had been killed and eighty-three people injured in a bomb attack on a restaurant near Torrejon AB, Spain; and Hezbollah had launched a suicide bomb attack on the US Embassy in East Beirut that killed 23 people and wounded 21 others including the American and British ambassadors. In this asymmetrical war the protection of nuclear weapons against terrorist attempts to seize such a weapon and protecting Air Force installations at home and abroad became a recurring theme and a serious concern for the Security Police.

To coordinate Security Police antiterrorism measures within the Air Force, AFOSP created the Antiterrorism Branch within the Air Base Defense Division. As chief of the branch, Maj David Linn would work closely with AFOSI to ensure that AFOSP had the latest terrorist threat information and “coordinate concepts, doctrine, tactics, training, and equipment for Air Force security police antiterrorism operations.”⁷⁷ The branch would also cross feed concepts developed by one MAJCOM to other commands.

At the 28th Worldwide Security Police Symposium, Air Force Secretary Verne Orr spoke to an audience of senior Security Police leadership on the subject of terrorism. Orr highlighted the change in Middle Eastern terrorist tactics from bombing empty buildings to suicide bombings of occupied targets and noted that “a brand new terrorism: state-sponsored terrorism” provided a new, more complicated threat.⁷⁸ In the past, Orr explained, “terrorists have acted independently in small groups for what they believed was a just cause. Now unfriendly governments are finding terrorism is: first, cheap; second, low risk; third, very difficult to prove [responsibility]; and fourth, easy to disavow.”⁷⁹

At the installation level, terrorism provided a daily challenge to the Security Police and forced some difficult choices. Orr explained that he felt the responsibility thrust on young airmen very deeply. “For example,” he told the audience, “say they are guarding the main gate and a car comes through at high speed...Is it a bomb or someone who drank too much?”⁸⁰ You couldn’t shoot at every car that failed to stop or dim its lights at the base gate, but not doing so “may admit a bomb such as the one that took the lives of over 200 Marines in Beirut.”⁸¹ The frontline in the fight against terrorism was the gate to the base and even though women were not allowed in the security field, the gate was the place where many young enlisted women in law enforcement started their careers. In fact, in Orr’s opinion, the decisions made by law enforcement at the gate were much harder than those made elsewhere on the perimeter by security troops “because if

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someone attempts to go through the perimeter, we all know they're not up to any good...At the main gate you're always going to have people who made a mistake."⁸²

Orr criticized existing gate security as "very, very thin" and predicted that "the time is going to come when every base should...put barrels so cars have to snake in the gate" and even though this would slow traffic "it gives our guards some time to decide if a car poses a threat."⁸³ He concluded, probably to the dismay of those in attendance, "I think we've got to do a great deal more on security. I think we're only touching the surface."⁸⁴

1984 was a presidential election year and President Reagan and Vice President George H. W. Bush faced Democrats Walter Mondale and Geraldine Ferraro. Bolstered by an improved economy and Reagan's optimism, Reagan and Bush captured almost 60 percent of the popular vote and carried every state but Mondale's Minnesota and the District of Columbia. In his inaugural address, delivered in the Capitol Rotunda on January 21, 1985, because of the bitterly cold weather, Reagan turned his attention to nuclear weapons proclaiming:

We seek the total elimination one day of nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth. Now, for decades, we and the Soviets have lived under the threat of mutual assured destruction; if either resorted to the use of nuclear weapons, the other could retaliate and destroy the one who had started it. Is there either logic or morality in believing that if one side threatens to kill tens of millions of our people, our only recourse is to threaten killing tens of millions of theirs? I have approved a research program to find, if we can, a security shield that would destroy nuclear missiles before they reach their target. It wouldn't kill people, it would destroy weapons. It wouldn't militarize space, it would help demilitarize the arsenals of Earth. It would render nuclear weapons obsolete. We will meet with the Soviets, hoping that we can agree on a way to rid the world of the threat of nuclear destruction.⁸⁵

Derided by critics as "Star Wars," the President's vision of a missile defense shield struck fear into the hearts of the Kremlin because if successful the United States could render the existing Soviet strategic nuclear weapons arsenal obsolete. Reagan would use this fear.

Two months later, on March 11, 1985, the Politburo of the USSR Communist Party Central Committee elected Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev as its new General Secretary. To save the Soviet system, which was foundering because of its lackluster economy, the arms race with the United States, the Afghan War, and the general discontent of its people and those of its satellites, the new Soviet leader initiated a series of reforms. His effort to transform the stagnant, inefficient command economy of the Soviet Union into a decentralized, market-oriented economy was dubbed *perestroika* (restructuring). Gorbachev's new policy of *glasnost* (openness) in public discussions about current and historical problems sought to strengthen and accelerate *perestroika*.

1985 was another year of significant changes for the Air Force Security Police. At the leadership level, CMSgt Robert C. Agee replaced Chief Adkins as the senior

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enlisted advisor to General Scheidel. Agee, a Baltimore, Maryland, native, was a 26-year veteran of the Security Police field. Of greater long term impact to the career field, however, was the assignment of a young airman.

On January 18, 1985, Ann Virginia Queen arrived at Lackland AFB to begin the Security Specialist Course.⁸⁶ Airman Queen was the first female to attend security specialist training after Secretary Orr lifted the bar on women in the security field effective January 1. She successfully completed training and graduated on March 4, 1985, and other women quickly followed her. On May 1, twelve females of class 850510 became the first all female flight in the training program. Scheidel welcomed the secretary's action and opposition to the change from the field seemed neither vocal nor long standing.⁸⁷

In addition to these new recruits for the security forces, by early 1985 new equipment was hitting the field for both security and law enforcement. Army-style camouflaged battle dress units or BDUs replaced the nondescript olive drab fatigues worn for years. Gone also was the Vietnam War-era flak vest and the steel pot worn by GIs since 1942, replaced by the Personnel Armor System for Ground Troops (PASGT) vest and Kevlar helmet with enhanced ear and neck protection. Changes in weaponry were also occurring. The MK-19 40mm grenade machine gun was adopted for ABGD and GLCM security duties and the Security Police were to be the first Air Force personnel to receive the 9mm Beretta model 92SB-F semiautomatic pistol just chosen by DoD to be the standard military sidearm replacing both the Air Force .38 caliber revolver and the Army .45 caliber automatic.⁸⁸

New vehicles were also on the horizon. A contract had recently been awarded to Ford Motor Company for new "LTD" sedans equipped with police suspensions and drive trains, heavy duty electrical systems, and 302 cubic inch V-8 engines to replace the ageing Plymouth "Volares."⁸⁹ A new tactical vehicle was on the way in the form of the High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle or Humvee, a light, highly mobile, diesel-powered, four-wheel-drive vehicle equipped with an automatic transmission.

Terrorism, particularly that perpetrated by Iranian backed Islamic militants or Palestinians, continued to target Americans and American interests in 1985. In Lebanon four Americans were kidnapped during the year and were not to be released by their captors until 1991. On June 14, a Trans World Airlines flight was hijacked by two Hezbollah terrorists and forced to fly to Beirut where the eight crew members and 145 passengers were held for 17 days. During that period Robert Dean Stethem, a US Navy diver, was singled out, murdered, and his body thrown out of the airliner's door onto the tarmac. In October, four Palestinian Liberation Front terrorists seized the Italian cruise liner *Achille Lauro* in the eastern Mediterranean, taking more than 700 hostages. The hijackers singled out a 69-year-old, wheelchair-bound American, Leon Klinghoffer, and shot him to death because he was Jewish. His body and wheelchair were thrown overboard. The hijacking ended without further deaths when the Egyptian government offered the terrorists safe haven in return for the hostages' freedom.

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Terrorism was not only a Middle Eastern phenomenon. In February a nightclub frequented by US servicemen near Athens, Greece, was bombed, injuring 79 people including 69 Americans. In April, 18 were killed and 37 wounded, including seven Americans, when a bomb destroyed a family restaurant in a suburb of Madrid, Spain. In June, four US Marines and two American businessmen were gunned down at an outdoor cafe in San Salvador. On August 8, the German Red Army Faction triggered a powerful car bomb at Rhein-Main AB near Frankfurt, West Germany, killing one Airman and the wife of another and injured 15 other Americans. Minutes before the blast, the body of an American soldier was discovered near Wiesbaden and investigators believed that his ID card was used to gain access for the bomb-laden car onto Rhein-Main Air Base. In November a US military shopping mall in Frankfurt was bombed, wounding 32 people, including 23 Americans. The year ended with near simultaneous grenade and automatic weapons attacks by terrorists upon passengers in the Rome, Italy, and Vienna, Austria, airports that killed 18 people including five Americans. By the end of the year the American death toll from terrorism stood at 23 dead and 160 wounded.⁹⁰

It was against this background of terrorism that the implementation of the ABGD initiatives contained in the Memorandum of Agreement on US Army-US Air Force Joint Force Development Process progressed to the next step on April 25, 1985, with the signing of the Joint Service Agreement for the Ground Defense of Air Force Bases and Installations. This agreement was heralded as “probably one of the most important milestones in ABGD history...” and divided responsibility for air base defense between internal, an Air Force responsibility, and external, an Army task.⁹¹

JSA #8 was implemented by a joint Army/Air Force pamphlet entitled “Joint Operational Concept for Air Base Ground Defense.”⁹² The pamphlet split air base defense responsibilities into internal and external in accordance with JSA #8 and established three levels of operation.

Internal defense was an air base commander responsibility executed by the chief of Security Police. Unlike the division of responsibility used in Vietnam which limited Air Force ground defense operations to those strictly inside the perimeter fence, the pamphlet specifically recognized that the internal or close defense area (CDA) “though geographically encompassed by a boundary, is actually fluid in its integration with the external defense area.”⁹³ Consequently, the Air Force was authorized, depending on the environment, threat and the availability of Army or host nation forces, to “employ external safeguards to provide early warning and detection of, and reaction to, enemy threats to air bases and installations.”⁹⁴

External defense was an Army responsibility and to perform this mission the Army proposed to rely primarily on its Military Police. This was a change from the then existing Distributed Area Defense Doctrine that made the Air Force responsible for providing ABGD assets up to 10 kilometers from the base perimeter.⁹⁵ Providing intelligence and counterintelligence assets necessary for air base defense remained an Air Force responsibility.

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The pamphlet established three threat levels with differing responsibilities for operational control (OPCON) of base defense forces. Level I was the threat posed by “agents, saboteurs, partisans, and terrorist groups.”⁹⁶ Level I threats were the responsibility of the Security Police. Level II threats were posed by “unconventional warfare forces (for example, [Soviet] SPETSNAZ [special forces] and Ranger-Commandos) whose primary tasks are covert reconnaissance and sabotage missions...”⁹⁷ Level II threats were identified as the primary ground threat to air bases and the defensive response was a joint SP/MP responsibility. Level III was the most serious threat and came from “tactical military units of battalion size or larger resulting from overt enemy heliborne, airborne, amphibious, or ground force operations.”⁹⁸ Defense against these forces required the commitment of American and/or host nation Tactical Combat Forces (TCF). During the response to Level I and II threats, OPCON of all ground defense forces was by the Air Force through the Base Defense Operation Center (BDOC). In Level III responses, the Army rear area battle officer would direct the defense effort through the Rear Area Operations Center (RAOC) and coordinate defensive actions with the Air Force through a four-man Base Defense Liaison Team. During Level III the Air Force had OPCON of only those security forces necessary to defend critical Air Force resources.

Initiative #9 making the Army responsible for ABGD training also moved toward implementation in 1986. In January, the *Air Force Times* reported that three Army posts, Fort Bliss, Texas; Fort Jackson, South Carolina; and Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, were under study as potential sites for ABGD training.⁹⁹ GEN William R. Richardson, commanding general of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), revealed that the Army and Air Force were working on an agreement that would require the Army to train 7,100 Air Force enlisted members and 200 junior officers each year while the Air Force would retain responsibility for training more senior personnel. The *Air Force Times* also reported that the Infantry Center at Fort Benning, Georgia was working on a six week, 278 hour-long ABGD training program curriculum. The Army estimated the total cost of implementing Initiative #9 at \$28 million for new construction, \$7 million for operations and maintenance, \$11 million for ammunition, and \$9.5 million for training equipment.¹⁰⁰

The Army favored moving ABGD training from Camp Bullis to Fort Bliss because Camp Bullis had been designated as the mobilization site for several Army Reserve medical units and because the sewage system would require costly upgrades to support the estimated increase in population. Air Training Command representatives on the Joint Air Base Defense Working Group were not thrilled with Fort Bliss and pointed out that the billeting facilities were substandard for the Air Force at least, the terrain in no way resembled that of Europe where most of the trainees would perform ABGD duties, and the long distance from the classroom areas to the ranges would eat up valuable training time in transporting the students back and forth. In response to these concerns, Fort Dix, New Jersey, was added to the list of candidates.¹⁰¹

By then the Air Force was leaning toward using Fort Jackson, but the dilapidated condition of the facilities both there and at Fort Leonard Wood and the reluctance of the

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Army to foot the bill for improvements, caused Fort Dix to move to the top of the list of potential sites. Fort Dix already had excellent training facilities, the proper terrain, and could easily handle an additional 7,200 Air Force trainees. In June 1986, the Air Force approved the use of Fort Dix for Level 1 (basic) ABGD training. Dix was then compared to Fort McClellan, Alabama, as the site for Level 2 (NCO) and Level 4 (officer). Due to the cost advantages of keeping all ABGD training at Fort Dix and the availability of support from nearby McGuire AFB, Dix got the nod to also be the home for Levels 2 and 4 training on November 26, 1986.

The graduation of the last ABGD class from Camp Bullis was scheduled for May 11, 1987, and the first class at Fort Dix was scheduled to begin in July. The 3287th Technical Training Squadron was to relocate from Bullis to Dix by July 1987 to supervise the Air Force students and provide Air Force specific training.¹⁰²

The training cadre provided by the Army at Fort Dix left something to be desired. Maj Ronnie Bullock, posted to Dix as commander of the 3287th, observed that the Air Force “did not necessarily get the brightest and shiniest instructors there. The challenge I had is that our airmen more times than not were smarter than the E-6 and E-7 Army soldiers that were training and so there was many a time that...I was trying to support the NCOs but... it was really hard when the airman was usually right over the NCO.”¹⁰³

This lack of competence was usually merely aggravating, but sometimes it killed people. During one live fire exercise, the NCO in charge of a fire team popped off so many smoke grenades that he lost track of his team and the team lost track of each other. Two Airmen continued to advance as ordered while two others, unable to see, halted. When the order to fire was given the two in the rear, unaware that their teammates were out in front, opened fire. Unfortunately, as reported to Bullock, “one of the airmen [Sean Elms] had gone forward and gotten in line with the airman behind him and had gotten shot in the head with an M16. The round got caught in the individual’s helmet and basically went into the guy’s head. And he died about an hour later.”¹⁰⁴

In April 1986, the Air Force Reserve, now seen as a valuable resource for the ABGD defense mission, approved its own ABGD training program for Security Police reservists. Called Project Warrior, the program, overseen by 10th Air Force, developed a training site at Camp Swift, Texas, to train SPs during their two week annual tours. The first Reserve SP flights completed training in September 1990 and two months later the Air Force Reserve Ground Combat Readiness Center (GCRC) opened for business at Bergstrom AFB, Texas.¹⁰⁵ Over the next five years, Project Warrior and the AFRES GCRC evolved into a training program for Security Police and other mission support elements needing ground combat training such as airlift control flights, public affairs and medical support teams, PERSCO (Personnel Support for Contingency Operations) teams, as well as civil engineer Prime BEEF (Base Engineer Emergency Force) and services Prime RIBS (Readiness In Base Services) teams.¹⁰⁶

Patriot Warrior also developed the Law Enforcement in the Interdiction of Narcotics (LION) training program to teach field craft and tactical skills needed to

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support the AFRES role in counter drug operations. The LION program was offered to civilian law enforcement agencies and over 3,000 local, state, and Federal police officers were trained at Camp Swift or by mobile training teams.¹⁰⁷

Between January 1981 when Ronald Reagan first took office and April 1986, over 300 Americans had been killed by terrorists. To implement his 1980 campaign promise to retaliate against terrorists and in response to growing public frustration over terrorist attacks against Americans, on April 3, 1986, the President signed National Security Decision Directive 138 which established a policy of preemptive and retaliatory strikes against terrorists.

Two days later a bomb destroyed Berlin's LaBelle Club, a discotheque popular with American servicemen. The blast killed one American soldier and injured over 200, including 75 Americans. Hard intelligence linked Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi to the attack and Reagan authorized an air strike against Libya. With the permission of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, a strong ally of the United States and a personal friend of President Reagan, FB-111 fighter bombers from the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing based at RAF Lakenheath, England, along with Navy carrier aircraft would strike targets in and around Tripoli, including Qadhafi's residence. The strike, dubbed Operation Eldorado Canyon, although complicated by Spanish and French refusal to allow over flights of their countries, was successful although one FB-111 and its crew of two were lost.



Reagan and Gorbachev at Reykjavik (University of Texas Archives)

Even as Reagan began to hit back hard at states linked to terrorist attacks against Americans, relations between the U.S and U.S.S.R were beginning the thaw somewhat as the President and his Soviet counterpart Gorbachev opened communications with each other. At their first meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, the previous year and through an exchange of personal letters, Reagan and Gorbachev discovered a shared desire to substantially reduce nuclear weapons. In October 1986, the two met in Reykjavik, Iceland to further this goal.

While a tentative agreement to eliminate intermediate range nuclear forces and substantially reduce nuclear warheads and strategic bombers had already been reached by negotiators, to the shock of their aides the two leaders began to talk about the total

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elimination of the Soviet and American nuclear arsenals. But Gorbachev pushed Reagan, as he had at Geneva, to restrict further development of SDI to the laboratory and adhere to the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 that limited missile defense systems as part of any deal to eliminate nuclear weapons, arguing that if nuclear weapons were eliminated a missile defense shield was not needed. Reagan refused to budge, countering Gorbachev's argument by pointing out that if a "madman" were to get nuclear weapons capability there had to be a defense against it, and told Gorbachev, "...I understand that after the war the nations decided that they would renounce poison gases. But thank God the gas mask continued to exist. Something similar can happen with nuclear weapons. And we will have to shield against them in any case."¹⁰⁸ With both men unwilling to compromise on the missile shield issue, the summit ended without a ground breaking agreement to totally eliminate nuclear weapons.

Although the Reykjavik summit failed to produce an agreement totally eliminating American and Soviet nuclear weapons, Reagan and Gorbachev did informally agree to drastically reduce intermediate range nuclear missiles such as the Pershing II, GLCM, and SS-20. On December 8, 1987, the two men signed the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, more commonly known as the INF Treaty. The treaty eliminated nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 300 to 3,400 miles. The Army "Pershings" and the Air Force "Tomahawk" GLCMs in Europe had served their purpose and would now be withdrawn and destroyed along with their support equipment. By the treaty's deadline of June 1, 1991, a total of 2,692 weapons had been destroyed; 846 by the US and 1,846 by the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁹

Although the two superpowers were cooperating in the reduction of nuclear arms, relations were hardly warm. Ronald Reagan had not abandoned his stated goal of destroying the Communist system and in his speeches continued to press for freedom for those behind the Iron Curtain. On June 12, 1987, even though negotiations on the INF treaty were on going, Reagan appeared in Berlin, the city whose wall most visibly marked the line between the Free World and the Soviet Bloc. In his speech, given at the Brandenburg Gate in the shadow of the Berlin Wall, the President challenged his negotiating partner to "Come here, to this gate. Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!"¹¹⁰ The speech was clearly audible to those behind the wall in Communist East Berlin.



East German honor guards in East Berlin, 1980 (Col Jerry M. Bullock)

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Brig Gen Scheidel retired from the Air Force in October 1986 and was replaced by Col Robert F. Hartman.¹¹¹ Hartman served in the position only until Brig Gen (select) Frank K. Martin took the reins on February 27, 1987. Martin was a native of New York City and a Cornell University graduate. He joined the Air Force in 1962 as an air policeman and was assigned to the 820th Combat Defense Squadron at Plattsburgh AFB, New York. Two years later he transferred to the 341st Strategic Missile Wing at Malmstrom AFB, Montana, as a missile combat crew member and a missileman he remained until 1975 when he was reassigned to Korat AFB, Thailand, as commander of the 388th SPS. Prior to becoming “Top Cop,” Martin served as



Brig Gen Frank K. Martin (Air Force photo)



Col Robert F. Hartman (Air Force photo)

executive officer to Brig Gen Tom Sadler, as chief of security police for Tactical Air Command, and as deputy chief of staff for security police for United States Air Forces in Europe.

In addition to new leadership, additional manpower was on the way to the Security Police in 1987. Three years earlier the Air Force proposed the “fifth flight” concept “as a workable proposal to get more SP authorizations from Congress.”¹¹² Pitched to lawmakers as a means to provide surge manpower to overseas areas during hostilities, Congress approved a nine year plan beginning in FY 1984 to bolster SP manpower at selected overseas locations.

On July 2, 1987, Program Management Directive (PMD) 27588F1526SF, *Program Management Directive for Air Base Ground Defense*, was issued. The PMD addressed the manpower requirements for 19 additional active duty flights as well as the necessary munitions and equipment storage facilities and the procurement of ABGD equipment for overseas and stateside mobility requirements.¹¹³ In addition to providing surge capability the fifth flight enabled units to more efficiently conduct ABGD training by relieving on-duty flights with personnel from the additional flight. By 1987, a total of four additional flights were in place in Korea. In Team Spirit '88 the following year the presence of the fifth flights at Osan and Kunsan Air Bases did allow the strengthening of base defense postures while decreasing the use of augmentees.

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More new equipment was also fielded that year. The last of the .38 revolvers were retired and replaced by the Berretta. State of the art PVS-5 night vision goggles (NVG) were also issued only to be replaced by improved PVS-7 NVG the following year.

Despite the improvement in Security Police ABGD capabilities, some officers continued to urge that the Air Force create a broader based, whole force defensive capability that did not rely solely on the Security Police. In 1983, retired Col Larry Runge and Lt Col Jon M. Samuels advocated a model for air base defense based on that of the British Royal Air Force. While acknowledging the primacy of the highly trained RAF Regiment in British ABGD doctrine, Runge and Samuels also noted that when a British air base exercised its ground defense forces:

...the entire base is involved in these operations. Virtually every person on the station has an additional duty assignment within the base security structure. When an exercise is initiated, the readiness state increases, or an actual emergency occurs, these augmenters draw their weapons and man close-in defensive positions, key points, and lines of communication. They are fully trained in the limited tactics that they are expected to employ and have rehearsed their roles many times. They do the same job, in the same place, under the guidance of the same RAF Regiment personnel, every time. Meanwhile, the highly trained, mobile Regiment "gunners" screen the perimeter, block enemy access routes, and seek and destroy attackers within the base's tactical area of responsibility.¹¹⁴

While Runge and Samuels advocated the greater use of designated augmentees to provide more depth to the defense provided by the highly trained Security Police professionals, others thought that everyone on the air base should pitch in. In the summer of 1987, Lt Col Price Bingham, a fighter pilot, argued that, "While we can hope the Army or host-nation forces will be available to defend our air bases, we cannot afford to depend on them... Nor can we afford to field our own army of security police whose sole duty is air base defense." Instead, Bingham urged, "...we must demand that everyone in the Air Force who serves or could serve in a theater position, officer and enlisted alike, achieve competence in the use of weapons, medical aid, and field craft. Requiring competence in these traditional military skills not only will significantly improve our ability to fight from the air base, it will also make an important contribution to esprit de corps by removing all doubts some may have as to whether the Air Force is a combat organization or a nine-to-five "blue suit" business."¹¹⁵ Neither the recommendations of Runge and Samuels nor that of Bingham became Air Force policy.

In November 1987, Frank Carlucci took over the reigns as SECDEF. The defense budget presented Carlucci with his most pressing challenge since he immediately had to deal with the DoD budget request for fiscal year 1989. Soon after the alarming stock market downturn of October 1987, the Reagan administration and Congress agreed on limiting the FY 1989 DoD budget to about \$299 billion, some \$33 billion less than Reagan had earlier requested. Carlucci had to now establish priorities for allocating the reduced funding among the military services and other units of the Defense Department. To balance the books, Carlucci chose to reduce personnel levels in order to protect a

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proposed military pay increase and to reduce force structure rather than cut training and support along with terminating uneconomical programs and delaying others.

The revised \$299.5 billion budget proposal presented to Congress in February 1988 projected a reduction of 36,000 from the current military personnel strength of 2,174,000. The services would also have to cut certain planned weapon systems and retire existing systems: The Navy would retire 16 frigates and one Poseidon-class submarine; the Army would lose 620 Vietnam-vintage helicopters; and the Air Force would phase out its fleet of SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft and deactivate a tactical fighter wing. The budget request included \$4.6 billion for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and \$200 million for the “Midgetman” missile. Over the next five years Carlucci anticipated that DoD spending would decrease \$300 billion from previous projections. Though Carlucci had no way of knowing, monumental changes in the balance of power between East and West would occur during that period.

In 1988, General Martin oversaw what he called the Reorganization of 1988.¹¹⁶ The primary focus of Martin’s plan was to create a mission support function to provide support to AFOSP akin to that provided by a combat support group to a flying wing. The resulting staff support directorate (SPS) headed by Col Neil R. Woodcock, joined the three other AFOSP directorates: operations (SPO); plans and programs (SPP); and information security (SPI). In making the change Martin stressed that the reorganization was not a single event, but was rather an on-going effort to look at how the headquarters was organized “to do what we are chartered with: to make policy, to provide guidance, to facilitate organizing, training, and equipping the force.”¹¹⁷ Martin believed that an organization could not be static and still be progressive; it needed to constantly look at how things were done and change them if necessary. He was particularly irked by the mantra of “doing more with less.” “That is a bankrupt statement,” Martin railed. “I don’t support it; I don’t subscribe to it; and we need to turn our thinking away from that philosophy of doing more with less to perhaps doing less.” That, he admitted, “was the hard part.”¹¹⁸

While Martin was reorganizing within the AFOSP, the Air Force was considering disestablishing the organization as a separate operating agency (SOA). There was also some question of where the Security Police function should reside in the Air Force organizational structure. Martin argued that “we are Air Staff in all respects except location” and should AFOSP at Kirtland be disestablished as a SOA “a security police function should continue to exist at Air Staff level” and recommended that the Security Police remain aligned under the inspector general.¹¹⁹ Ultimately, the Air Force decided against any changes to the existing Security Police organization—at least for the time being.

AFOSP had a big job. AFOSP ABGD Division personnel attended the Team Spirit 88, Gallant Eagle 88, and the Creek Warrior/REFORGER 88 exercises. The Creek Warrior exercise focused on Army/Air Force ABGD skills and the testing of new equipment. One outcome of the exercise was a contract awarded to TRW, Inc. to

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“develop methodology for incorporating men, patrol dogs, and electro/mechanical sensors in the design and defense of air bases.”¹²⁰

The human side of the triad TRW was to develop was represented by 50,000 Security Police personnel both civilian and military. The canine side was maintained by AFOSP through its Police Services Branch which supervised military working dog related activities for 3,253 MWDs in DoD, including 2,034 in the Air Force alone, and three non-DoD Federal agencies.¹²¹ The electro/mechanical side, however, needed work as the exercises of 1988 revealed. Reports indicated that, “Several of the visual systems proved to be totally useless in wooded areas. Others could not be used in rain or fog. Also, some of the ground sensors had unacceptably high nuisance alarm rates.”¹²² So poor were the results obtained from the use of the sensors that some questioned whether the Air Force was getting its money’s worth from its procurement of these devices.

The thaw in US-Soviet relations and the resulting INF Treaty with its verification provisions and improvements in nuclear weapons security also posed new challenges for AFOSP. Under the INF treaty, Soviet and American inspectors were allowed to visit installations in each country to ensure compliance with the terms of the treaty. Mr. Frank Farris was assigned the task of acting as the point of contact for matters concerning the Security Police and after a series of meetings, two plans were developed—the INF Treaty Compliance Plan for bases in the CONUS and the GLCM plan for the drawdown of the Europe-based GLCM units.¹²³

The nuclear confrontation between East and West was not over and while AFOSP was involved in the destruction of one class of weapons, in order to safeguard another class it was also participating in the design and construction of the state-of-the-art Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance Storage Complex (KUMMSC) as a replacement for the dated Manzano nuclear weapons storage facility at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico.

Initially rejected for funding in FY 1986, Congress finally appropriated \$46 million for KUMMSC in FY 1988. Design for KUMMSC had started four years earlier when the Defense Nuclear Agency began investigating underground storage facilities that could meet the requirement of delaying any attempt at forced entry for 30 minutes.¹²⁴ The Vicksburg, Mississippi, District Army Corps of Engineers constructed a quarter-scale mock up of an underground storage complex and attempted to gain entry through the roof. After three attempts at penetration using M-180 cratering kits with rocket-propelled shaped charges packing 40 pounds of high explosive, the engineers determined that the 30-minute penetration standard could be met. The six-inch solid steel entry/blast doors were also tested for compliance with the 30-minute standard at the Naval Surface Weapons Center at White Oak, Maryland. At White Oak, engineers tried to blast their way through the doors using M-180 kits and C-4 explosive without success.¹²⁵

As finally designed, the KUMMSC facility was to be built underground on a 38-acre site with walls and ceiling of two- to three-foot thick reinforced concrete covered with between 14 and 28 feet of dirt landscaped to resemble the native terrain. An

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operations building, armory, dining hall, and other support buildings were located above ground.¹²⁶

The primary selling point for KUMMSC was enhanced security at reduced cost. Upgrading the 1940's vintage Manzano facility was considered as an option and it was estimated that it would cost \$111 million to bring it up to minimal standards. For much less, a new facility could be "security engineered" from the ground up. KUMMSC also promised \$14 million in personnel savings each year since 270 fewer Security Police and 30 less munitions maintenance personnel were required to operate the facility. By 1988 the site had been excavated and the rebar installed and completion of the facility was anticipated sometime in 1990.¹²⁷

An organizational change affecting how the Security Police responded to contingencies also came about in 1988. For several years the basic ABGD flight was made up of 44 personnel, but experience had shown that when these flights were deployed they were often broken up to perform tasks needing augmentation at the receiving base, while the base from which the flight deployed had to cover the loss of 44 bodies.¹²⁸ Additionally, unrest in the Philippines and Panama highlighted the need for smaller, rapidly deployable ABGD units. The solution to these problems was the creation of the Contingency Security Element or CSE.


The CSE force was created by forming thirteen-man squads at five bases in five major commands for a total of 25 teams. The personnel came from existing air base defense flights and were rapidly deployable to overseas areas based upon their geographical location in the United States. The seven east coast CSEs were tasked to support contingencies in Europe and Southwest Asia, those in the central US went to contingencies in Latin America, while those on the west coast supported bases in PACAF.¹²⁹ The CSEs were equipped with the latest equipment in the Air Force inventory—Mk19 grenade launchers and HUMVEES from the deactivating GLCM security forces as well as the new Squad Automatic Weapon or SAW just then being fielded as a replacement for the M-60 machine gun.¹³⁰

Although Mr. Gorbachev did not take President Reagan up on his 1987 challenge to "tear down this wall," in 1988 Gorbachev did abandon the Brezhnev Doctrine articulated by General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev twenty years earlier under which the USSR proclaimed that it had the authority to enforce Communist doctrine in its satellite nations. Both the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan to save faltering Communist governments were justified under the doctrine. Gorbachev's new policy allowed the Soviet bloc nations to determine their own internal affairs and in December he announced a unilateral decision to cut total Soviet armed forces 10 percent, withdraw 50,000 troops from Eastern Europe and reduce by half the number of Soviet tanks in East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia within two years. President Reagan's responded to the announcement with a Russian proverb: "Trust, but verify."¹³¹

Gorbachev's renunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine and his new policy of non-intervention in the affairs of the other Warsaw Pact states had unintended consequences

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as one Eastern European nation after another rejected Communism in a series of generally peaceful revolutions beginning in 1989. But as one enemy declined, another became bolder. On December 21, 1988, Pan Am Flight 103 enroute from London to New York with 259 passengers disintegrated over Lockerbie, Scotland, destroyed by a bomb believed to have been placed on the aircraft at a stopover in Frankfurt, Germany, by Libyan agents in retaliation for the Eldorado Canyon air strikes.



President George H. W. Bush (White House photo)

As the revolutions against Soviet domination spread throughout Eastern Europe and the dead of Lockerbie were counted, a new President was in the White House. On January 20, 1989, Reagan's vice president, George H. W. Bush, assumed the presidency after handily defeating his opponent, Democrat Michael Dukakis. Bush, cognizant of the tumultuous change in the world focused immediately on the changes behind the Iron Curtain, declaring in his inaugural address "...a new breeze is blowing...The totalitarian era is passing, its old ideas blown away like leaves from an ancient, lifeless tree. A new breeze is blowing, and a nation refreshed by freedom stands ready to push on." Yet he also pledged, "We will continue the new closeness with the Soviet Union, consistent both with our security and with progress. One might say that our new relationship in part reflects the triumph of hope and strength over experience. But hope is good, and so is strength and

vigilance."¹³²

In April 1989, the *Security Police Digest* reported an ominous fact that indicated that the "new breeze" was not blowing away old ideas with equal strength. Readers of the *Digest* learned that terrorist attacks against DoD targets had doubled from 1988 to 1989 from seven to fourteen. The attacks were worldwide occurring in Spain, Greece, West Germany, Honduras, Puerto Rico, Turkey and Italy. Five of these attacks targeted Air Force resources, personnel, or places where airmen spent time off-duty.¹³³

As President Bush gave his inaugural address, 600 SPs were about to participate in Brim Frost 89 in Alaska. The exercise, held in temperatures that dipped to 75 degrees below zero, involved participants from the Air Force, Army, Coast Guard, the Alaska Army and Air National Guards and Canadian Defense Forces and was to involve land battles, air-to-air operations, and air and maritime defense. A mock attack by Army forces on Eielson AFB had to be abandoned because of the brutal cold, but Air Force SPs and Army MPs at Elmendorf AFB outside of Anchorage did get to test their air base defense skills against attackers from the Army's 12th Special Forces Group.¹³⁴

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Despite the excellent cooperation between Army and Air Force defenders exhibited at Brim Frost, by 1989 the Army began to back away from JSA #8 by deciding that Army National Guard and Army Reserve MPs would fulfill the Army's obligations for air base defense. "There will simply not be enough US Army forces," it was acknowledged, "to counter the threat external to every air base. This requires USAF personnel to take on some external responsibility..."¹³⁵

Part of this responsibility would be filled by a stealthy drone if Canadair Defence Group got its way. Canadair's CL-227 "Sentinel" unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) looked somewhat like a dumbbell with two rotating propellers around its midsection and could be equipped with a variety of payloads including "an infrared device...so sensitive it can spot the body heat of a squirrel at a distance of hundreds of feet..."¹³⁶ Army and Navy testing of the CL-227 was completed in late 1989 and the Air Force, ever open to high tech help, was to begin testing the nearly silent vehicle in a base defense support role in early 1990.

By December 1989, ABGD moved from the realm of theory to practice as Security Police were dispatched to Panama to augment the 24th SPS at Howard AFB. The reason for the reinforcement of the 24th was that the United States had invaded the small Central American country with the mission of securing the Panama Canal, protecting American citizens, installing the elected Panamanian president and vice president, and capturing Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega.

A one-time ally of the United States who was under a 1988 indictment in the United States for drug trafficking, by the fall of 1989 Noriega was becoming increasingly antagonistic and threatening to American interests and citizens in Panama. When his slate of candidates was facing defeat in the 1989 presidential elections Noriega cancelled



Gen Manuel Noriega (AFP/Getty Images)

the elections and unleashed his "dignity battalions" against his opponents. The US imposed economic sanctions against Panama as punishment for Noriega's actions. By mid-December Noriega had declared war on the United States and his continuing

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harassment of Americans in Panama had resulted in the death of a US Marine, the wounding of one serviceman and the beating of another.


At 0100 Panama time on December 20, 1989, President Bush ordered the launching of Operation Just Cause. Over 27,000 American forces, including a regiment of the 82nd Airborne making the division's first parachute assault since World War II, quickly overwhelmed the Panamanian forces. Noriega took refuge in the Vatican diplomatic mission and American troops, unable to attack what was Vatican City territory, played loud rock music over huge speakers day and night to keep Noriega awake and under stress. Noriega finally surrendered and was extradited to the United States to stand trial.

During Just Cause, the 24th SPS, augmented by Security Police from other Air Force units, guarded Howard AFB, the military family housing area and US Southern Command headquarters at Albrook Air Force Station and provided customs and security services at Tacumen Civil Airport. They also transported, processed, and interviewed enemy prisoners of war, conducted search and clear missions for arms caches, and provided security and escorts for newly appointed Panamanian leaders.¹³⁷



1st Lt Matthew H Morrow, 55th SPS, Offutt AFB, during his deployment to Panama to augment the 24th SPS during Operation Just Cause (Security Forces

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After the closure of Clark AB, its horses were transferred to the 24th SPS at Howard AFB, Panama (Security Forces Museum)

The mission was far from routine for some of the SPs. Sgt Sean P. Davis of Langley AFB's 1st SPS was assigned to Albrook as part of the defense for HQ USSOUTHCOM. As the invasion of Panama City began, Davis and an assistant gunner were posted with an M-60 machine gun on the second floor of a building overlooking one of Albrook's two entry gates. His flight chief instructed him to "prepare a full load" for the machine gun and he was brought extra ammo and told to "break all the seals" on the ammo boxes.¹³⁸

Around 0030 hours, Davis heard firing and saw tracers arcing through the night and received orders to "take out any vehicle which approaches at a high rate of speed, blows the military checkpoints outside the gates, or shoots at the gates." "All of a sudden," Davis later recalled, "we saw this car with a PDF (Panama Defense Forces) badge pull up and someone inside the vehicle started shooting at the gate guards." Responding to his training, Davis in what "wasn't a conscious thought" flipped off the safety and began to spray the vehicle with 7.62mm rounds as his assistant gunner blazed away from an adjoining window with his M-16. The car backed out of Davis's line of fire right into the line of fire of an Army MP's M-60. "They really didn't have much hope," Davis observed. The next morning Davis's assistant went outside to take a look and called to Davis to come outside. Looking up at the window from where he had been firing his M-60, Davis saw bullet holes all around it. "I had seen the tracers," Davis admitted, "but I never gave it a thought."¹³⁹ For his actions that evening, Davis received a Bronze Star.

Half a world away from Panama, Mikhail Gorbachev was not dismantling the Berlin Wall with his own hands, but his new policy of non-intervention in the affairs of the USSR's satellites had doomed it nonetheless. In August, 1989, Warsaw Pact member

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Hungary opened its border with Austria without Soviet interference and over 13,000 East German tourists visiting Hungary crossed into the West. At the same time anti-government demonstrations filled the streets of East German cities, forcing the resignation of long time Communist leader Ernst Honecker. His successor, Egon Krenz, decided to allow East Germans to apply for visas to visit West Germany and when his decision was announced on November 9, 1989, tens of thousands of East Berliners descended upon the checkpoints through the Wall and the border guards, faced with calling in force or opening the gates, opened the gates.

Met on the other side of the Wall by thousands of West Berliners, the jubilant “Osties” danced on top of the barrier and soon the Wall was being attacked by thousands of hammer wielding Germans who over the next few days destroyed long stretches of the hated symbol of their country’s division. Col Steve Mannell, USAFE DCS for Security Police, was dining in a Russian officer’s club in East Berlin that evening and was told by one of the waiters, “with tears in his eyes,” what was happening at the Wall.¹⁴⁰ It took Mannell eight hours to make it back to his base at Ramstein the next day. “I remember arguing with the finance clerk,” Mannell recalled, “about why I put in for an extra day [of travel per diem]. He said, ‘Why did it take you so long?’ I said, ‘Just forget it.’ The experience was worth the extra day per diem.”¹⁴¹ Although the Wall was not completely dismantled for another two years, November 9, 1989, was the day the Berlin Wall fell.

The Cold War extracted a high price from both sides. Between 1945 and 1989, trillions of dollars had been spent to develop the most awesomely destructive weapons in the history of mankind and untold thousands if not millions died in the titanic struggle between East and West. Between 1981 and 1988 alone US defense spending increased by 32 percent, eliminating the hollow force and replacing it with one that was robust with more and newer weapons, better paid personnel, and high morale. The Reagan military buildup was impossible for the Soviets to match. Anatoly Chernyaev, a Communist party official wrote in his diary of a June 1984 Central Committee briefing in which committee members were shown documentaries about the US buildup. “It was amazing,” he recalled, “missiles honing in on their targets from hundreds of thousands of kilometers away; aircraft carriers, submarines that could do anything; winged missiles that, like in a cartoon, could be guided through a canyon and hit a target 10 meters in diameter from 2,500 kilometers away. An incredible breakthrough of modern technology. And, of course, unthinkably expensive.”¹⁴²

Gorbachev’s loosening of Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe was credited with ending the Cold War, and for this and for withdrawing Soviet troops from Afghanistan after suffering an estimated 15,000 dead, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize on October 15, 1990. Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, and Pope John Paul II who by their strength of will and support of those who challenged Soviet domination all contributed to the decline and fall of Soviet Communism and the end of the Cold War, were not similarly honored.

The Cold War was over, but peace was to prove elusive.

¹ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 2, 1981, 14.

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- ² Display in Security Forces Museum, Lackland AFB, TX.
- ³ Ronald W. Reagan First Inaugural Address (<http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres61.html>).
- ⁴ Joseph J. Sabia, "Ronald Reagan, R.I.P.," *FrontPageMagazine.com* (June 7, 2004).
- ⁵ Speech at Notre Dame University May 17, 1981.
- ⁶ Speech to the British House of Commons, June 6, 1982, *Modern History Source Book* (<http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1982reagan1.html>).
- ⁷ United States Department of State Webpage (<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/dr/17741.htm>).
- ⁸ Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals, March 8, 1983 (http://www.ronaldreagan.com/sp_6.html).
- ⁹ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 2, 3 (1981).
- ¹⁰ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 2, 3 (1981). PRP was the Personnel Reliability Program that, among other things, certified a security policeman to carry weapons. Without PRP certification Air Force personnel could not perform SP duties.
- ¹¹ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 2, 1981, 11.
- ¹² *Security Police Digest*, Issue 2, 1981, 11.
- ¹³ Interview of Brig Gen William R. Brooksher, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), March 17, 2005.
- ¹⁴ For example, USAFE CINC Gen John W. Pauly stated in a 1981 interview his opinion that, "since the Army has defaulted on protection of the airbases, we should be given a force like the RAF...I believe anybody that is given a responsibility as serious as the responsibility the commander is given should be given the wherewithal to be able to do it and not rely on somebody else." (Interview with Gen John W. Pauly, 28-29 July 1981).
- ¹⁵ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 3, 1981, 6. The 452nd at March AFB, California, the 940th at Mather AFB, California, and the 931st at Grissom AFB, Indiana were the first Reserve Air Base Defense Flights. Each of these units had converted from Weapons System Security Flights (*Security Police Digest*, Issue 2, 1982, 10).
- ¹⁶ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 2, 1983, 10.
- ¹⁷ Interview of Brig Gen William R. Brooksher, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), March 17, 2005.
- ¹⁸ Dr. John W. Brokaw, "Air Force Police—A History (LXVII)" *Tiger Flight*, Volume 13, Number 6 (November-December, 2004), 19.
- ¹⁹ The 18th and 51st were not the first SP units to have anti-aircraft defense capabilities. In 1952 the 19th APS at Andersen AFB, Guam added an Anti-Aircraft Section (Historical Report for the 19th Air Police Squadron, 19th Air Base Group).
- ²⁰ Dr. John W. Brokaw, "Air Force Police—A History (LXVII)" *Tiger Flight*, Volume 13, Number 6 (November-December, 2004), 17.
- ²¹ Col Hart J. Guenther USAF (Ret.), Biographical Submittal, January 2005 (in possession of authors).
- ²² Interview of Col Larry J. Runge, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), May 14, 2005.
- ²³ Interview of Col Larry J. Runge, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), May 14, 2005.
- ²⁴ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 3, 1981, 4.
- ²⁵ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 3, 1981, 4.
- ²⁶ Gen Curtis LeMay, April 1979 as quoted in Capt Marie Shadden, *The Peacekeepers: Security Police History 1947 – 1982* (Lackland AFB, TX: USAF Security Police Academy, 1983), 189.
- ²⁷ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 3, 1981, 4.
- ²⁸ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 3, 1981, 4.
- ²⁹ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 3, 1981, 4. In 1997 Peacekeeper Challenge was renamed Defender Challenge in accordance with the new focus and nickname of the Security Forces.
- ³⁰ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 3, 1981, 4. According to Col Jay Swander who supervised the initial tests of the MILES, the Department of Energy "had bought some of those weapons, some of those MILES things for a DOE exercise called Compass Rose that a guy named Marty Strones, who was an ex-Air Force security policeman...had run. And Marty worked for DOE. [We asked] Hey, Marty, can we borrow some of your stuff ... that's kind of how we got it." (Interview of Col Jay A. Swander, USAF (Ret) by Col James L. Conrad, USAF (Ret), January 23, 2005).
- ³¹ Interview of Col Jay A. Swander, USAF (Ret) by Col James L. Conrad, USAF (Ret), January 23, 2005.
- ³² "Protest by North Korea on War Games Rejected" *New York Times*, March 10, 1982.

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- ³³ *History 321st Security Police Group January – March 1981, Volume No. 1, 9.*
- ³⁴ Peter Grier “The Short, Happy Life of the Glick-Em,” *Air Force Magazine*, Vol. 85, No. 07 (July 2002) (*Air Force Magazine Online* (<http://www.afa.org/magazine/July2002/0702glcm.asp>)).
- ³⁵ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 3, 1963, 5.
- ³⁶ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 3, 1983, 5.
- ³⁷ Col Paul E. Samulski, USAF (Ret.) “How Do You Spell GLCM?” Part II” *Tiger Flight*, Volume 14, Number 1 (January-February 2005), 21; *Security Police Digest*, Issue 3, 1983, 5.
- ³⁸ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 3, 1983, 5.
- ³⁹ Col Larry J. Runge and Lt Col Jon M. Samuels “Toward A Rearmed Force,” *Air University Review* (May-June 1983).
- ⁴⁰ Peter Grier “The Short, Happy Life of the Glick-Em,” *Air Force Magazine*, Vol. 85, No. 07 (July 2002) (*Air Force Magazine Online* (<http://www.afa.org/magazine/July2002/0702glcm.asp>)).
- ⁴¹ Peter Grier “The Short, Happy Life of the Glick-Em,” *Air Force Magazine*, Vol. 85, No. 07 (July 2002) (*Air Force Magazine Online* (<http://www.afa.org/magazine/July2002/0702glcm.asp>)).
- ⁴² The Danish Peace Academy: The Greenham Common Peace Camp Songbook (<http://www.fredsakademiet.dk/abase/sange/greenham.htm>).
- ⁴³ Peter Grier “The Short, Happy Life of the Glick-Em,” *Air Force Magazine*, Vol. 85, No. 07 (July 2002) (*Air Force Magazine Online* (<http://www.afa.org/magazine/July2002/0702glcm.asp>)).
- ⁴⁴ “Peace Protestor’s Roll Call” *New Statesman* reproduced at The Danish Peace Academy: The Greenham Commons Peace Camp Songbook (<http://www.fredsakademiet.dk/abase/sange/greenham.htm>).
- ⁴⁵ The Danish Peace Academy: The Greenham Commons Peace Camp Songbook (<http://www.fredsakademiet.dk/abase/sange/greenham.htm>).
- ⁴⁶ “Peace Protestor’s Roll Call” *New Statesman*, Vol. 108, No. 2802, 6 (1984) reproduced at The Danish Peace Academy: The Greenham Commons Peace Camp Songbook (<http://www.fredsakademiet.dk/abase/sange/greenham.htm>). Although the last GLCM was withdrawn in 1991 the camp was maintained until 2000 as a protest against nuclear weapons in general.
- ⁴⁷ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 3, 1983, 5.
- ⁴⁸ Air Force Space Command History and Heritage Website (<http://www.peterson.af.mil/hqafspc/history/Heritage-Formation.htm>).
- ⁴⁹ Col Larry J. Runge and Lt Col Jon M. Samuels “Toward A Rearmed Force,” *Air University Review* (May-June 1983); Draft letter for signature by Lt Gen Spence M. Armstrong, commander Air Force Military Training Center, attached to staff summary sheet dated 29 Mar 1982 from Col Carl B. DeNisio, commander, 320th Technical Training Group.
- ⁵⁰ Draft letter for signature by Lt Gen Spence M. Armstrong, commander Air Force Military Training Center, attached to staff summary sheet dated 29 Mar 1982 from Col Carl B. DeNisio, commander, 320th Technical Training Group.
- ⁵¹ Draft letter for signature by Lt Gen Spence M. Armstrong, commander Air Force Military Training Center, attached to staff summary sheet dated 29 Mar 1982 from Col Carl B. DeNisio, commander, 320th Technical Training Group.
- ⁵² Draft letter for signature by Lt Gen Spence M. Armstrong, commander Air Force Military Training Center, attached to staff summary sheet dated 29 Mar 1982 from Col Carl B. DeNisio, commander, 320th Technical Training Group.
- ⁵³ Staff Summary Sheet, 4 March 1982, 3280th Technical Training Group.
- ⁵⁴ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 2, 1983, 10.
- ⁵⁵ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 2, 1983, 12.
- ⁵⁶ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 2, 1983, 12.
- ⁵⁷ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 2, 1983, 12.
- ⁵⁸ Dr. Eliot A. Cohen, Director, *Gulf War Air Power Survey*, Volume III, (Washington, DC, 1993), 32.
- ⁵⁹ Those killed were Capt Michael F. Kelly and MSgt Leslie Burch, HQ Military Airlift Command, Scott AFB, Illinois and TSgt Fredrick J. Francis and Sgt William R. Robinson, 437th SPS, Charleston AFB, South Carolina.
- ⁶⁰ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 1, 1983, 7.
- ⁶¹ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 3, 1983, 6.
- ⁶² *Security Police Digest*, Issue 1, 1983, 7.
- ⁶³ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 3, 1983, 6.

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- ⁶⁴ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 3, 1983, 6.
- ⁶⁵ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 1, 1983, 7.
- ⁶⁶ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 1, 1983, 7.
- ⁶⁷ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 3, 1983, 4.
- ⁶⁸ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 3, 1983, 4.
- ⁶⁹ *Security Police Digest*, Issue 3, 1983, 10.
- ⁷⁰ The 1314th GCRES was redesignated the 314th Phoenix Ace and then moved to Fort Dix, NJ where it became the 421st Ground Combat Training Squadron, HQ Air Mobility Warfare Center (HQ AMWC).
- ⁷¹ Narrative accompanying exhibit at the Security Police Museum, Lackland AFB, TX.
- ⁷² Public Law 99-433. "Purple" is a reference to the color resulting from the mixing of the colors of the uniforms of each service.
- ⁷³ Text available in *Department of the Army Historical Summary Fiscal Year 1984* at <http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/DAHSUM/1984/appA.htm>.
- ⁷⁴ *Security Police Digest*, December 1984, 2.
- ⁷⁵ *Security Police Digest*, October 1984, 4.
- ⁷⁶ *Security Police Digest*, October 1984, 4.
- ⁷⁷ *Security Police Digest*, October 1984, 3.
- ⁷⁸ *Security Police Digest*, October 1984, 1.
- ⁷⁹ *Security Police Digest*, October 1984, 1.
- ⁸⁰ *Security Police Digest*, October 1984, 1.
- ⁸¹ *Security Police Digest*, October 1984, 3.
- ⁸² *Security Police Digest*, October 1984, 3.
- ⁸³ *Security Police Digest*, October 1984, 3.
- ⁸⁴ *Security Police Digest*, October 1984, 3.
- ⁸⁵ Ronald W. Reagan Second Inaugural Address, January 21, 1985 (<http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres62.html>).
- ⁸⁶ Undated Security Police history timeline by Col Matt Matecko, USAF (Ret), in author's possession.
- ⁸⁷ *SP Digest*, April 1985, 2.
- ⁸⁸ *SP Digest*, April 1985, 1.
- ⁸⁹ *Security Police Digest*, October 1984, 3.
- ⁹⁰ *Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combating Terrorism, February 1986* (http://www.population-security.org/bush_report_on_terrorism/bush_report_on_terrorism.htm#_Toc536414888).
- ⁹¹ Interview with Brig Gen Frank K. Martin, 13 August 1989 in *History of the Air Force Office of Security Police, 1 Jan 1988 thru 31 Dec 1988*, Volume II, Supporting Document I-13.
- ⁹² Army Pamphlet 525-14/Air Force Pamphlet 206-4, 15 July 1986.
- ⁹³ Army Pamphlet 525-14/Air Force Pamphlet 206-4, 5.
- ⁹⁴ Army Pamphlet 525-14/Air Force Pamphlet 206-4, paragraph 6e.
- ⁹⁵ *History of the Air Force Military Training Center January-December 1986*, Volume I, 79.
- ⁹⁶ Army Pamphlet 525-14/Air Force Pamphlet 206-4, paragraph 5a(1).
- ⁹⁷ Army Pamphlet 525-14/Air Force Pamphlet 206-4, paragraph 5a(2).
- ⁹⁸ Army Pamphlet 525-14/Air Force Pamphlet 206-4, paragraph 5a(3).
- ⁹⁹ "Three Army Posts Studied for Air Base Defense" *Air Force Times*, January 13, 1986.
- ¹⁰⁰ "Three Army Posts Studied for Air Base Defense" *Air Force Times*, January 13, 1986.
- ¹⁰¹ *History of the Air Force Military Training Center January-December 1986*, Volume I, 78.
- ¹⁰² *History of the Air Force Military Training Center January-December 1986*, Volume I, 78.
- ¹⁰³ Interview of Col Ronnie J. Bullock by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), 11 February 2005.
- ¹⁰⁴ Interview of Col Ronnie J. Bullock by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), 11 February 2005.
- ¹⁰⁵ *SP Digest*, June 1991, 5.
- ¹⁰⁶ Patriot Warrior Fact Sheet and Timeline (no author, no date).
- ¹⁰⁷ Patriot Warrior Fact Sheet and Timeline (no author, no date).
- ¹⁰⁸ Reagan-Gorbachev Transcript, Reykjavik, Iceland, October 11-16, 1986 (<http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/22/documents/reykjavik/>).
- ¹⁰⁹ Eight display articles were permitted to survive under the terms of the treaty. The US Air Force Museum at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, has the first of the "Gryphons" that went on alert at Greenham Common

and The Ground Launched Cruise Missile Historical Foundation dedicated a second display article at the Pima Air and Space Museum in Tucson, Arizona in 2002.

¹¹⁰ Speech at the Berlin Wall, June 12, 1987 (<http://www.reaganlibrary.com/reagan/speeches/wall.asp>).

¹¹¹ HQ AFOSP Special Order G-1.

¹¹² History of the Air Force Office of Security Police, 1 Jan 1988 thru 31 Dec 1988, Volume I, 8.

¹¹³ History of the Air Force Office of Security Police, 1 Jan 1988 thru 31 Dec 1988, Volume I, 8.

¹¹⁴ Col Larry J. Runge and Lt Col Jon M. Samuels "Toward A Rearmed Force," *Air University Review*, May-June, 1983.

¹¹⁵ Lt Col Price T. Bingham "Fighting From the Air Base," *Aerospace Power Journal*, Summer 1987.

¹¹⁶ Interview with Brig Gen Frank K. Martin, 13 August 1989 in History of the Air Force Office of Security Police, 1 Jan 1988 thru 31 Dec 1988, Volume II, Supporting Document I-13, 2.

¹¹⁷ Interview with Brig Gen Frank K. Martin, 13 August 1989 in History of the Air Force Office of Security Police, 1 Jan 1988 thru 31 Dec 1988, Volume II, Supporting Document I-13, 2.

¹¹⁸ Interview with Brig Gen Frank K. Martin, 13 August 1989 in History of the Air Force Office of Security Police, 1 Jan 1988 thru 31 Dec 1988, Volume II, Supporting Document I-13, 3.

¹¹⁹ Script to accompany slide presentation in History of the Air Force Office of Security Police, 1 Jan 1988 thru 31 Dec 1988, Volume II, Supporting Document II-1, 2.

¹²⁰ History of the Air Force Office of Security Police, 1 Jan 1988 thru 31 Dec 1988, Volume I, 10.

¹²¹ History of the Air Force Office of Security Police, 1 Jan 1988 thru 31 Dec 1988, Volume I, Table II-1.

¹²² History of the Air Force Office of Security Police, 1 Jan 1988 thru 31 Dec 1988, Volume I, 10.

¹²³ History of the Air Force Office of Security Police, 1 Jan 1988 thru 31 Dec 1988, Volume I, 20.

¹²⁴ History of the Air Force Office of Security Police, 1 Jan 1988 thru 31 Dec 1988, Volume I, 22.

¹²⁵ History of the Air Force Office of Security Police, 1 Jan 1988 thru 31 Dec 1988, Volume I, 21-22.

¹²⁶ History of the Air Force Office of Security Police, 1 Jan 1988 thru 31 Dec 1988, Volume I, 21.

¹²⁷ History of the Air Force Office of Security Police, 1 Jan 1988 thru 31 Dec 1988, Volume I, 22.

¹²⁸ History of the Air Force Office of Security Police, 1 Jan 1988 thru 31 Dec 1988, Volume I, 22.

¹²⁹ Interview with Brig Gen Frank K. Martin, 13 August 1989 in History of the Air Force Office of Security Police, 1 Jan 1988 thru 31 Dec 1988, Volume II, Supporting Document I-13, 7.

¹³⁰ Interview with Brig Gen Frank K. Martin, 13 August 1989 in History of the Air Force Office of Security Police, 1 Jan 1988 thru 31 Dec 1988, Volume II, Supporting Document I-13, 7.

¹³¹ Walter Isaacson, "The Gorbachev Challenge," *Time*, Vol. 132, No. 5, December 18, 1988.

¹³² Inaugural Address, January 20, 1989 (George Bush Presidential Library Webpage, <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers/1989/89012000.html>).

¹³³ *Security Police Digest*, April 1989, 1.

¹³⁴ *Security Police Digest*, April 1989, 1.

¹³⁵ Undated Security Police history timeline by Col Matt Matecko, USAF (Ret), in author's possession.

¹³⁶ David Fulgham "Sentry drone may replace manned patrols," *Air Force Times*, November 20, 1989.

¹³⁷ Narrative from display in Security Police Museum, Lackland AFB, Texas.

¹³⁸ *SP Digest*, June 1991, 4.

¹³⁹ *SP Digest*, June 1991, 4.

¹⁴⁰ Interview of Brig Gen Stephen C. Mannell, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), June 5, 2005, 19.

¹⁴¹ Interview of Brig Gen Stephen C. Mannell, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), June 5, 2005, 19.

¹⁴² Quoted in David E. Hoffman, "Hastening an End to the Cold War" *Washington Post*, June 6, 2004.

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CHAPTER NINE

THE NEW WORLD ORDER: 1990 – September 10, 2001

“Now comes Mikhail Gorbachev with a sweeping vision of a ‘new world order’ for the 21st century. In his dramatic speech to the United Nations last week, the Soviet president painted an alluring ghost of Christmas future in which the threat of military force would no longer be an instrument of foreign policy, and ideology would cease to play a dominant role in relations among nations,” *Time* magazine reporter Walter Isaacson wrote on December 19, 1988.¹ Gorbachev’s continued softening of Communism in the USSR and Eastern Europe was indeed bringing about some sort of as yet undefined “new order” since his policies had irreparably undermined both the power of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of Gorbachev himself. Gorbachev’s *glasnost* was opening wide and would eventually swallow both him and the USSR. In the Soviet Republics, many long resentful of their often forcible union with Russia, Gorbachev’s openness had reawakened long-suppressed nationalist and anti-Russian feelings and unleashed a force that would ultimately destroy the Soviet Union.²

While the death throes of the Soviet Union and the liberation of Eastern Europe were watched with great interest and satisfaction by Washington, Air Force Security Police were under fire closer to home in Central America. In the spring of 1990, units from eight Tactical Air Command bases, including 25 security policemen, were deployed to Honduras as part of Task Force 820 to construct an airfield and base camp at Jamastran as part of the JCS exercise Ahuas Tara ’90.

1st Lt Paul Lewis of MacDill AFB’s 56th SPS, the deployed chief of Security Police, had learned his air base defense lessons well. Months before the first engineers arrived to move dirt, Lewis had visited the site to develop a security plan. Doing everything “by the text book,” Lewis had cranes and back-hoes construct formidable fighting positions along with concertina wire festooned with white phosphorous trip flares.³ Five M-60 machine gun positions covered with steel mesh protection against RPGs were strategically placed around the perimeter. Each SP due to deploy with the task force received a 25-page operating instruction from Lewis explaining how he wanted the troops to operate together. Once in Honduras the SPs and their Honduran counterparts were divided into two 12-hour shifts, each backed up by two Humvee mounted security response teams.⁴

Lewis described his mission as “personnel protection” and he had certainly done all he could to fulfill that mission at Task Force 820’s base camp. Unfortunately, Marxist terrorists, aided by the Sandinistas who had been recently defeated in nearby Nicaragua’s elections, struck at softer targets. On March 31, task force members returning to Jamastran from a morale and welfare visit were ambushed by snipers along the highway between Soto Cano and Tegucigalpa. Eight Airmen, including Sgt Todd Fewell of the 4th SPS at Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina, and Sgt. Kevin Flint of Holloman AFB, New Mexico’s 833rd SPS, were wounded. A1C Lee Cooke and A1C Michael Green, also

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of the 833rd, were credited with helping protect their wounded comrades. Both Fewell and Flint received Purple Heart medals.⁵

On August 2, 1990, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein demonstrated to the world that he at least did not subscribe to any new world order that renounced the use of force to settle disputes when he sent 120,000 men and 850 tanks south to overrun his neighbor Kuwait after negotiations over oil prices, the alleged theft of Iraqi oil by slant drilling across the border, the repayment terms of some \$15 billion in Kuwaiti loans to Iraq, and Iraqi claims to Kuwaiti territory broke. By August 3, tiny Kuwait had been overrun and Iraqi troops were poised along the border of Saudi Arabia. Within three days the United

Nations ordered an embargo of trade with Iraq and US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney was in Saudi Arabia to consult with the Saudis on the defense of that country.



1991 photo of Saddam Hussein (Associated Press)

On August 7, President Bush launched Operation Desert Shield and dispatched American ground troops to Saudi Arabia to enforce the United Nations resolution demanding that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait. Two Navy battle groups, including the powerful World War II-era battleships USS *Missouri* and USS *Wisconsin* in what was to be their final use in combat, were also ordered to the waters of the Persian Gulf. The initial Air Force contingent was composed of 48 F-15 fighters from the 1st Fighter Wing at Langley AFB, Virginia, and they immediately began flying patrols along the Iraqi/Saudi border.

Eventually, 500,000 American troops and 160,000 troops from 34 other countries were sent to the region to deter any Iraqi advance into Saudi

Arabia. Included in the American order of battle were Security Police from almost 200 individual squadrons from practically every MAJCOM as well as from the Air Force Reserve Command and Air National Guard.⁶ All told approximately 4,500 Security Police men and women, just 500 fewer than their number at peak strength in Vietnam, would serve in theater providing protection for 25 different Air Force sites.⁷

With so many SPs deployed or preparing for deployment there was no time for games, so General Martin cancelled Peacekeeper Challenge '90 scheduled for September

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23-29 at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico.⁸ Martin declared that while the deployment of personnel and equipment in support of Desert Shield was “working as planned,” it was not “business as usual” for those deployed or for those remaining at home station.⁹ He noted that Security Police men and women remaining behind “face similar challenges as those units which have deployed, including 12-hour work shifts, canceled leaves, and reduced mission funding,” but he was confident that despite hardships the field would do “everything possible to provide the Air Force with our maximum support.”¹⁰



A1C Robert Mott of the 90th SPG guards an E-3A airborne warning and control aircraft during Desert Shield (Air Force photo)

Col William Karbowsky, chief of Security Police for US Central Command Tactical Air Forces (CENTAF), was pleased with the deployed Security Police personnel he was receiving and praised them for “performing magnificently under some very tough conditions.”¹¹ Because so many MAJCOMs were represented at CENTAF’s bases, the leadership, Karbowsky noted, worked hard to eliminate “command pride” and replace it with “CENTAF pride,” since when troops from four or five MAJCOMs were thrown together at one place “you had best get them working as an integral team ASAP.”¹² Karbowsky was impressed with “the spirit and ‘can do’ attitude” exhibited by the deployed Security Police men and women and noted that “Lieutenant General [Charles “Chuck”] Horner, CENTAF commander, has noticed, too, commenting that the cops always have high morale.”¹³ Colonel Karbowsky also praised the “superb”

leadership exhibited by “some very young NCOs and officers [who] have tackled vast responsibility and performed brilliantly.”¹⁴ Their task, Karbowsky noted, was made easier by the “mature, intelligent, well trained, and well equipped” forces they were leading.¹⁵

Standing up a credible ground defense posture posed some challenges for Air Force commanders. Since the decision was made to rush combat forces to the Gulf in advance of support units, many deployed wing commanders found themselves initially dependent upon host nation forces for air base defense. At Thumrait AB, Oman, Omani guards were used by CENTAF to guard C-130s for two days despite Military Airlift Command’s reluctance to entrust their aircraft to host nation security. At the airfield near

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Dubai in the United Arab Emirates civilian police, aided by camel and goat herders outside the base equipped with cell phones to alert the police to potential threats, patrolled the base perimeter and reported suspicious activities to the Security Police. Some commanders augmented their small Security Police contingents with personnel from maintenance, supply, and other support forces until additional Security Police arrived.¹⁶ CENTAF later created a 44-man quick reaction team at Riyadh Air Base, Saudi Arabia, that could be airlifted to facilities needing augmentation of their Security Police forces.¹⁷

CENTAF built its theater Security Police force around AFR 207-1, *The Air Force Physical Security Program*, and AFR 125-37, *The Installation and Resources Protection Program*. These regulations, of course, focused on internal security of priority resources in peacetime, so CENTAF planners added additional manpower to perform force protection, internal air base ground defense, and some limited external security operations. CENTAF planning, therefore, naturally focused on internal base security and depended upon Army or host nations forces for external defense. Despite CENTAF's trust of host nation security forces, some SP commanders did not trust them to provide an adequate defense and demanded that Army Military Police or infantry surround their bases and this first real world test of the Army/Air Force agreement on air base ground defense revealed its limitations.

The primary weakness exposed by Desert Shield was that the Air Force and the Army differed on how they approached rear area security. The Air Force believed that since airpower was a key to the air-land battle both services were committed to fight, its air fields should be the Army's number one priority for rear area security. The Army, however, viewed the Air Force's landing strips as only one of numerous priority resources and sites in the rear area requiring protection and, in accordance with its doctrine of fire and maneuver, avoided having its combat forces tied to a static defense of any rear area location. Wherever the interests of the two services coincided, such as at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, where many Air Force personnel and assets were bedded down and which was also the Army's primary port of entry for its personnel and equipment, there was little conflict between the differing visions of air base defense. Generally, however, as the official postwar *Gulf War Air Power Survey* observed: "Despite years of exercises and joint training efforts at the unit level, the divergent expectations of Army and Air Force leaders became manifest throughout the initial employment of their forces."¹⁸

Because of the Army's decision to entrust air base defense to Reserve and Guard MPs, the bulk of the Army MPs responsible for air base defense would not be available until after a call-up of these forces by the President. Although President Bush had issued a call-up order, Reserve and National Guard MPs were slow to arrive in theater and the more than 17,000 MPs eventually available were, in addition to "normal" police duties, also responsible for guarding 9,000 kilometers of supply routes, 172 critical facilities, and later nearly 84,000 prisoners.¹⁹ Eventually, Army forces protected air bases closest to the Saudi-Kuwaiti border, but these forces were not necessarily located on or even near the base. Farther from the border, where terrorist attacks or sabotage were the major

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threats, security was provided by host nation forces externally and Security Police internally.²⁰ Particular attention was paid to off-base areas near the airfields that might conceal attackers with Soviet made shoulder fired anti-aircraft missiles.

These problems added impetus to an on-going Army-Air Force dialogue on air base ground defense. Work was progressing on a new JCS Publication, 3-10.1 *Base Defense*, and a new joint manual AFM 3-3/DA 525-14, *US Army – USAF Air Base Ground Defense*, was also in the works that featured an “emphasis on Air Force commanders preparing for ground defense by selectively arming additional personnel to defend their base.”²¹ A key theme of AFM 3-3 was that base defense was an Air Force command responsibility, not a Security Police responsibility. Accordingly, AFOSP recommended that “training and arming all Air Force personnel become an integral part of Air Force life.”²²

By January 1992, the Air Force planned to eliminate the air base ground defense 206 series of regulations and incorporate ABGD in AFR 207-1, Volume II based on the premise that base defense was a natural outgrowth of peacetime security and that these functions transitioned to wartime with little change. AFR 207-1, Volume II also contained basic ABGD doctrine for commanders, while the “nuts and bolts” of tactics, procedures, and field craft were assembled in a new Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 207-11, *Air Base Ground Defense and Contingency Operations*.²³

As Army/Air Force air base defense doctrine continued to be refined, joint MP/SP operations were ongoing at Soto Cano AB, Honduras as part of Joint Task Force (JTF) Bravo. JTF Bravo was a 1,200 man Army-Air Force unit with three basic missions: nation building, training, and contingency planning and support. The JTF Bravo Joint Security Force (JSF) was primarily an Army show with an Army commander commanding the 571st Military Police Company; B Company, 3rd Battalion, 14th Infantry, and 56 Air Force SPs. But the JSF was also responsible for air base ground defense and here, the Army commander admitted, “Since SPs train for that mission, we are learning from them.”²⁴

As American and coalition forces rushed to Saudi Arabia, President George Bush addressed Congress on September 11, setting forth his own vision of the “new world order:”

A new partnership of nations has begun, and we stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment. The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective -- a new world order -- can emerge: A new era - - freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, east and west, north and south, can prosper and live in harmony.²⁵

Saddam Hussein’s aggression was, the President said, “[T]he first assault on the new world that we seek, the first test of our mettle.”²⁶

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He returned to this theme in his State of the Union speech in January, referring to events in Iraq and declaring to the nation that:

[T]onight we lead the world in facing down a threat to decency and humanity. What is at stake is more than one small country, it is a big idea – a new world order, where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind: peace and security, freedom and the rule of law. Such is a world worthy of our struggle, and worthy of our children’s future.²⁷

On January 16, 1991, the day after the U.N. deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait went unheeded by Saddam Hussein, US Army GEN H. Norman Schwarzkopf, CENTCOM and coalition commander, ordered the attack and informed his command: "Soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines of the United States Central Command, this morning at 0300, we launched Operation Desert Storm, an offensive campaign that will enforce the United Nation's resolutions that Iraq must cease its rape and pillage of its weaker neighbor and withdraw its forces from Kuwait. My confidence in you is total. Our cause is just! Now you must be the thunder and lightning of Desert Storm. May God be with you, your loved ones at home, and our Country."²⁸

For the next 38 days, Air Force, Navy, Marine, British Royal Air Force, and other coalition aircraft pounded Iraqi positions in Kuwait and their supply lines into Iraq along with other high value targets. Flying an average of 2,555 sorties a day the Airmen targeted Soviet-built SS-1 “Scud” air-to-ground missile launchers, Iraqi airfields, air defenses, electrical power facilities, suspected biological and chemical weapons sites, military headquarters, intelligence assets, communications facilities, and oil refining facilities, often using precision guided weapons including Tomahawk cruise missiles fired from Navy vessels in the Persian Gulf. So effective were these precision munitions that civilian casualties were minimized and maximum damage was inflicted upon the Iraqi military even though the tonnage of munitions expended was far less than used in past wars to achieve a similar level of destruction.

“Scud hunting” took on high priority after Saddam lobbed seven of the missiles into Israel on January 17 to provoke Israeli involvement in the war in hopes of causing Arab members of the coalition against him to withdraw rather than to be seen siding with the Jewish state. To dissuade Israel from retaliating, President Bush promised the Israelis that Scud launchers would be a high priority target and quickly rushed Patriot anti-aircraft missiles modified to shoot down Scuds to Israel. The Scuds were not only a threat to Israeli civilians; on February 25 one blasted into a barracks at Dhahran killing 28 American soldiers.

Hunting Scuds was not limited to air attacks and some Air Force Security Police directly participated in special operations missions to, among other things, seek out and destroy the highly mobile Iraqi missiles. From January 22 to January 31, Capt Clifford E. Day led the security element for “a team deployed behind enemy lines” with the mission of verifying “intelligence data concerning enemy troop movements and topography, and to destroy, if found, Iraqi mobile Scud missile launchers.”²⁹ On January 25, the team was spotted and engaged by Iraqi forces, but Day was able to disengage and elude further contact. On the 27th, Captain Day’s team spotted an Iraqi armored column and Day

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painted it with a laser designator and called in fighter bombers armed with laser guided munitions that destroyed the Iraqi column. As soon as friendly aircraft located and struck the target, Day evaded enemy contact as he moved the team to a secure location. As recounted in the citation for his Bronze Star with "V" for Valor, "Captain Day's courageous, immediate actions, under the intense stress of combat, resulted in the gathering of valuable intelligence...thus aiding coalition ground commanders with their development of the ground campaign."³⁰

At 0400 on February 24, coalition ground forces crossed the border into Kuwait, crushing Iraqi opposition and flanking the enemy in sweeping left hook through the desert. Asked for the offensive plan at a press conference, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman GEN Colin Powell said the objective was the Iraqi army in Kuwait and the plan was simply, "first we're going to cut it off and then we're going to kill it."³¹ After having ignited hundreds of Kuwaiti oil wells and dumping millions of gallons of crude oil into the waters of the Persian Gulf, the outgunned, outfought, and outmaneuvered Iraqis fled toward Iraq with tens of thousands of conscripts surrendering along the way to any coalition soldiers they could find.

Air Force Security Police were in the advance as Kuwait was liberated. TSgt Chris Batta and his Belgian Malinois MWD Carlos from Sembach AB, Germany's, 601st SPS were attached to the Army Special Forces during the advance. As the only MWD team with the Special Forces, Batta and Carlos "were continually in demand" to find unexploded ordnance.³² All told, the two detected over 167 pieces of ordnance and returned to Sembach as celebrities with their story recounted on Paul Harvey's radio show, in the European *Stars and Stripes*, and *Dog World, Airman*, and *Air Force* magazines.³³

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Saddam's forces fleeing from Kuwait were caught along the Abdali highway leading from Kuwait to Iraq and trapped by the destruction of vehicles at the front and rear of the long column. They were then mercilessly bombed, strafed, and shelled on February 26 and 27, losing over a thousand military vehicles and hundreds of soldiers. Dubbed the "Highway of Death" by the media, the scenes of destruction along the road caused President Bush some discomfort and when informed by GEN Powell that he



GEN Schwarzkopf meets with Iraq generals to negotiate terms of a the cease fire (Air Force photo)

would be making a recommendation in 24 hours to cease hostilities, Bush decided to go ahead and end the ground war 12 hours early at the 100-hour point. The ceasefire took effect at 0800, February 28, 1991, although two days later the Hammurabi Division of the Iraqi Republican guard attempted to fight its way through the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division and was decimated. Iraqi losses were estimated at some 22,000 killed, while 148 Americans were killed in combat.

Under the terms of the cease fire Saddam was forced to admit United Nation's weapons inspectors to ensure the dismantling of his nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs. Iraq's oil exports were strictly regulated under a U.N. "Oil for Food" program which sought to ensure that oil revenues were not diverted to military purposes. Iraqi fixed wing aircraft, but not helicopters in an oversight that would later prove fatal to many Shia Muslims and Kurds, were prohibited and these "no fly" zones were to be enforced by coalition aircraft. All of these efforts were directed at keeping Saddam "in his box."

The first American troops began to return home from Desert Shield/Desert Storm on March 17, 1991, to accolades including a ticker tape parade in New York City on June 10. The Air Force along with naval aviators flying from aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf, however, stayed on to counter Saddam Hussein's latest outrages—the repression of the rebellious Kurds of Northern Iraq. Longtime victims of Saddam's brutality--the Kurds had been the target of Iraqi chemical weapons attacks in 1988--by April, 1991,

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Saddam's attacks on the Kurds and the resulting flood of refugees into the rugged mountains of Turkey and Iran led to the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 688 which condemned "the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq," demanded that the Iraqi government "immediately end this repression," and called on the U.N. Secretary General to "use all the resources at his disposal, including those of the relevant United Nations agencies, to address urgently the critical needs of the refugees and displaced Iraqi population."³⁴

Based on this resolution, coalition forces led by the United States launched Operation Provide Comfort to supply the Kurdish refugees with food, shelter and clothing. Ground troops from the United States and 12 other countries also established a security zone to protect the Kurds from the Iraqi army. By mid-July, Air Force transports had delivered over 7,000 tons in relief supplies while Air Force fighters provided air support for the ground forces involved.³⁵

In concert with Provide Comfort, the US, the United Kingdom, and France established a northern no-fly zone from the Turkish border south to the 36th parallel in which Iraqi military aircraft were forbidden to operate. Stymied in the north, Saddam now turned south to punish the rebellious Shiite Muslims and in August 1992, a southern no-fly zone was created relying on the authority of Security Council Resolution 688. As part of what was called Operation Southern Watch, coalition aircraft, led primarily by the US and U.K., patrolled the skies from the Kuwaiti border north to the 33rd parallel to prevent Iraqi military aircraft operations. With the northern no-fly zone (re-designated Operation Northern Watch after Provide Comfort ended at the end of 1996) and Operation Southern Watch, the coalition was essentially conducting "the air occupation of a country..."³⁶

While providing air support for Provide Comfort and Northern Watch was turned over to USAFE, Southern Watch was under the command of CENTCOM's Joint Task Force Southwest Asia (JTF-SWA) and required the continuing use of air bases in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. Of course these bases needed defense and security and since CENTAF owned no forces of its own, Security Police, along with thousands of others in various Air Force specialties from units worldwide, rotated in and out of Southwest Asia for their turn to "play" in the "sandbox." Even though their mission was partly to protect predominately Muslim Persian Gulf states from any new threat from Saddam Hussein by keeping him contained, the continuing American and European presence in Saudi Arabia, home of the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina, fuelled the hatred of an as yet unrecognized enemy.

On 5 February, as Desert Storm raged, a reorganization of Air Force headquarters to centralize all Air Force policy making in Washington brought a new functional office to Washington as the Office of the Chief of Security Police once again became a member of the Air Force Special Staff with the office symbol of HQ USAF/SP. The seed for the move had probably been planted when Martin told Air Force Inspector General Lt Gen Brad Hosmer that he thought the head of Security Police ought to be in Washington, not out at Kirtland. Hosmer's response was that Martin was asking the wrong question and

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instead of asking why he was at Kirtland he should be asking why he worked for Hosmer. Martin explained the history of how that came to be, but Hosmer bluntly told him, “I don’t believe you ought to work for me...I work for the secretary of the Air Force because I have an inspection function. You run security for the Air Force. You should be responsible to the chief of staff of the Air Force because he has the responsibility for security.”³⁷ One of Chief of Staff Merrill McPeak’s first acts upon taking office was to move the “Top Cop” back to the Air Staff and Martin always believed that Hosmer made that happen.³⁸

General Martin welcomed the move and believed “the creation of HQ USAF/SP under the chief of staff will provide great benefits to security police, including a greater recognition of, and emphasis on, the wartime capabilities of our career field.”³⁹ As part of this reorganization AFOSP at Kirtland changed its name to the Air Force Security Police Center (AFSPC) and became a field operating agency (FOA) under HQ USAF/SP.⁴⁰ Col Fredric L. Miller assumed command of the AFSPC on March 18, 1991.



Lt Gen Bradley C. Hosmer (Air Force photo)

AF/SP assumed policy making responsibilities for resource protection, air base ground defense, combat arms training and maintenance, information security, and law enforcement and police services. These responsibilities were carried out by three divisions: Security Police Policy (SPO); Plans and Programs (SPX); and Information Security (SPI). The AFSPC was to be the center of functional expertise and implemented the guidance and policies set by AF/SP through its four directorates at Kirtland: Physical Security (SPS); Law Enforcement and Training (SPL); Safeguarding (SPD); and Plans and Programs (SPP).⁴¹ The Air Force Security Clearance Office (AFSCO), which occupied leased office space in Rosslyn, Virginia, across the Potomac from Washington and near the Pentagon, was also designated as a FOA.

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In June nature brought a sudden and significant change to the Air Force's worldwide presence as Mt. Pinatubo, a mile-high volcano ten miles from Clark AFB in the Philippines rumbled into life. After several minor eruptions, evacuations of dependents from Clark to the huge US naval base at Subic Bay began on June 10. Four days later the mountain blew its top in a massive explosion that blanketed Clark and surrounding areas in a thick layer of volcanic ash while torrential rains from Typhoon Yunya turned the ash into a cement-like mix that collapsed buildings. On June 16, Operation Firey Vigil was launched to evacuate 18,000 Air Force and Navy dependents



3rd SPS horse patrol after evacuation of Clark AB (Air Force photo)

from Subic Bay. At Clark a caretaker contingent, including 960 Security Police, remained to safeguard the public and private property on the base. Additionally, the DoD Dog Center at Lackland shipped 30 patrol dogs and two instructors to Clark on June 30 to train 30 local nationals commissioned as DoD special police.⁴²

The futures of Clark and Subic had been in doubt even before Pinatubo blew its top as some Filipino politicians argued against renewal of the base leases to remove what they saw as a last vestige of colonialism and as terrorist attacks against American military personnel by the Marxist New People's Army, heirs to the vanquished Huks, increased. In July an agreement was reached between the US and the Philippines to close Clark by September 1992 and keep Subic open for an additional 10 years.⁴³ However, the

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Philippine Senate rejected the treaty and both Clark and Subic were abandoned by the United States, ending almost a century of American presence in the Philippine Islands.

On another Pacific Ocean island that summer US Marines on Guam playing the role of terrorists as part of an exercise called Operation Midnight Trail, “attacked” on August 16, 1991, a machine gun position guarding priority resources and manned by 19-year-old Ann Laurie Lucas and Sgt Gerald Delp of Andersen AFB’s 633rd SPS. According to some reports, when a referee declared the machine gun position to be “knocked out” by the “terrorists,” Delp disagreed with the call and kept firing. A Marine officer shouted, “Smoke, grenades” and Marine Lance Corporal Kevin Joyner, believing he was throwing a training grenade simulator, tossed a live Mark 3A2 concussion grenade into Delp’s and Lucas’s position. As Joyner and the others scrambled up the 18-foot tall revetment atop which sat the machine gun position, he heard a female screaming, “He blew off my foot.” Evacuated to the naval hospital at Agana Heights, Lucas died there four days later after undergoing three surgeries and receiving 32 pints of blood.⁴⁴ A grim milestone had been reached; Laurie Lucas was the first female SP killed in the line of duty. Corporal Joyner would later be tried and acquitted by a court-martial on charges of involuntary manslaughter, disobeying a lawful order, and aggravated assault.⁴⁵

Before the year was out death would stalk Andersen AFB’s 633rd SPS a second time. On December 29, 1991, Sgt Stacey E. Levay escorted Mrs. Peregrina L. Armour, an employee of the base commissary carrying \$74,000 in daily receipts, to make a deposit in the base’s Fort Sam Houston Bank branch. At the bank night deposit box, the two were ambushed by five robbers. Armour was punched in the stomach and the money pouch taken from her while another assailant stuck a semi-automatic rifle in Levay’s back. Levay turned on his assailant and struggled with him for the weapon, but two of the gang grabbed him and held him while Dennis S. Simoy beat him repeatedly on the head with a steel pipe. As the gang ran to their getaway car, driven by Simoy’s brother, security policeman Senior Airman (SrA) Jose Simoy, TSgt Donald P. Marquardt drove up and was stabbed in the chest and throat by one of the gang while he sat in his car. Marquardt survived, but Sgt Levay died of his injuries on New Year’s Day.⁴⁶

SrA Simoy, who used his Security Police training and knowledge of the commissary’s nightly deposit to plan and carry out the robbery, was tried by court-martial for robbery and for the murder of Sgt Levay. After a 14-day trial, Simoy was found guilty and sentenced to death.⁴⁷

In between the deaths of Laurie Lucas and Stacey Levay a country also died. On August 19, the State Committee on the State Emergency, made up of Soviet hardliners opposed to Gorbachev’s attempt to restructure the union of republics into a federation of independent states with a common president, foreign policy, and military, arrested Gorbachev at his vacation home in the Crimea. The plotters also tried to arrest reformist Russian President Boris Yeltsin at his office in the “White House” in Moscow, but thousands of Muscovites rallied around Yeltsin and by August 21, the coup had collapsed and Gorbachev reinstated as Soviet president. His power, however, was fatally compromised and throughout the autumn the Russian republic took over the various

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Soviet ministries. On Christmas Day, Gorbachev resigned as president of the USSR, and on December 31 the Soviet Union was dissolved and replaced by the Commonwealth of Independent States.



Gen Merrill McPeak (Air Force photo)

The United States Air Force that greeted the New Year of 1992 would be vastly different from the one that would see in 1993 as Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Merrill McPeak implemented the most sweeping organizational changes in the service's 45-year history. McPeak's actions were prompted by the dramatic changes in the international arena during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, and the Gulf War all led defense planners to reexamine the structure of the military establishment that had evolved during the Cold War. They concluded that the existing structure was not well suited to the new world situation, particularly since while the likelihood of a large-scale nuclear conflict seemed remote, US military forces would probably be increasingly called upon to participate in smaller regional conflicts and humanitarian operations.

In light of these new realities, the Air Force began to reconsider the long-standing distinction between two of its major commands: Strategic Air Command (SAC) and Tactical Air Command (TAC). Over the years the term "strategic" had become almost totally linked to the notion of nuclear deterrence while the focus of "tactical" operations was on joint missions with the Air Force working in tandem with ground and naval forces. This distinction, however, did not lend itself to a limited conflict. During the war in Southeast Asia, for example, "strategic" B-52 bombers performed "tactical" ground support missions, while "tactical" fighter aircraft carried out "strategic" bombing of enemy infrastructure deep into North Vietnam. The way airpower was used during Operation Desert Storm further blurred the distinction between the two terms and the two commands.

General McPeak envisioned a streamlined, flexible Air Force that eliminated artificial force distinctions and unnecessary organizational layers and was organized to provide global reach and project global power. After examining numerous reorganization options, senior planners decided the best course of action involved a merger of most of SAC's and all of TAC's resources and a reorganization of the Military Airlift Command. Under this restructuring of forces, airlift and most refueling assets would be consolidated under a new Air Mobility Command (AMC) which provided the "global reach" of the Air Force. SAC and TAC would be deactivated and replaced by a new Air Combat Command (ACC) to provide the Air Force's "global power."

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Needless to say, the decision to deactivate SAC and TAC was not well received by the rank and file. SAC's warriors particularly suspected that McPeak, a fighter pilot, would ensure the old TAC's supremacy in the new ACC. Some waited to see what the new ACC organizational emblem would be; would it merge the mailed fist of SAC with the winged sword of TAC or be all one or the other? SAC diehards felt confirmed in their suspicions when the new ACC emblem turned out to be the former emblem of Tactical Air Command and the ACC's first commander was TAC's last commander, Gen John M. Loh.

On June 1, 1992, SAC, TAC, and MAC ceased to exist and were replaced by ACC and AMC. Major organizational changes would continue, however. One month later, Air Force Systems Command and Air Force Logistics Command were deactivated and merged into Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC). A year after that, Air Training Command was replaced by Air Education and Training Command (AETC) and the former SAC ICBMs originally transferred to ACC were shifted to Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) which would serve as the Air Force component of United States Strategic Command, a joint Army/Navy command controlling the Air Force and Navy nuclear ICBM forces from SAC's former headquarters at Offutt AFB, Nebraska.

These were not the only changes McPeak would institute. His attention took in crew neck T-shirts which were banned; the service dress uniform which was shorn of its epaulets and changed to display RAF/Navy-type cuff braid rank insignia; embroidered name tapes on BDUs which were scrapped in favor of Velcro air crew style leather name tags; and Air Force regulations which were eliminated, rewritten, and renumbered as Air Force Instructions (AFI) and Air Force Manuals (AFM), thereby wiping out years of accumulated knowledge. So numerous were the changes that one general lamented to his colleagues, "this air staff is going to be remembered for changing the uniform more than any other issue to come out of here."⁴⁸ McPeak's changes to the uniform were particularly despised by the force, to put it mildly, and with the exception of the new MAJCOMs only the AFR to AFI changeover survived his departure as CSAF.

In March 1992, Brig Gen Frank Martin retired after having provided a steady hand guiding the career field through a major war and an extensive reorganization. Martin was replaced by Brig Gen Stephen C. Mannell. Mannell entered the Security Police in 1966 after graduation from the University of Oregon as an ROTC distinguished graduate. A distinguished graduate of both the Air Command and Staff College and the Air War College, Mannell started his career as the Air Police operations officer at Hurlburt Field, Florida, and progressed to two squadron commands, several tours as



Brig Gen Stephen C. Mannell (Air Force photo)

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an officer on MAJCOM and AFOSP staffs, chief of security police for Space Command, North American Aerospace Defense Command, and US Space Command, and DCS for Security Police at USAFE, and finally as the chief of plans and programs at HQ USAF/SP.

Mannell set out three “overarching” goals for the career field as he assumed the position as chief of Security Police. First, to “continue to provide the best possible security for Air Force weapons, aircraft, information, funds, and families.”⁴⁹ Second, to ensure the Security Police’s continued readiness for war. Finally, that the men and women of the Security Police continue to “strive to demonstrate professionalism at all times as the most visible representatives of the US Air Force.”⁵⁰

Noting the dramatic reorganization of the Air Force, Mannell explained that “we are moving toward building a new Air Force from the bottom up to recognize the diminished global threat to the United States, while maintaining our ability to achieve global reach and power.”⁵¹ Mannell pointed out that the role of the Security Police in this new force was, according to General McPeak, to be his “ground combat arm.”⁵² Consequently, the chief of staff was taking a keen interest in how the SPs reorganized and equipped themselves to achieve combat readiness. The mission of the Air Force, as recently restated by McPeak, was to “defend the United States through control and exploitation of air and space” and the role of the Security Police in fulfilling this mission, Mannell explained, was to “make absolutely sure Air Force weapons systems, bases, and personnel are secured and defended.”⁵³ Mannell’s personal challenge would be, as he put it later, “To try and keep the career field the way it had been established, to make sure we remained [on] the staff, with the capability to do the mission that would be given to us.”⁵⁴

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Satellite photo of KUMMSC (US Geological Survey)

In June 1992, the Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance Storage Complex (KUMMSC) was activated and the Manzano Weapons Storage Area was deactivated and used to store furniture and boxes.

The early 90's were a time of decreasing defense budgets in an effort to capture the so-called "peace dividend" from the end of the Cold War. President Bush and his Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney proposed defense budgets for fiscal years 1990-1993 that represented a decline in DoD's total obligation authority from \$291.3 billion to \$269.9 billion. Over this period, military personnel strength declined by 19.4 percent from 2.2 million personnel in 1989 to 1.7 million in FY 1993. The Army lost 25.8 percent of its strength; the Navy took a 14 percent cut; and the Air Force was to implement a 22.3 percent manpower reduction.⁵⁵

To absorb this reduction every career field in the Air Force had to justify its existence and one manpower exercise after another was conducted looking for slots to cut. Even though McPeak was a big supporter of the Security Police and, according to Mannell, "felt we were absolutely important, critical to war fighting, and he couldn't deploy anywhere in the world without us," he still expected the Security Police to be sized like the rest of the Air Force was sized.⁵⁶ "So," Mannell recalled, "we continually had to justify every vehicle, every piece of equipment that we owned, every training hour."⁵⁷

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As the Air Force's largest enlisted career field Security Police was "a terrible target" for reductions and General Mannell chalked up as one of his successes that "we didn't get downsized more than anyone else. In fact, we probably got downsized less."⁵⁸ Mannell did not disagree with what McPeak was trying to do and in fact was frustrated by how some in his career field dug in their heels against any change. He grudgingly admired the dog handlers who had managed to gather many proponents for the use of MWD teams. "There were so many advocates for dogs," Mannell later observed. "They had done such a great job in public relations that that's the one functional area that never... downsized. They had done a better job of PR. I'll tell you if the Air Force public relations would use the military working dog school as an example, they could sell the Air Force to anybody."⁵⁹ Despite Mannell's efforts to hold the line and despite the acknowledged importance to the Air Force mission, by late 1994 the Security Police had downsized by 20 percent.⁶⁰



SAT response late 1980s (Security Forces Museum)

It was during this period of downsizing that some senior officers began to question the need for an Air Force uniformed police force at all. At one point Air Force vice chief of staff Gen Michael P. C. Carns asked General Mannell why he had a police force at all and pointed out that Bolling AFB had a police force larger than that of nearby civilian communities. One of the reasons for the disparity, Mannell patiently explained, was that various private security companies took up some of the slack off-base, while Bolling did not have that luxury. Mannell generally deflected queries such as Carns's by noting that a baseline strength had to be maintained to have sufficient forces to meet wartime requirements, but the seed of contracting out some Security Police functions was planted by the questions Carns and others asked. Now, in addition to educating the

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manpower community on the Security Police mission to avoid debilitating cuts, Mannell had to “make sure that we didn’t become a contracted guard force.”⁶¹ For the time being, however, the seed did not sprout because Federal law prohibited the use of contract security guards.⁶²

One bit of favorable fallout from the personnel cuts was that more money became available for equipment and Mannell jumped on this funding to obtain base defense materiel and stored it in warehouses throughout the Air Force. The additional equipment allowed the outfitting of deployable security flights that had begun years earlier to be completed and these flights became the foundation for “lean, mean, rapidly deployable security forces.”⁶³

These flights would be needed as the Air Force became more and more involved in military operations other than war (MOOTW). As the Cold War ended, the seeming stability imposed on the world by the confrontation of the superpowers began to crumble as religious strife and nationalistic movements began to struggle for control in the Third World. The United States military was often called upon to provide humanitarian assistance, evacuation of US citizens, and peacekeeping operations in hot spots throughout the world. Between 1990 and 1996 no less than 23 MOOTW operations, not counting those in Southwest Asia, were conducted in Africa, Haiti, and the former nation of Yugoslavia. Air Force support for these operations sometimes came from fixed, established main operating bases, but often Air Force assets were deployed to facilities that were less than secure and the Security Police came along to protect their fellow Airmen.

In November 1992, Democrat Arkansas Governor William Jefferson Clinton defeated President George H. W. Bush in his presidential re-election bid. Clinton, an obscure young politician who gained his party’s nomination after higher profile Democrats decided that Bush was a shoo-in based on his high popularity ratings after the Gulf War, campaigned almost exclusively on domestic issues and unlike Bush had no experience in foreign policy or military affairs. In his inaugural address Clinton offered



President Bill Clinton (White House photo)

no clear vision of his foreign policy beyond declaring only that, “There is no longer division between what is foreign and what is domestic—the world economy, the world environment, the world AIDS crisis, the world arms race—they affect us all.”⁶⁴ He did acknowledge that “the new world is more free but less stable” since “Communism’s collapse has called forth old animosities and new dangers” and the new President vowed that, “When our vital interests are challenged, or the will and conscience of the international community is defied, we will act—with peaceful diplomacy whenever possible, with force when necessary.”⁶⁵

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Clinton's relationship with the military as commander-in-chief would be one of the most strained in American history. In contrast to Bush, the World War II Navy torpedo bomber pilot, Clinton was alleged to have dodged the draft during Vietnam and to have participated in demonstrations against the Vietnam War while a student in England. The appearance during the presidential campaign of a letter in which he wrote that he "loathed the military" and Clinton's campaign promise to allow homosexuals to serve openly in the armed forces created a tension with the military services that continued throughout his term in office.

Clinton's relations with the military were also not enhanced by his choice for secretary of defense – Wisconsin Congressman Les Aspin. Aspin, a recognized expert on defense issues, had advised Clinton on military affairs during the campaign, and early in his tenure as SECDEF accurately identified the dangers brought about by the end of the Cold War including the uncertainty that reform could succeed in the former Soviet Union, the possibility that terrorists or terrorist states could acquire nuclear weapons, and the likely proliferation of regional conflicts. Despite these pressing challenges, however, one of Aspin's first acts was to attempt to revise DoD policy to allow homosexuals to serve openly in the Armed Forces; a controversial action that deepened the animosity each side of the issue had for the other and needlessly embroiled him in controversy until the end of 1993.



Secretary of the Air Force Sheila E. Widnall (Air Force photo)

Aspin also tackled the just as controversial issue of women in combat and in April 1993, he issued a revised policy on the assignment of women in the armed forces. The new policy directed the services to allow women to compete for assignments in combat aircraft, open additional Navy ships to women with the goal of ultimately removing existing legislative barriers to the assignment of women to combat vessels, and to create opportunities for women to serve in Army components such as field artillery and air defense. Consistent with Clinton's view of women in the military, Sheila E. Widnall became the first woman service secretary with her confirmation by the Senate as Secretary of the Air Force. But Aspin's

actions regarding homosexuals and women in the military services led to charges by administration opponents that Clinton and Aspin were using the military for "social experimentation" and Aspin's actions were held up as evidence that the Clinton administration was not serious about "real" defense issues.

Aspin also launched a bottom-up review or BUR of the entire US defense establishment. Clinton had pledged to further reduce the defense budget as part of his

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campaign and the BUR report released in September 1993 proposed a reduced force structure capable of fighting and winning two simultaneous major regional conflicts. The BUR projected a force of ten active Army divisions, 11 Navy carrier battle groups of about 345 ships and 45 to 55 attack submarines along with five active Marine brigades, and 13 active and seven reserve Air Force fighter wings. The BUR was criticized as being based on meeting budget cutting goals rather than strategic requirements since the FY 1994 defense budget submitted in March 1993, before the BUR was even completed, was \$12 billion below that of the previous year and reflected cuts in the military services similar to those later included in the BUR.⁶⁶

As politicians squabbled over the BUR and the Air Force downsized and reorganized, the United States was at war, although it did not realize it at the time. The first attack in that new war came at 12:17 p.m. on February 26, 1993, as a 1,500-pound car bomb was detonated in the parking garage beneath Tower One of New York's World Trade Center. The plan, the brainchild of Islamic fundamentalist Ramzi Yousef, was to undermine the supports of Tower One and send it toppling into Tower Two. Yousef and the other conspirators involved in the bombing received financing from Yousef's uncle, Khalid Sheik Mohammed, a member of a shadowy Islamic terrorist group called *Al Qaeda* led by former Afghan-Soviet War *mujahadeen* Osama bin-Laden. Yousef's ambitious plan to drop the World Trade Center towers failed, but he did manage to blast a 30-meter-wide hole through four sublevels of concrete and kill six and injure 1,042 people.

The US response was to apprehend and put the conspirators on trial as common criminals. By 1998, Yousef and nine other conspirators were convicted and each sentenced to 240 years in prison.

As the BUR controversy raged in Washington, a controversy with the ranks of the Security Police was also on. The subject was once again the split career fields of security and law enforcement. As part of his reorganization of the Air Force, General McPeak declared 1992 the "Year of Training" and directed that the goal of all training would be to make Air Force members "mission ready" upon arrival at their first duty station. One aspect of this was a requirement that all enlisted personnel attend technical training. Out of the consequent review of SP training a rumor arose that the security and law enforcement career fields would be recombined into one AFSC, something both General Mannell and CMSgt Wayne Cox, the career field senior enlisted manager, opposed. Chief Cox sought to squelch this rumor by authoring a point paper that Mannell sent to all MAJCOM Security Police chiefs to underscore AF/SP's "commitment to maintaining separate security and law enforcement career ladders."⁶⁷ The MAJCOM chiefs were advised to use Cox's paper "to counter persistent rumors about reconsolidating the career fields" and educate personnel who may not have lived under the dual AFSC structure and "make sure they understand how far we've come and why we shouldn't go back."⁶⁸

In the point paper, Cox revisited the poor morale caused by the perception and the reality that law enforcement personnel received better duty and more promotions than their counterparts in security under the single AFSC system. He also noted that both

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security and law enforcement had become more and more specialized over the years with only a few duties in common and that every review of the career field since the split in 1971 had concluded the same. Cox's final point was that, "Notwithstanding our common mission of air base defense, there are simply too many factors that call for maintaining our current career ladders. It's best for the Air Force. It's best for our people."⁶⁹ Cox's point paper was also disseminated to the rank and file in the form of a question and answer article in the *SP Digest*.⁷⁰

One thing in common to both specialties was the risk that went with the job. While routine duty may involve hours of mind numbing routine, it could change in moments to stark terror as two SPs at two different bases were to discover over the course of a little more than a year.

On May 26, 1993, a deranged Air Force retiree, Leroy Swain, Jr., used his retiree identification to enter 21st Air Force headquarters at McGuire AFB, New Jersey. Swain was convinced that microwaves and computers at McGuire were causing "electronic emissions" in his brain. Personnel in the building saw Swain, who was armed with a 9mm pistol, enter the legal office and called 911. Maj Robert L. Lowry, a judge advocate and son of retired Air Force Brig Gen Joseph R. Lowry, approached Swain and attempted to calm him long enough for people to get to cover and for the SPs to arrive. Swain shot and killed Major Lowry moments before MSgt James Pierpont and his partner A1C Art Voss arrived on the scene.⁷¹

Pierpont found Swain in room 218 and talked him into coming out into the hallway and tried to convince him to surrender, until Swain trained his pistol on Voss. Pierpont then stepped out into the hallway to attract Swain's attention from Voss and as Swain turned to point his weapon at Pierpont, the sergeant fired 10 rounds hitting Swain eight times and killing him. Pierpont, who later said his only thought as he fired was "Dear God, don't let him shoot me in the face," noted that when Swain fell, "he was still pointing his weapon; he still had a grip on it."⁷² Both Lowry and Pierpont received the Airmen's Medal for their courage that day.

On June 20, 1994, bicycle patrolman SrA Andrew P. Brown of the 92nd SPS had his moment of terror as he pedaled toward the hospital at Fairchild AFB, Washington, in response to a "shots fired" call on his radio. Arriving at the hospital parking lot, Brown found himself surrounded by a panic-stricken crowd fleeing the scene. He questioned several of the frightened throng who provided conflicting reports of the location and number of gunmen involved in the attack. After riding through the crowd Brown spotted an individual firing a MAC-90 assault rifle indiscriminately into the fleeing people outside the hospital. Unknown to Brown, the gunman, later identified as recently discharged A1C Dean Mellberg, had already killed the psychologist who recommended his discharge and shot several others inside of the hospital. Brown dismounted, drew his weapon, identified himself as a police officer, and ordered Mellberg to drop his weapon. When Mellberg ignored the command and continued to fire at people around the hospital, Brown fired four times, hitting Mellberg twice and killing him. Before he was felled by Brown, Mellberg killed five and wounded 23 in and around the hospital. Brown was

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awarded the Airman's Medal for his heroism and received the Colonel Billy Jack Carter Award for making the most significant contribution to protecting Air Force personnel and resources in the year 1994.⁷³

Three changes to the SP career field and its organization did take place in late 1993. First, on September 1, the 3320th Correction and Rehabilitation Squadron at Lowry AFB, Colorado, was deactivated after 42 years. The deactivation was driven primarily by the impending closure of Lowry and the functions of the 3320th were taken over by the newly established Directorate of Corrections at the Air Force Security Police Agency (AFSPCA) at Kirtland. The new directorate was comprised of two divisions: Corrections and Inmate Management. The Corrections Division had responsibility for overall implementation of the Air Force Corrections Program while the inmate management staff was responsible for all actions affecting inmates, including transfers, releases, and personnel and military pay issues.⁷⁴

The loss of the Lowry facility required that space be located to house Air Force prisoners serving sentences from one to three years confinement, so the Air Force entered into an agreement with the Navy to house these prisoners and AFSPA activated two additional corrections detachments, Detachment 2 at Miramar Naval Air Station, California, and Detachment 3 at Charleston Naval Weapons Station, South Carolina. These two detachments joined Detachment 1 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The Air Force Return to Duty program also relocated to the Navy brig at Charleston. As part of this reorganization, three regional Air Force confinement facilities were established at Beale AFB, California, Edwards AFB, California, and Dyess AFB, Texas, to handle prisoners with sentences of less than one year. These three facilities augmented the capacity of 60 local Air Force confinement facilities as well as Army and Marine Corps facilities nationwide.⁷⁵

Second, as part of Gen McPeak's continuing revamping of almost every aspect of the Air Force, the Security Police lost their 81XX AFSC's. Effective on November 1, security specialists became 3POX1s, law enforcement specialists 3POX2s, Combat Arms Training & Maintenance, (CATM) specialists were re-designated 3P1X1, and Security Police commissioned officers became 31PXs.⁷⁶

Finally, as part of McPeak's initiative to give every Air Force specialty a functional badge, effective in 1994, SPs, CATM troops, and AFOSI agents would all share the same law enforcement functional badge, eliminating the Security Police qualification badge first approved in 1975. The new badge featured the spread eagle from the SP qualification badge superimposed over a globe surrounded by a wreath. The eagle symbolized the "security police, CATM, and OSI's role as guardians of our nation's resources" while the globe symbolized "worldwide mission capability and our contribution to 'Global Reach, Global Power'."⁷⁷

Responding to the CSAF's focus on air base defense, Col John E. Killeen, commander of the AFSPA, hosted an Air Base Defense Workshop at Kirtland AFB on March 22 and 23, 1994, with representatives from each of the MAJCOMs. The purpose

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of the workshop was to “facilitate inter-command communication; update key ABD planners on changes to planning, equipment, and supporting documents; and allow each command to explain its own unique deployment lessons learned.”⁷⁸

Colonel Killeen opened the workshop by reminding the attendees that ABD was now a worldwide mission supporting operations with varying missions, noting that, “USAF security police personnel are deployed to Cairo West, Southwest Asia, Cyprus, Croatia, Italy, and South America on diverse missions including: peacekeeping, disaster relief, low intensity conflict resolution, anti-drug, [and] anti-terror...”⁷⁹

Killeen reminded everyone that these missions, many of them without precedent, were being performed with fewer people and on smaller budgets since the SP budget had dropped by 44 percent since the mid-1980s and its personnel strength had declined by one-third to the lowest number since 1947. Minimizing ground vulnerability of high cost, high tech resources was the focus of air base defense, Killeen stressed, but, in his opinion, the Security Police in the air base defense role were “only half prepared,” part-time warriors “consumed by peacetime roles” who failed to train as they would fight.⁸⁰ The good news was that armored HUMVEES were being procured to give security forces a new response vehicle, Scope Shield II radios were in the field and, although the long anticipated addition of the M-249 Squad Automatic Weapon or SAW to the inventory was delayed by a jamming problem, it too was expected for fielding soon.

Killeen’s observations were valuable, if disconcerting, since the ABD mission had taken on added importance for the Air Force as the cooperative relationship between the Army and Air Force in ABD forged in the mid-1980’s began to fall apart. In 1993, the Army, also under pressure to downsize, determined that its ABD responsibilities under JSA #8 would apply only to wartime operations not the numerous MOOTW operations.⁸¹ Training for ABD would also again become an Air Force responsibility as the Army withdrew from JSA #9 and the Army training facilities at Fort Dix closed.

Consequently, the ABD school needed to be relocated elsewhere by October 1995. The Army had offered space at four different forts, none of which were wholly acceptable. The two choices remaining were Fort Hood and Camp Bullis, Texas. Fort Hood had recently absorbed several large Army units and was also used for Army National Guard training which limited its availability. Camp Bullis, Texas, the former home of ABD training, had limited training areas and no large gunnery ranges and required a multitude of environmental clearances. By the time of the workshop no choice between the two locations had been made.

The lessons learned shared at the workshop by the MAJCOM representatives painted a picture of an evolving mission. Air Mobility Command (AMC) recounted its experience in helping to feed starving Somalis caught in a brutal civil war during operations Provide Relief and Restore Hope.⁸²

Between December 1992 and May 1993, AMC aircraft from 19 airlift wings ferried millions of tons of food and 32,000 multi-national troops into the airport at the

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Somali capital of Mogadishu. The airlift revealed weakness in ABD doctrine, policy and training. Delivering and distributing relief supplies from bare bases in conjunction with international forces exposed deficiencies in “convoy operations, resource protection (as in food stuffs delivered to a starving country and left on the ramp for SPs to secure in the face of hungry people), training and advising local security personnel, and finally in dealing with other UN security forces.”⁸³ These deficiencies became evident because the deployed security forces had to convoy to the US Embassy to get supplies; had to take control of the airfield approach and departure paths to guard against shoulder fired SAMs; and had to improvise their own defensive positions by filling empty barrels with dirt to construct bunkers and revetments.

Defensive operations were complicated because the deployed Security Police “didn’t own the high ground” necessary to adequately defend the air fields.⁸⁴ AMC was taking the lead in addressing some of these problems by making sure vehicle packages were part of the initial cargo deployed to ensure sufficient mobility for the security contingent; by developing convoy doctrine; and by reintroducing brassards to clearly identify SPs as military police.

USAFE reported it was learning much the same lessons as AMC since its Security Police began providing support to operations Provide Promise in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Deny Flight and Provide Comfort in Iraq. During these operations USAFE SPs “found themselves providing security for special operations missions..., mobile hospitals, providing two [lieutenant colonels] as provost marshals, and even providing enroute support to tankers operating out of bases in France.”⁸⁵ USAFE was also developing its own deployment packages to ensure the proper security resources were delivered to the right place at the right time.

ACC’s Security Police were tasked primarily to support Central Command and Southern Command, its representative reported to the workshop attendees. Southern Command taskings involved support to JTF Bravo at Soto Cano AB, Honduras, and to the drug interdiction operations Support Justice and Steady State involving small numbers of SPs ranging from one to 14 personnel.⁸⁶ ACC ran two training facilities to train deploying personnel. Troops from any MAJCOM tasked to support CENTCOM could attend training at the Silver Flag Alpha desert training center near Nellis AFB which in 1993 provided training for 1,800 students and anticipated training another 2,100 in 1994. Those tasked to head south attended a 5-day long training course at Silver Flag Bravo at Howard AFB, Panama, where they received an introduction to jungle warfare and survival, weapons training, site evaluation, selection, and construction, and escape and evasion.

Despite the ABD problems revealed by the myriad of MOOTW taskings, perhaps the most disturbing presentation at the workshop was by Mr. David Shlapak of the Rand Corporation who presented a briefing on the findings of his soon to be released study of air base defense entitled “Check 6 Begins on the Ground.” Shlapak’s sobering report indicated that some of the ground gained in improving air base defense for the Air Force since Vietnam had been lost and some of the same problems that plagued Billy Jack

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Carter, Kent Miller and the other Security Police warriors in Vietnam seemed to have redeveloped.⁸⁷

Shlapak's work was part of a larger study of threats to USAF operations and he and his colleagues identified two primary threats. The first were tactical and ballistic missiles as demonstrated by Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The second, and most serious threat in Rand's opinion, was the Air Force's institutional under-appreciation of the importance of air base defense. Shlapak believed that there was a "serious need for a wake up call" for Air Force leadership on the necessity for and importance of air base defense.⁸⁸ For air base defense to get the attention it needed, the Rand researchers believed two key actions needed to be taken: First, get everyone in the chain of command to understand that air base defense was not hard to do and second, convince higher headquarters that there really is a ground threat to air bases. An indicator of the leadership's lack of appreciation of the threat from ground attacks was that the only place US forces were expected to defeat an enemy without close air support (CAS) was around air bases.⁸⁹ That these actions were once again necessary was alarming. One easy fix recommended by Rand to begin to draw attention to the ground attack threat was to put the "G" for "ground" that had disappeared at some point, back in air base defense.

Shlapak and his colleagues agreed with Security Police doctrine that wrote off Level III attacks a lost cause without Army or host nation assistance. However, it was possible to mount an effective defense against Level II attacks if Air Force leadership understood and appreciated the threat. Both Rand and AF/SP agreed that even with a massive influx of personnel and equipment, neither Air Force, Army, nor host nation security forces could adequately secure aircraft parked, landing, or taking off from stand off attacks. They also agreed that the mobility of the Security Police both inside and outside the fence had to be addressed, since "a response force that responds too slowly is of no help."⁹⁰ But, Shlapak noted, the problems identified in the study were liable to persist as long as ABGD remained a part-time job for the Security Police in particular and the Air Force in general.

Shlapak's recommendations for fixes could have come right from 1968. They included raising the situational awareness of Air Force leadership to the ground threat to their air bases, acquiring SP controlled airborne assets including AC-130 gunships and remotely piloted vehicles to identify and destroy stand off threats, acquiring automated sensors, enhancing Security Police tactical mobility, developing cheap ways of increasing manpower including using more augmenters and placing heavier reliance on owner/user security; and creating full-time ABGD core units.⁹¹

Part of the reason ABGD had insufficient visibility may have been due to the long term organizational practice of grouping Security Police with other support, rather than operational, functions. In 1994, Air Force Space Command changed this when it reorganized its ICBM security function by assigning missile security personnel to operational missile squadrons. Under the reorganization alarm response teams, flight security controllers, and flight leadership were assigned to the missile squadrons along with facility managers and missile alert crews while security escorts, camper alert teams,

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and mobile fire teams were assigned to an operational support squadron. AFSPC's goal for the reorganization was to give "individual squadron commanders all the personnel and resources needed to conduct mission essential tasks."⁹²

In October 1994, Lt Col James M. Shames, chief of ABD Program Integration for HQ USAF/SP, and Maj Michael F. Pasquin traveled to Kunsan AB, Korea, to observe the air base defense portion of the Foal Eagle 94 exercise. Based on their observations from October 30 through November 10, Shames and Pasquin were able to report that "ABD planning in the ROK AOR has made a significant leap forward" and they noticed improvement in almost all areas of ABD. The performance of the base defense force improved throughout the exercise and they were able to consistently defeat the opposing force (OPFOR) made up of other Security Police and sister service special operations forces. Shames reported with satisfaction that "these special operators were more than a little impressed and frustrated by the defense force."⁹³

But there were problems and amidst the praise the headquarters representatives also noted that "many ABD matters remain haphazardly planned and executed."⁹⁴ Among the problems noted were faulty establishment and execution of fields of fire, questionable control and coordination of crew served weapons, lack of integration of close air support into local plans, limited Stinger anti-aircraft missile employment because the wing commander considered the air attack exercise scenario to be an unrealistic portrayal of actual threat, and a lack of cooperation by host nation forces.⁹⁵

On the bright side, the effective employment of TASS successfully detected several OPFOR penetrations even though there were no written procedures or detailed concept of operations to help the defenders deploy or employ the sensor system. Particularly useful were the two thermal imagers mounted on towers which detected the OPFOR up to a kilometer from the fence line and contributed to so many defeats for the OPFOR that the outer perimeter became known as the "killing fields."⁹⁶ MWD teams were placed on patrol immediately outside the base perimeter and detected two or three OPFOR movements. However, Shames noted, "while MWD teams added to the detection screen, their relative value to improving detection screen capabilities when sensors and imagers are employed is questionable."⁹⁷ Overall, the report concluded, "despite numbers of issues raised...host units in Korea have made admirable improvements in an extremely difficult environment," but warned that "substantive improvements on most issues will take 1 to 5 years."⁹⁸

While there might have been problems at Kunsan, they were nothing compared to those observed at Osan AB, Korea, during Foal Eagle 95 from October 21 through 28 the following year. The HQ USAF/SP observers were led by RAF Wing Commander William Lacey, Shames' replacement as chief of ABD program integration. He was accompanied by Army liaison officer CPT Thomas P. Clark and RAF exchange officer Squadron Leader John A. Ingham.

Foal Eagle 95 was designed to "execute the combined defense plan, exercise command, control and communications (C3), exercise air base defense tactics, integrate

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selective arming (SELARM) and the Security Trained and Ready (STAR) [augmentation] program and finally the C3 of the AC130 gunship.”⁹⁹ What Lacey and his team saw in action was a ground defense force paralyzed by poor leadership as exemplified by the clueless defense force commander who “appeared to have little understanding of his responsibilities as the overall commander of the defenses and appeared overwhelmed by the mission” and was consequently “ineffective and failed to give the necessary direction to his subordinates.”¹⁰⁰

The lack of ABD leadership was evidently not something that arose just during the exercise; its results were visible across Osan AB. The base’s fixed defensive fighting positions were “badly constructed, incorrectly sited and dangerous” and, Lacey reported, “Considering the day to day alert posture in theater, we were appalled at the state of these positions.”¹⁰¹ The sector command posts visited were also used during periodic base level exercises, but some were in “a very dismal state of repair while others resembled a building site with equipment and trash scattered about.”¹⁰² The 51st SPS’s heavy weapons were dirty and the spare barrels for the .50 caliber machine gun were “filthy” with one in the “initial stages of corrosion.”¹⁰³

While “extremely impressed with the high level of motivation and the desire to learn demonstrated by the young Airmen,” the headquarters observers concluded “due to the total lack of command and control...the exercise quickly degenerated into a survival exercise for the personnel in the field” and the sad condition of the fighting positions “greatly contributed towards the inability of the defenders to achieve their primary mission of detecting, delaying and destroying the enemy.”¹⁰⁴ There was probably no better example of some of the issues identified in David Shlapak’s “Check 6” report of a year earlier than what was observed at Foal Eagle 95.

If training deficiencies were to blame for the sort of problems observed at Osan, after August 1995 the Air Force became totally responsible for correcting them because on that date air base ground (the dropped “G” having been restored) defense training moved from Ft. Dix and began again at Lackland AFB and Camp Bullis, Texas. The 343rd Training Squadron was responsible for the four-week course that was evenly split between classroom and field training. A change from the past was that now ABGD training preceded specialized law enforcement or security training so that those who could not “hack” the career field’s wartime mission were identified before money was wasted on specialized training.¹⁰⁵

In March 1996, General Mannell retired after having astutely guided the Security Police through the most thorough reorganization of the Air Force since its inception, avoiding both draconian force cuts and extensive restructuring of the career field. He was replaced as CSP by Brig Gen (select) Richard A. Coleman who had enlisted



Brig Gen Richard A. Coleman (Air Force photo)

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in the Air Force in November 1956 as an air policeman. Commissioned in 1972, Coleman continued his Security Police career as operations officer of the 308th SPS at Little Rock AFB, Arkansas. Prior to his elevation to chief, Coleman served in several squadron command billets, as a staff officer at AFOSP, and as director of Security Police for ACC. While Mannell guided the career field through the Air Force's reorganization, Coleman would be destined to guide the Air Force Security Police through its most thorough reorganization since 1947. Coleman's first challenge, however, arose a world away from his headquarters in Washington.



Khobar Towers after the attack (Air Force News Service)

Just before 2200 hours on June 25, 1996, three security policemen, SSgt Alfredo Guerrero, SrA Corey Grice, and A1C Cliff Wager, posted as guards atop Building 131 of the 4404th Wing (Provisional) compound in the Khobar Towers complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, watched as a tanker truck pulled up and came to a stop along the road in front of the building. When they saw the truck's occupants bolt from the cab and tumble into a nearby sedan which sped away, the SPs sprang into action. Guerrero radioed the CSC and reported a probable attack in progress and then he, Grice, and Wager began running through the building shouting for everyone to "Get the hell out of the building!"¹⁰⁶ The evacuation was barely beginning when the truck exploded with a force later estimated to be that of 20,000 pounds of TNT. Nineteen airmen, either shredded by flying glass or crushed beneath debris, died and another 500 were wounded. For their actions that night Guerrero, Grice, and Wager each received the Airman's Medal pinned to their BDUs by Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Ronald R. Fogleman.



Gen Ronald Fogleman pins the Airman's Medal on SSgt Alfredo Guerrero for his actions at the Khobar Towers (DoD photo)

The perpetrators of the attack were later identified as the Saudi branch of the Iranian-backed Hezbollah and their goal was to repeat the 1983 attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut on an even deadlier scale. Preliminary reports by DoD and House of Representatives National Security Committee investigators sent to the scene placed the blame on faulty intelligence. Secretary of Defense William Perry, after reviewing the preliminary results of these investigations, stated that, "Our commanders were trying to do right, but ... had a difficult task to know what to plan for."¹⁰⁷

Perry commissioned retired GEN Wayne Downing to conduct an investigation for the Pentagon and when Downing released his report in August, he too placed some of the blame on bad intelligence, but he also faulted the 4404th commander, Maj Gen (select) Terryl J. Schwailer, who was to turn over command of the wing the day after the bombing, for failing to "adequately protect his forces from a terrorist attack."¹⁰⁸ Downing also criticized 4404th SPS commander, Lt Col James Traister, for various shortcomings in security despite acknowledging that Traister had made, or tried to get the Saudis to make, several improvements in security including the posting of guards on top of the buildings – an act that saved many lives on the night of the bombing. The Downing Report also noted that, "The Security Police commander essentially served as his own intelligence officer for base defense with assistance from the Air Force Office of Special Investigations Detachment."¹⁰⁹ To correct this deficiency the report recommended that US Air Force Security Police units assigned an air base defense mission be provided an organic intelligence capability – something that hadn't been done since Safeside almost 30 years before.¹¹⁰

Secretary of the Air Force Sheila E. Widnall commissioned Lt Gen James F. Record to conduct her own investigation into the Downing Report charges. Record's three-volume report found that Schwailer, his staff, and his superiors had taken "reasonable and prudent" actions to protect the force.¹¹¹

The staff of the new secretary of defense, William S. Cohen, asked the Air Force to do a second evaluation. That report, authored by the Air Force Inspector General and the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force, also found no grounds for finding

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Schwalier negligent in his force protection responsibilities and noted that Schwalier had implemented 130 separate security measures prior to the attack and had made 36 of 39 changes recommended in a recent vulnerability assessment. It also contradicted many of the Downing Report observations critical of Lt Col Traister, including those alleging that he failed to request adequate manning, failed to ensure proper training for his SPs, and practiced poor weapons maintenance.¹¹² There the matter lay as 1996 ended.

A result of the Khobar bombing was the relocation of the 4404th to the more remote and defensible Prince Sultan AB near Al Kharj, 50 miles southeast of Riyadh, and the number of Security Police in theater increased from 450 to approximately 900. General Coleman also announced that beginning in April 1997, a \$47 million package of thermal imaging equipment and night vision devices would be deployed in Southwest Asia. In the nine months following the Khobar Towers attack, \$75 million was spent by the Air Force on security improvements. Coleman described the funding for security as “generous” and noted that, “Anything we have identified as a need, the funding has been there for us.”¹¹³

Increasing security for American facilities and personnel in the Middle East would definitely be needed, for on August 23, 1996, a declaration of war was issued against the United States by Osama bin Laden. Using part of his great personal wealth as an heir of the owner of a successful Saudi Arabian construction company, in 1988 bin Laden created *Al Qaeda*, an armed Sunni Muslim organization with the objective of eliminating foreign influence in Muslim countries and establishing the supremacy of the Sunni version of Islam worldwide that attracted adherents of Wahhabism, a militant and very strict version of Islam. In 1990, bin Laden had offered the services of his *mujahadeen* to Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd to help protect the kingdom from the Iraqi army in Kuwait. When Fahd rejected the offer and instead invited the Americans to provide for the kingdom’s defense, a furious bin Laden denounced the Saudi government for inviting infidels into the home of the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina (even though no non-Muslim American ever set foot in either) and was consequently exiled by Fahd.

Moving to Sudan, bin Laden began to launch terrorist operations against Americans as well as other Muslims who did not share his radical beliefs and hatred of the West. Between 1991 and 1996, *Al Qaeda* took part in several major attacks including the bombing of two hotels in Aden, Yemen targeting American troops en route to Somalia as well as furnishing massive assistance to Somali militias, whose brutal attacks in the October 1993 “Blackhawk Down” incident brought about the eventual withdrawal of US forces in 1994. In June 1995, bin Laden was also involved in an assassination attempt against Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in Ethiopia.¹¹⁴

Bin Laden’s August “Declaration of War Against the Americans Who Occupy the Land of the Two Holy Mosques” called on the United States to leave Saudi Arabia “for its own good.”¹¹⁵ Since that was unlikely, he declared that, “There is no more important duty [for Muslims] than pushing the American enemy out of the holy land” and since the “USA Crusader military forces” were very powerful, he called on Muslims in the

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“Islamic Gulf” countries to launch “a guerrilla war, where the sons of the nation, and not the military forces, take part in it.”¹¹⁶

Bin Laden’s “declaration of war” was not taken at face value by the Clinton administration which continued to pursue him as a common criminal. When under American pressure Sudan decided to expel bin Laden, Clinton, however, refused an offer by the Sudanese government to take him into custody because there was insufficient evidence to arrest and try him in the United States. Ordered out of Sudan in May 1996, bin Laden and his followers settled in Afghanistan under the protection of the Islamic fundamentalist Taliban regime.

In the wake of the Khobar Towers bombing force protection Air Force-wide, not just in SWA, became the order of the day. In October 1996, Air Force Executive Guidance was issued that stated: “US reliance on small numbers of high-value, forward deployed or forward based aircraft makes those assets tempting targets for ground attack. The Air Force must have sufficient organic force protection capability to support single service air operations in deployed locations.”¹¹⁷ The Air Force was evolving into an expeditionary air force with the capability to deploy forces to and operate from fixed bases in allied territory where an established security infrastructure already existed or from bare bases in hostile territory where it would have to carry in its own security force. In late 1996, General Coleman issued AF/SP Program Action Directive 97-04 as a blueprint to begin the transformation of the Security Police into an organization that could better provide that “organic force protection capability.”¹¹⁸

General Coleman understood that the new world order envisioned by Gorbachev and Bush had failed to develop and that, “The new order evolving is volatile not tranquil.”¹¹⁹ In either a tranquil or volatile world the United States would continue to have global interests that would have to be protected by a smaller force. Guarding the air forces sent out to protect those interests was the responsibility of “30,000 security forces professionals...” including Guard and Reserve personnel.¹²⁰ The force protection mission these personnel would have to perform was complicated by the fact that with the end of the Cold War the United States had decreased its forward presence with the result that in the future “for the first time since World War II, our forces may deploy to locations in the world where the Air Force does not have fixed bases...In fact, there may be no base there at all.”¹²¹

Even before the Khobar Towers attack, Coleman was under pressure to eliminate law enforcement functions in favor of more security. The impetus was an AF/XP recommendation that law enforcement and combat arms training and maintenance (CATM) be contracted out. Coleman did not agree with the XP recommendation and appealed to Chief of Staff Ronald Fogleman’s background as “a student of military history” by arguing that there were some things that were “inherently military” and that law enforcement and CATM were among those missions that should remain a military function.¹²² Coleman also argued that law enforcement was part and parcel of base security and since the SPs were “the only armed force that the commander owns [on] an air base. We don’t need to be contracting it out. A commander should never have to

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negotiate with the only armed force that he owns for the security of his installation.”¹²³ Fogleman ultimately did not approve XP’s recommendation, but he did advise Coleman that, “We do need to get out of this...police business” and that he expected Coleman to “[d]o something to orientate [the Security Police] toward the expeditionary [force] which is a part of our future.”¹²⁴

In recognition of the new primacy of the security mission, in January 1997 Coleman’s title was changed from Chief of Security Police to Director of Security Forces. The name change also better described the Security Police’s mission capabilities to other services and, in accordance with Fogleman’s desire to de-emphasize police work, sent the message that policing was no longer job one.

At the same time, a new Force Protection Division was created at the headquarters. CMSgt Daryl Janicki, now titled Air Force Security Forces Enlisted Manager, was blunt about how the change in name reflected a change in mission. “We will continue military police functions,” Janicki told a reporter for the Air Force News Service, “but it will not be our primary mission...There are many things that we do that civilian police don’t do [so] We will explore contracting these types of services or transferring responsibility to owners and users...”¹²⁵ Echoing the thoughts and wishes of many that had come before him, Janicki went on to say, “The Air Force needs its own ground defense force.”¹²⁶

The changes on the horizon would involve much more than a name change. On January 2, 1997, retired Lt Gen Howard W. Leaf, a former Air Force IG, wrote Gen Fogleman outlining the history of the Security Police’s air base ground defense mission and particularly the on again off again relationship with the Army in that role. “It is my contention and belief that the US Army has not in the past been serious or committed to the defense of USAF bases – nor will they be so in the future,” Leaf wrote.¹²⁷ “I further believe,” he continued, “we (the Air Force) should use the RAF regiment as a model” and that the regiment’s commander should be invited to brief the Air Staff on their concept of operations and organization.¹²⁸ At General Fogleman’s request, the Security Forces directorate forwarded a letter for the chief of staff’s signature inviting the Commandant General of the RAF Regiment, Air Commodore McNeil, to visit Washington during the third week of May so Fogleman could “learn more about the roles and missions of the Regiment...”¹²⁹

Another organization that was examined as a security force model was the Marine Corps’ Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) which was praised by the Downing Report authors as the “most impressive security forces” they had seen in Saudi Arabia.¹³⁰ “[S]uperbly trained, well equipped, and well led,” FAST companies provided a dedicated cadre to train and augment local installation security forces. They were deployed upon request by combatant commanders on orders from the chief of naval operations and were designed to come in, set up security, and depart. Downing believed they provided “a useful model for development of service training programs.”¹³¹

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Even without a formal briefing from the RAF Regiment and a study of the Marine FAST units, General Coleman and his staff knew enough from past experience that for the Security Police to operate as the Air Force's ground force in this new "come as you are" environment, rapidly deployable forces equipped, trained, and dedicated to the air base ground defense and force protection missions were essential. Even in his days at ACC, Coleman saw a need for an "organization that was dedicated to doing the hard things in the high threat areas of the world to protect and defend Air Force resources."¹³²

With Fogelman's support and money the 820th Security Forces Group, commanded by Lt Col Larry Buckingham, was activated on March 17, 1997 at Lackland AFB to provide that capability. The 820th SFG adopted the insignia of the old 82nd Combat Security Police Wing and was organized to furnish the same capability that the 82nd was created to provide, but never really obtained.



820th SFG insignia (Air Force photo)

The 820th was specifically designed to go into a location with the initial deployment of forces, set up defenses, turn the mission over to follow-on forces within 90 days, and redeploy to home base to await another call. To provide this capability the 820th could draw on seven 48-person security flights from seven different commands based at Westover AFB, Massachusetts (AFRES), McGuire AFB, New Jersey (AMC), Eglin AFB, Florida (AFMC), Lackland AFB, Texas (AETC), El Paso ANGB, Texas, Davis Monthan AFB, Arizona (ACC), and Vandenberg AFB, California (AFSPC). The group was designed to be multifunctional so only half of its 68 headquarters manpower authorizations would be Security Police; the remainder would come from fields such as OSI, intelligence, communications, logistics, transportation, and explosive ordnance



Gen Ronald Fogleman (left foreground) and Brig Gen Richard Coleman (center) at the activation ceremony for the 820th Security Forces Group (Security Forces Museum)

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disposal. Before the year was over, the 820th deployed three times: twice to Bahrain to support the 366th Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW) and the 347th AEW, and once to Egypt to support the Bright Star exercise.

The concept of a “first in” security force was also adopted by Air Mobility Command early in 1997 with its Phoenix Raven program. Raven teams of two or more personnel reporting to the aircraft commander were assigned to aircraft transiting high threat areas and when not performing security duties could assist the aircraft loadmaster with cargo handling.¹³³

The Phoenix Ravens, named after the phoenix, the mythical bird that could rise from its own ashes, and the raven, supposedly the most intelligent predatory bird, were specially trained volunteers who attended an intensive eight-day course at the Air Mobility Warfare Center at Fort Dix that focused not just on combat skills, but on human relations and international law. The volunteers were trained on local customs and the “force continuum” of starting out with the lowest level of force required and escalating the use of force only when lesser steps did not provide adequate deterrence or protection. Ravens carried their weapons unobtrusively and were trained to avoid confrontations in the interest of good international relations; as one reporter put it in an article on the Phoenix Raven program: “Headlines that read ‘American Airmen Slaughter Village Greeting Party’ would do nothing to endear us to friends abroad.”¹³⁴ Should the need arise, however, the Raven teams were trained and equipped to defend the aircraft and crew with deadly force.

Once training was successfully completed, each new Raven was assigned a number that remained with him or her permanently; the AMC director of force protection, Col Lawrence R. “Rocky” Lane, was Raven #1. This number was embroidered on the aircrew style name tags the Ravens wore on their flight suits when deployed. When not deployed each Raven wore a distinctive Raven tab on his normal SP uniform.

The Phoenix Raven program was part and parcel of the new focus on force protection. “Before the Ravens,” Col Lane noted, “we sent our aircraft around the world with very little protection.”¹³⁵ The Ravens were part of a new paradigm in AMC that “instilled security in everything AMC does.” Phoenix Raven was such a success for AMC that ACC adopted it the following year.¹³⁶



Force Protection Battlelab insignia

In June 1997, the 820th SFG was joined at Lackland by another new organization – the Force Protection Battlelab. One of six battlelabs created by the Air Force in the wake of Khobar Towers, the Force Protection Battlelab, commanded by Col Donal Collins, was created to “explore and integrate technology, tactics and training to increase force protection readiness.”¹³⁷ Like the 820th, the battlelab was a multi-disciplinary organization integrating Security Forces personnel with

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experts from the OSI, civil engineering, communications, aviator, medical, and contracting fields. The battlelab focused on finding off-the-shelf items that could play a role in force protection rather than developing new systems so its mission was to chase ideas not technology. Ideas from the troops actually performing the security mission were actively solicited and after its first year in operation Colonel Collins declared that, “most of the great ideas, the truly innovative ones, have come from troops in the field as opposed to industry.”¹³⁸

In June 1997, a white paper entitled *USAF Force Protection and Security Force Requirements: A Vision for the 21st Century* was released. The document was highly critical of the Air Force’s past approach to air base ground defense and force protection finding it to be “erratic” and based on “episodic” reactions to events rather than a systematic program sustained over the long term.¹³⁹ The report identified numerous problem areas in organizing, training, and equipping the Air Force for base defense and force protection and proposed solutions to those problems.

Concerning organization, the report yet again urged the creation of a “dedicated unit tasked with providing a world-wide force protection capability” and noted that while the 820th SFG provided the headquarters element of such a force, it needed to be expanded from seven flights to “at least three dedicated squadrons.”¹⁴⁰ In addition, the study advocated that each of the Air Force’s deployable wings have an organic security force of at least flight strength.

Even if these recommendations were implemented, the report noted that to provide adequate protection and defense for Air Force forces the continuing assumption that force protection was only the responsibility of the Security Police must be eliminated. Citing Churchill’s admonition that airfields should be the stronghold of fighting men, and noting that the active duty Security Police of less 21,000 personnel could not meet the threat to air bases without assistance, the white paper once again urged that every airman and officer receive weapons and ground combat skills training to both prepare them for a force protection role and inculcate an understanding that force protection was everyone’s responsibility. The white paper’s authors also advocated increased procurement of sensors and imaging devices as a force multiplier, but, cognizant that past practice had been to cut Security Forces manning as technology came on line, reminded their readers that the primary benefit of technology was that it freed manpower from manning static defenses, thereby increasing “mobility and flexibility,” not that it necessarily translated into manpower savings.¹⁴¹

The white paper revisited an old issue when it advocated that the Air Force’s security doctrine recognize the importance of securing both the base and the “tactical perimeter” outside the fence from which attacks could be launched. This was a revision of past doctrine that focused on Air Force defensive actions to inside the base perimeter, but as the authors of the white paper noted, “If we are engaging hostile forces at the fence line it’s too late!”¹⁴² To enhance command and control the report recommended that Air Force wing commanders exercise direct control over force protection assets and, to

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facilitate defensive operations, suggested that disaster preparedness, explosive ordnance disposal, and intelligence assets be made organic to all Security Police units.

The white paper noted that the Expeditionary Air Force concept had increased the personnel tempo for the Security Forces since its manning had been cut by 36.5 percent since 1990 while contingency taskings had risen by 31 percent. It was imperative, therefore, the report noted, that the Security Police be manned at a level that decreased the strain of deployments on both units and individual personnel. The white paper recommended that part of this effort include the shedding of activities performed by SF that detracted from force protection along with an increased role for the Guard and Reserve. Recognizing the importance of nuclear security, the white paper recommended that nuclear security forces not be tasked to support contingencies at all.

The paper concluded that, “Force protection is critical to global engagement” and therefore the Air Force needed to address the issues raised in the report, particularly the establishment of a dedicated, worldwide deployable force.¹⁴³ “In the future, the Air Force will be an expeditionary force,” the authors noted, and that the bottom line was not “whether we will do force protection, rather how much we will do. We can no longer afford to support contingency operations with a piecemeal security force.”¹⁴⁴

In the midst of the SP reorganization the final act of the Khobar Towers tragedy grabbed center stage. On July 31, 1997, Secretary of Defense Cohen issued a statement that despite the findings of the Air Force’s two investigations into Khobar Towers he found that, “Brig Gen Schwalier’s actions with respect to force protection did not meet the standard required for a Major General, and I have therefore recommended to the President that his name be removed from the list of those to be promoted to that grade.”¹⁴⁵ Cohen stressed that this was a difficult decision since “Schwalier is a fine officer, who has had a distinguished career and who ably discharged his primary mission of enforcing the no-fly zone in Southern Iraq through Operation Southern Watch,” but nonetheless believed that “the security lapses at Khobar Towers make his promotion inappropriate.”¹⁴⁶ Schwalier’s name was duly stricken from the major general’s list and he immediately retired from the Air Force.

Secretary Widnall released a statement declaring her “respect” for and “support” of Cohen’s decision even though, “After exhaustive reviews of the Khobar Towers bombing, the Air Force concluded that all individuals charged with the responsibility for force protection at that location acted in a reasonable and prudent manner under the circumstances as they then existed” and that she and “The Chief of Staff...accepted and support that conclusion.”¹⁴⁷ Gen Fogelman, however, refused to support Cohen’s action and resigned as chief of staff in protest later that week and requested to be retired. Although not in protest over Cohen’s action regarding Schwailler, Widnall too stepped down on October 30 to return to the faculty of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

The changes in the Security Police wrought by Khobar Towers continued apace during the Schwailler controversy. In July, the Security Police, who had worn a MAJCOM insignia on their blue berets since they were first issued in the 1970s, now

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received a new insignia along with a new motto. The insignia harkened back to the 1041st SPS and displayed the same falcon and lightning bolts worn by those elite troops nearly 30 years earlier. Below the falcon the motto “Defensor Fortis,” Latin for “Defender of the Force,” appeared for the first time.¹⁴⁸ With the advent of the beret flash, the career field for the first time exhibited a common insignia that banded them together and its adoption was a visible statement that the Security Police was perhaps beginning to view itself as an elite corps.



Defensor Fortis beret flash (Air Force artwork)

In October 1997, the two biggest changes in the reorganization of the Security Police took place. On October 31, the law enforcement, security, and CATM AFSCs were merged into one security forces AFSC and the Security Police were renamed the Security Forces. As part of the merger CATM lost their distinctive red hats and donned the blue beret. Coleman was not a fan of the split career field and had discovered in a past assignment that as a commander he could “not always get the right number of security specialists versus law enforcement specialists because there were an abundance of security specialists because...the reduction in the nuclear inventory took away all the requirements for these numbers of ...security specialists.”¹⁴⁹ Coleman proposed the consolidation of the career field into one AFSC to the CSAF in order to produce personnel “that can provide the law enforcement training, can provide the security, the close-in weapons system security, and...are skilled in the base defense skills, particularly in weapons, communications, sensors.”¹⁵⁰

While the new Security Forces would still perform the military police function for the Air Force and while in that role would continue to be called security police, the AFSC consolidation was designed to posture the career field to “assume duties and responsibilities outside the limits of the ‘police’ role” which was now defined as the

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peacetime duties of the former Security Police, while the name change better described the career field's mission capabilities.¹⁵¹

General Colman recognized that the reconsolidation of the security and law enforcement AFSCs after 25 years would raise “concerns and questions.”¹⁵² These he addressed in the first issue of the renamed *Security Forces Digest*. Coleman explained that there were many reasons for the change, but he chose to highlight only a few. First, he explained, “in our wartime duties which are the very reason we exist, we don't differentiate between security and law enforcement.”¹⁵³ Second, the career fields merged when an individual was promoted to master sergeant since “he or she is expected to know the entire career field.”¹⁵⁴ Finally, from a practical standpoint, duties were being assigned to individuals regardless of AFSC as evidenced by the fact that on his visits to the field Coleman found “security troops at main gates and base patrol, and...law enforcement troops doing security duties.”¹⁵⁵ Coleman's vision of a “year 2000 SP” was of one who could perform any of the duties of the career field.¹⁵⁶

Chief Janicki also addressed the issue of the merger by explaining to the enlisted force that the mission of the Security Forces was force protection and that mission did not respect what Janicki called, the “old artificiality of ‘security has the flightline or storage area’ and ‘LE has all else’...”¹⁵⁷ Janicki noted that the threat faced by the Air Force was “ever changing and coming from many different sources” and since the Air Force mission was “dynamic,” the new requirement was for “personnel with a much wider breadth of experience” so the Security Forces could “organize for maximum mobility and flexibility.”¹⁵⁸ He placed the burden of ensuring the success of the reorganization on the NCOs and while he expected that some would “whine and cry and complain and demoralize the troops,” they would, he warned, “be left behind.”¹⁵⁹

The final change that autumn was when the Air Force Security Police Agency completed its move from Kirtland to a new facility at Lackland and officially became the Air Force Security Forces Center (AFSFC) on November 12, 1997. The AFSFC was established as a direct reporting unit to the CSAF with General Coleman in command and was to function as the Air Force center of excellence for force protection. In addition to overseeing the 820th SFG and Force Protection Battlelab, the AFSFC had four divisions: operations, plans and programs, corrections, and force protection.¹⁶⁰ Coleman was the moving force behind this consolidation at Lackland since, as he argued, “Synergism is created down here because the Security Forces Academy is here. Camp Bullis was a [sic] important part of it. And...AIA [Air Intelligence Agency], the intel part of it, which we were vastly depending on, was also located here. And this sort of was the home [of Security Forces].”¹⁶¹

Force protection training was enhanced on November 14, 1997, when Coleman and 37th Training Wing commander, Brig Gen Barry Barksdale, cut the ribbon opening a new ground combat skills training complex at Camp Bullis, Texas. The \$15 million complex contained the Ground Combat Skills Training Center, which housed administrative offices, classrooms, a computer lab, and an infirmary; the Peacekeeper Logistics Center storing \$22 million in equipment and weapons; the Guardian Inn dining

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facility; and dormitory and billeting facilities. General Barksdale declared the new training complex to be “a giant step in providing realistic training for our security forces.”¹⁶²

On January 10, 1998, as if to remind everyone that the routine law enforcement duties that had been relegated to a secondary role by the new focus on base defense and force protection were still part and parcel of the Security Force’s mission and could be every bit as dangerous as confronting bomb wielding terrorists, TSgt Robert B. Butler was shot to death at Edwards AFB, California. Butler, who had stopped SrA Devaughn L. Brown on suspicion of drunk driving, was found lying near his patrol car shot in the face. Unknown to Butler when he stopped Brown was that the Airman had already killed SrA Darrick Moore, with whom he had argued earlier that night, and dumped his body at the base landfill. Before he was killed, Butler had radioed for back up and Security Forces responding to his call saw Brown drive away and pursued him to his dormitory. Escaping capture, Brown went to the dayroom and shot himself to death with the 9mm Glock pistol he had used to kill Butler and Moore. Butler, an eight-year veteran of the Security Forces, left behind a wife and three young children.¹⁶³



TSgt Robert B. Butler (Air Force photo)

In February 1998, the world again heard from Osama bin Laden when he and several other militant Muslims formed a coalition called the International Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders to continue the fight against the United States and Israel. The Islamic Front membership included *Al Qaeda*, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad led by Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Egyptian Islamic Group, and Islamic militant organizations based in Kashmir and Bangladesh. The militants signed a *fatwah* or religious opinion, even though none of the groups or individuals had authority under Islam to issue such an edict, which was published in a London-based Arabic newspaper.

The *fatwah* began by listing three “facts.” First, “for over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples.” Second, “despite the great devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people by the crusader-Zionist alliance, and despite the huge number of those killed, in excess of 1 million... despite all this, the Americans are once again trying to repeat the horrific massacres, as though they are not content with the protracted blockade imposed after the ferocious war or the fragmentation and devastation.” Finally, by



Osama bin Laden (Reuters)

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these actions the Americans sought to “serve the Jews' petty state and divert attention from its occupation of Jerusalem and murder of Muslims there.”¹⁶⁴

Because of these perceived attacks upon Islam and Muslims, the Islamic Front issued a ruling based on God's command that “to kill the Americans and their allies--civilians and military--is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim.” Invoking the aid of God, the Front issued a “call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it” and for “Muslim *ulema* [scholars], leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan's US troops and the devil's supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson.”¹⁶⁵

After the issuance of the *fatwah*, operations by *Al Qaeda* against American interests overseas escalated. In August, *Al Qaeda* operatives bombed the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in near simultaneous attacks that resulted in the deaths of more than 200 people, including 12 Americans. In retaliation, President Clinton launched limited cruise missile attacks against targets in Sudan and Afghanistan. In November, Bin Laden was indicted by a New York Federal Grand Jury on 238 counts of conspiring to attack American facilities overseas and kill Americans.

By this time, however, the attention of Clinton and of Congress was distracted by allegations that the President had lied under oath in a civil sexual harassment suit brought by Paula Jones based on Clinton's conduct toward her while he was governor of Arkansas. It was alleged, and later proven, that despite his testimony in a deposition in the Jones case, that Clinton had engaged in a sexual relationship in the White House Oval Office with a 19-year-old White House intern named Monica Lewinsky. By December, Clinton stood impeached by the House of Representatives for perjury, but in January he was tried and acquitted by the Senate. Clinton's conduct led to the Republican effort to remove him from office and diverted the country's attention at a critical time leaving bin Laden both alive and free to plan future strikes against the United States.

By the summer of 1998 what was now called the Expeditionary Aerospace Force concept was wearing out the troops with frequent and often short notice deployments. Air Force personnel tasked as part of force packages were asking for some predictability in their lives and commanders were demanding some advance notice of when they would lose troops from their units to deployments. On August 4, 1998, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Michael Ryan and Acting Secretary of the Air Force F. Whitten Peters announced that the Air Force would



Gen Michael E. Ryan (Air Force photo)

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package its forces into 10 equally capable Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEF) made up of active duty, Reserve and Air National Guard forces. These ten AEFs would provide combat power on a rotating basis to combatant commanders worldwide. Each AEF was to be on call to handle contingency operations for about 90 days every 15 months with two more on call at all times on a rotating basis as reinforcements. Since units would be tasked to provide certain forces for a particular AEF, the troops and their commanders would now know what “bucket” they were in and when they were subject to deployment.

One more change to the Air Force’s and Security Force’s organization became effective on October 1, 1998, when the Security Forces moved to the operational side of the Air Force under the deputy chief of staff for air and space operations and Gen Coleman’s office symbol became XOF. Coleman, who actually recommended the move, based it on his recognition that “especially since Khobar Towers...everything I did, I did in concert with XO... So if I was in that family, it made sense to me that I had a great proponent for my mission, the Air Force security forces, in the way of XO. Because that’s who runs the Air Force.”¹⁶⁶

For the Security Forces, Coleman believed, the realignment would mean increased support for the force protection mission while the operators would benefit from better communication and coordination between those who employed Air Force assets and those responsible for protecting those assets. As part of the change the AFSFC changed from a direct reporting unit to the chief of staff with Gen Coleman as its commander to a field operating agency reporting to the new Air Force Security Forces Directorate.¹⁶⁷

While some perceived this as a demotion for the Security Forces since it lost its status as part of the special staff, even though Coleman knew “when you work for the Chief as a special staff, you don’t have all that much access to him because he’s too busy,” others had long advocated that security should be part of operations at the base level so it was desirable that it be so aligned at the Air Force headquarters.¹⁶⁸ However, despite the headquarters realignment the Security Forces squadrons on most bases remained part of the mission support group.

In October 1998, *Air Force Magazine* examined the state of force protection, particularly in Southwest Asia, in the wake of Khobar Towers and the African embassy bombings. The article surveyed the Phoenix Raven program, the Force Protection Battlelab, and the 820th SFG and noted that the Security Forces had changed its training and upgraded its equipment to meet the threats posed by terrorism. In an interview with the article’s author General Coleman stated that a new attitude prevailed in the Air Force and that now the question asked before every deployment was, “How’s it [the force] going to be protected?” Coleman stressed that, “We will not move resources anywhere anymore unless they’re protected.”¹⁶⁹

Despite this new attitude and the doubling of expenditures for force protection, shortages in equipment, and personnel still existed. Equipment shortages could be fixed by more money, but the personnel shortages were caused by retention problems directly

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attributable to the “stress of increased deployments.”¹⁷⁰ Coleman hoped that this problem could be eliminated within a year through the use of recruiting and retention incentives. He was, however, enough of a realist to know that the mere existence of heightened security would not deter terrorists; they would continue to try. With this in mind he reminded the Security Forces that, “right now, some guy is out there plotting evil against the United States. It’s your responsibility to make sure he doesn’t succeed.”¹⁷¹ Even so, “[E]veryone concedes,” the article reported, “that somewhere, sometime, a terrorist will succeed again in attacking Americans.”¹⁷²

In 1998, the 820th SFG demonstrated its “first in” capability by having 12 airborne qualified members participate in night drops with the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division during a joint exercise at Duke Field, Florida. The exercise tested the concept of assaulting an enemy air base with Army paratroopers who then handed over base ground defense to the 820th. By early 2000, 32 members of the 820th were airborne qualified and its commander, Col Dale Hewitt, had established a goal of sending as many 820th troopers to Army jump school as the Army could handle. Now based at Moody AFB, Georgia, the 820th was expanding and by the spring of 2000, Hewitt was looking for volunteers to fill out two new squadrons – the 822nd and 823rd SFS. Each of the two new squadrons, along with a third, the 824th, consisted of over 200 personnel from 15 different career fields.¹⁷³

In Europe, USAFE commander Gen John Jumper observed that since the end of Desert Storm the Air Force had contributed forces to 50 small-scale contingencies and while the AEF concept worked, “Air Force units have been committed through stovepipes...” so that, “While other services are tasked to deploy in recognizable units (a US Marine Expeditionary Unit or Marine Expeditionary Force, for example), Air Force units tend to be tasked by Unit Type Codes (UTC) or, in some cases, individual specialties.”¹⁷⁴ To help get the Air Force on the ground rapidly with the necessary personnel and an established chain of command, Jumper proposed to Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Michael Ryan that a contingency response unit be established by USAFE as a test unit. Ryan approved and on March 20, 1999, the 86th Contingency Response Group (CRG) of the 86th Airlift Wing (AW) became operational at Ramstein AB, Germany.



86th CRG insignia (Air Force artwork)

Jumper conceived of the 86th CRG as “a multidisciplinary, cross-functional team whose mission is to provide the first on-scene Air Force forces trained to command, assess, and prepare a base for expeditionary aerospace forces.”¹⁷⁵ The core of the 86th consisted of 134 personnel assigned to two squadrons, the 86th Air Mobility Squadron and the 786th Security Forces Squadron. Spread among these two squadrons was a smorgasbord of 40 Air Force specialties including Security Forces, communications, aerial port, AFOSI, medical, intelligence,

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command and control, fire support, supply, airfield management, information management, maintenance, civil engineering, vehicle maintenance, and health care. Depending on the contingency, the 86th could rapidly expand to 2,000 personnel by calling in augmentees.

Within two weeks of its formation, the 86th CRG was deployed to Triana, Albania, in support of Joint Task Force (JTF) Shining Hope to provide relief for thousands of Kosovar Albanians driven from the former Yugoslavia by Slobodan Milosevic's ethnic cleansing campaign. Jumper declared that the “test of USAFE's 86th CRG was a resounding success and far surpassed our expectations toward enhancing expeditionary operations”¹⁷⁶ Jumper accordingly urged other MAJCOMs to form their own CRG-type units, something both PACAF and Air Mobility Command would eventually do.

Jumper also understood that the Air Force would have to insert itself into hostile areas and would have to work “with the other services to enable the CRG to rapidly assume control of a base captured or secured by ground forces.”¹⁷⁷ Once in, the Air Force would have to defend the newly seized base from air and ground threats and the organization and training of the CRG would have to be reexamined to determine whether it was capable of defending an air base in such a demanding environment. In this regard, Jumper echoed the past when he suggested, “The Royal Air Force's Regiment provides us with a standard we should aim toward.”¹⁷⁸

In March 2000, after having presided over a reorganization of the career field and its transformation into an expeditionary combat force, General Coleman retired and was replaced as the director of Security Forces by Brig Gen (select) James M. Shames. Shames was a 1974 Air Force Academy graduate and career security policeman who chose the Security Police career field while a cadet because he “wanted to be with people who [were] professional.”¹⁷⁹ Prior to replacing Coleman, Shames had served as “Top Cop” for both PACAF and Air Force Space Command and as vice commander of the AFSFC. Shames took charge of a career field with a total strength of 750 officers and 22,390 other ranks; the second largest career field in the Air Force and 7.9 percent of its total enlisted force.¹⁸⁰



Brig Gen James M. Shames (Air Force photo)

It was two years before the terrorist success that General Coleman feared finally came to pass. After foiled attempts to strike civilian targets worldwide, including Los Angeles International Airport as part of the so-called Millennium Plot, late on the

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morning of October 12, 2000, an *Al Qaeda* suicide squad in a speedboat laden with explosives came alongside USS *Cole*, a guided-missile destroyer docked at the port of Aden, Yemen, and blew themselves up. The resulting blast tore a huge hole in the side of the warship, killing 17 American sailors and nearly sinking the *Cole*. President Clinton warned the perpetrators, “You will not find a safe harbor. We will find you. And justice will prevail.”¹⁸¹

One month after the *Cole* bombing, a presidential election was held pitting Clinton’s two-term Vice President Albert Gore, Jr. against former President George H. W. Bush’s son, Texas governor George W. Bush. The vote count was so close that Gore filed suit in Florida, the state upon which the entire election swung, to recount the votes in certain counties. Throughout the remainder of 2000 and the first weeks of 2001 the country was treated to an education in “chads” – hanging, pregnant, and dimpled – until the United States Supreme Court in a ruling in January effectively ended the controversy in Bush’s favor, to the undying animosity of many of his opponents. Because of the uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the election, many key defense and national security posts remained unfilled months after Bush’s inauguration.

The new President became the commander-in-chief of American military forces deployed worldwide. In the Balkans, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Turkey, Honduras, and the Persian Gulf, soldiers, sailors, Airmen, and Marines were involved in humanitarian missions, deterrence of potential enemies, and keeping Saddam Hussein in his “box.” Better protected than before the Khobar Tower bombing, the United States military projected the nation’s power abroad.



President George W. Bush (White House photo)

Back home the country moved into summer with the newspaper and television news programs dominated by the scandal ignited by the disappearance of California Congressman Gary Condit’s 24-year-old intern/mistress in May and by the seemingly alarming increase in the number of shark attacks in the waters off of Florida, Alabama, Virginia, and New York. On July 30, *Time* magazine, invoking the specter of the movie *Jaws*, proclaimed the summer of 2001 to be “the summer of the shark.”

Other sharks were seeking prey that summer. On June 25, 2001, the *Sunday Times* of London reported, in a story little noted in the United States, that, “Osama bin Laden, the world’s most-wanted terrorist, is planning a big attack on American and Israeli targets within the next two weeks, a London-based Arab satellite television station has claimed.”¹⁸² Not to worry, however, according to an opinion piece published in the *New York Times* on

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July 10. “Judging from news reports and the portrayal of villains in our popular entertainment,” wrote Larry C. Johnson a counterterrorism expert, “Americans are bedeviled by fantasies about terrorism. They seem to believe that terrorism is the greatest threat to the United States and that it is becoming more widespread and lethal. They are likely to think that the United States is the most popular target of terrorists. And they almost certainly have the impression that extremist Islamic groups cause most terrorism. None of these beliefs are based in fact.”¹⁸³

On September 10, 2001, just days after another shark attack killed a ten-year-old boy at Virginia Beach, two men, Mohammed Atta, a 33-year-old Egyptian, and Abdulaziz Alomari, a Saudi Arabian, checked into room 232 of the Comfort Inn in South Portland, Maine, having driven in from Boston, Massachusetts. They had reservations on a commuter flight back to Boston in the morning.

¹ Walter Isaacson, “The Gorbachev Challenge,” *Time*, Vol. 132, No. 5, December 18, 1988.

² Mikhail Gorbachev, OnPedia.com, <http://www.onpedia.com/encyclopedia/Mikhail-Gorbachev>,

³ *SP Digest*, October 1990, 4 .

⁴ *SP Digest*, October 1990, 4.

⁵ *SP Digest*, October 1990, 4.

⁶ Narrative from display in Security Police Museum, Lackland AFB, Texas.

⁷ Dr. Eliot A. Cohen, Director, *Gulf War Air Power Survey*, Volume III, (Washington, DC, 1993), 31.

⁸ *SP Digest*, October 1990, 1.

⁹ *SP Digest*, December 1990, 2.

¹⁰ *SP Digest*, December 1990, 2.

¹¹ *SP Digest*, December 1990, 3.

¹² *SP Digest*, December 1990, 3.

¹³ *SP Digest*, December 1990, 3.

¹⁴ *SP Digest*, December 1990, 3.

¹⁵ *SP Digest*, December 1990, 3.

¹⁶ Dr. Eliot A. Cohen, Director, *Gulf War Air Power Survey*, Volume III, (Washington, DC, 1993), 32, 34, 43.

¹⁷ Dr. Eliot A. Cohen, Director, *Gulf War Air Power Survey*, Volume III, (Washington, DC, 1993), 43.

¹⁸ Dr. Eliot A. Cohen, Director, *Gulf War Air Power Survey*, Volume III, (Washington, DC, 1993), 37.

¹⁹ Dr. Eliot A. Cohen, Director, *Gulf War Air Power Survey*, Volume III, (Washington, DC, 1993), 38.

²⁰ Dr. Eliot A. Cohen, Director, *Gulf War Air Power Survey*, Volume III, (Washington, DC, 1993), 48.

²¹ *SP Digest*, June 1991, 6.

²² *SP Digest*, June 1991, 6.

²³ *SP Digest*, June 1991, 6.

²⁴ *SP Digest*, June 1991, 8.

²⁵ George H. W. Bush Address to Congress, September 11, 1990, University of Virginia, Miller Center of Public Affairs Webpage, (http://millercenter.virginia.edu/scripps/diglibrary/prezspeeches/ghbush/ghb_1990_0911.html).

²⁶ George H. W. Bush Address to Congress, September 11, 1990, University of Virginia, Miller Center of Public Affairs Webpage, (http://millercenter.virginia.edu/scripps/diglibrary/prezspeeches/ghbush/ghb_1990_0911.html).

²⁷ George H. W. Bush State of the Union Speech, January 29, 1991

(<http://stateoftheunion.onetwothree.net/texts/19910129.html>).

²⁸ “US Navy in Desert Shield/Desert Storm”(Naval Historical Center Webpage, (<http://www.history.navy.mil/wars/dstorm/ds5.htm>).

²⁹ Citation to Accompany the Award of Bronze Star Medal (First Oak Leaf Cluster with Valor) to Clifford E. Day.

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- ³⁰ Citation to Accompany the Award of Bronze Star Medal (First Oak Leaf Cluster with Valor) to Clifford E. Day.
- ³¹ General Colin Powell, PBS Frontline interview (<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/powell/3.html>).
- ³² Letter from Maj Gen Robert S. Delligatti, CINCUSAFE/CS to Maj Gen Billy G. McCoy, Commander Lackland Training Center, 7 June 1991.
- ³³ TSgt Batta would be named one of the Air Force's Twelve Outstanding Airman for 1991. As for Carlos, CINCUSAFE forwarded copies of the magazine articles to Lackland along with a request that the Lackland Training Center commander "help in getting him proper recognition as well as assuring him a place at the Lackland Kennels in his advancing years" (Letter from Maj Gen Robert S. Delligatti, CINCUSAFE/CS to Maj Gen Billy G. McCoy, Commander Lackland Training Center, 7 June 1991).
- ³⁴ Security Council Resolution 688, 5 April 1991 (<http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0688.htm>).
- ³⁵ Daniel L. Haulman, "Crisis in Iraq: Operation PROVIDE COMFORT" in A. Timothy Warnock, ed. *Short of War: Major USAF Contingency Operations* (Air Force History and Museums Program: Maxwell AFB, AL, 2000), 179-188.
- ³⁶ General Ronald R. Fogleman quoted in William J. Allen "Crisis in Southern Iraq: Operation SOUTHERN WATCH" in A. Timothy Warnock, ed. *Short of War: Major USAF Contingency Operations* (Air Force History and Museums Program: Maxwell AFB, AL, 2000), 195.
- ³⁷ Interview of Brig Gen Frank K. Martin, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret) and Col Jim Conrad, USAF (Ret), June 8, 2005.
- ³⁸ Interview of Brig Gen Frank K. Martin, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret) and Col Jim Conrad, USAF (Ret), June 8, 2005.
- ³⁹ *SP Digest*, June 1991, 2.
- ⁴⁰ *SP Digest*, June 1991, 1.
- ⁴¹ *SP Digest*, June 1991, 1.
- ⁴² Letter from Col Aulay S. Mac Rae, 3250th TTW/CC to AFMTC/CC, 28 Jun 91.
- ⁴³ "Firey Vigil" *Airman*, Vol. XXXV, No. 9 (September 1991), 2.
- ⁴⁴ Transcript of ABC News program 20/20, "The Deadliest Game – High-Level Military Coverup," August 5, 1994, Transcript # 1431-1 (LSP Personnel-4 File, SF Museum).
- ⁴⁵ Tamba A. Bryant, "Marine Not Guilty In Grenade Death," *Pacific Daily News*, June 19, 1992.
- ⁴⁶ Security Police Case File No. 9146D15-146/9146D8-936/9246D6-490 synopsis.
- ⁴⁷ Sgt Orville Desjarlais "Guilty! Simoy Sentenced to Death Penalty for Murder," *Tropic Topics*, July 24, 1992.
- ⁴⁸ Interview of Brig Gen Stephen C. Mannell, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), June 5, 2005.
- ⁴⁹ *SP Digest*, July 1992, 1.
- ⁵⁰ *SP Digest*, July 1992, 1.
- ⁵¹ *SP Digest*, July 1992, 1.
- ⁵² *SP Digest*, July 1992, 2.
- ⁵³ *SP Digest*, July 1992, 1.
- ⁵⁴ Interview of Brig Gen Stephen C. Mannell, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), June 5, 2005.
- ⁵⁵ Histories of the Secretary of Defense, Richard B. Cheney (http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories).
- ⁵⁶ Interview of Brig Gen Stephen C. Mannell, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), June 5, 2005.
- ⁵⁷ Interview of Brig Gen Stephen C. Mannell, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), June 5, 2005.
- ⁵⁸ Interview of Brig Gen Stephen C. Mannell, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), June 5, 2005.
- ⁵⁹ Interview of Brig Gen Stephen C. Mannell, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), June 5, 2005.
- ⁶⁰ *SP Digest*, Fall/Winter 1994, 10.
- ⁶¹ Interview of Brig Gen Stephen C. Mannell, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), June 5, 2005.

⁶² 10 United States Code Section 2465(a) prohibited the DoD from contracting out security guard and firefighting functions within the United States unless it was a renewal of a contract entered into prior to September 24, 1983.

⁶³ Interview of Brig Gen Stephen C. Mannell, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), June 5, 2005.

⁶⁴ William J. Clinton, First Inaugural Address, January 20, 1993, Clinton Foundation Website (<http://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/012093-speech-by-president-address-to-nation-inaugural.htm>).

⁶⁵ William J. Clinton First Inaugural Address, January 20, 1993, Clinton Foundation Website (<http://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/012093-speech-by-president-address-to-nation-inaugural.htm>).

⁶⁶ For a critique of the BUR see John T. Correll "The Legacy of the Bottom-up Review," *Air Force Magazine*, Vol. 86, No. 10 (October 2003).

⁶⁷ Letter HQ USAF/SP to ALMAJCOM/SP, Subject: Retaining Separate Security and Law Enforcement Career Fields, with attached point paper, 17 Sep 93.

⁶⁸ Letter HQ USAF/SP to ALMAJCOM/SP, Subject: Retaining Separate Security and Law Enforcement Career Fields, with attached point paper, 17 Sep 93.

⁶⁹ Letter HQ USAF/SP to ALMAJCOM/SP, Subject: Retaining Separate Security and Law Enforcement Career Fields, with attached point paper, 17 Sep 93.

⁷⁰ *SP Digest*, November 1993, 2.

⁷¹ Lt Col Patricia A. Kerns, *The First 50 Years: US Air Force Judge Advocate General's Department* (Government Printing Office: 2001), 161.

⁷² Capt Robyn Chumley "Facing Danger," *Airman* (no date).

⁷³ MSgt Merrie Schilter Lowe "Airman gets highest SPS award," Air Force News Service, April 1995.

⁷⁴ MSgt Randy Holcomb, HQ AFSPA/SPCC, Paper on Air Force Corrections, undated.

⁷⁵ MSgt Randy Holcomb, HQ AFSPA/SPCC, Paper on Air Force Corrections, undated.

⁷⁶ *SP Digest*, November 1993, 3.

⁷⁷ *SP Digest*, November 1993, 7.

⁷⁸ Memorandum from AFSPA/CC, Subject: ABD Workshop Executive Summary, 29 Mar 94.

⁷⁹ Memorandum from AFSPA/CC, Subject: ABD Workshop Executive Summary, Attachment 4, 29 Mar 94.

⁸⁰ Memorandum from AFSPA/CC, Subject: ABD Workshop Executive Summary, Attachment 4, 29 Mar 94.

⁸¹ Undated Security Police history timeline by Col Matt Matecko, USAF (Ret), in author's possession.

⁸² PROVIDE RELIEF began August 14, 1992 and delivered food by air and sea to Somalia and Kenya, near whose border many Somali refugees had camped. Even though 38 million pounds of food had been delivered during PROVIDE RELIEF, much of it was stolen by armed thugs loyal to one or another of the warlords fighting for control of Somalia. On December 4, 1992, President Bush launched operation RESTORE HOPE to establish order and help ensure the delivery of the badly needed food. RESTORE HOPE ended on May 4, 1993, replaced by CONTINUE HOPE now under United Nations control. The UN expanded the mission to one of nation building and the multi-national force was thereby brought into direct conflict with the warlords culminating in the October 3, 1993 "Blackhawk Down" incident in Mogadishu during which eighteen Americans were killed and 84 wounded. President Clinton launched RESTORE HOPE II on October 5 to reinforce the American contingent, but promised all American troops would be withdrawn by the end of March 1994. The last American departed Somalia on March 25, 1994, with the country still in anarchy. (Daniel L. Haulman "Crisis in Somalia: Operations PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE" in A. Timothy Warnock, ed. *Short of War: Major USAF Contingency Operations* (Air Force History and Museums Program: Maxwell AFB, AL, 2000), 209-218)

⁸³ Memorandum from AFSPA/CC, Subject: ABD Workshop Executive Summary, Attachment 4, 29 Mar 94.

⁸⁴ Memorandum from AFSPA/CC, Subject: ABD Workshop Executive Summary, Attachment 4, 29 Mar 94.

⁸⁵ Memorandum from AFSPA/CC, Subject: ABD Workshop Executive Summary, Attachment 4, 29 Mar 94.

⁸⁶ Operation Support Justice was initiated in mid-1991 to provide communication, radar, and intelligence support to Colombian military and law enforcement authorities. Operation Steady State evolved from the Operation Support Justice series of programs in the Andean countries in 1991 through 1994.

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- ⁸⁷ Memorandum from AFSPA/CC, Subject: ABD Workshop Executive Summary, Attachment 4, 29 Mar 94.
- ⁸⁸ Memorandum from AFSPA/CC, Subject: ABD Workshop Executive Summary, Attachment 4, 29 Mar 94.
- ⁸⁹ Efforts to address this anomaly began in May 1995 with a survey of existing guidance on CAS and ABD. A review of Joint Publications, including Joint Pub 3-10.1, "JTTP for Base Defense," showed that CAS was listed as a tool for ABD, but Air Force doctrine and publications did not specifically list ABD as a CAS mission. While Security Police generated guidance listed ABD as an AC-130 mission, it was noted that SPs were not trained to request and direct CAS and that tactical air control parties should be assigned to wings to perform this function. The survey recommended that ABD be added as a CAS mission in all applicable Air Force publications. (Bullet Background Paper on Close Air Support (CAS) in Air Base Defense (ABD) Doctrine and Policy, 4 May 95)
- ⁹⁰ Memorandum from AFSPA/CC, Subject: ABD Workshop Executive Summary, Attachment 4, 29 Mar 94.
- ⁹¹ Memorandum from AFSPA/CC, Subject: ABD Workshop Executive Summary, Attachment 4, 29 Mar 94.
- ⁹² *SP Digest*, Fall/Winter 1994, 5.
- ⁹³ Memorandum for SPX, SPI, SPR, SPE, and SP from HQ USAF/SPO, Subject: Exercise FOAL EAGLE 94 and Orientation Visit to other ABD Plans for Republic of Korea (ROK), 30 Oct 94 – 10 Nov 94 dated 22 Nov 94.
- ⁹⁴ Memorandum for SPX, SPI, SPR, SPE, and SP from HQ USAF/SPO, Subject: Exercise FOAL EAGLE 94 and Orientation Visit to other ABD Plans for Republic of Korea (ROK), 30 Oct 94 – 10 Nov 94 dated 22 Nov 94.
- ⁹⁵ Memorandum for SPX, SPI, SPR, SPE, and SP from HQ USAF/SPO, Subject: Exercise FOAL EAGLE 94 and Orientation Visit to other ABD Plans for Republic of Korea (ROK), 30 Oct 94 – 10 Nov 94 dated 22 Nov 94.
- ⁹⁶ Memorandum for SPX, SPI, SPR, SPE, and SP from HQ USAF/SPO, Subject: Exercise FOAL EAGLE 94 and Orientation Visit to other ABD Plans for Republic of Korea (ROK), 30 Oct 94 – 10 Nov 94 dated 22 Nov 94.
- ⁹⁷ Memorandum for SPX, SPI, SPR, SPE, and SP from HQ USAF/SPO, Subject: Exercise FOAL EAGLE 94 and Orientation Visit to other ABD Plans for Republic of Korea (ROK), 30 Oct 94 – 10 Nov 94 dated 22 Nov 94.
- ⁹⁸ Memorandum for SPX, SPI, SPR, SPE, and SP from HQ USAF/SPO, Subject: Exercise FOAL EAGLE 94 and Orientation Visit to other ABD Plans for Republic of Korea (ROK), 30 Oct 94 – 10 Nov 94 dated 22 Nov 94.
- ⁹⁹ Memorandum for SPI, SPO, SPX, and SP from AF/SPO, Subject: Exercise FOAL EAGLE 95 Trip Report dated 1 Nov 95.
- ¹⁰⁰ Memorandum for SPI, SPO, SPX, and SP from AF/SPO, Subject: Exercise FOAL EAGLE 95 Trip Report dated 1 Nov 95.
- ¹⁰¹ Memorandum for SPI, SPO, SPX, and SP from AF/SPO, Subject: Exercise FOAL EAGLE 95 Trip Report dated 1 Nov 95.
- ¹⁰² Memorandum for SPI, SPO, SPX, and SP from AF/SPO, Subject: Exercise FOAL EAGLE 95 Trip Report dated 1 Nov 95.
- ¹⁰³ Memorandum for SPI, SPO, SPX, and SP from AF/SPO, Subject: Exercise FOAL EAGLE 95 Trip Report dated 1 Nov 95.
- ¹⁰⁴ Memorandum for SPI, SPO, SPX, and SP from AF/SPO, Subject: Exercise FOAL EAGLE 95 Trip Report dated 1 Nov 95.
- ¹⁰⁵ SSgt Dee Ann Poole, "343rd adds course, class begins Aug. 8," Lackland AFB *Talespinner*, January 20, 1995.
- ¹⁰⁶ Excerpt from *Tiger Flight*, (no date), 28.
- ¹⁰⁷ Rebecca Grant "The Second Sacking of Terryl Schwailer," *Air Force Magazine Online* (<http://dc01-cdh-afa03.tranguard.net/AFA/Features/personnel/box0320096schwailer.htm>).
- ¹⁰⁸ Finding 20, Downing Assessment Task Force Report of the Assessment of the Khobar Towers Bombing, August 30, 1996 (<http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/downing/downltr.htm>).

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- ¹⁰⁹ Finding 11, Downing Assessment Task Force Report of the Assessment of the Khobar Towers Bombing, August 30, 1996 (<http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/downing/downltr.htm>).
- ¹¹⁰ Finding 11, Downing Assessment Task Force Report of the Assessment of the Khobar Towers Bombing, August 30, 1996 (<http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/downing/downltr.htm>).
- ¹¹¹ Lt Gen James F. Record *Independent Review of the Khobar Towers Bombing, Part B, Section V(c)I* (<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/khobar/recordf.htm>).
- ¹¹² Lt Gen Richard T. Swope and Maj Gen Bryan G. Hawley *Report of Investigation Concerning the Khobar Towers Bombing, 25 June 1996* (<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/khobar/tableof.htm>).
- ¹¹³ "USAF moves to bolster security at Gulf bases," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 5 February 1997.
- ¹¹⁴ Osama bin Laden, *ADL, Anti-Defamation League*, http://www.adl.org/terrorism_america/bin_L.asp
- ¹¹⁵ Osama bin Laden v. the US: Edicts and Statements, PBS Frontline "Hunting bin Laden" webpage (<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/edicts.html>).
- ¹¹⁶ Osama bin Laden v. the US: Edicts and Statements, PBS Frontline "Hunting bin Laden" webpage (<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/edicts.html>).
- ¹¹⁷ Partial copy of *Security Forces Digest* (date unknown), 12.
- ¹¹⁸ Partial copy of *Security Forces Digest* (date unknown), 12.
- ¹¹⁹ Partial copy of *Security Forces Digest* (date unknown), 4.
- ¹²⁰ Partial copy of *Security Forces Digest* (date unknown), 4.
- ¹²¹ Partial copy of *Security Forces Digest* (date unknown), 4.
- ¹²² Interview of Brig Gen Richard Coleman, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), 14 May 2005.
- ¹²³ Interview of Brig Gen Richard Coleman, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), 14 May 2005.
- ¹²⁴ Interview of Brig Gen Richard Coleman, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), 14 May 2005.
- ¹²⁵ SSgt Michael Dorsey "Air Force's 21st century vision includes security police changes," Air Force News Service, July 3, 1997.
- ¹²⁶ SSgt Michael Dorsey "Air Force's 21st century vision includes security police changes," Air Force News Service, July 3, 1997.
- ¹²⁷ Memo for AF/CC and AF/CV Subject: Khobar [*sic*] Terrace Bombing, 2 Jan 97.
- ¹²⁸ Memo for AF/CC and AF/CV Subject: Khobar [*sic*] Terrace Bombing, 2 Jan 97.
- ¹²⁹ Draft of Letter to Air Chief Marshall Sir Michael Graydon attached to Staff Summary Sheet from Col Andrew A. Corso, Chief Force Protection Division, Directorate of Security Forces, 7 January 1997.
- ¹³⁰ Finding 6, Downing Assessment Task Force Report of the Assessment of the Khobar Towers Bombing, August 30, 1996 (<http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/downing/downltr.htm>).
- ¹³¹ Finding 6, Downing Assessment Task Force Report of the Assessment of the Khobar Towers Bombing, August 30, 1996 (<http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/downing/downltr.htm>).
- ¹³² Interview of Brig Gen Richard Coleman, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), 14 May 2005.
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CHAPTER TEN*

THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR: SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 – DECEMBER 31, 2006

Tuesday, September 11, 2001, was a magnificent late summer day over the eastern half of the country with cloudless, bright blue skies, and almost perfect temperatures. At Boston's Logan International Airport Mohammed Atta and Abdulaziz Alomari arrived on a commuter flight from North Portland, Maine, and boarded American Airlines Flight 11 bound for Los Angeles, taking their seats among the 76 other passengers and crew. Also boarding Flight 11 were Satam al Suqami and brothers Wail al Shehri and Waleed al Shehri. At 7:45 a.m. the aircraft pushed back from the gate.¹

At 8:14 a.m. the pilot of American Airlines Flight 11 acknowledged a transmission from air traffic controllers in Boston. Sixteen seconds later a transmission instructing the pilot to climb to 35,000 feet went unacknowledged because by this time Atta was at the controls of the aircraft and two flight attendants and a passenger lay bleeding from wounds inflicted by box cutter utility knives smuggled aboard by the hijackers. At 8:27, Atta turned Flight 11 south and 19 minutes and 40 seconds later crashed the airliner into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City.



* This chapter falls more properly in the realm of current events, not history. Much of the material available for the Global War on Terror is classified and the full story of this pivotal time in Security Forces history will be the province of future historians.




Gen John P. Jumper (Air Force photo)

As Atta guided the hijacked airliner toward his target, Security Forces director Brig Gen Jim Shames was in the Pentagon attending the first senior staff meeting chaired by Air Force Chief of Staff Gen John Jumper, then in his first day on the job. Soon after Atta crashed American Airlines Flight 11 into the North Tower, Jumper and his staff received the news. Assuming it was an accident, as did millions of others that beautiful September morning, the incident “didn’t seem like a big problem at the time” to the assembled Air Force leadership.² That assumption was proved wrong at 9:03 as United Flight 175 swooped into view on millions of television screens and slammed directly into the South Tower of the World Trade Center. After receiving the report on Flight 175

Shames recalled thinking “there’s no way this can be coincidence any more. There’s no accident potential left”—the country was under attack.³ By the time Shames received a call at around 0945 reporting an explosion and fire on the other side of the Pentagon, Secretary of the Air Force Roche had joined Jumper in what had by now transitioned from the usual senior staff meeting into the Air Force battle staff. It was another 8 to 10 minutes before it was reported that the explosion and fire at the Pentagon was because American Airlines Flight 77, hijacked after departing Dulles airport outside of Washington, had been crashed into the Pentagon.

Shames’ office was in the Pentagon’s B Ring on the side of the building struck by Flight 77, but fortunately most of his staff was still quartered in Rosslyn, Virginia, where they had been moved while their offices in the Pentagon were renovated. Two of Shames’ staff, Security Forces Enlisted Manager CMSgt John Monaccio and Shames’ executive officer Maj Joe Miller, ventured into the smoke and flames and helped some injured personnel escape. Monaccio and Miller were not the only ones who jumped in to help. Hundreds of military and civilian personnel, both high and low ranking, pitched in with both Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the Air Force Surgeon General among those out on the Pentagon lawn assisting the injured. Shames later called Miller and Monaccio to the battle staff; he kept Miller with him, but Monaccio said he needed to be “out there” and Shames let him return to the rescue effort.⁴ Monaccio and Miller both received Air Medals for their efforts on September 11. It was later determined that Flight 77 had penetrated the



A security camera outside the Pentagon captures the moment American Airlines Flight 77 tore into the building, September 11, 2001 (DoD photo)

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Pentagon's C, D, and E Rings with the cockpit coming to rest in the C Ring directly behind Shames's B Ring office.⁵

By nightfall on September 11, 2001, Atta, Alomari and 17 other Islamic terrorists under his command, using four California-bound civilian airliners loaded with fuel hijacked after departure from Boston, Dulles, and Newark airports, had scarred the skyline of Manhattan by crashing two of them into the twin towers of the World Trade Center, collapsing them both, punched a huge hole in the side of the Pentagon with another, and deliberately crashed the last, United Flight 93, into a Pennsylvania field when the passengers tried to regain control of the aircraft.⁶ All told, 2,595 people in and around the World Trade Center along with 157 others aboard the two airliners died. At the Pentagon, 126 civilian and military personnel in the building died along with another 67 on Flight 77. Aboard Flight 93, 44 passengers, including the 4 hijackers, and crew died. Over 3,000 Americans who had been alive that morning were now dead and symbols of America's financial and military power were destroyed or damaged. All of this carnage and destruction resulted from Atta's successful execution of the "Planes Operation." First proposed to *Al Qaeda* chief Osama bin Laden in 1996 by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who had provided support for the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, the "Planes Operation" was finally approved and funded by bin Laden in late 1998 or early 1999.⁷

Uncertainty and confusion reigned during and immediately after the attacks. The big question, as Shames explained later, was, "...what do you do about this? You've got this catastrophic event at two locations. You don't know if there are others planned. You know if the bad guy wants to hurt somebody and hits the Pentagon, why wouldn't you hit other places in the world? Well, the only reason you wouldn't hit them is because you haven't had time to plan it yet. Or you haven't mustered the forces to do it yet. So it's coming."⁸

One problem in mounting a defense against follow-on attacks using domestic airliners or small aircraft was that the air defense structure of the United States was designed to look outward and intercept incoming threats; internally generated threats were another matter. Complicating the air defense efforts was that the attacking aircraft were not enemy bombers, but civilian airliners. An effective defense against this threat might mean shooting down those airliners and killing hundreds of passengers. To help the military identify potential threats, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) ordered all civilian aircraft in US airspace to land at the nearest airport and for the next two days not an aircraft, nor contrail, nor was noise of an aircraft engine seen or heard over vast portions of the country. The military had free reign of the skies and within 18 hours of the attacks, 301 fighters were on alert or in the active air in defense of American airspace. On September 11 alone 179 missions were flown, mostly as combat air patrols over major American cities.

North American Air Defense Command was responsible for continental air defense and commanders from all services put forces at its disposal. Over 400 fighter and support aircraft at 69 locations and on 14 Navy warships were at full combat posture.

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The air defense of the United States transitioned from a token air sovereignty posture on the morning of September 11 to a full-scale defense against airborne threats approaching or originating inside the United States by that evening. “Pretty soon,” Colonel Robert J. Marr, Jr., commander of North American Air Defense Command’s (NORAD) Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), later recalled, “fighters were all over the sky, like you kicked a hornet’s nest.”⁹



F-16s on patrol over San Francisco during Operation Noble Eagle (Air Force photo)

This was the start of Operation Noble Eagle and the Air Force was heavily involved. Beginning on September 11, 2001, over the next year the Air Force logged 23,733 total sorties in defense of the airspace of the United States.¹⁰ Enhanced security of military facilities was also part of Noble Eagle and this stretched the Security Forces pretty thin. All previous planning for Security Forces assumed that Force Protection Condition Bravo would be the maximum sustained effort needed in the continental United States, but bases now remained at the much tighter and more manpower intensive Charlie force protection condition. These heightened security levels placed heavy demands on Security Forces personnel who now had to increase patrols of installations, strictly enforce base entry procedures, conduct random vehicle checks, and set up barriers and obstacles to control traffic flow. Hurlburt Field in Florida, for example, required 20 personnel to control just two entry points during the morning rush hour.

In confronting this new reality Shames felt that the Security Forces were too wedded to the force protection condition mindset and that rote execution of the checklist had replaced innovation in fulfilling the security mission. His message to the field was to “... forget that really cool book you’ve got out there...figure out who your adversary is and how you are actually going to combat him, not how you are going to finish your checklist. Get over the checklist.”¹¹

Shames also lamented the mindset that let manning dictate how much security could be provided rather than the other way around. However, since Security Force

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manning was based on performing the checklist tasks, as security requirements increased, the strain on the active duty Security Forces was tremendous and Shames had Air Force Reserve and Guard SF personnel and even Army Guard personnel called in to bolster the force and handle more routine duties such as gate guard. This, however, merely shifted the burden. “As we began to mobilize, we didn’t have enough steady state security forces to protect our own bases at force protection of Charlie and Delta, let alone lose a bunch of them to go protect an active duty base or go overseas,” Brig Gen Paul Kimmel, ANG Chief Operating Officer and Crisis Action Team director, observed.¹²

Augmenting the active force was not the only mission given to the Reserve and Guard. In late September, in response to an FAA request, President Bush authorized the use of National Guard MPs and Security Forces for four to six months to augment security at 422 airports. The troops, in battle dress uniforms and armed with automatic weapons, reinforced airport security checkpoints, monitored the alertness of civilian security screeners, and gave assistance to screeners and airport police as needed. Perhaps more importantly, the troops provided a visible security presence so that, in the words of President Bush, “the traveling public will know we are serious about airline safety in



SrA Emery Blanchard (left) and SrA Andrew Haywood of the Utah Air National Guard’s 151st SPS, on duty at Salt Lake City Airport (Air Force photo)

America.”¹³ The guardsmen providing this armed military presence, common in many foreign airports, but unprecedented in the United States, remained under the control of state governors while the Federal government covered their pay.

Despite the fact that the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, later said that, “The system was blinking red” with numerous unspecific warnings of planned *Al Qaeda* attacks both at home and abroad, the attacks of September 11 came as a surprise to the government, the military, and the citizenry.¹⁴ The American response to the attacks may have surprised bin Laden and *Al Qaeda* just as much as their actions

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surprised America since President Bush, breaking with past practice, treated the attacks not as crimes, but as acts of war. As after the surprise attack on the United States by the Japanese on December 7, 1941, it seemed this latest “day of infamy” had once again “awakened a sleeping giant and filled him with a terrible resolve.”¹⁵ On September 18, Congress authorized the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”¹⁶

Four days before receiving Congressional authority to go to war, Bush visited “Ground Zero,” the still smoldering site of where the twin towers of the World Trade Center once stood. Climbing onto a fire truck, Bush took a bullhorn and responded to the cheers of the rescue workers by declaring, “I can hear you. The rest of the world hears



A call to arms: President Bush at Ground Zero, September 14, 2001 (White House photo)

you. And the people who knocked down these buildings will hear all of us soon.”¹⁷ That same day Bush declared a national emergency and ordered the Ready Reserve to active duty for up to two years.

The first target in the Global War on Terror, known in Pentagon parlance as GWOT, was the Taliban regime of Afghanistan that harbored Osama bin Laden. American efforts against the Taliban would benefit from the international reaction to the attacks of September 11. France’s *Le Monde* newspaper declared *Nous sommes tous Américains* (We Are All Americans). Two days after the attacks, Queen Elizabeth approved for the first time the playing of another country’s national anthem during the changing of the guard at Buckingham Palace. Some 5,000 Americans, stranded in London because of the suspension of airline flights to the US, gathered outside the palace and sang the Star Spangled Banner as the band of the Coldstream Guards played. Many wept.¹⁸ On September 12, 2001, the North Atlantic Council, the political arm of NATO,

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voted unanimously to invoke Article Five of the NATO Charter for the first time in the history of the alliance obligating all NATO members to assist the United States in fighting whoever was responsible for the 9/11 attacks. However, in some Arab and Muslim countries, while the leadership generally issued statements of support, some citizens celebrated the attacks in the streets.

The solidarity of the United States and its closest ally, Great Britain, was on display on September 20 as the President addressed a joint session of Congress with British Prime Minister Tony Blair in the audience. In his speech Bush identified Osama bin Laden and *al Qaeda* as the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks and accused the Taliban of sponsoring and sheltering bin Laden and his terrorists. “By aiding and abetting murder,” Bush informed the Congress, “the Taliban regime is committing murder.”¹⁹ The President issued an ultimatum to the Taliban that evening—deliver Osama bin Laden and those responsible for the attacks of September 11 to the United States, close the terrorist training camps in Afghanistan, release unjustly imprisoned foreign nationals, and give the United States access to the terrorist camps or else. “These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion,” Bush warned. “The Taliban must act and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate.”²⁰

The President went to great pains to identify America’s enemies as not the Muslim or Arab world, but as terrorists who were trying to “hijack Islam.” “Our enemy,” Bush explained, “is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them.” In that regard, he set out what came to be called the Bush Doctrine: “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.” Seeking to tap into the international support manifest after the 9/11 attacks, the President also declared that the War on Terror “is not, however, just America's fight. And what is at stake is not just America's freedom. This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom.” The President also identified the enemy’s philosophy, goals and tactics and made a prediction as to the outcome of this new war:

These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life. With every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking our friends. They stand against us, because we stand in their way. We are not deceived by their pretenses to piety. We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the twentieth century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions -- by abandoning every value except the will to power -- they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends: in history's unmarked grave of discarded lies.²¹

When by October 7, no response had been received from Mullah Omar, the one-eyed leader of the Taliban government; the President addressed the nation and announced that he had ordered an attack on Afghanistan’s Taliban regime. Bush revealed that Great

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Britain, Canada, Australia, Germany, and France had pledged forces for the effort and many other nations across the world had allowed overflight and landing rights to American aircraft and shared intelligence. The President noted that, “This military action is a part of our campaign against terrorism, another front in a war that has already been joined through diplomacy, intelligence, the freezing of financial assets and the arrests of known terrorists by law enforcement agents in 38 countries.”²² The military operation launched against the Taliban that day was called Operation Enduring Freedom.



While many pundits and the anti-war minority worldwide predicted disaster both at the hands of the fierce *mujahadeen* who had defeated the Soviet war machine and from the soon to arrive brutal Afghan winter, the United States and the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance made short work of the repressive Islamic regime. By October 20, virtually all Taliban air defenses had been destroyed and a raid launched on the residence of Mullah Omar in the middle of the Taliban capital of Qandahar, although Omar escaped capture. Twenty days later, the provincial capital of Mazar-e Sharif fell and then in rapid succession, Herat, Kabul, and Jalalabad. By December, coalition troops and Afghan fighters also destroyed *al Qaeda's* training camps and drove bin Laden and his followers into the caves of the rugged Tora Bora mountain region. But despite a massive effort by coalition and anti-Taliban forces to destroy him and his fighters, bin Laden and some of his men managed to slip through the mountain passes into the tribal areas in neighboring Pakistan where they were sheltered by sympathetic tribesmen.

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By mid-December, Marines had secured Qandahar Airport and the Taliban capital was in the hands of anti-Taliban forces. On December 22, only 78 days after the beginning of combat operations, GEN Tommy Franks, CENTCOM commander, traveled to Kabul to attend a ceremony marking the inauguration of the Afghan interim government. Although regular Army and Air Force units were heavily engaged against Taliban and terrorist forces, it was the special operations forces that were instrumental in the victory. In a case of the *King of the Khyber Rifles* meets *Star Wars*, these Special Operations Command warriors, including Air Force Combat Controllers, often mounted on horseback with Afghan tribal robes over their uniforms, but carrying the most sophisticated portable electronics to locate and target the enemy with air strikes, acting in concert with anti-Taliban Northern Alliance forces, decimated the Taliban.

On December 20, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386 authorized the establishment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) which by late 2006 consisted of 32,000 troops from 37 nations. The ISAF was initially charged with securing Kabul from the Taliban, *al Qaeda*, and Afghan warlords hostile to the new Afghan government led by Hamid Karzai, but its charter was later expanded to cover the entire country.

The Air Force initially operated in support of Enduring Freedom from countries bordering Afghanistan, some of which had never seen an American soldier. On December 16, 2001, members of the 86th Contingency Response Group, including the 786th SFS from Ramstein AB, Germany, labored in the bitter cold of a Kyrgyz winter to build a base from scratch at Manas International Airport, located just outside the city of Bishkek, capital of the former Soviet republic of Kyrgyzstan. Named Ganci Air Base in honor of Peter Ganci Jr., former chief of the New York City Fire Department, who died on September 11, 2001, in the collapse of the World Trade Center, the base later took on the same name as the airport.



SMSgt Michael Buckley watches as SSgt Christopher Guild and his MWD Petty check a vehicle for explosives at Manas AB, Kyrgyzstan (Air Force photo)

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Within three months, 200 tents had been set up and more than 12 million pounds of cargo and over 1,000 troops had been processed. The 376th Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW) later took over operations from the 86th CRG and the 822nd SFS arrived to take over security. Along with performing force protection duties on base, they went outside the fence to patrol nearby villages about three to five kilometers out to deter stand off attacks and to see and be seen by the locals. "We go out in HUMVEES and we go out dismounted," SMSgt Michael Buckley said describing the patrols. "We'll park the HUMVEES and walk through the villages. We always have an interpreter with us and we interact with the folks so they can see us and touch us. We want them to know about us and not be afraid of us."²³

In Uzbekistan, the 416th Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron (ESFS) secured Air Force resources at Karshi-Khanabad AB. Security Forces deployments to Afghanistan proper accelerated as the Taliban were driven from power and the Air Force moved to bases in country. At Bagram, a former Soviet airfield about 27 miles north of Kabul, the 445th AEW moved in and its 455th ESFS became responsible for base security.



Staff Sgt. Christopher Norte of the 455th ESFS provides security for a convoy near Bagram AB, Afghanistan (Air Force photo)

On January 20, 2002, President Bush delivered his State of the Union Address to Congress and the American people. In this first post-9/11 State of the Union, the President noted that, "In four short months, our nation has comforted the victims [of 9/11], begun to rebuild New York and the Pentagon, rallied a great coalition, captured, arrested, and rid the world of thousands of terrorists, destroyed Afghanistan's terrorist training camps, saved a people from starvation, and freed a country from brutal oppression." But, Bush reminded his audience and the world that, "Our war on terror is well begun, but it is only begun" and that threats to the nation's and the world's security

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remained. In particular the President singled out North Korea, Iran, and Iraq as forming an “axis of evil” that supported terrorism and sought to obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMD). “America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation's security,” Bush warned these regimes. Presaging the doctrine of preemption he would formally announce in a speech at West Point in July, he declared, “I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons.”²⁴

To the President and others, Iraq posed the most immediate threat of any of the “axis of evil” regimes. Saddam had already demonstrated that he had chemical weapons when he used them against his Kurdish population. U.N. inspections after Desert Storm revealed he had established research and development and production facilities for chemical and biological weapons and was actively pursuing the technology needed for the production of nuclear weapons. Although he had agreed after his defeat in the Gulf War to dismantle his WMD programs and cooperate with U.N. inspectors sent to confirm his compliance, Saddam impeded their efforts, concealed information, and ultimately threw them out of Iraq, resulting in Operation Desert Fox a bombing campaign ordered by then President Clinton to damage his suspected WMD facilities and force him to allow the inspectors to continue their work. At the time of the President’s speech the United Nations and practically all Western intelligence agencies believed that Saddam still possessed weapons of mass destruction.

Saddam had also demonstrated his aggressiveness in the region by his attack on Iran, the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980’s, and by his invasion of Kuwait. He supported terrorists by paying rewards of \$20,000 to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers who killed themselves in attacks on Israeli targets, by giving safe haven to terrorists such as the notorious Palestinian Abu Nidal, and had plotted to assassinate President George H. W. Bush. Additionally, the United States and its coalition partners patrolling the no-fly zones had long been engaged in a low intensity conflict with his regime.

In September, the President ratcheted up the pressure on Saddam during an address to the United Nations General Assembly the day after the first anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. In his address Bush, after detailing Saddam’s defiance of numerous U.N. resolutions, branded the Iraqi regime as a threat to the “authority of the United Nations, and a threat to peace” and startled the assembled delegates by asking, “Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced, or cast aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?”²⁵ He also warned Saddam and the world that American patience was far from infinite. “We will work with the U.N. Security Council for the necessary resolutions,” the President promised. “But the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced -- the just demands of peace and security will be met -- or action will be unavoidable. And a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its power.”²⁶

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Within days of the speech the Bush administration began floating the wording for a new U.N. resolution and warned that once the resolution passed, Saddam would have “days and weeks, not months and years” to comply.²⁷ This warning was given teeth on October 16 when Congress authorized the President to use the Armed Forces of the United States to “defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq...and enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.”²⁸ On November 8, after two months of diplomacy and three proposals, the Security Council finally passed Resolution 1441 ordering the return of weapons inspection teams to Iraq. The first of the teams arrived in Baghdad seventeen days later, but the Iraqi regime refused to give the inspections teams the full cooperation demanded by 1441 and denied the existence of suspected stockpiles of chemical weapons.

Given Saddam’s intransigence, President Bush ordered 25,000 troops to deploy to the Persian Gulf region on New Year’s Day 2003. But the solidarity exhibited by the West after 9/11 did not extend to invading Iraq and on January 20, the French foreign minister announced that France would not support an attack on Iraq to enforce 1441. Even after chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix reported Iraq’s failure to cooperate with his inspectors and Secretary of State Colin Powell laid out the available evidence that Saddam was continuing to clandestinely develop WMD, France and Russia, two countries with long financial ties to Iraq, refused to support military action. True to his word that the United States would deal with the Iraqi threat if the United Nations failed to do so, by March 5, Bush had 200,000 troops, five carrier battle groups, and 1,000 aircraft enroute to the Persian Gulf.

On March 16, President Bush, Prime Minister Blair, and Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar issued a challenge to the Security Council to force Saddam to comply with its resolutions. The Security Council, stymied by France and Russia, refused to act and the following day Bush issued an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein—leave Iraq within 48 hours or face attack. On March 19, one hour after the expiration of the deadline, targets in Baghdad were hit with cruise missiles and bombs. Operation Iraqi Freedom had begun.

In his televised speech that evening to the American people announcing the start of hostilities, the President stated the goals of Iraqi Freedom to be “to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger.”²⁹ “The people of the United States and our friends and allies will not live at the mercy of an outlaw regime that threatens the peace with weapons of mass murder,” Bush declared. “We will meet that threat now...so that we do not have to meet it later with armies of fire fighters and police and doctors on the streets of our cities.”³⁰

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Although resistance from Iraqi Republican Guard forces and Saddam's fanatic *Fedayeen* irregulars was sometimes fierce, American and British forces made rapid advances. On March 26, Air Force history was made when 18 members of the 786th SFS under command of Maj Erik Rundquist and two members from the 86th CRG, made the first Air Force Security Forces combat parachute assault along with around 1,000 troopers of the Army's 173rd Airborne Brigade onto Bashur Airfield in mountainous northern Iraq. This was also the first combat jump made from the C-17 "Globemaster" transport and the largest airborne assault since Panama.³¹ With their bellies full of steak and lobster, courtesy of the Air Force at the departure point of Aviano AB, Italy, the force jumped into a cold, pouring rain and landed in knee deep mud. The mission of the wet, muddy Airmen of the 86th was, according to its commander, Col Steven K. Weart who jumped into Bashur with his troops, to "support the 173rd Airborne Brigade and its buildup of combat power."³² As the 86th prepared the 7,000-foot runway to receive the first transport aircraft, the group's Security Forces troops controlled the runway and ramp, while 173rd Airborne soldiers and Iraqi Kurd Peshmurga fighters protected the airfield's

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perimeter. By April 9 the approximately 200 Airmen stationed at Bashur were handling around 1 million pounds of cargo a day.³³

The same day Rundquist was making history, MSgt Jeffery J. Moore of the Arizona Air National Guard's 161st SFS made a little of his own as he led a 13-man team, including SSgt Dena Brackin, onto the recently captured Iraqi Tallil AB near the city of Al Nasiriyah, claiming for itself the honor of being the first SF team in Iraq and for SSgt Brackin the title of being the first female Security Forces troop in the war zone.³⁴ Airmen of the 820th SFG soon joined them as part of a convoy from Kuwait.

By April 7, American tanks were in downtown Baghdad helping Iraqi citizens topple a huge statute of Saddam Hussein which they beat with the soles of their shoes in a sign of contempt. On May 1, President Bush was flown to the aircraft carrier USS *Abraham Lincoln* to congratulate the Armed Forces and from its flight deck declared that organized resistance in Iraq had ceased.

While the Iraqi military had been vanquished, operations continued with the goal of killing or capturing key Iraqi officials, pictured on a famous deck of cards issued to the troops to aid in identification, and stabilizing the country. By July, Saddam's sadistic sons had been killed in a shootout with American forces and other members of Saddam's regime had been captured or killed. Saddam himself remained on the run, funding and ordering attacks by diehard Baath party members until December 13, 2003, when he was finally extracted, bearded and disheveled, from an underground hiding place near his birthplace of Tikrit. In an address to the nation the following day, President Bush declared, "The capture of this man was crucial to the rise of a free Iraq. It marks the end of the road for him, and for all who bullied and killed in his name. For the Baathist holdouts largely responsible for the current violence, there will be no return to the corrupt power and privilege they once held."³⁵

But the Baathist and Taliban "holdouts" did not give up and May 1, 2003, marked what may yet prove to be the high point in America's post-9/11 military offensive to eliminate Islamic terrorism and the regimes that gave it aid and comfort. Over the months that followed coalition forces in both Afghanistan and Iraq, despite the installation of democratically elected governments, began to be plagued by attacks from Saddam and Taliban loyalists and from *al Qaeda* terrorists aided by Syria and Iran. Pitched battles were fought against sectarian militias at Fallujah, in the streets of Baghdad, and throughout the so-called Sunni Triangle north of Baghdad.



Saddam Hussein after his capture on December 13, 2003 (Associated Press)

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This new war, which over time came to be portrayed by the Democratic party and the media as a quagmire, one of the opposition's favorite terms from Vietnam, was both dirty and costly. New terms such as IED (improvised explosive device) and VBIED (vehicle borne improvised explosive device) entered the military lexicon to describe bombs cobbled together from old artillery shells with a cell phone detonator planted along the road to blow up American military vehicles or fashioned from vehicles crammed with explosives driven into crowded civilian areas and triggered by the *kamikaze* driver. These terror weapons killed Iraqi and Afghan civilians and coalition troops indiscriminately with what began to be alarming regularity. The depravity and brutality of the enemy was also demonstrated by the torture and mutilation of captives and the videotaped beheadings of Western prisoners, later released on the internet or shown on the Arab language television news network *Al Jazeera*. These filmed beheadings were a favored method of terror of *Al Qaeda* in Iraq led by the Jordanian Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi until he was killed in an American air strike. While relatively few combat deaths occurred between March 19 and May 1, 2003, as the insurgency and terror campaigns picked up steam, particularly after *Al Qaeda* in Iraq provoked Sunni/Shia conflict with the bombing of the Shia Golden Dome mosque in Samara in February 2006, coalition casualties rose and by Christmas Day 2006, 2,974 Americans had been killed in combat and another 22,401 wounded.



TSgt Lukas Parr (right) and SSgt Kenneth Gordon of the 332nd ESFS FAST guard on aircraft (Air Force photo)

Battling the brutal insurgents and terrorists in Iraq and the remnants of the Taliban in Afghanistan stretched the Army and Marine Corps to the limit and assisting its sister services would require some of the most fundamental changes in the Air Force in general and the Security Forces in particular since the creation of the service in 1947. Many of these changes were brought about by new, non-traditional missions taken on by the Air Force to assist the Army and Marines. One of these new tasks was convoy escort duty.

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The materiel necessary for war reaches a theater of operations either by sea or air and in Iraq the major aerial port was Balad air base some 40 miles north of Baghdad. From Balad, supplies were distributed to the field by air or military and civilian truck convoys under protection of the Army or Marines.

Transport of supplies and personnel in theater was provided by the workhorse C-130 “Hercules.” Emulating AMC’s Phoenix Raven teams and taking a page from its training handbook, expeditionary security forces squadrons throughout the theater of operations formed two- to four-person volunteer Fly Away Security Teams (FAST) to provide protection for the aircraft and crew. Between May and June 2004, the 386th ESFS FAST teams alone flew on 115 combat missions to 12 different countries, escorting more than 5,000 passengers.³⁶

By 2004, however, it was clear that the Army and Marines could not handle the ground convoy security workload and they requested help from the Air Force. One of the first, but not the last, of the “in-lieu of” taskings from the Army and Marine Corps, convoy escort duty was a new mission for the Air Force and gave rise to a new type of organization—the Aerospace Expeditionary Force Transportation Company. As a company in the Army model rather than a squadron, these organization’s subunits were denominated as platoons, not flights, and were commanded by senior NCOs. Duty with an Air Force transportation company was, as one Airman put it, “definitely a different Air Force than the one I signed up for.”³⁷



Air Force Gun Truck on display at the Air Force Enlisted Heritage Hall, Maxwell Air Force Base's Gunter Annex, Ala. The vehicle was decommissioned after an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attack in Iraq made the vehicle inoperable. (Air Force photo)

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After training at Army bases stateside, the 2632nd Aerospace Expeditionary Transportation Company arrived at Balad in April 2004. The Airmen in these special units manned 5-ton gun trucks mounting .50 caliber machine guns in makeshift armored turrets that gave them a look that one Airman described as being a “cross between Mad Max and the Beverly Hillbillies.”³⁸ To prepare them for this new duty, Security Forces personnel trained Airmen at stateside bases, including at the Air Force’s Basic Combat Convoy Course at Camp Bullis, on weapons use, tactics, maneuvers, and small-unit and leadership skills to prepare them for convoy escort duties. Security Forces also served as escorts themselves. The duty was dangerous since the convoys were ripe targets for terrorist attacks and IEDs and it took a deadly toll.



A1C Elizabeth N. Jacobson (Air Force photo)

On September 28, 2005, A1C Elizabeth N. Jacobson, a cheerful, dedicated 21-year-old Florida native from Goodfellow AFB, Texas’ 17th SFS, was serving on the weapons crew of an Army gun truck enroute to Camp Bucca, near Umm Qasr in southern Iraq, when an IED tore through the truck, killing Jacobson and the driver and critically wounding the soldier in the gun turret.³⁹ Jacobson was the first Security Forces member killed in combat since the May 1975 *Mayaguez* operation, the first SF member killed in the war on terror, and the first SF female killed in combat operations. With General Holmes’ support, SF Senior Enlisted Advisor CMSgt Bruce Broder put together a proposal to create an Air Force level award in memory of A1C Jacobson and on May 12, 2006, the Air Force approved the creation of the Elizabeth N. Jacobson Award for Expeditionary Excellence to recognize first-term Security Forces Airmen for outstanding expeditionary achievement.⁴⁰

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SSgt Brian S. McElroy (Air Force photo)

On January 22, 2006, two Security Forces Airmen from Elmendorf AFB, Alaska's, 3rd SFS were killed by an IED while performing convoy escort duties near Taji, Iraq, while assigned to the 70th Medium Truck Detachment, 586th Expeditionary Logistics Readiness Squadron. TSgt Jason L. Norton, a 31-year-old from Miami, Oklahoma, was married with two small children. Twenty-eight-year-old SSgt Brian S. McElroy left behind a wife and four-year-old daughter. Their remains fit into one coffin and they were buried together at Arlington National Cemetery under the same headstone.⁴¹



TSgt Jason L. Norton (Air Force photo)

By early 2005, more than 2,500 Air Force personnel were involved in convoy escort operations and many of those, especially early on, had been thrown into a high threat environment without proper combat training.⁴² While convoy escort training was enhanced, "in-lieu of" taskings normally performed by Army infantrymen and Marine riflemen and the general situation on the ground in both Iraq and Afghanistan required sweeping changes in Air Force basic training if Airmen were to survive in ground combat.

With this in mind, starting in November 2005 basic military training (BMT) at Lackland began to increase the focus on combat skills by discarding such time wasting exercises as folding underwear into 6-inch squares. The training time saved was instead spent on skills that would save lives such as combat training, the development of air base ground defense skills, and combat first aid. This was a big culture shift for a training program that in the past didn't allow a trainee to touch an M-16 until the last week of training. As Brig Gen Mary Kay Hertog, commander of the 37th Training Wing, remarked, "We aren't trying to make people into Army infantry... We are trying to give them the basic combat skills they need to survive."⁴³ Physical fitness standards were increased and it was announced that by October 2007 two and a half additional weeks

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would be added to the six-week basic training course whose duration had been unchanged since 1966 and a deployment exercise called “the Beast”—Basic Expeditionary Airman Skills Training—would replace the existing “Warrior Week.” The goal of this revamped training curriculum was to produce Airmen with the necessary skills to deploy and survive with the aerospace expeditionary forces.



Security Forces Airmen deploy from their Humvees during Phoenix Warrior training (Air Force photo)

The Security Forces also increased training in combat skills through Phoenix Warrior. Hosted by the Air Mobility Warfare Center’s 421st Combat Training Squadron at Ft. Dix, New Jersey, beginning in August 2006, the 13-day course provided training in weapons, convoy operations, military operations in urban terrain, mounted and dismounted patrolling, manning static posts including vehicle search and entry control point operations, culminating in participation in the Air Force Eagle Flag exercise as part of a field training exercise.⁴⁴

In conjunction with the Army, a Combined Arms Collective Training Facility (CACTF) was opened at Camp Bullis to provide urban warfare training to Security Forces personnel. The CACTF spread over 25 acres and included 16 separate structures including multi-story buildings, subterranean tunnels, and landing zones. For the Soldiers and Airman who trained there the facility presented “everything found and faced by our forces, full body targets, voices, smells, and other sights and sounds of an urban ops environment.”⁴⁵

Ensuring the Security Forces received the proper training was seen as more than just a professional responsibility by their leadership; it was debt owed to the troops. “[T]he troops are astounding,” said Brig. Gen Holmes in an interview. “They will do whatever you ask them to do. They do more. So we owe it to them as leaders to give

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them the training, give them the equipment to insure that they are combat ready. In my mind, that's a moral responsibility.”⁴⁶

The EAF concept that served as the vehicle for deploying these intensively trained forces was severely tested after 9/11 during the Global War on Terror with simultaneous deployments for operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom and Noble Eagle. During the height of these operations in 2003 more than 107,000 Airmen were deployed, nearly twice as many as during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. To meet the rising demands of air and space power worldwide, the AEF cycle was expanded from a 90-day, 15-month cycle to a 120-day, 20-month cycle beginning on September 1, 2004.⁴⁷

The Global War on Terror also revealed the need for change in the Security Forces. While Security Forces had always deployed for contingencies, the GWOT saw deployments increase to a level not before experienced. As General Shames observed, “We were down to seven or eight hundred people deployed at a time before 9/11. And then as things ramped up for Afghanistan and Iraq, we went up to around 5,000 ...”⁴⁸ When Shames retired from the Air Force in June 2004 there were 23,651 enlisted and 936 officers on duty in the Security Forces; a slight increase since 2001, but not enough to cover deployments and home station taskings particularly since, as Shames noted, the “security forces were...one of the most highly used groups of people in the Air Force”.⁴⁹



Brig Gen Robert H. Holmes (Air Force photo)

Something had to give and that was the challenge facing Shames' successor as Director of Security Forces and Force Protection, Brig Gen Robert H. “Bob” Holmes. Holmes, who received his commission from OTS in 1978, assumed the leadership of the Security Forces under a handicap—he was a combat controller, not a Security Forces career officer.

General Holmes came to his new job from the 37th Training Wing at Lackland and during Enduring Freedom had served as the deputy commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force-South (Task Force K-Bar), responsible for directing and conducting joint combat operations in southern Afghanistan. Holmes frankly admitted that when he took over from Shames his “learning curve [was] straight up,” but acknowledged that he probably made “a bigger deal of having been the new guy on the block more so than the great security force folks” that he worked with and he deeply appreciated “the willingness, the acceptance” that he had been shown.⁵⁰

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While he might not be a “cop,” Holmes was an excellent leader who was open to making the changes required in the Security Forces to both ease the stress on the force and to reorganize it to “become the enterprise leader in defending, securing, and if necessary fighting an air base.”⁵¹ As he asked questions, he discovered that the Security Forces were still organized to provide installation security for “Cold War, fixed base installations,” not for the new battlefields of the GWOT.⁵² One advantage he had over a career Security Forces officer was that not much of what the Security Forces did was sacred to him. The pace of SF deployments necessitated shedding some duties that were not key and essential to a wartime force and Holmes was not shy about separating the wheat from the chaff. One of the first things to go was gate guard duty.



A contract gate guard checks identification at Randolph AFB, Texas (Air Force photo)

Shames had begun the initiative to contract out gate guard duties and on April 7, 2004, the Air Force awarded a \$23 million contract to Worldwide Security Services, Ltd. to supply armed civilian guards for 11 military installations.⁵³ This contract was made possible by a change in the law that temporarily repealed the prohibition against the Department of Defense contracting out security guard and firefighting functions within the United States. At the request of DoD Congress allowed these services to be carried out by contractors if service members would otherwise have to perform the tasks as long as the contractor personnel received training comparable to that received by DoD personnel, they were adequately supervised, and their use did not reduce the security of an installation.⁵⁴

Gate guard was not the only function examined for contracting out or curtailing. Certain elements of the law enforcement function were, in Holmes’s opinion, areas that “really should be considered for divestiture...or at least doing...with a different force mix. And...a very good bit of that could be civilianized.”⁵⁵ While he did not believe that the Air Force should just “contract it out and forget about it,” because he believed that “police services, law enforcement, is a very important element of integrated base defense,” he did support examining what part of law enforcement had to be deployable and what part remained at the home station.⁵⁶

Where law enforcement was not needed as part of the fight, Holmes sought “creative solutions” to transfer some of the burden of law enforcement from the uniformed Security Forces. He believed that at most installations it was not inconceivable that “the security force commander could have a civilian chief of police services... And the force mix for the police services activity could be a mix of active duty, civilian, and

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for those periods of time that you need to increase your force protection levels, then you contract the backend of that as you needed to.”⁵⁷

However, as General Holmes recognized, law enforcement did play a valuable role in the theater of operations and sometimes providing it was a joint service affair. Tallil AB, for example, created a provost marshal program in 2004 to combat the “anything goes—this is a combat zone” mentality that had taken hold on the base.⁵⁸ Under a Memorandum of Agreement signed by the senior commanders of the coalition forces based at Tallil, the 407th ESFS commander was appointed provost marshal and had Air Force, Army, Marine, and coalition forces as part of his organization. The provost marshal became responsible for traffic enforcement, violations of General Orders, and violations of the UCMJ and had two full-time criminal investigators assigned to him. The creation of a provost marshal to exercise law enforcement responsibilities was a recognition that, according to the base’s first provost marshal, Lt Col Charles Douglass, “Enforcement of law and order is essential to any community, even in a combat zone.”⁵⁹

Air Force Security Forces even helped provide law enforcement and customs support for Army bases, such as with the deployment of the 48-person Detachment 1, 732nd Mission Support Group, from Balad AB to the Army base at Mosul, Iraq. Some of the Airmen found the duty unusual since, as one SF sergeant noted, “Usually we deploy and take up a base defense role, but not here. The Army has the [perimeter] covered...while we have inside the wire working with Army force protection and the law



A1C Brandon Sutton (left) and SSgt Jeremy West, 332nd ESFS, Detachment 1, Provost Marshal’s Office, on duty at Balad AB, Iraq (Air Force photo)

run into things most security forces members don’t experience at an Air Force base for

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years,” explained one sergeant. “We...have handled cases involving alcohol use, weapons, sexual assault, pornography, larceny and trafficking drugs.”⁶¹

Installation and law enforcement training was enhanced in June 2006 by the opening at Medina Base of the \$13 million Mock Air Base. The “base” contained a mock alert aircraft parking area, weapons storage area, housing area, childcare center, bank, and other simulated base infrastructure in order to present “a complete layout for training and exercise scenarios...SF apprentice course trainees will face on duty.”⁶²

Another of the “in-lieu of” taskings thrust upon the Security Forces to assist their Army counterparts was the guarding of enemy detainees. The Pentagon directed in early 2004 that Air Force Security Forces augment Army MPs in guarding prisoners, but it was not until January 2005 that 400 Airmen drawn from 17 different bases to form the 732nd ESFS joined the 18th Military Police Brigade at Camp Bucca Theater Internment Facility (TIF) for a six-month tour of duty after having completed a 32-day orientation course. While the Security Forces had experience in guarding American military prisoners, the arrival of the 732nd at Bucca marked the first time that Air Force personnel were used as guards for enemy prisoners. At Bucca, the Airmen became part of a force of 1,200 MPs and Security Forces that guarded some 5,000 confirmed or suspected terrorists and insurgents. The 732nd ESFS also provided base defense and force protection and added a 360-degree layered defense and \$2 million in security upgrades to the defenses of the camp and the TIF.⁶³

Because of the notorious mistreatment of prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison by ill-disciplined Army reservists, guarding detainees became a high visibility job with human rights groups, the increasingly vocal anti-war movement, and the media all ready to jump on, and accept as gospel, any reports of prisoner abuse. Certain prisoner provocations, however, provoked justifiably harsh responses. January 31, 2005, was a case in point.

That day guards searching Compound 5, one of the prison’s eight compounds, were accused by a Muslim cleric of damaging several Korans. As the rumors spread, a throng of prisoners were soon pressing against the fence of Compound 5 chanting and shouting. TSgt Keith Gray rushed his 15-member emergency response force to the scene to restore order. Worried that the sheer mass of the prisoners would topple the fence, Gray had his men spray pepper gas to force the prisoners back from the fence. While this eye watering onslaught caused the first row or two of the rioters to retreat, the Airmen were soon under attack by the prisoners who used makeshift slingshots to fire rocks, chunks of concrete, water bottles filled with sand, and flaming bags filled with hand sanitizer at the guards.⁶⁴

Soon prisoners in four other compounds joined the melee and SrA Tony Miles in a tower at Compound 1 was pinned down by the hail of debris. Miles described the scene as “chaotic” with “stuff...coming from everywhere.”⁶⁵ From his perch in another tower, A1C Eric Cogswell repeatedly shouted to the rioters, commanding them in Arabic to stop. “But they weren’t listening,” he later reported. “I fired eight shotgun rounds of

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nonlethal rubber bullets and small rubber pellets. But a lot of the prisoners were using sleeping bags as shields.”⁶⁶ Some guards noticed that the prisoners seemed to know the range of the nonlethal projectiles and gas spray and withdrew from range as these were used by the guards, only to rush forward once the firing had ceased.

The riot lasted almost one hour until two Army sergeants, concluding in accordance with the rules of engagement that there was a potential for loss of life or grievous bodily injury, fired their M-16s into the crowd of prisoners killing four and wounding six others. Prison staff suspected that the riot was planned and could have been meant to protest the Iraqi elections held the day before or to test the response of the guards.⁶⁷ In the aftermath of the riot, guards received additional training in the rules of engagement, new nonlethal weapons with greater range were issued, and a 1,000-gallon fire truck was obtained to use as a water cannon against rioters.⁶⁸

Security Forces, including those in the Air National Guard, also provided guards for detainees held by American forces in Afghanistan. In January 2006, the first Air Force Security Forces were deployed to that country for detainee operations and the deployment included seventeen members of the 190th SFS of the Kansas Air National Guard. The “Kansas Coyotes” worked with their Army, Navy and Marine counterparts to guard and care for hundreds of enemy detainees. In addition to performing detainee operations, Airmen of the Coyotes participated in Mobile Training Teams (MTT) that traveled to forward operating bases to train soldiers in the field on the proper handling and care of detainees. Other members of the 190th served in a first-of-its-kind Assessment Branch that assisted the Government of Afghanistan in preparing for prosecution of criminals within their legal system.⁶⁹

Detainee operations became more sophisticated and by 2006 Airmen tasked for detainee guard duty had to complete an eight-week course at “Camp Caisson,” the Detainee Training Operations Course at Fort Lewis, Washington, to learn the ropes. At the course, Airmen were taught self-defense, convoy security, base defense, proper riot baton use, and the effects of pepper spray.⁷⁰



An Army instructor at Camp Caisson demonstrates the technique involved in firing from behind riot to Air Force personnel (*Airman Magazine*)

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Despite these new missions, air base ground defense was still recognized as the Security Force's primary wartime mission, but the execution of that mission in the past had been one of defense to the fence line; operations in Iraq and Afghanistan would change that. With the Army over tasked to provide external air base defense, in 2005 they formally abrogated Joint Service Agreement #8. This meant that the Air Force Security Forces now had to engage, in General Holmes' words, in "active, offensive activities in the base security zone where we put our security forces outside the base perimeter, outside the wire to go find, fix, and then engage" the enemy.⁷¹

Finding, fixing, and engaging the enemy would require new tools and new doctrine and cause some old tools and doctrine to be dusted off and relearned. One tool brought to bear as part of air base ground defense was the sniper team. Even prior to 9/11 the Air Force sent Security Force personnel to the Army Sniper School at Fort Benning, Georgia, and to the Army National Guard's counter sniper school at Fort



Ghille-suited Airmen from the 506th ESFS set up surveillance at Kirkuk AB, Iraq (Air Force photo)

Robinson, Arkansas, for training, primarily for use in hostage situations. In April 2001, 19-year-old SrA Jennifer Donaldson of the Illinois ANG's 183rd SFS became the first female SF member and the first female ever, to successfully complete the demanding course at Fort Robinson.⁷² Euphemistically known as "close precision engagement," the numbers and mission of Security Forces snipers would expand as the air base ground defense force began to shed itself of the past restraints on its operations. By 2004, USAFE alone mandated the establishment of 15 two-man sniper teams at six of its bases.⁷³

Snipers became part and parcel of air base defense during Operation Iraqi Freedom and a two-man sniper team parachuted into Bashur as part of the 786th SFS

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contingent. When not engaged in traditional security duties inside the perimeter these close engagement professionals took up their M-24 sniper rifles, donned their camouflaged Ghillie suits, and made long range patrols along the ridges outside the perimeter looking for infiltrators armed with shoulder fired surface to air missiles.⁷⁴

In addition to sniper teams patrolling outside the perimeter a new high tech method was added to detect threats as far from the base as possible. A seven-pound, Styrofoam-like remotely piloted vehicle called Desert Hawk was used at Tallil AB, Iraq,



The Security Force's long awaited eyes in the sky. SrA David Tillery (left) and TSgt Lloyd Joyner check out a Desert Hawk after a mission in Iraq. (Air Force photo)

and at other bases in Iraq and Afghanistan to detect stand-off threats, provide security for teams operating off-base, and for convoys. A part of the Air Force's Force Protection Airborne Surveillance System, Lockheed Martin's Desert Hawk and AeroVironment's RQ-11 Raven finally provided the Security Forces with the dedicated airborne reconnaissance asset long advocated for air base defense.⁷⁵

The Force Protection Battlelab was also working with the Army and the Air Force Research Laboratory to test unmanned ground vehicles (UGV). One of the main findings of an Integrated Base Defense (IBD) study conducted in 2002 was that the Security Forces had limitations in detecting, intercepting, and neutralizing a penetrative threat against an air base or installation. Finding better detection systems and buying time for the defenders to deploy and neutralize the threat became the focus for the battlelab and tests were conducted with various combinations of intercommunicative sensors and robots that could detect, challenge, and delay intruders until a Security Forces response could be mounted.⁷⁶

Continuing its quest for technology solutions to base defense, in September 2003 the Air Force announced the potential award of up to \$498 million in contracts to four companies for the design and development of an Integrated Base Defense Security

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System (IBDSS). One of these companies, Northrop Grumman, described its vision of IBDSS as being a link of “numerous technologies -- including sensor, software, surveillance, integrated command and control, wireless devices, and wide-area intrusion detection and tracking -- and other force protection elements to enable integrated protection of critical assets.”⁷⁷

One old tool dusted off for the new “outside the fence line” defense doctrine was the Safeside concept of operations. On January 1, 2005, Task Force 1041, built around a squadron of the 820th SFG, launched Operation Desert Safeside, a 60-day operation to kill or capture insurgents that had bombarded the base at Balad with mortars, some with up to a 6.5 kilometer range. Balad and the neighboring Logistics Support Area (LSA) Anaconda just outside the base had been bombarded so many times that it was nicknamed “Mortarville” by the troops. On one day alone in July 2004, 400 rounds dropped on the base. During a bombardment on September 11, 2004, a 107mm mortar shell landed five feet from Security Forces SrA Brian Kolflage, Jr., throwing him six feet, collapsing a lung, and shredding off his legs and right arm. Kolflage was given up for dead, but survived after amputation of both legs and his right arm.⁷⁸

Freed of the operational constraints of its Vietnam War forbearer, TF 1041 implemented the aggressive base defense doctrine the original 1041st SPS was originally designed for, but was unable to execute. Designed by Col Brad Spacy at SF headquarters, the execution of Desert Safeside was entrusted to Lt Col Chris Bargery, an officer with a “reputation as an innovative combat leader.”⁷⁹ Echoing the lessons learned by other commanders in a long ago jungle war, Bargery explained to an interviewer that, “The vast majority attacks against air bases are stand-offs. We can’t stay inside the fence and hope the bad guys go away. Hope isn’t effective in preventing attacks, so we go out and take action.”⁸⁰



TSgt Myron Verett and SSgt Joseph Trumbull of TF 1041 on patrol (Air Force photo)

TF 1041’s area of operation was one of the region’s most violent areas and encompassed a rectangle 10 kilometers wide and 6 kilometers deep, stretching from the



TF 1041 patrol near Baghdad, Iraq (Air Force photo)

Balad perimeter to the Tigris River. Throughout January and February, Bargery and TF 1041, under the tactical control of the Army's 2nd Brigade Combat Team, conducted over 500 combat missions, including raids, ambushes, and sniper operations with the goal of "taking back the initiative enjoyed by the enemy for more than two years."⁸¹ "This was a historic mission for Air Force security forces," Colonel Spacy noted. "It was bold, put Airmen at risk, and the stakes were high. We knew the results of Operation Desert Safeside would have far-reaching implications on the future of Air Force security forces as a credible ground combat force."⁸²

In 60 days, TF 1041 captured 17 high value targets (high ranking insurgents and terrorists), eight major weapons caches, and 98 other insurgents and terrorists and reduced enemy attacks to near zero. Although under small arms fire and assault from IEDs on numerous occasions, TF 1041 sustained no casualties. "Operation Desert Safeside was," according to Colonel Spacy, "...an overwhelming success" and "showed the world that Air Force security forces are an exceptionally capable ground combat force."⁸³ But TF 1041 was not a permanent organization and when it stood down on March 1 most of its Airmen were transferred to Kirkuk Air Base. The Army picked up the unit's mission at Balad.

Other Security Forces units in Iraq were also extending air base defense beyond the fence line. At Ali Base, the former Tallil AB, Maj Erik Rundquist, commander of the 407th ESFS "Desert Hunters," launched Operation Kaleidoscope in the spring of 2005. Rundquist, utilizing a new-found capability to communicate with local Iraqis in the form of a Lebanese-American interpreter called Sam, sent patrols outside of the base to cultivate relationships with Iraqis living near the base who would, it was hoped, alert the 407th to enemy activity and potential threats to the base. While the squadron had maps of the 340 square kilometers surrounding Ali Base, Army Camps Adder and Cedar II, and the Italian army compound and knew the terrain, it didn't know the people. Kaleidoscope was meant to remedy this shortfall. In the past off-base patrols drove by "these people

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and [looked] at them as part of the environment,” Rundquist noted. “I see them as part of the defense solution.”⁸⁴

The operation was dangerous and exhausting. Heavily armed and mounted in Humvees, but more often than not walking dusty village streets in sweaty desert camouflaged BDUs and wearing “SF” brassards since their shields were covered by body armor, the 407th Airmen gained a valuable understanding of the Iraqis and the Iraqis of them by simply speaking with the local population. Moved by the poverty surrounding the base and to improve relations with the villagers, Rundquist also started Operation Reach Out that delivered shoes and other necessities to the Iraqis.



SSgt James Partin, 407th ESFS, speaks with local children during an Operation Kaleidoscope mission (Air Force photo)

The payoff of Kaleidoscope came when locals began alerting the Security Forces of suspicious or criminal activities, drive-by shootings, and kidnappings. When information was received, the 407th relayed it to Army civil affairs or the Italian forces primarily responsible for area security. Overall, Operation Kaleidoscope resulted in “a clear tactical picture of who lives and travels through this area, and who is suspicious and dangerous” and made the base safer, Rundquist reported.⁸⁵

On September 11, 2005, the 407th ESFS proved that offensive operations outside the perimeter were essential to air base defense when one of its patrols surprised enemy forces several miles from Ali Base preparing to deliver a high explosive 9/11 anniversary present to the base. Although the terrorists escaped, the 407th Airmen interrupted them as they were affixing timers to rockets aimed at the base and seized the rockets.⁸⁶

At other bases, the old paradigm prevailed. At Balad, after the stand down of TF 1041, 332nd ESFS Airmen manned the Joint Defense Operations Center along with the Army. While the 332nd's sensors, UAV, and patrols were integral to the defense of Balad and LSA Anaconda, when enemy forces were detected outside the fence, the Army engaged the threat.⁸⁷

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Whether operating inside or outside the base perimeter the duty was the same—uncomfortable and dangerous. “There are hundreds of hazards—from snakes and other wildlife to the sun and unexploded ordnance...,” Sgt Anthony Coyle of the 506th ESFS told a reporter from the Kirkuk AB newspaper. “You can’t ever let your guard down...”⁸⁸ The stifling heat, magnified by the weight of the body armor, helmet, and weaponry he or she wore, was a constant companion of the Security Forces Airman. An Airman with the 332nd ESFS at Balad AB reported that, “When I get to my post, it’s between 110 and 120 degrees.”⁸⁹ Despite the hardships morale was high, but not because anyone enjoyed being where they were. Just what the troops thought of Iraq and Afghanistan was relayed to a visitor. “This place sucks,” he was told. “Some places suck worse...some don’t suck so bad...but it all sucks!”⁹⁰



A1C Gurtavo Corte (left) and SrA Douglas Thompson inspect their .50-caliber machine gun mounted on a Humvee (Air Force photo)

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TSgt John Mascolo and his military working dog, Ajax, await a helicopter pickup outside Forward Operating Base Normandy, Iraq. Ajax is wearing "doggles." The 35th Security Force Squadron Airman and his dog had completed a security sweep of a farmhouse looking for weapons and materials used to make improvised explosive devices. (Army photo)

Sharing the harsh conditions with the troops, as they had in past conflicts, were the faithful military working dogs. Often sporting small goggles called "doggles" to protect their eyes from the sand and sun, the dogs went on patrols with their handlers, conducted entry control point checks, and searched for weapons caches and unexploded ordnance. To protect them from the heat the dogs were housed in air conditioned kennels and were acclimated slowly to their new conditions upon their arrival in theater.



TSgt Jamie Dana and Rex (Air Force photo)

The dogs also shared the dangers of service in a war zone with the troops. One dog, a German Shepherd named Rex, became something of a celebrity after he was wounded along with his handler TSgt Jamie Dana by an IED on June 25, 2005. While recovering from her wounds, TSgt Dana asked to adopt Rex, but her request was turned down since current law required that Rex remain on duty until he reached the retirement age of 10 to 14 years old. However, the Air Force supported her request. "They were injured together and they should heal together," General

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Holmes declared.⁹¹ Several Congressmen and Senators also supported TSgt Dana's request and inserted a provision into the pending Department of Defense Appropriations Act allowing injured MWDs to be retired early for adoption by their handlers. On January 13, 2006, the Air Force made Rex's adoption official by presenting TSgt Dana a certificate signed by Air Force Secretary Michael W. Wynne. Having changed the law, TSgt Dana and Rex then went on to make history a few days later by appearing in the gallery of the House of Representatives as two of 24 invited Presidential guests at the 2006 State of the Union address.⁹²

The Security Forces' involvement in the GWOT was causing some officers to rethink the existing doctrine and organization of the career field and publish their thoughts in professional journals. In September 2004, Maj David P. Briar, commander of the 99th Security Support Squadron, Nellis AFB, Nevada, published an article in the *Air and Space Power Journal* reviewing what he considered to be the shortcomings in the Security Force's base defense doctrine and organization.

Briar noted that current Air Force doctrine clearly made the air base commander responsible for defending the base from penetrations or stand off attacks within his or her tactical area of responsibility (TAOR). Unfortunately, since the TAOR was defined as "the area which the defense force commander can control through organic heavy/light weapons fire" its extent had no relation to the threat or the security needs of the base but was determined rather by how far the heaviest weapon on base could shoot.⁹³ Outside the TAOR it was assumed that host nation forces or US ground forces would pick up the defense mission.

This definition of TAOR and the assumption of outside assistance led to two problems. First, if Air Force responsibility and capability ended where the Security Force's rounds fell, then the enemy only need pull back out of range to avoid engagement. Even though the enemy may be safe from base defensive forces, the base and its aircraft were probably still in range of enemy stand off weapons and shoulder fired SAMs. The doctrinal reliance on friendly ground forces to deal with an enemy outside of the TAOR was, in Briar's opinion, "fraught with danger. For example, denying the area from which an adversary can employ SAMs against US aircraft requires a significant and persistent commitment of manpower. If the friendly forces tasked with providing that commitment are diverted for some other purpose, then the Air Force will face great risks."⁹⁴

The second problem identified by Briar was that the existing doctrine did not coincide with the mission of the base defense force commander who had the responsibility under AFI 31-301 to defeat Level I threats, disrupt or delay Level II threats, and delay Level III threats.⁹⁵ If the defense force commander could not operate outside the TAOR, however, he would have little ability to disrupt or delay an enemy assembling to attack the base. The Air Force, however, had long subscribed to the notion that establishing patrols outside the TAOR to deny territory to the enemy from which it could launch SAMs or bombard the base with stand off weapons was the job of friendly ground forces. "In sum," Major Briar wrote, "doctrinal restriction of security forces

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inside the TAOR and reliance on friendly forces for controlling the terrain beyond the TAOR come with risks that the Air Force may not be prepared to handle.”⁹⁶

What could the Air Force bring to the fight if a combatant commander tasked the air component commander to defend his own air bases without depending on friendly ground forces? According to Briar not much since, with the exception of the three squadrons of the 820th SFG, all Air Force “provisional security-forces units are the sum of subunits, also known as shreds, organized under the AEF model out of fixed-base units in the CONUS and overseas” leaving their home bases undermanned and spreading the Security Forces so “thin over CONUS and overseas missions that they risk protecting nothing by trying to protect everything.”⁹⁷

The Security Forces were, Briar argued, neither organized nor trained to handle a conflict where “aircraft [are] deployed so far forward that our security forces will have to patrol the stand off footprint because other friendly forces simply will not be available to conduct these operations.”⁹⁸ They needed to become a truly expeditionary force to support the expeditionary Air Force, in Briar’s opinion. To do that, Briar argued, the Security Forces would need to divest itself of law enforcement, entry control, and administrative functions and contract them out. The resources and personnel dedicated to these duties should be used, he argued, to form at least four more 820th SFG-type of units. While acknowledging that this organizational change was “huge,” he argued that “radical times call for radical changes.”⁹⁹ Dumping these responsibilities would also allow Security Forces squadrons to train as they would fight as did other operational squadrons rather than “trying to squeeze training into a schedule that includes registering cars and making sure that base organizations properly secure their classified documents.”¹⁰⁰

To defend air bases on the modern non-linear battlefield which had no delineated frontline or rear area, Briar concluded, the Air Force needed to change its doctrine so that it dealt “comprehensively with threats to air bases, in the CONUS or overseas; eliminates the distinction between threats posed by terrorists and those posed by special forces during a major theater war; and focuses on countering threats based on the capabilities, tactics, or techniques that an enemy could employ to attack our bases.”¹⁰¹

The time for change was now, Major Briar declared, since “it is only a matter of time until forces opposing the United States find the gap around our air bases and begin to exploit it...Consequently, the Air Force needs an expeditionary security force with the force structure and training to meet steady-state AEF needs as well as provide combatant commanders with a unified, highly trained force capable of moving beyond the TAOR to meet the enemy: five, 10, or maybe even 15 kilometers from the air base.”¹⁰²

Once the Army pulled out of JSA #8 in 2005, after the Air Force concluded, to the Army’s agreement, that they could not meet this previous agreement, Briar’s observations took on even more weight and urgency. Regardless of whether Briar was privy to already contemplated changes or whether SF leadership read his article and took his recommendations to heart, the transformation of the Security Forces became a priority with General Holmes. In January 2006, Col Brad Spacy noted that the demise of JSA #8

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created a “tough problem; while security forces are eager to fight outside the wire, most are untested in the combat environment” and were “spread thin conducting security missions and tasks throughout the theater.”¹⁰³ To deal with this “tough problem” required what General Holmes and his staff called the “Security Forces Transformation.”

The purpose of the transformation was to allow the Security Forces to “embrace the air base defense mission” by addressing doctrine, training, equipment, and leadership and by altering the organizational structure to “ensure we have the number of troops available to take the fight to the enemy outside the wire.”¹⁰⁴ But, Spacy pointed out, even after transformation, the Security Forces couldn’t do it alone; an effective defense required that the Air Force embrace the concept of “every Airman is a warrior” and:

...enlist the whole force in defending an air base much like Sailors do for an aircraft carrier...All Airmen must be trained and equipped to man “battle stations,” and leaders must be prepared to lead them in the ground fight. Security forces might be the ones outside the wire, but the whole Air Force team will have to ensure the base remains protected...and be ready to respond when called upon.¹⁰⁵

Colonel Spacy’s thinking was not original; similar observations echoed through Air Force history from the Korean War forward. What was new this time was that the Army had finally abandoned the air base defense mission, shifting the burden to the Air Force and, because of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Air Force had finally recognized that its Airmen needed ground combat training to survive on the modern battlefield. These two needs coincided to provide an opportunity to create a true Air Force ground combat force built around the Security Forces with properly trained and equipped Airmen to back them up. The increased emphasis on basic combat skills during basic training would enhance the ability of commanders to organize a whole base defense force, but it was up to the Security Forces to take up the challenge of transforming itself into a true ground combat force able to project its power from the air base.

The transformation of the Security Forces required that it first identify its core competencies. Accordingly, two were identified: Security Operations and Air Provost. Security operations involved passive and active measures necessary to protect, defend,

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and fight from the base, while air provost encompassed police services, law enforcement,



506th ESFS Airman searches Iraqi at the Kirkuk AB, Iraq entry point (506th ESFS)

and administrative security. Holmes' goal was for the Security Forces to be "the enterprise leader for security operations for a deployed joint commander" without an increase in manpower, which in Holmes' opinion had always been seen as the panacea to Security Force's problems.¹⁰⁶ His vision was nothing less than a transformation of the force into an organization structured for expeditionary operations and merely adding manpower would not do that. Holmes was, instead, "drawing the line to say, no, we're going to be a lighter, leaner force."¹⁰⁷ Holmes also advocated increased use of sensors as a way to stay within existing manpower constraints and believed that with electronic assistance "four folks may do the work of 13."¹⁰⁸

To transform within existing manpower levels would require shedding duties that spread the force too thin. In September 2005, a proposed message for Air Force Chief of Staff Gen T. Michael Mosley to send to MAJCOM commanders was circulated for coordination by Lt Col Robert M. Eatman, chief of nuclear and physical security policy at Security Forces headquarters.

The message, entitled Interim Integrated Base Defense Implementation Guidance and Modification of Force Protection Baseline, curtailed or eliminated some traditional security and law enforcement duties "to secure home stations resources by assuming acceptable risk where necessary, while fully supporting our expeditionary, deployed, and remote Air Force missions." Among the changes were using non-SF personnel for back up for gate ID checks, using non-SF personnel to conduct random antiterrorism measures,

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and vehicle inspections and a recommendation to explore using local law enforcement for patrols when the police jurisdiction of the base allowed.¹⁰⁹

In addition, Security Forces personnel were to be relieved of the responsibility for joint drug enforcement, drug abuse resistance education (DARE) programs, manning more than one round the clock entry gate, conducting investigations into thefts of unsecured private property of a value of less than \$2,500, responding to shoplifting incidents, writing tickets for non-moving traffic violations, routinely conducting speed enforcement activities, and responding to minor traffic accidents and vehicle lockouts. Security Forces personnel were also to be exempted from base details, such as airman leadership school instructor and flag detail, and were not to be used to establish and man cordons for non-hostile incidents. Wing commanders were directed to make maximum use of technology to replace manpower, have wing orderly rooms take over issuing vehicle decals, reduce the SF staff to wartime, mission essential levels and accept the accompanying degradation of services, and ensure that sufficient numbers of non-SF personnel were trained to participate in basic security operations.¹¹⁰

The transformation of security operations, on the other hand, involved assuming new responsibilities rather than eliminating existing ones as was done on the air provost side of the house. Effectively assuming those new responsibilities required a new base defense doctrine and in January 2006, General Holmes discussed the changes in doctrine and organization taking place in the Security Forces with a writer for *Air Force* magazine. In the article, Holmes acknowledged that while the Air Force Security Forces was certainly an “outstanding force” already, he was just as certain that it “must change to be a relevant warfighting capability.”¹¹¹ In addition to taking on the role of commanding joint offensive and defensive operations at expeditionary bases, the Security Forces were also addressing the changes required by the Army’s abandonment of its air base defense role.

Under the old doctrine, base defense commanders had to call on friendly force maneuver elements to engage enemy forces beyond the TAOR, but defending the Air Force’s base might or might not be one of their priorities. The solution, according to

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At Bagram AB, Afghanistan, SrA Zane Aguilar (left) practices a defensive posture behind an armored Humvee as SSgt Alan Clontz calls in on the radio. The Airmen are assigned to the 455th Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron and work with the Army to secure the base. (Air Force photo)

Holmes, was to treat the base itself as a maneuver element which gave it a clearly recognized status in joint terminology and emphasized “the air base as a fighting position...”¹¹² As a maneuver element, the air base itself would have a specified area of operations which would encompass a security zone extending out at least six miles to deny the mortar and SAM belt to the enemy. Security Forces had to be able to defend the base from attack by dominating this security zone. If the air base needed help, it would request support from the joint force commander just as would any other maneuver element.

The goal of Security Forces reorganization, Holmes stressed was not to build Air Force infantry battalions, but rather a force organized primarily for expeditionary combat not just base security. “We wear uniforms, we carry ID cards that tell us we’re combatants,” Holmes told the reporter, “so we need to be a capability based on what our service says our fight is going to be.”¹¹³ But, as any deployed Security Forces Airman could have told him, “a deployment will really show you that you are an infantryman in the Air Force...”¹¹⁴

Within a year, General Holmes’s transformation of the Security Forces into an expeditionary combat force was well advanced and he reported on the changes and ongoing initiatives in an article in the *Air and Space Power Journal*.¹¹⁵ The doctrinal changes long advocated as necessary to an effective air base defense were finally being implemented on the joint level by a new Joint Publication 3-10 entitled *Joint Security Operations in Theater*, Holmes noted.¹¹⁶ This new joint doctrine made base commanders

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responsible for defense within a base boundary that was established by the base commander taking into consideration the terrain and the threat, including SAMs, to the base and its aircraft. The base boundary was not the same as the base perimeter and could encompass a much larger area of territory than the base itself and within this base boundary, the base commander had tactical control of all forces performing base defense missions. Because of the need to dominate this larger area, Holmes predicted that, “Normal [base defense] operations in the future will resemble offensive-style efforts such as Desert Safeside.”¹¹⁷

The new defense doctrine required a new defense force. Once again relearning a lesson from the past, an organic intelligence capability was seen as essential to an effective base defense and a new initiative, Force Protection Intelligence or FPI, a joint Air Force intelligence, SF, and AFOSI initiative, was developed to furnish “the full spectrum of intelligence capabilities to commanders who must make effective decisions in the force-protection mission area.”¹¹⁸ Echoing pleas from the past, Holmes and his co-authors urged that the Air Force take a page from the Navy and assign every Airman on a base a “battle station” just as every sailor aboard ship had one. To make this “fight the base” concept a reality, the Installation Arming and Response Program was created to assign, train, and exercise Airmen for “battle stations.”

Finally, Holmes advocated creating an offensive capability for the Security Forces to more effectively participate in hostile base seizure operations in conjunction with Army ground forces. As currently conducted, these operations had a gap between initial seizure of an air base from enemy forces and opening the base for operations. The capability to rapidly bring a newly captured base to full operational capability and also take over its defense so ground forces could move on to their next objective, was not organic to the various MAJCOM CRGs. To close this gap, Holmes advocated adding CRG capabilities to the Air Force Special Operations Command’s 720th Special Tactics Group or to the 820th SFG with the goal of creating what he called an air expeditionary combat task unit (AECTU). These AECTUs would “arrive with the seizure force during the assault phase,” Holmes explained. “Special tactics and security forces, inserted into the assault element, would fight alongside joint forces to eliminate resistance and then provide security and initial base defense as the remaining AECTU forces arrive to establish air operations.”¹¹⁹ Holmes was convinced that the post-Cold War non-linear battlefield would institutionalize the changes to the way the Air Force and the Security Forces approached base defense since, “Land-component maneuver forces will be stretched thin for the foreseeable future, so the Air Force must invest in its capabilities to securely project combat air and—now—ground power.”¹²⁰

Air base defense was now officially the primary mission of the Security Forces. That mission would not, Holmes predicted, be downplayed once the Afghanistan and Iraq operations wound down as it had been after Korea and Vietnam. The cycle of learning, forgetting, and relearning the lessons and the mission of air base defense might finally be broken.¹²¹ For better or worse, the Air Force was now primarily responsible for defending its air bases and the doctrinal definition of those bases now included the “high ground” outside the fence line. To effectively dominate the area now encompassed by

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the base boundary, the Air Force would need to establish and maintain a sufficiently large force trained in ground combat and equipped with the necessary equipment to provide the necessary firepower and mobility.

When the 82nd CSPW was disbanded in 1969, Lt Col Bill Wise said, “We can only hope that there will be a day when the Air Force will recognize the real importance of sustaining a capability for local ground defense units for use...in the hostile areas of the world.”¹²² It seemed that day had come.



SSgt Lealofi N. Lealofi (left), 30th SFS, interacts with the local children in Baghdad, Iraq (Air Force Link)

Becoming combat soldiers did not mean that the Security Forces in the war zone abandoned their common humanity. On February 23, 2006, while deployed to the 732nd ESFS, Detachment 3 in Baghdad, SSgt Lealofi N. Lealofi assisted by his partner and an Iraqi teenager, was responsible for saving 50 Iraqis from a fire in the *Al Qadesiyah* Apartment Complex, also known as the "215 Apartments." Originally from American Samoa, Sgt Lealofi, whose name quite appropriately translated from Samoan as "Lionheart," became one of the CSAF's first "Portraits in Courage" celebrating the bravery of USAF personnel.¹²³

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In June 2006, Brig Gen Holmes was transferred to the position of deputy director of operations for US Central Command at MacDill AFB, Florida. His successor would be the commander of the 37th Training Wing, Brig Gen Mary Kay Hertog, daughter of an Air Force security policeman, the first female general officer selected from the Security Forces, and the same Lt Reeves who survived running the gauntlet at Kirtland 28 years before. Hertog came to the director's job with a broad base of Security Forces experience, having served as commander of the 554th SPS, 377th SFS, and 86th SFS. She also served as director of Security Forces at Air Combat Command, commander of the 37th Training Group, and wing command of 37th Training Wing, Lackland AFB, TX. Maj Gen Hertog was promoted to the rank of Maj Gen in Jun 2009, becoming the 1st Career SF Airman to achieve the rank of Major General.



Maj Gen Mary Kay Hertog (Air Force photo)

With the new director came yet another shuffle of Security Forces at the Air Staff level. On February 1, 2006, the Air Staff abandoned its traditional two-letter system of designating offices in favor of the joint services “A-staff” organization. As part of this reorganization, the director of Security Forces and force protection moved from the operational side of the house to the mission support side as it realigned from XO to the DCS for Logistics, Installations, and Mission Support or A4/7. As part of the realignment and the adoption of the “A-staff” organization the director's office symbol changed from XOF to A7S.

Once again, many of the rank and file were concerned about the change, but in fact most MAJCOMs had continued to place Security Forces under mission support at both their headquarters and bases even after the director's office at Air Force headquarters slid into XO, so this change actually aligned the headquarters organization with that prevalent in the field. Nevertheless, after having finally been accepted as part of the operational forces some saw the realignment of the career field out of the operational community as a demotion and an indication that the Air Force had decided that the Security Forces were not part of the operational Air Force.

Hertog, however, had no problem with the change, particularly since the A4/7 encompassed “about 40 percent of the Air Force's population... [and] executed 26 percent of the Air Force's budget.”¹²⁴ “We are war fighters,” Hertog explained, “but we are also support, because we are the biggest enlisted career field...in the Air Force.”¹²⁵ In

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Hertog's opinion it didn't really matter where on the Air Staff wiring diagram the Security Forces appeared since "we are at the most highly respected height in our career field... We have got more credibility with Air Force senior leaders now than I think we've ever had."¹²⁶

One thing that did not change with the arrival of General Hertog was the Security Force's commitment to change. Hertog continued to push the contracting out or civilianizing of some air provost functions and curtailing others. "We don't need a big military contingent to do law enforcement or police services," she told an interviewer. "That can be civilianized."¹²⁷ Many Air Force senior leaders, however, questioned the move toward civilianization of functions typically performed by blue-suiters. Hertog had an answer for them: "[I]f [you] want us to remain the same, then [you] need to give me several thousand more cops to do the job that we have to do."¹²⁸ Hertog knew that this would be unpalatable since under Program Budget Directive 720 the Air Force had committed to shed 40,000 personnel to pay for force modernization, so additional personnel would not be forthcoming. Not that she couldn't make a case for additional manpower, for even though the Security Forces represented 6.6 percent of the total Air Force active duty, Reserve and Guard strength, the career field had a validated requirement for 2,800 more Airmen and a need for 2,400 civilians.¹²⁹ In fact, the Security Forces were slated to lose personnel as part of PBD 720, but in recognition of their importance to the Air Force those cuts were limited to only 158 officers, mostly excess lieutenants.¹³⁰ On September 30, 2006, there were 23,993 personnel in the Security Forces, totaling 8.8 percent of the active duty Air Force's total strength.¹³¹

While Hertog wholeheartedly embraced the changes to the organization and mission of the Security Forces begun under Shames and Holmes, she drew the line at anything that smacked of elitism. Soon after assuming her new position she was briefed on the Advanced Security Forces War Fighter concept which proposed creating an elite force of Airmen who received six months advanced ground combat training.

The concept originally envisioned a new Safeside force with a different color beret and insignia, but those were dropped since Hertog "hadn't liked the elitism" signified by the beret and insignia.¹³² That air of elitism had prevented the full acceptance of the original Safeside troops by the rest of the force and Hertog was not going to split the team by any indication that some Security Forces were more important than others. Hertog also believed, as had some of her predecessors, that, "We are Airmen and the more we try to say that we are unique to the rest of the Air Force and not integrate ourselves in to the Air Force, the more I think we stand to lose."¹³³ One of her goals was to grow Air Force leaders, not just Security Forces leaders, and if the career field was seen as an "elite" force outside of the mainstream Air Force, Hertog believed that that goal would be unattainable.¹³⁴

The other problem with the advanced war fighter concept was the fact that there was no mission requirement identified for them to fulfill. When Hertog asked the advocates of the concept just what they intended to do with these highly trained officers and Airmen she was told that they were to serve as examples of great training. At that

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point Hertog killed the concept. “I don’t make an investment of somebody in six months of training,” she told the briefers, “to have them come back to a unit and sit on their butts and do absolutely nothing but be an example.”¹³⁵

Two interconnected problems commanded General Hertog’s attention almost immediately. First was the issue of retention of Security Forces personnel. The Air Force goal for retention of first term enlistees was 55 percent, but Security Forces retention stood at 30 percent. Hertog was convinced the first problem was due to the second problem—the high deployment rate of the Security Forces. Noting that “we have deployed so many of our first-termers for so long that’s all they’ve known,” Hertog wanted to reduce the numbers of deployments an Airman might experience in a year, bring the Security Force average 179-day deployment length into line with the 120 day deployment of the rest of the Air Force, and make more Airmen available for deployment.¹³⁶



Brig Gen Hertog visits with deployed Airmen at Camp Bucca, Iraq (Air Force photo)

Increasing the pool of those available for deployment could be accomplished by handing over home station duties to civilians and by allowing the 5,800 Airmen whose duties normally exempted them from deployment, such as nuclear security or Presidential support, to volunteer for deployments. Although her request to add 2,400 contract positions to the fiscal year 2008 budget was rejected as being too expensive, she did approve a test program at 20th Air Force to allow normally exempt personnel to volunteer for deployment. At Malmstrom AFB, Montana, alone there were 1,200 personnel who could now volunteer to deploy.¹³⁷ Almost 4,100 Security Forces personnel were deployed by mid-2006 with about 1,900 of them performing “in lieu of” taskings, including almost 900 at Camp Bucca guarding detainees.¹³⁸

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A1C LeeBernard "Lee" Emmanuel Chavis (Air Force Security Police Association)

While Hertog worked with the mechanics of deployment, those deployed to the war zone hoped just to return home in one piece. Most did, but many did not and some continued to pay the ultimate price. On October 14, 2006, 21-year-old A1C LeeBernard "Lee" Emmanuel Chavis of the 820th SFG, on duty with the 732nd ESFS, was sitting in the gun turret of his armored

Humvee patrolling the streets of Baghdad with the Iraqi police as part of a Police Training Team (PTT) when he was shot and killed by a sniper as he tried to keep civilians away from a suspected roadside bomb.¹³⁹ Spurred by his death, Detachment 7, 732nd ESFS and the 447th Expeditionary Logistics Readiness Squadron's vehicle maintenance shop designed and built a better Humvee gun turret. The improved turret was dubbed the "Chavis turret" in his memory.¹⁴⁰ Two days after Chavis' death, SSgt Rory Sturm and Airman Kevin Perez Glazer of the 586th ESFS were wounded when an IED struck their Humvee near Safwan, Iraq.¹⁴¹



"Chavis Turret" prototype (Air Force Times)



SSgt Jason Kimberling (Air Force photo)

Others left as heroes, though none would so proclaim themselves. On August 8, 2006, SSgt Jason Kimberling, TDY from Mountain Home, Idaho's, 366th SFS, was part of a three-person Security Forces convoy team called upon to assist Afghan national police and Afghan army personnel when they came under attack from Taliban forces at a highway checkpoint in Afghanistan's Qalat Province.¹⁴²

As Kimberling and the team responded to the call for help, from a nearby village more than 100 Taliban foreign fighters unleashed a coordinated ambush with rocket-propelled grenades, small-arms and machine-gun fire against the group. The first RPG fired in Kimberling's direction landed within five meters of his Humvee and the driver immediately headed for cover. Scrambling from the vehicle, Kimberling sought a

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good firing position, but a near miss from an RPG knocked him and another Airman to the ground. Shaking off the impact, Kimberling took cover behind a wall and peering over it, saw two Taliban emerge from a house and begin to rake his position with automatic weapons. Kimberling, now under fire from three directions, killed both Taliban, slowing the assault so that Afghan forces were able to close with the remaining Taliban and eliminate them.

Kimberling's actions were credited with preventing the convoy from becoming split up by the enemy and, even though under fire for two hours, he was calm enough to call in Dutch fighter-bombers on the Taliban, preventing them from overrunning the coalition positions. Kimberling's actions were lauded as being instrumental in eliminating an estimated 20 Taliban, saving the lives of more than two dozen Afghan soldiers and police, and resulting in zero casualties to coalition forces.¹⁴³

Almost one year later, Kimberling was presented with a Bronze Star medal with "V" for Valor and an Army Commendation Medal. The 366th Mission Support Group commander described the sergeant as "an Air Force combat hero." Kimberling, however, expressed the view shared by all true heroes and said, "'They're calling me a hero. I don't think I did anything special. I went out there to do my job.'"¹⁴⁴

By the end of 2006, some 55 Air Force personnel had been killed and another 325 wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan. For the first time in Air Force history, because of the non-traditional roles the force was engaged in, more support personnel had been killed and wounded than aircrews. Airmen were distinguishing themselves in ground combat on such a regular basis that a new decoration, the Air Force Combat Action Medal, was later authorized to recognize those Airmen who risked their lives in combat on the ground.¹⁴⁵

By Election Day 2006, America was losing patience with the war in Iraq. Although it had re-elected George Bush as President only two years earlier, rejecting the anti-war rhetoric of the Democrat Party candidate Senator John Kerry, when the polls closed this time the Democrats, having campaigning on a platform of "redeploying" from Iraq that the Republicans dismissed as being a strategy of "cut and run," took control of both houses of Congress. Although the Republican defeat had other causes, the unpopularity of the war in Iraq unquestionably played a part. The day after the election, President Bush fired Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and began to search for a new path to victory in Iraq.

Victory, however, would take time—Pentagon insiders were now referring to the GWOT as "the Long War"—but the question the people wanted an answer to was "how much time?" The President was honest, but not comforting, when he told America in December that "this war on terror is the calling of a new generation; it is the calling of our generation. Success is essential to securing a future of peace for our children and grandchildren. And securing this peace for the future is going to require a sustained commitment from the American people and our military."¹⁴⁶

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The results of the election, however, showed that America's commitment to stabilizing Iraq was wavering. Even the execution by hanging of Saddam Hussein on December 29 after his conviction in an Iraqi court on charges of murdering hundreds of Iraqis was noted not as evidence of victory, but as an example of how the Iraqi government was incapable of even carrying out an execution as hooded executioners taunted the fallen dictator and made him look like the most dignified person in the death chamber.

Comparisons with Vietnam came hot and heavy and the argument that Iraq was only one front in the overall war on terror seemed rejected. On October 18, 2006, Donald Rumsfeld had summed up the state of affairs in a speech at the Air War College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. "Their battlefield is not just Baghdad or Kabul, but American living rooms and television screens," Rumsfeld explained. "We talk about where's the center of gravity of the war. The center of gravity of this war is very much in Washington, D.C., and it's in the capitals across the world. There's no way our forces can lose, militarily. There's also no way they can win by military means alone."¹⁴⁷

But as 2006 closed it seemed the enemy was winning the battle in America's living rooms and in Washington. While a military victory in Iraq was attainable, a political defeat akin to the Tet Offensive seemed definitely possible.

¹ The events of September 11, 2001 recounted herein are taken from *The 9/11 Commission Report* (National Commission On Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: July 22, 2004).

² Interview of Brig Gen James M. Shames, USAF (Ret.) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), June 7, 2005.

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⁶ The events of September 11, 2001 are covered in detail in *The 9/11 Commission Report* (National Commission On Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: July 22, 2004).

⁷ After his capture in March 2003 by the Pakistanis and subsequent interrogation by the CIA, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed confessed that he, Bin Laden, and Mohammed Atef, al Qaeda's operations officer, had come up with the target list for Atta and his men. These included the White House, the US Capitol, the Pentagon, and the World Trade Center. Bin Laden and Atef wanted to destroy the White House and the Pentagon, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed wanted to strike the World Trade Center and perhaps succeed where his nephew had earlier failed, and all of them wanted to strike the Capitol building.

⁸ Interview of Brig Gen James M. Shames, USAF (Ret.) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), June 7, 2005.

⁹ *The First 600 Days of Combat* (Task Force Enduring Look: July 2004), 31.

¹⁰ *The First 600 Days of Combat* (Task Force Enduring Look: July 2004), 21. In its most intense phase, from September 11 through January 2002, the Air Force was flying more sorties over America for Operation NOBLE EAGLE than in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan.

¹¹ Interview of Brig Gen James M. Shames, USAF (Ret.) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), June 7, 2005.

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¹³ MSgt Bob Haskell "National Guard steps in to help with airport security," *Air Force News*, October 8, 2001.

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EPILOGUE

For almost 60 years Security Forces have served the Air Force under different names in various guises. Changing threats, new Air Force missions, and the availability of funding impacted the Air Police, Security Police, and Security Forces and drove transformations in their mission, organization, equipment, and personnel. However, these transformations did not progress linearly over time, but were more like a roller coaster with ups and downs, twists and turns.

While it was never doubted at its creation that the United States Air Force would have its own military police force, just what the primary mission of that force would be has greatly varied over time. Although the need for “soldiers” for air base security was one of the justifications Army Air Forces Air Provost Marshal Col H.G.



1101st Guard Squadron personnel, 1944 (Douglass AAF *Flight Pattern*)

Reynolds used to urge the creation of an air provost corps for the AAF, when it came time to plan for a separate and independent post-war Air Force, Reynolds did not mention base defense as an anticipated mission of his proposed “Security Corps.” Instead he recommended the creation of a provost marshal function with four branches--military police, internal security, police and prisons, and investigations.¹ None of these missions required specially trained and equipped infantry-type formations such as the Air Base Security Battalions. As the Military Police Companies (Aviation) and the Guard Squadrons of the Army Air Forces became the Air Police of the United States Air Force that new organization turned its back on the air base defense mission of the Air Base Security Battalions and embraced the role of military policeman, enforcing law and order and securing the flight line on Air Force bases worldwide.

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A1C Joe Aguilar, Nov 1956 (Security Forces Museum)

From 1947 to 2001, law enforcement was the most visible of Air Force security personnel. While the law enforcement troops provided the first line of defense as they manned entry gates and patrolled base cantonment areas, the bulk of the force on bases with a combat mission fell to the much larger group who provided the day-to-day security of the combat resources. Clearly, the Air Force, with its diverse missions, was not one-size-fits-all in its security contingent. Most Air Training command bases, for example, had small air police/security police squadrons with a virtually pure law enforcement mission. Large combat commands installations; SAC, TAC, USAFE, and PACAF, were heavily security-oriented. For a number of years in SAC, the law enforcement function was entirely separate from the security function. They may have been invisible,

but the bulk of the personnel assigned to the security police were employed in the area of close-in resource security.

Regardless of where the security troops were assigned, they and the Air Force leadership thought of them as cops. This was in the sense of the civilian street cop. During the history of the force, this analogy was not true for the majority of the force. It is part of the perceived uniqueness of the career field; the troops cling to the idea, “I am a cop.”

Although the term “Police” was purged from the name of the career field and the nickname “Peacekeepers” gave way to the more militant “Defenders of the Force,” for most of its history, law enforcement and resource protection was the face of the Air Force Security Forces. That all changed after the start of the Global War on Terror and law enforcement has since been divested of many of its missions and responsibilities and has, at least for the foreseeable future, lost its *de facto* status as the primary mission of the Security Forces.

In 1983, nuclear security was proclaimed by then Chief of Security Police Brig Gen Neal Scheidel as being the Security Police’s “number one peacetime priority.”² Of the three core competencies of the Security Forces—law enforcement, air base defense, and nuclear security—nuclear security has been the most stable over time. It was also the most dull, arduous duty and those who performed it often felt underappreciated and trapped in a second class career field. Some of this dissatisfaction was undoubtedly alleviated by the reconsolidation of the Security Forces into one AFSC. Although the initiatives begun by Gen Tom Sadler to improve the lot of the “Ramp Rats” were

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welcomed by those who guarded the bombers and missiles of America's nuclear deterrent, with the exception of increased use of sensor technology, not much has changed for these men and women still out in the dark and cold counting the rivets on alert aircraft. Despite Scheidel's declaration, nuclear security was really not a priority at all for those outside of the commands and bases housing nuclear forces. While unquestionably important, it still remained a mission not common to the entire security force.



B-52 on alert at Westover AFB, Massachusetts in 1961 (www.814thcds.com/Photos-from-the-past.htm)

The Security Forces mission with the longest ride on the roller coaster was air base ground defense. Only during the periods from about 1951 to 1956, coinciding with the period from the Korean War to the closure of the Parks AFB Air Base Defense School; from 1968 to 1972, coinciding with the Tet Offensive to the drawdown in Vietnam; and again after the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, marking the start of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), was air base ground defense considered job one for the Security Forces.

The first period of air base ground defense primacy was due to the vision of Gen Curtis LeMay, who was one of the first senior officers to appreciate the vulnerability of an air base to ground attack. His vision was put into action by his provost marshal, Col Jim Luper. Under Luper's guidance, the SAC base defense school at Camp Carson, Colorado, preceded the Air Force school at Parks Air Force Base, California, by well over a year.

Korea was the first war where the battle lines were so fluid that Air Force bases might find themselves subject to massed ground attack. One of the reasons the ABS battalions were disbanded during World War II was that they provided forces to repel attacks that never came and the manpower and equipment tied up in those formations could not be justified by the threat. Korea was a different matter. As the armies moved up and down, the peninsula air bases could quickly find themselves in the line of an enemy advance. Guerrillas also posed a threat to those air bases farther from the FEBA. However, the Air Police found themselves untrained, except for those who were "Luper's Troopers," and unequipped to mount a defense against enemy attacks. It was only after officers on the ground in Korea, such as Capt Garland "Gish" Jarvis, pointed out these shortcomings that the headquarters responded with new organizations, equipment, and

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training. It would not be the last time the Air Police entered a war unequipped and untrained.

The final push toward the acknowledgement of air base ground defense as a core mission of the Air Police was due to something that never occurred—the so-called Kimp’o “Massacre” in January 1951. As with most legends, the Kimp’o one was believable since the Air Force lacked a trained air base defense force and since the Air Police were the only Air Force ground personnel who were routinely armed and who received even the most rudimentary weapons and ground combat training.



Field training, Parks AFB, California, 1956 (Col Jerry M. Bullock)

However, the actual threat in Korea was identified by Maj Ben Marshall in late 1952 when he reported to Luper that “the great majority of [base security] was handled by police rather than security guards” and that “the nature of the guerilla activity concerned loot and theft rather than hostile attack.”³ Based on these observations and because it was considered a luxury in an era of declining budgets, by 1956 the Air Base Defense School at Parks was closed. By 1957, air base defense had been replaced by the Internal Installation Security Program that focused on protecting individual operational resources from sabotage. Air base defense doctrine, such as it was, required that if a threat to the base exceeded the capability of the small security teams established by the Installation Security Program, then “the base must be garrisoned by friendly ground forces or evacuation...must be accomplished.”⁴

The emphasis on resource protection lasted throughout the 1960’s even in the war zone of Southeast Asia. Despite facing a highly effective guerrilla force with a demonstrated ability to strike US air bases, when it came to air base ground defense the Air Force was content to rely on the United States Army and host nation forces for defense. Since guarding the flight line and other resources inside the fence line was seen to be its only air base defense mission, the Security Police clung to an interior police organization.

The first effort to incorporate into the air base defense mix an active, aggressive base defense force that could operate outside the perimeter to find, fix, and kill the enemy

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was called Operation Safeside of the 1041st CSPS. However, that unit's original mission to deny the enemy the "rocket belt" and assembly areas for attacks by conducting search and destroy operations outside of the base perimeter, died in a turf war with the Army. Ever jealous of its rear area defense mission, but unable to adequately perform it, the Army did not take kindly to the Security Police assuming the role of Air Force infantry and many Air Force leaders agreed. It fell to individual Security Police commanders such as Lt Cols Kent Miller and Billy Jack Carter to train and equip their units to perform a defensive mission, often in direct contravention of higher headquarters directives.

When the enemy waves broke against Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut in January 1968, disaster was avoided only by the leadership and dedication of the officers and men of the outgunned and outnumbered 3rd and 377th Security Police Squadrons (SPS). Although the timely arrival of Army units helped, it was the Security Police who resisted and ultimately saved the bases. However, because of the restrictions on the Security Police operating outside the fence and the lack of FWMF units outside the base perimeters, the enemy formations were able to assemble undetected near the bases and the battle itself occurred inside rather than outside the fence lines. The pitched battles at Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut were wake up calls and after Tet the Security Police in Southeast Asia began to receive more heavy weapons, armored vehicles, and combat training.



Base defense doctrine changed after Tet. Anticipating more massed attacks and unaware of the utter decimation of the VC and NVA formations in South Vietnam, the Security Police implemented a doctrine of massing along the perimeter. This doctrine was exactly wrong for the infiltration attacks the enemy turned to since once the perimeter line was breached, nothing stood between the enemy and the airfield and its aircraft. Once a defense in depth was implemented as the new defense doctrine, the enemy increasingly relied on stand off attacks with long range rockets rather than penetrating the base. Tied to their bases, the Security Police had a limited ability to prevent and respond to these attacks. It was not until shortly before the last American

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ground forces left Vietnam that the Air Force finally settled on a base defense doctrine that integrated heavy weapons, better intelligence, technology, and airborne surveillance of the “rocket belt.”

In short order after the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam the focus of the Security Police quickly returned to resource protection and the rising threat of terrorism. The staff study of 1971 that identified the protection of priority resources as a primary consideration also identified a new “violence prone, militant element” that constituted a threat to the entire installation and its personnel.⁵ To meet this new threat without decreasing the protection of priority resources, the working group concluded that “it has been made painfully clear that we must increase our efforts beyond the priority security areas.”⁶ The mechanism to accomplish this was the building up of the law enforcement side of the house, and once again, the Security Police were organized as a guard force and not a combat force. Even though lip service was paid to the idea that air base defense was an important mission, law enforcement, not combat ready forces, would add the protection needed to secure, but not necessarily defend, Air Force installations.



As the perceived threat changed from enemy attacks to civil disturbances, riot control formations, such as this demonstrated by the 100th SFS at RAF Mildenhall, United Kingdom, replaced tactical formations (Air Force photo)

But in August 1974, AFR 206-2, *Local Ground Defense of US Air Force Installations*, reaffirmed the importance of, and for the first time recognized the role of, the Security Police in the “external area” outside the base perimeter. In what seemed to be a renewed emphasis of air base ground defense, all security policemen received air base ground defense training at Lackland or as part of their home unit training. By the mid-80’s, the Security Forces were, with the exception of the Korean bases and the SPECS program, essentially out of the air base ground defense business. The signing of the Joint Service Agreement for the Ground Defense of Air Force Bases and Installations (JSA Initiatives #8 and #9), was heralded at the time as “probably one of the most important milestones in ABGD history...”. It divided responsibility for air base defense between internal, an Air Force responsibility, and external, an Army task and made the Army responsible for ABGD training.⁷

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The Army never really seemed committed to air base defense and JSA initiative #9 was terminated by the closure of the Ft. Dix training area in 1995. JSA #8, despite the problems identified during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, limped along until 2005, when it ran into the reality of Iraq. Faced with battling *al Qaeda* terrorists, diehard Baathists, and Sunni and Shia militias, the Army had its hands full and not only did it shed the air base defense mission, it was also forced to ask the Air Force for assistance in performing traditional Army duties such as convoy escort and guarding captured enemy combatants. These “in-lieu” taskings fell initially to the Security Forces, but as more and more Airmen from other career fields were assigned to these missions the entire training program of the Air Force changed to provide much greater emphasis on combat skills training than ever before. For the first time the Air Force took on the look of an armed force from top to bottom. Necessity required that the Air Force change its image of being a force of “uniformed civilians” to that of “fighting air-ground men.”⁸

The Army’s abandonment of the air base ground defense mission opened new opportunities and imposed new burdens on the Security Forces. While it was freed from past restrictions on its operations outside the base perimeter by both the Army’s abandonment of the base defense mission and by new joint service doctrine that recognized the need for air base defense operations within a much expanded base boundary, the Security Forces now needed new organizations and new doctrine to fulfill its expanded mission.

Organizations focused on air base ground defense such as the 820th SFG and 786th SFS demonstrated their ability to establish air base security and defense on bare bases quickly, but they were meant to turn over that mission to follow-on security forces within 90 days. Unlike the 820th and 786th, these follow-on forces were provisional expeditionary units made up of Security Forces personnel drawn from various active duty, Reserve, and Air National Guard personnel and were neither specially trained nor



A1C Steven Nicholas and SrA Jeremy Brown, Security Forces Airmen deployed from Eielson AB, Alaska, check the perimeter of the flightline at Karshi-Khanabad AB, Uzbekistan (Air Force photo)

specifically organized for the air base ground defense mission. That these provisional

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units were nevertheless capable of dominating the “high ground” around air bases was demonstrated by Operation Desert Safeside. Other Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron (ESFS) also moved outside the “fence” to patrol, gather intelligence, and deny the enemy freedom to operate against the bases. Innovative Security Forces officers devised operations to defend their bases that sent SF patrols outside the fence and into Iraqi villages to cultivate good relations with the local populace and obtain intelligence on enemy operations. Honed sharp on the whetstone of war, this new brand of leaders was unafraid to take the battle to the enemy in defense of the air base.

The high demand for Security Forces as part of the GWOT stretched the force thin and began to have an impact on retention. Something had to give and beginning in 2005 that something was law enforcement. The elimination or curtailing of some traditional law enforcement activities and the contracting out of others demonstrated that, as in wars of the past, the Security Forces was once again transforming itself from a



SSgt Erica Clark of the 407th Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron and SMSgt Robert Appling of the 407th Expeditionary Civil Engineer Squadron, Tallil AB, Iraq, talk with a young Bedouin girl as Sergeant Clark places a shoe on the child's foot (Air Force photo)

guard force into a combat force. In October 2005, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen T. Michael Moseley described the changes to, and the challenges facing, the Security Forces after 9/11:

If you joined the Air Force not long ago and became a security forces person you would have spent a lot of your time guarding missile silos, guarding bombers, alert fighters, guarding gates, or at least being at a gate. But after we stood up 50 expeditionary bases in the Arabian Gulf and after we've had attacks on the bases, after we have had rockets and mortar attacks on the bases, after we've had aircraft hit on arrival and departure with surface-to-air missiles and small arms fire, and after we've looked at what does it take to secure an airfield in an expeditionary sense, this security force business takes on a whole different light. This is not checking IDs at a gate. This is not walking around a perimeter, around an alert site. This is not much different than the intel empowerment of begin to think outside the fence -- the fence being the expeditionary airfield. Get outside the wire with the Office of Special Investigation folks, with the OSI counter-intelligence and counter-espionage folks, and get out there and begin to think about what's a

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threat to this airfield, what do we have to do to defend it so we can operate 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, in a true joint sense, and in a true combatant sense, so that there's no threats to this airfield that we haven't thought about.⁹

The personnel who were performing the duties General Moseley described were probably the best trained in the history of the Air Force. That, however, was not always the case. In the early days, the Air Police were dependent upon the Army for training and while that training was generally adequate the slots available for Air Force personnel were limited. Therefore, many Air Police officers and men were sent to the field on direct duty assignments with no police training. It was not until 1972 that the Air Force ended the practice of assigning untrained Airmen directly from basic training to Security Police units on direct duty assignments. Until that time the official belief was that anything a security policeman needed to know could be learned on the job. Placing the Security Police in Category A, training required, was a small step toward recognizing the career field as a professional field.

As the emphasis swung between air base ground defense and law enforcement, so too did training. During and after Korea, the most effective Air Police training program was found at Parks AFB's air base defense school. When it closed in 1956 and Air Police training moved to Lackland AFB, air base defense was deemphasized in favor of law enforcement. With increasing Air Force involvement in Vietnam a shift in emphasis back toward air base ground defense and combat skills training could have been expected. However, while courses such as AZR did develop to teach rudimentary combat skills, no new specialized air base ground defense school, with the exception of the 1041st's facilities at Hickam and later Ft. Campbell, was instituted. On-the-job training was instead relied upon to turn Airmen into "infantrymen" and cops into "soldiers."

With the end of the Vietnam War, training emphasis did not shift as radically away from air base defense as it had in the past. By 1975, air base ground defense training was officially required for every security policeman, but the threat to be faced had changed. Traditional air base ground defense training shifted from defense of air bases to training security policemen to respond "to terrorists and dissidents seizing buildings, weapons and hostages on largely urbanized complexes."¹⁰ By 1976, ABGD training was replaced by the combat skills/terrorist threat training (CS/TTT) program that emphasized small unit tactics, search and clear operations and other counterterrorist techniques instead of the air base defense focus of ABGD training. From 1985 until 1995, the Air Force provided no air base ground defense training at all since under the Joint Service Agreement for the Ground Defense of Air Force Bases and Installations Initiative #9 the Army undertook the responsibility for that training.

Law enforcement training did not suffer from the ups and downs of air base defense. After an initial reliance on the Army for provost marshal and military police training, the Air Force established its own training programs, first at Parks AFB and later Lackland AFB. Civilian institutions were also used for training and some law enforcement specialists continued to attend Army MP schools to round out their

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educations. Law enforcement specialists also had a professional support group in the form of cooperative relationships with civilian law enforcement agencies. Those Airmen in security did not have this benefit since few civilian agencies defend air bases or secure nuclear weapons.

The most profound changes in Security Force's training in particular and Air Force training in general was brought about by the GWOT. Asymmetrical warfare, non-linear battlefields, and "in lieu of" taskings changed Security Forces training to the closest it had ever come to producing "blue infantry." Security Forces were now trained to aggressively dominate the "high ground" around Air Force bases in Iraq and Afghanistan, to guard violent detainees, and to escort vulnerable convoys through



SrA Kimwa Edwards, 18th SFS, watches for enemy movement during an urban warfare field training exercise at Camp Schwab, Japan (Air Force photo)

dangerous territories. New training facilities at Camp Bullis provided realistic training in both installation security and urban warfare. At the same time, Air Force personnel who in the past might be lucky to even see a weapon after basic training were now trained to use them, to fire and maneuver, and to generally survive in a combat zone.

As the focus of Air Force security swung back and forth between law enforcement and air base defense, so too did where the career field fell in the Air Force's organizational wiring diagram. The question revolved around whether the security forces were part of the operational, war fighting side of the Air Force, or part of the mission support side of the force. In 1947, the Air Police started as a directorate under the Air Force Inspector General and remained part of this staff agency until the 1970's when the director of Security Police became a member of the special staff. The next organizational change in 1978 placed them back under the IG until Chief of Staff General Merrill McPeak placed the "Top Cop" once again on the special staff. In October 1998, the newly titled Director of Security Forces moved, at the urging of then director Gen Dick Coleman, firmly to the operational side as XOF, since, according to Coleman, "that's who runs the Air Force."¹¹ Less than eight years later the Security Forces went back to the mission support side of the headquarters as part of the Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS) for logistics, installations, and mission support (A4/7).

Each of these changes brought about an identity crisis and launched impassioned arguments against moving to the support side of the Air Force. Gen Mary Kay Hertog, however, recognized that he who controls the money and manpower in times of tight budgets and manning reductions actually "controls the Air Force" and argued that SF was better off in A4/7 since it included "about 40 percent of the Air Force's population... [and] excutes 26 percent of the Air Force's budget" were under A4/7.¹² Hertog also observed that Security Forces were both operational and support and where she sat around the table at staff meetings did not alter that fact. Gen Hertog also noted that with

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the move to mission support in 2006, the Air Staff was finally organized like the field. This was, of course, true. Early on the air provost marshal reported to the operational commander while the Air Police squadron commander answered to the mission support commander. With the exception of SAC, AFSPC, and USAFE's GLCM units where the missile defense forces were placed under operational control while law enforcement remained a mission support function, the Air Force's security forces have long been aligned under mission support. Today the Security Forces seem secure in their role as both a combat force and as mission support assets. Indeed, the GWOT has blurred the distinctions between war fighter and support across the entire Air Force.

The equipment furnished to the Security Forces over its history has also been dictated by the perceived mission at the time. Upon its transition from Military Police to Air Police, the primary mission was manning base entry points, patrolling the flight line, and providing interior police services. Accordingly, the arms and equipment furnished were suitable for a police force. Pistols, rifles, and hand-me-down sedans and pick-ups made up the equipment list of the typical Air Police squadron. Tactical vehicles and heavy weapons were not issued nor were they deemed necessary for police work.

Less than three years after its independence, the Air Force found itself with bases in Korea and as the fighting moved up and down the peninsula these bases became vulnerable. But the Air Force found itself without a force adequately equipped, organized, or trained to defend its bases. It seems incredulous in hindsight that Capt Garland "Gish" Jarvis would have to write to the air provost marshal from the war zone to plead for adequate weaponry and equipment to enable the Air Police to defend the air bases. The Air Police leadership responded by authorizing the Air Police Squadron (Special), an organization specially created for base defense, and by scrambling to procure armored vehicles, machine guns, and tactical radios.

Pitched battles over air bases did not occur in Korea, but theft and infiltration did, and so by the mid-1950's the Air Police reverted to its pre-war role of police. Armored vehicles and heavy weapons began to disappear from motor pools and armories to be replaced once again by worn out former flight line vehicles and base taxis and side arms. The Air Police force that went into the next war in Vietnam was therefore initially as inadequately manned and equipped as their Korean War counterparts had been.

After the end of the Vietnam War even though the image of the Security Police as "the guy in the white hat giving a ticket was replaced by a troop in 'cammies' standing in a tower," it seemed for a time that once again the Security Police would revert to a police force without heavy weapons and tactical vehicles.¹³ While air base ground defense officially remained a priority mission, terrorism was seen as the emerging threat and meeting that threat was deemed to be primarily a law enforcement function. A 1971 study had concluded that there had been "a neglect of the functions loosely grouped under the term law enforcement," so law enforcement capability was consequently increased with the arrival of the first purpose built patrol cars in the mid-1970's and later the "Peacekeeper" light armored vehicle.¹⁴

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Unlike the aftermath of the Korean War, increasing the role of law enforcement did not result in a wholesale abandonment of the combat role of the Security Police. The need to equip SPECS units, the advent of the GLCM field security mission, and the creation of the Air Expeditionary Forces in the 1990's all required that combat arms and equipment be retained in the inventory. Since the start of the GWOT the Security Forces have become a force primarily equipped for ground combat.



506th ESFS machine gun position at Kirkuk AB, Iraq (506th ESFS)

All of this equipment from heavy weapons to armored Humvees was for outfitting the active defense forces, but the security and defense of Air Force resources and personnel has always had a passive defense component. The earliest passive defensive measures were no more sophisticated than fences and locks. Starting in Vietnam these passive defense measures became more and more sophisticated with the

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A1C Scott Minchak, 506th ESFS, performs a system check before SrA Sean Grabowski launches an RQ-11B "Raven" on its first flight over Kirkuk AB, Iraq (Air Force photo)

advent of ground radars, electronic intrusion detection devices and, more recently, reconnaissance drones to monitor the areas around the base perimeter. From SPEMA to the Force Protection Battlelab, the Security Forces has actively pursued passive defense technology with various programs to develop, test, and procure such systems and today technology plays an integral role in base defense and resource protection.

The use of technology today is a far cry from the early days in Vietnam where gadgets arrived in theater without instructions for their use or a doctrine for their effective deployment. The Security Force's reliance on technology is likely to increase and in the not too distant future may well be used in an active defense role. For example, robots able to respond to intrusions with deadly force are being developed and tested. The increasing use of technology, however, is a double-edged sword and whether it is seen as a replacement for manpower justifying force cuts or as merely a force multiplier depends primarily upon the priorities of the Air Force at the time. In the opinion of Gen Hertog, "we do not have the technology that's mature enough and fielded that reduces our manpower... I can't find the technology that allows you to give up that manpower... it's coming; it's a couple of years out. But it's not here yet."¹⁵

Whatever the equipment, behind it have always stood the men, and later women, of the Security Forces. The initial cadre of the Air Police was furnished by transfers from the AAF Military Police force so the new organization at least began with a core of trained personnel. As this infusion of experience aged and retired the Air Police became increasingly dependent upon new recruits, who more often than not came to the career field with no training and no experience. As one of the largest enlisted career fields in the Air Force the security forces were constantly requiring additional manpower due to increasing requirements. Often quantity outweighed quality, and the Air Police and its

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successor organizations did not necessarily get the cream of the crop. Since law enforcement and security were classified as “soft” or non-technical career fields, they were seen as a place where those with the lower scores in the Armed Forces Qualifying Test could safely be dumped. This attitude reached its height with Project 100,000 when many of these marginally qualified recruits were placed in the security forces. For many years the old Air Force adage that if someone couldn’t do anything else you could make him a cop had at least a grain of truth in it.

The officer corps, at least until the Security Police was able to place a career manager at the personnel center, was not much better than the enlisted personnel. It was not unusual for an air provost marshal to have any security or law enforcement experience. Often they were rated officers either banked with the security forces or on a rated supplement assignment to broaden their careers. Practically all were sent to their first security or law enforcement assignments with no training. As late as Vietnam, officers were sent to the war zone to occupy important Security Police billets without any experience in either security or law enforcement.

The presence of inexperienced officers and senior NCOs in the career field, while often necessary to address manpower shortages and increase promotion opportunities, generally had an adverse impact on morale. The career officer corps found it disheartening that no one from their ranks rose to the top of the career field until 1973 when Col Billy Jack Carter, a career security policeman, was placed in the “Top Cop” position. That was a short-lived victory since his successor was not a career cop. It would be 6 years before another career cop occupied the job, but for the following 23 years the “Top Cop” would be a career policeman.

Women were not initially welcomed into the career field; Renee Rubin had to almost force her way in and Sally Kucera, (Col (Ret) Uebelacker), was practically sneaked in. It took over 40 years from the day Renee Rubin became the first female awarded the Air Police AFSC for a woman to rise to the top of the career field, but her rise and those of other females could have been harder. When women enter any male-



Staff Sgt Gloria Banks, part of the 455th ESFS FAST, watches for suspicious activity while guarding a C-130 at an airstrip near Farah, Afghanistan. (Air Force

dominated field there is bound to be opposition and dissent and the Security Police was no exception, but generally they were treated as professionals by officers and NCOs who expected them to perform as well as their male counterparts and mentored them on the job as they should any young Airman. That these leaders did this did a great deal to stifle what grumbling there was in the ranks.

Black Airmen served in the security forces from early on and their numbers only increased as time went on. In the initial conversion of MP (Aviation) and Guard

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Companies that began in 1947, black MPs found themselves transformed into APs. Since it was a “non-technical” field, over time black Airmen became somewhat overrepresented in the security forces ranks as they were placed there, since it was felt they “couldn’t do anything else.” Even though race relations in the security forces were subject to the same stresses as society at large particularly during the Vietnam era, the one Air Force racial incident that was primarily a Security Police incident, that at Minot in 1975, was seemingly driven more by the rift between security and law enforcement personnel than by a conflict between black and white. By 1977 an African-American was serving as chief of Security Police.

As in any military organization some of the enlisted men and women and their officers failed, but most persevered and succeeded despite the uncomfortable, dangerous duties it fell to them to perform. By doing so they were able to provide the strength, innovation, and flexibility to take on new missions addressing new threats. Today no one in the Air Force leadership or rank and file seriously questions the professionalism or quality of the Security Forces. As Gen Hertog has noted, “Our Airmen are doing jobs they have not done before...And they’re doing an outstanding job... You know that great book Tom Brokaw wrote a couple of years ago about the greatest generation...? We have another greatest generation out there. And that’s those Airmen out there today.”¹⁶



As more Air Force personnel are killed in ground combat, an Army tradition honoring fallen Soldiers becomes an Air Force tradition to honor fallen Airmen. This memorial is for TSgt Jason L. Norton and SSgt Brian S. McElroy (Air Force photo)

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The Security Forces of the United States Air Force are unquestionably better trained, equipped, manned, and organized than at any other time in its history. The question for the future is how will that force change to meet new threats? Will its equipment and organization again be at the mercy of “lessons” learned from the “last war” so that it finds itself unable to meet new threats to the Air Force’s security? Some trends with long term consequences indicate that the changes driven by the GWOT have altered the Security Forces in a lasting manner.

First, both the President and the Pentagon have warned that the GWOT is the work of a generation and while the term “Long War” has fallen into disfavor, the struggle against Islamofacism will in fact be a long war—if the American public and their leaders have the strength to see it to its conclusion.

Second, this war and perhaps others against new enemies will have no front lines and no rear areas. The targets of the enemy are everywhere, military and civilian both at home and abroad, and while he only has to get lucky somewhere once, America’s defenders have to be lucky everywhere constantly. As Frederick the Great observed, “he who seeks to defend everything ultimately defends nothing,” yet the struggle against terrorism requires that practically everything be defended. The challenge is to avoid defending nothing by defending too much and this requires multiple layers of defense, both military and civilian, combined with taking the fight to the enemy to destroy his safe havens and eliminate his capability to launch attacks.

Finally, a global war against an often unseen enemy requires economy of force. The primary reason Frederick counseled against defending everything was the dispersal of forces necessary to accomplish that mission. Without conscription, the size of any armed force is determined partly by the number of volunteers who respond to the call to service. Since the forces available are finite and the resources to be defended potentially infinite, choices have to be made concerning which of several competing organizational missions are the most important. These three features of the GWOT have had impacts on the Security Forces and the Air Force.

The long-term nature of the GWOT has led to changes in the Security Forces, and the Air Force, which are not easily reversed. The inability of the Army to carry out its external air base defense functions and some of its other traditional missions has forced the Air Force and the Security Forces to train and equip personnel for a ground combat role. The changes to basic training and Security Forces training to emphasize combat skills and small unit tactics are likely permanent changes. These changes are to assist the Air Force to perform its mission and support the force structure it has chosen for itself. “We face threats that are going to require national solutions, not just military solutions,” General Bob Holmes observed. “So for our Air Force to be relevant it has stated its path for transformation to become lighter, leaner, deployable, with overwhelming superiority in the air, in space and information. So...if you want your security force to be relevant, then it’s got to determine what it brings to the table in order to secure, protect, and defend that kind of air force. [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff GEN John] Shalikashvili

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probably said it best when he said, if you don't like change, you'll like being irrelevant even less."¹⁷

While the "in lieu of" taskings of convoy escort and guarding enemy prisoners may fall by the wayside in the future, what Gen Holmes called the "joint war-fighting construct" of all services pitching in together, is unlikely to change. It is "going to be a part of our future," Holmes stressed. While he dismissed any notion of creating "an Air Force infantry," he acknowledged that "we are trying to create a security capability that can be an integral part of air base security and fit in with an Army or coalition maneuver partner and be an effective member of that team."¹⁸ That could mean on a non-linear battlefield that "as Airmen lodge at an expeditionary air base and must perform certain convoys or movements, that we will have to protect ourselves. So we in security forces will take the lead in providing security and force protection as Airmen for Airmen's work."¹⁹ Gen Hertog echoed Holmes's assessment when she told an interviewer, "I don't think we are ever going to come out of our expeditionary mindset that we are now... Our core competency is we deploy to where you need us, when you need us, and we're trained and ready to go. And we're also going to be capable of taking the fight outside the perimeter. You know, you talked about the perimeter being secured or beyond the perimeter being secured by a small cadre of people. That's going to be us. It's not the Army."²⁰



SrA Christopher Bounds, 822nd SFS, gets a bead on a target while manning his post at Tallil AB, Iraq (Air Force photo)

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To perform the missions set for it since 9/11, the Security Forces has become less and less of a law enforcement organization. Gen Hertog acknowledged that, “We are never going to, I think, have the police services emphasis that we’ve always had in the



Security Forces memorial on the grounds of the National Museum of the United States Air Force at Wright-Patterson, AFB, Ohio, donated by the Air Force Security Police Association to honor the Air Police, Security Police, and Security Forces personnel killed in the line of duty (Air Force Security Police Association)

past. That’s over and done with, because the threat is not there. I mean we do have threats to our home station units but not like we have threats to our expeditionary units.”²¹ That reality “has led to relying more on civilianization and contract guards, too.”²²

Another feature of the new expeditionary Air Force base defense organization is the increasing use of well-trained augmentees to aid in air base ground defense and to fill in for deployed units. “We are using augmentees,” Gen Hertog admitted, “people that are not cops, coming in to augment us when we have big pieces of our squadron that have deployed. So the thing that we have evolved towards, and I am very happy to see, is that force protection has become everybody’s business. Not just the business of a couple of AFSCs like us. But it’s got to be everybody’s business in order to protect the base.”²³ “I don’t want to make everybody a cop; don’t get me wrong,” she stressed. “But everybody needs to be a warrior and be able to pick up a weapon when the time comes to defend themselves or defend their fellow wingmen for that base.”²⁴

So what might the Security Forces of the future look like? If the changes set in motion by GWOT continue, it is likely to be a force heavy on security, light on law enforcement, dependent upon technology as a force multiplier, well-armed, equipped, and trained for ground combat and able to take the fight to the enemy, highly mobile, and backed up by trained Airmen each of whom has a “battle station” in defense of the base.

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It is conceivable that the Security Forces we now know could become a ground combat/nuclear security force which are “able to pick up and go wherever that threat is and be able to go into a base, open that base, and protect whatever assets are coming in shortly thereafter.”²⁵ The only certainty for the future is that no matter where, when, or how the wars of the future are fought the men and women of the Air Force Security Forces in whatever way, shape, or form will be on the ramparts in defense of the force.



Staff Sgt. Matthew Smith, 447th Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron member, guards Air Force One April 7 on Sather Air Base, Iraq, flightline. Members of the 447th ESFS protected Air Force One while President Barack Obama spoke to a crowd of nearly 1,500 servicemembers, government civilians and contractors at Al Faw Palace, Camp Victory, Iraq, during an unannounced visit to Iraq. (Air Force photo)

¹ See discussion in Prologue, 23-25.

² *Security Police Digest*, Issue 1, 1983,7.

³ History of the 3924th Air Police Squadron (Special), 1 August 1952 – 31 January 1953, Chapter V, 11.

⁴ Staff Study, The Provost Marshal, Local Ground Defense of Air Bases, May 1957 as quoted in Lt Col Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973* (Office of Air Force History: Washington, D.C., 1979), 8.

⁵ “Resume: Proposed Resource Protection Program,” 1972 Worldwide Security Police Conference, 2.

⁶ “Resume: Proposed Resource Protection Program,” 1972 Worldwide Security Police Conference, 2.

⁷ Interview with Brig Gen Frank K. Martin, 13 August 1989 in *History of the Air Force Office of Security Police, 1 Jan 1988 thru 31 Dec 1988*, Volume II, Supporting Document I-13.

⁸ Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. 3, *The Grand Alliance* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950), 776-77.

⁹ Remarks to the American Enterprise Institute, October 11, 2005, *Air Force Link* (<http://www.af.mil/library/speeches/>).

¹⁰ Memorandum from HQ ATC/TT to USAF/DPP, HQ USAF/SP Subject: Security Police Training, 12 Aug 75.

¹¹ Interview of Brig Gen Richard Coleman, USAF (Ret) by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), 14 May 2005.

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- ¹² Interview of Brig Gen Mary Kay Hertog by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), September 15, 2006.
- ¹³ Maj Milton R. Kirste, 315 SPS/CC, Phang Rang AB, End of Tour Report, 10 Jun 71 – 31 Mar 72.
- ¹⁴ “Resume: Proposed Resource Protection Program,” 1972 Worldwide Security Police Conference, 1.
- ¹⁵ Interview of Brig Gen Mary Kay Hertog by Col Jerry M. Bullock USAF (Ret), September 15, 2006.
- ¹⁶ Interview of Brig Gen Mary Kay Hertog by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), September 15, 2006.
- ¹⁷ Interview of Brig Gen Robert H. Holmes by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret) and Col James L. Conrad, USAF (Ret), June 8, 2005.
- ¹⁸ Interview of Brig Gen Robert H. Holmes by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret) and Col James L. Conrad, USAF (Ret), June 8, 2005.
- ¹⁹ Interview of Brig Gen Robert H. Holmes by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret.) and Col James L. Conrad, USAF (Ret), June 8, 2005.
- ²⁰ Interview of Brig Gen Mary Kay Hertog by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), September 15, 2006.
- ²¹ Interview of Brig Gen Mary Kay Hertog by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), September 15, 2006.
- ²² Interview of Brig Gen Mary Kay Hertog by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), September 15, 2006.
- ²³ Interview of Brig Gen Mary Kay Hertog by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), September 15, 2006.
- ²⁴ Interview of Brig Gen Mary Kay Hertog by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), September 15, 2006.
- ²⁵ Interview of Brig Gen Mary Kay Hertog by Col Jerry M. Bullock, USAF (Ret), September 15, 2006.

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Air Force Security Forces History Postscript

Brigadier General Mary Kay Hertog years

2006-2009

This postscript to DEFENDERS OF THE FORCE: THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE SECURITY FORCES 1947 – 2006 is intended to capture the changes, updates and milestones of the Air Force Security Forces career field under the leadership of Brigadier General (now Major General) Mary Kay Hertog. During General Hertog's tenure as the Director of Security Forces, the Security Forces community continued its evolution as not only one of the Air Force's most premier career specialties but significantly stressed due to SF manpower demands for numerous security mission at home station and in the Central Command theater of operations Under General Hertog's leadership some of the accomplishments attained by her career field set the standard for future deployments and home station security manpower demands, with the development of the Force Protection Enhancement Unit Type Codes (UTC), Tactical Security Elements, Police Transition Teams, Post Traumatic Stress awareness, funding of contract/civilian police positions, and Security Forces role in reinvigoration of the AF nuclear enterprise under the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Schwartz.

In June 2006, Brigadier General Holmes transferred to Deputy Director of Operations for US Central Command at MacDill AFB, Florida. His successor would be the commander of the 37th Training Wing, Brigadier General Mary Kay Hertog, daughter of an Air Force officer and career Security Policeman. General Hertog came to the director's job with a broad base of Security Forces (SF) experience. The General started her Security Police career working nuclear security at Kirtland AFB, she then served tours as the SPS operations officer at Norton and Nellis AFB's (respectively), with separate MAJCOM staff tours at AMC and PACAF. She attended Air Command and Staff College and Air War College, and completed an Air Staff tour. Primed for command and, in quick succession, she was the commander of three SF squadrons, and eventually was selected to become a training group commander at Lackland AFB. She then was assigned as the ACC Security Forces Director, returned to Lackland AFB as the 37th Training Wing Commander, and from wing command to HQ Air Force as the Director of Security Forces. In doing this, she fulfilled a number of 'firsts' for the SF career field, becoming the first woman to become director and a general officer of the career field. Of the many things that she accomplished or attempted as director, she gave the career field more credibility.

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Training and Manpower

General Hertog valued her time in the training realm among the most beneficial of her career. She already knew many of the people who were on the Air Staff or were in leadership positions in the Air Force (AF) at the 3 and 4-star level, whom she had met while serving as the 37th Training Wing Commander. Through these associations she was able to forge relationships to advance many SF initiatives. She had the remarkable ability to build on personal and professional relationships for the benefit of the career field and continually supported and encouraged other SF officers and NCOs to do the same. She insisted that officers and NCOs get out of the career field for a temporary period of time so they could learn and see how the broader AF works, cultivate relationships, work with other career fields and then return to SF and capitalize on those relationships.

The most challenging issue that General Hertog had to address during her tour as director was the lack of adequate manpower. One immediate challenge was the demand for SF at home station and to support CENTCOM and the other combatant commands. Her initial strategy for meeting competing manpower requirements, given the shortfall in the manpower inventory prior to the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), was to prioritize what requirements could be filled and to concentrate on meeting requirements with the skill set that matched SF core competencies. The pressing deployment demands on the Air Force caused by OIF requirements resulted in repeated request for Security Forces to fill numerous, but often unrelated “Request for Forces” (RFFs). General Hertog held the line and did not fill many of these RFF unless they were within SF core competencies. Even when RFFs sourced to the AF were within SF core competencies, General Hertog often filled RFFs that first supported air operations. However, the demands for SF increased due to the expanding OIF security requirements and the success of SF as they completed many operations. It was not uncommon, during this time, that SF became a “force of choice” due to the successful reputation they were building in accomplishing many OIF missions.

Detainee operations at Camp Bucca and at Bagram Air Base soon began to draw SF manpower. Other non-traditional taskings also began to affect the limited manpower inventory. General Hertog knew this and decided to get the career field out of detainee operations and redirect it into more combat oriented, air operations supporting ‘blue taskings’, something SF could contribute to AFCENT. In filling RFFs, the standard staffing policy that General Hertog mandated was to analyze SF core competencies and sustainment and compare it to what was being requested. A number of AF In-Lieu-Of (ILO) taskings (later re-titled by the AF as Joint Expeditionary Taskings (JET)), such as interpreters, would be reviewed and then pushed back to the Joint Staff planner as not an SF core competency. Any task that pertained to aircraft security, such as Raven or fly-away security, or outside-the-wire activities, such as Police Transition Teams (PTT), continued to be accepted by General Hertog’s staff because SF were well trained to do those missions. The goal was to reduce the ILO Joint Staff taskings, which at one point became almost 54% of all SF deployed. Following General Hertog’s guidance, that percentage was significantly reduced to less than 26% of personnel deployed for ILO duty. This resulted in SF being utilized for SF core competency missions and reduced

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the number of requirements and the strain of multiple deployments on a limited SF inventory.

General Hertog also championed the idea to deploy other AF Airmen in a Force Protection Enhancement (FPE) UTC (QFEZU). The FPE did not go over well with the rest of the AF, mainly because the concept was to pull from all career fields and form deployment teams to fill traditionally SF related duties. The idea of the FPE was two-fold, reduce the strain on one of the most stressed career fields (SF) and free up more SF personnel to fill more combat oriented environments. The Gulf state and 'steady-state' bases such as Al Udied, Al Dafhra and Ali Al Salem were targeted for these teams. At these locations, many SF were tied up doing vehicle search pit duties, tower duties, entry control duties and other posts. These duties, in low threat environment, could be accomplished by all Airmen with minimum SF training. The Air Staff came up with the idea of deploying 13-man squads, 4 SF members and 9 non-SF members, who would come from the same base, train locally and were tagged to deploy and fill SF duties as augmentees. This type of program was already being used at CONUS bases, and the proposed concept would continue in the CENTCOM area of operation.

Another initiative that helped reduce the strain on the career field and increase the deployment pool was one that General Hertog implemented called the 'Return to Core' program. The goal was to return career SF to traditional SF duties and build up the SF inventory for deployment and home station security. Legitimate billets, but not necessarily SF oriented, were a cold war legacy that needed to be addressed. Positions such as Military Training Instructors and 1st Sergeant duty were not part of 'Return to Core', as those duties fell under the general's concept of necessary career broadening. The 'Return to Core' program targeted positions that could be civilianized, such as the Special Security Officer (SSO). General Mosley (then CSAF) gave General Hertog permission to bring as many personnel back 'into the fold' as possible. The success of the program was visible in that almost 40% of the non-SF career field assignments were brought back to the core competencies, thus again increasing the SF inventory.

At the same time the career field was implementing 'Return to Core' and initiating other policies to stabilize the force and give SF personnel a better home station dwell ratio, the problem was also attacked with other initiatives. In the training arena, General Hertog, along with her career field manager CMSgt Bruce Broder, continually talked with the AF manpower community to increase class seats for the SF Academy, pushing for additional seats above the normal yearly allocation. This helped bring the career field up to its baseline manpower standard. Additionally, extending the 'Sundown Clause' of contract security was quickly on General Hertog and her staff's radar. The General, along with members of her staff led by Mr. Mat Matecko (A7SX), regularly appealed to various Congressional staffers, asking for their assistance. Originally slated to expire in 2009, the program was successfully extended to the end of fiscal year 2012 with the drawdown of contract guard support being reduced every year by 10% until 2012. As the contract guard force drew down, many were replaced with government service over hires. The key to AF civilians' success in supplementing SF home station posting requirements was due to the increasing numbers of deployment requirements.

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The Air Reserve Component (ARC) had played a large role in SF deployments throughout General Hertog's time as the director. Knowing full well that the active duty had relied heavily on the ARC through mobilization and volunteerism, she was ever mindful of their contributions. The career field had to be careful not to take the ARC for granted as they had always been there to answer the call. Gen Hertog was leery of constantly relying on SF ARC manpower support and "burning" this capability out. Being mobilized for a number of years to some degree, and also assuming security control of a few OCONUS key bases, helped with the overall utilization of ARC SF manpower. The 'teaming' concept came from the ARC, to train, deploy and redeploy as a team, was implemented by the Air Staff. As of mid-2009, the ARC had been filling 19% of all SF taskings, and General Hertog was actively looking at ways of drawing them down. Knowing that the active duty needed to eventually take on the ARC's taskings, she insisted the AF be good stewards of the manpower they borrowed to allow the Reserve and National Guard SF time to stand-down and give personnel a break to reset for future missions.

Taking into account the massive involvement of SF overseas and multiple AEF deployments, some of the planning that General Hertog initiated in 2007-08 was to deal with shaping of the force moving ahead into the future. Dealing with the possibility that current (2009) 'surge' numbers of SF deployed could eventually become steady-state for the career field, she directed a re-vectoring of training to look at building 'partnership capacity' and 'irregular warfare' – two mission sets SF can have a large part of in the AF future. Building Partnership Capacity meant US military personnel, having completed the 'combat' phase and now worked with host nations to build up their military and government systems. Application of Irregular warfare concepts was also seen as a mission to meet security challenges in the new Africa Command (AFRICOM) area of operation. This long-term thinking is only one example how General Hertog shaped the thinking and set the stage for SF to remain expeditionary for years to come. Two additional pieces affecting this thinking rested on the advocating for additional civilianization of the force, not only to increase the deployment pool but providing long-needed continuity, and continuing to leverage more security technology. Examples were the civilianization of SF at Bolling AFB, due to the DOD Joint Basing initiatives and Remote-Target Engagement System (R-TES), a remotely operated engagement system. This and many other initiatives helped fulfill General Hertog's objective of increasing the SF inventory to meet many requirements.

Taking Care of the Airmen

Throughout the course of General Hertog's time as the Director of SF it should be noted that almost every initiative, plan or tasking she pushed for dealt with improving the health and welfare of SF members but the lives of all Airmen. Whether it was by increasing civilianized support and deployable numbers (thereby increasing home station dwell time) or by standardization and technology use, she made her objectives clear.

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There was a fine balance she and the Air Staff had to maintain between taking care of the force and meeting the ever increasing demand for SF's capabilities throughout the AF.

One of the many initiatives General Hertog championed early on as the Director was 'taking care of the troops'. This was a comprehensive outlook for SF, from training and equipping, to taking care of them after a deployment. It started with a call to standardize the training at SF Regional Training Centers (RTC), eventually reaching a 70%-30% mix of standardized versus specialized training at the RTCs. Following standardization, the concept of 'teaming' was implemented to get as many folks deploying together into training and deploying to their locations together. With the advent of the Force Protection Commodity Council, a particularly contentious issue was dealt with; that of standardizing equipment. By moving away from 'Gucci gear' and individualized equipment early in 2007, SF completed their first standardized equipment 'buy' through the Commodity Council. The first buy was the new tactical load bearing system, which gave every SF member the exact same set of gear.

Post-deployment care became the most important link in taking care of the troops. General Hertog was concerned with Post Traumatic Stress (PTS), knowing that the combination of specific taskings, along with multiple deployments, made the SF career field very susceptible to PTS. Working with the Air Force Surgeon General's office (SG), she implemented a tracking system to enable installation commanders to identify who had been deployed on a Police Transition Team (PTT) and to be aware that PTS could potentially be part of the returning Airman's issues. General Hertog also asked the SG to put something together specifically for SF personnel. Prior to deployment on PTTs, SF were interviewed and tracked to see if there were any predisposition 'markers' to having PTS symptoms. This program has been such a resounding success that it has been looked at for Air Force wide implementation. A combat simulator was constructed at Wilford Hall, Lackland AFB, TX to assist returning Airmen with potential PTS issues. As of the fall of 2009, SF members working on Tactical Security Elements (TSE) were now reintegrating with their OSI counterparts instead of with other SF. Reintegrating SF into the 'real world' from their deployment has been one of the most important issues General Hertog addressed throughout her tour as Director. As General Hertog states, "Post deployment care is tremendous – we do sights and sounds and smells of war to prepare our people to bust down doors and rock the streets of Baghdad but this is ground breaking in terms that it will help you recover should you be suffering from Post Traumatic Stress."

Reinvigoration of the Nuclear Enterprise

During the fall of 2007 and early 2008, two incidents involving AF nuclear weapons and components occurred. In the first, live nuclear-tipped warheads were accidentally flown from Minot AFB, ND to Barksdale AFB, LA. In the second, nuclear missile fuses were accidentally shipped to Taiwan in late 2006, but it was not discovered until 2008. These incidents forced then SECAF Michael Wynne to order a Blue Ribbon Panel to review AF nuclear surety and policies. SF was an intricate part of this panel.

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The panel recommended the AF nuclear enterprise was in need of readjustment and reinvigoration.

General Hertog understood that while SF was not targeted specifically SF had room for significant improvement as they had contributed to several Nuclear-Surety Inspection failures.. The new CSAF, General Norton Schwartz made Nuclear Surety number one priority to reinvigorate the nuclear enterprise, and SF was deeply involved. The first order of business was to take a look at the 100% SF manning posture for nuclear security, which was shown to be adequate. But the review did identify that having proper skill sets and continuity of training needed to be addressed. General Hertog did not wait for the AF to respond. She directed SF to re-vector training and put more nuclear specific emphasis into initial skill sets for officers and Airmen as well as the SF 7-level courses. She immediately mandated new nuclear-specific training for senior NCOs and officers who were likely to be in key nuclear leadership positions. This was accomplished by partnering with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the Nuclear Weapons Center (NWC) and the Nuclear Weapons School (NWS) to build courses and to get access to courses already being taught. The AF Nuclear Security Training Program course was established, giving a career path for key SF personnel working in nuclear units. The program gave a syllabus for personnel to follow, requiring that they have this training and certification standard by the time they had been in a command position or had been in a nuclear unit for six months.

General Hertog's predecessor, General Holmes, started Blue Coach training or 'force-on-force' training for nuclear security units. She continued support for this training and improved it by standardizing the training, establishing specific training locations and gaining more training funds. Camp Guernsey was designated as an RTC center of excellence for nuclear security training. Nuclear mission essential task lists (METLs), were developed, something that AF did not have before. The Air Staff worked with the Inspector General's office (IG) and standardized the IG checklists for nuclear security, ensuring every functional area was updated. Working with DTRA, 'modeling' was done using their modern simulations program for each nuclear environment to look at critical path analysis for the enemy. Sensor refreshes for above ground Weapon Storage Areas (WSA) were upgraded on the priority list and additionally funded. Additionally, SF contracted ex-Special Forces personnel to conduct unit force-on-force training for those individuals in their nuclear environment. General Hertog mandated that this training continue in order for SF to continuously refresh the new population of Airmen that come in for the nuclear environment. Lastly, the outdated missile field security manning standard was reviewed in order to 'right-size' the force, or to better man all the required posts.

Another reinvigoration item that was started was the re-write of the nuclear security regulations (published as AFMAN 31-108, published in 2009) and it was done in an entirely different way. Every nuclear MAJCOM, from all the nuclear environments, were included in the process to write their own chapters. Also, maintainers and IG inspectors were included to make sure it was right from their perspective. The A7S suggested hiring the same subject matter expert contractor who worked on the DoD

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parent regulation (DoD5210-41M) to assist with writing the AF supplement. By doing this, it eliminated any potential gaps or seams between the AFMAN and the DoD regulation. This was part of the overall long range goal to mitigate the nuclear units not having proper guidance and policy. As part of this re-writing of regulations, General Hertog directed her staff to go back to the basics, almost to the point of following the old Strategic Air Command procedures. This entailed moving away from terms such as 'should' and 'may', to a more black and white 'will' and 'must' with guidance.

Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) stood up in mid 2009 just as General Hertog was getting ready to leave the director position. The transfer of nuclear responsibilities to AFGSC fit perfectly into her vision of where the reinvigoration of the nuclear enterprise was headed. A robust SF staff was built for AFGSC as it combined AFSPC and ACC roles and duties. In addition to the typical O-6 as A7S SF lead for security, a second AF O-6 was assigned as deputy A4/7, thus providing additional security expertise within AFGSC.

Coming full circle

One of General Hertog's overarching goals throughout her time as Director was to get out and travel as much as possible to tell Airmen on the ground what the A7S Staff was trying to do for the cops in the field. She and CMSgt Broder traveled around the world and talked to thousands of SF, spreading the word about what was going on and why they were doing what they were doing. It was important for her to lay eyes on the Airmen and hear issues and concerns directly from the troops. Answering their questions and telling Airmen directly 'here's what we can and cannot do for you' was very important to her to give the unvarnished truth. She also thought it very important that SF Airmen lay eyes on their Director and career field manager and to put a face to a name and know who was working for them. Her leadership motto regarding this face-to-face format was 'don't ever ask somebody to do something you are not willing to do yourself.'

In April 2009, Brig Gen Hertog's efforts to take care of SF enlisted Airmen was acknowledged when she was awarded the AF Order of the Sword, The highest honor an officer can receive from the AF enlisted corps.

In May 2009 General Hertog was promoted to Major General, another first for the career field, and the first career SF Airman to achieve the rank of Major General. With that promotion it was widely known that she would not be long for the SF career field. The Air Force had bigger plans in store for Major General Hertog. Shortly after her promotion she was selected to be the 2nd Air Force Commander at Kessler AFB where she is responsible for the development, oversight, and direction of all operational aspects of basic military training, initial skills training, and advanced technical training for the AF enlisted force and support officers. The selection as the new 2nd Air Force Commander was General Hertog's career coming full-circle, returning to the training realm where she was able to utilize the relationships and knowledge that she had built up over the years of her SF career to improve training for not just the SF, but the entire AF.

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Major General Mary Kay Hertog turned over the reigns as Director of Security Forces to Brigadier General Jimmy McMillan, also a career SF officer, in September 2009. **

** This chapter was written by SMSgt A. Sobeski and based on interviews with Maj Gen Mary Kay Hertog.

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*Appendix 1

Air Provost Marshals Directors of Security & Law Enforcement Chiefs of Security Police Directors of Security Forces

Air Provost Marshals (1946-1962)



Major General Joseph V. Dillon (1946-1953) was graduated from the US Military Academy at West Point on 2 July 1920. The same date he was commissioned a second lieutenant of Infantry and promoted to first lieutenant in the Regular Army. As was common in the Army pre-World War II, he would remain a first lieutenant until 1 August 1935. Most of his early career was spent in the artillery.

In September 1934 he became a student officer at Georgetown University Law School, Washington, D.C., from which he graduated in 1937 with a bachelor of laws degree. Two years later he received his master of laws degree from Georgetown and was transferred to the

Judge Advocate General's Department.

Gen. Dillon served in the Army military police and provost marshal positions throughout World War II. In November 1941 he was appointed chief of the Military Police Division of the Provost Marshal General's Office at Washington, D.C. The following May he was named deputy provost marshal general and in December 1942 became commandant of the Provost Marshal General's Training Center at Fort Riley, Kansas.

In May 1943 he was assigned as provost marshal general of the North African theater, where he served until October 1944, when he became provost marshal general of the Southern Line of Communications in France and deputy provost marshal of the European theater.

Gen. Dillon was highly regarded by his peers and can in many ways be thought of as the father of the career field. He died 1 August 1971 at the age of 72.

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Brigadier General William L. Fagg (1953-1958) was born in Blanco, Oklahoma, in 1905. After graduating from Farmersville High School, Farmersville, Texas, in 1922, he attended North Texas Agricultural College, Arlington, Texas. In 1924 he was appointed to the U. S. Military Academy at West Point and was graduated and commissioned a second lieutenant on June 13, 1929,

Until September 1939 he was stationed at Brooks Field, Texas; Fort Sam Houston, Texas; Philippine Islands; and Fort Howard, Maryland, in various capacities. He then entered Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, and in June 1936 was appointed an instructor there. After a year at Fort Snelling, Minnesota, General Fagg entered the University of Virginia Law School, Charlottesville, Virginia, and graduated in June 1941.

Immediately thereafter he was assigned to the judge advocate general's office in Washington, D.C. He attended the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for three months prior to becoming assistant judge advocate of the First Cavalry Division at Fort Bliss, Texas. Then he was named judge advocate of the Second Infantry Division at Fort Sam Houston and later was assigned as judge advocate of the Fourth Army Corps at Camp Springs, California.

General Fagg was designated G-3, Operations of the 69th Infantry Division at Hattiesburg, Mississippi, in May 1943. From December of that year to May 1944 he was a War Department Observer with the Fifth Army in Italy. Returning to the United States he was again assigned as battalion commander and then regimental commander of the 283rd Infantry. In July 1944 he was assigned to the Ninth Army headquarters in Europe as an air operations officer. He was named commandant of the Ground Liaison School at Keesler Field, Mississippi, in October 1945.

In May 1946 he went to Columbia University as a student officer at the European Staff Officers' Studies Course. He went to Germany in October 1946 and was named regional commander of the 970th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment. In February 1947 he was named executive officer of the Intelligence Division at European Command headquarters. He transferred to the Department of the Air Force on September 26, 1947. Still in Germany, he was appointed deputy inspector general in May 1949. In August 1950 he returned to the US and graduated from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in June 1951.

Assigned to Air Force Headquarters in July 1951, he was named executive officer to the inspector general. In June 1952 he was appointed deputy to the air provost marshal, and in August 1953 he was designated the air provost marshal in the Office of the Inspector General.

General Fagg retired December 31, 1958, and died April 17, 2000, at the age of 95.

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Brigadier General Robert F. Burnham (1959-1962) was born in Battle Creek, Michigan, in 1913. He graduated from Battle Creek High School in 1929 and entered Battle Creek College that year. He was appointed a cadet to the U. S. Coast Guard Academy in June 1930. In 1933 he resigned to apply for appointment as a flying cadet, Army Air Corps and was appointed a flying cadet in February 1935.

He was assigned to the 97th Operations Squadron, Mitchell Field, New York, as a flying cadet. The personnel policy of those years required an additional year of duty as a flying cadet between graduation and commissioning. He was commissioned a second lieutenant, Air Corps Reserves, March 1, 1937.

Then in July 1937 he was transferred to Randolph Field, Texas, as a flying instructor. He was commissioned a second lieutenant, Regular Air Corps, in October 1936.

Subsequently he helped organize and became Air Corps supervisor of the Primary Flying Schools at Tuscaloosa and Decatur, Alabama. In 1942 he was assigned as director of training for the Southeast Training Center's Heavy Glider Program at Lockbourne, Ohio, and moved with the program to Stuttgart, Arkansas.

After receiving B-17 transition training in the spring of 1943, General Burnham was assigned to the 13th Air Force in the South Pacific area. He flew 46 heavy bomber missions in the South, Southwest, and Central Pacific areas before returning to the United States in November 1944 to assume command of Lockbourne Air Force Base, Ohio.

At the end of World War II, he was transferred to Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, where he assisted in the establishment of the Air University. In 1948 he entered Air War College as a student. Upon graduation he was assigned to Headquarters US Air Force for duty as chief, Legislative Division, Directorate of Legislative, Liaison, where he continued until he entered the National War College in 1952.

After graduation from the National War College, he was assigned to Allied Air Forces, Northern Europe, Oslo, Norway, as deputy chief of staff, plans. Next he was selected to be deputy chief of staff, plans, and operations, Allied Forces, Northern Europe.

He returned to Headquarters US Air Force in August 1956 for duty with the directorate of plans. In June 1957 he assumed duty as the executive to the undersecretary of the Air Force.

He was promoted to brigadier general in June 1959 and in July was transferred to the inspector general, Headquarters U. S. Air Force, for duty as the provost marshal.

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Effective June 11, 1962, General Burnham was appointed director of special investigations (The Inspector General). He retired September 1, 1966 and died on January 16, 1969.

Directors of Security and Law Enforcement (1962-1975)



Colonel A. T. Learnard (1962-1964), was selected to serve as the Director in 1962. During his tenure the name of his position changed, but the Security Police remained under the Air Force Inspector General. Little is known of Learnard and an extensive search of official and unofficial sources failed to disclose a biography. Not even his first name was uncovered.



Colonel Charles W. Howe (1964-1965), a graduate of UCLA, was selected to be the Director in the summer of 1964. He came to Washington from Evereux, France, where he had commanded the 322nd Air Division covering Air Force air transport activities in Europe, Africa, and Asia.

During World War II in three years he flew 136 combat missions, including nine separate campaigns in the Pacific. Those were followed by seven combat campaigns in Korea.



Colonel Kenneth A. Reeher (1965-1966), a Maryland native, became the Director in June 1965. Commissioned a second lieutenant in April 1942, he flew combat missions from England and from Russia. There he commanded a U. S. base employed to shuttle missions into Germany.

Prior to coming to the headquarters he served in Strategic Air Command (SAC) in personnel, executive officer, and squadron and group command positions. He was named Deputy Director of Security and Law Enforcement in September 1962.

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Colonel Donald C. Shultis (1966-1970) was born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in July 1917. He was the son of a Milwaukee police officer. He served the longest of any of the colonels who were the Directors in this period. A fighter pilot in World War II, he earned his wings in July 1939 through the Aviation Cadet program and came to the director's position from HQ Pacific Air Forces where he was director of intelligence.

Shultis served as the Director during the buildup to Vietnam and through much of the action there. Under his watch the name of the career field was changed from Air Police to Security Police. Also under his watch the Safeside Combat Security Police units were formed. While the operations were generally seen as successful, the program died for lack of funding. The concept, however, would be seen in future security forces operations.



Colonel Robert Blauw (1970-1973) came to the job from Pease AFB, New Hampshire, where he had commanded a SAC B-52 wing. A veteran of World War II, he flew 17 missions over Europe before being transferred to North Africa. After completing his operations in Europe he retrained into the B-29 and flew missions in the Pacific.

His time as Director was a pivotal one during which the ground was set for major changes in the career field.



Colonel Billy J. Carter (1973-1975) started his Air Force service as an Aviation Cadet in 1943 and served as a B-17 navigator until 1945. After the war he graduated from the University of Wichita and served with the Wichita Police Department and as an investigator with the Treasury Department until recalled to active duty in 1950. He was the first career security policeman to be named "top Cop" and had a distinguished career in the security police career field. He was the commander of the 377th Security Police Squadron at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Vietnam during the Tet Offensive during which his troops won a major victory over the attacking Vietnamese.

On his return from the Republic of Vietnam he was assigned to the Military Personnel Center as the first security police career field manager and used this position to rejuvenate the Air Staff by picking highly qualified officers for the assignments. He came to the Air Staff himself as the Deputy Director of Security and Law Enforcement and, upon the departure of Col. Blauw, became the Director.

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Chiefs of Security Police (1975-2001)



Major General Thomas M. Sadler (1975-1977), a native of Canton, Ohio, began his military career with his enlistment in the U. S. Army Air Corps in 1943. He flew missions with the 8th Air Force in Europe as a B-17 gunner. After World War II he pursued his education at the University of Alabama. After graduation he reentered the Air Force and earned his pilots wings. He flew combat troop carrier missions through the Korean War and in Vietnam.

In March 1975 he was commander of the 437th Airlift Wing at Charleston Air Force Base (AFB), South Carolina, when he was assigned to be Chief of Security Police, Headquarters U. S. Air Force.



Brigadier General William E. Brown, Jr. (1977-1978) was born in the Bronx, New York, and was commissioned in December 1951 at Craig AFB, Alabama, after completing pilot training as a distinguished graduate. His first assignment was to Williams AFB, Arizona, as a student in the F-80 Shooting Star jet transition program.

From 1952 to 1970 Gen. Brown served principally in fighter aircraft in various squadron, wing, and numbered air force positions. He flew 125 combat missions in F-86 "Saberjet" with the 4th Fighter-Interceptor Wing in South Korea and another 100 combat missions in F-4 "Phantoms" during tours of duty in Thailand at Ubon Royal Thai Air Base in 1966 and 1968. After follow-on tours in Europe, Texas, and Washington, D.C., he took command of the 1st Composite Wing, Military Airlift Command, Andrews AFB, Maryland.

The general was named Chief of Security Police, Headquarters U. S. Air Force, in October 1977. He retired as a lieutenant general, commander of Allied Air Forces Southern Europe, and deputy command-in-chief, U. S. Air Forces in Europe for the Southern Area, with headquarters in Naples, Italy.



Brigadier General William R. Brooksher (1978-1981), a native of Turkey, Arkansas, began his career in 1950 as an enlisted administrative specialist. After graduating OCS in 1953, he served in the meteorological and personnel fields until he entered the ballistic missile program. He served as vice wing commander and then the commander of the 341st Missile Wing, Malmstrom AFB, Montana, and subsequently commanded the 91st SMS at Minot, North Dakota.

He was serving as the Director of Security Police, Strategic Air

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Command, when he was promoted to the grade of brigadier general. He was the first general to become the Chief of Security Police who actually had some experience in the career field.

In 1978 he presided over the move of the headquarters element from Washington, D.C., to Albuquerque, New Mexico. The move was part of the Chief of Staff's efforts to reduce the military presence in the Capital area. His experience and his leadership kept this move from being a major degradation of the headway the career field had made.



Colonel Larry J. Runge (1981-1982) served first as the deputy to Brig Gen Brooksher and upon the general's retirement became the Chief of Security Police. A career Security Police officer, he advanced rapidly with below-the-zone promotions to major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel. The majority of his service was with Strategic Air Command. He also served in Vietnam at 7th Air Force Headquarters.



Brigadier General Paul Neal Scheidel (1982-1987) was the first career field officer to be promoted to the rank of brigadier general. A Nebraska native, he entered the U. S. Air Force as a second lieutenant after graduating from Stanford University in October 1959. After attending Air Police School his first operational assignment was as an Air Police officer at Sheppard AFB, Texas; he later served as operations officer. From April 1961 to April 1964 he was assigned to Headquarters 2nd Air Force, Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, as chief of the Missile Security Section. Next he went to England where he served as chief of security police at Royal Air Force Station Mildenhall and later at West Ruislip Air Station.

From June 1967 to July 1968 he served as chief and commander of security police at Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Base, Thailand. Upon completion of his Southeast Asia tour of duty he was assigned to Headquarters U. S. Air Force, Washington, D.C., as a staff officer in the Installation Security Division of the Security Police Directorate, Office of the Inspector General.

Following graduation from Air Command and Staff College in August 1972, he was assigned as chief of the Weapons Systems Security Division, Directorate of Security Police, at Headquarters Military Airlift Command, Scott AFB, Illinois. In June 1973 he

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was reassigned as deputy director in the same directorate. He became Military Airlift Command's chief of security police in August 1978 and subsequently became deputy base commander at Scott AFB in December 1976.

He attended the Air War College, August 1977-May 1978. Upon graduation he was assigned initially as deputy and then in August 1979 as chief of security police at Headquarters U. S. Air Forces in Europe, Ramstein Air Base, Germany. In 1982 he was selected to be the Director of Security Police Headquarters U. S. Air Force.

Gen Scheidel died in 2004.



Colonel Robert Hartman (1987-1988) was assigned to the Air Force Office of Security Police in 1983. He served as the deputy chief under Brig Gen Scheidel for much of Gen Scheidel's administration and, upon Gen. Scheidel's retirement, became the Chief. Therefore, his service in that office covers considerably more time than he actually served as the chief.



Brigadier General Frank M. Martin (1988-1992), a New York City native, was commissioned through the Air Force Reserve Officer Training (ROTC) program after graduation from Cornell University. He began his Air Force and Security Police careers with the 820th Combat Defense Squadron, Plattsburgh AFB, New York, in July 1962 as duty officer and later as operations officer.

He worked outside the career field in the ballistic missile programs for 11 years until he attended the Air Command and Staff School. Upon completion of ACSC he was assigned to Korat Royal Air Base, Thailand, as commander of the 388th Security Police Squadron. In September 1975 he transferred to the Air Force chief of security police staff, Washington, D.C., as a staff officer and became its executive officer in June 1977.

Gen. Martin attended the National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C., August 1979.-June 1980. Then he was assigned to Headquarters Tactical Air Command (TAC), Langley AFB, Virginia, as deputy chief of security police. He became the TAC chief of security police in April 1981.

In June 1985 he became deputy chief of staff for security police, Headquarters US Air Forces in Europe, Ramstein Air Base, West Germany. In February 1987 he was assigned

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as Air Force Chief of Security Police, assistant Air Force Inspector General for Security, and commander of the Air Force Office of Security Police.



Brigadier General Stephen C. Mannell (1992-1996) entered the Air Force in 1966 as a distinguished graduate of the University of Oregon's ROTC program. He then served as security police operations officer at Hurlburt Field, Florida. In March 1969 he became the chief of security police, Tainan Air Station, Taiwan. In March 1971 he was assigned as the chief of law enforcement, Tan Son Nhut Air Base, South Vietnam. A year later, he became the 4787th Security Police Squadron commander, Duluth International Airport, Minnesota. In April 1974, he was assigned to Headquarters Aerospace Defense Command, Petersen AFB, Colorado, as a security staff officer.

Gen. Mannell became chief of security police for Air Force Space Command at Petersen AFB in July 1987. Two years later he was assigned as deputy chief of staff for security police, Headquarters U. S. Air Forces in Europe, Ramstein Air Base, West Germany. He became Chief, Security Police Plans and Programs Division, Air Force Headquarters, in August 1991 and in March 1992 became Chief of Security Police.

Director of Security Forces (1996-present)



Brigadier General Richard A. Coleman (1996-2001) enlisted in the Air Force in September 1956 and for the next fifteen years performed air police and security police duties in the Philippines, Georgia, Morocco, England, Oklahoma, Texas, and South Vietnam. He was also a military training instructor and small arms instructor at Lackland AFB. He was commissioned as a distinguished graduate of Officer Training School through the bootstrap commissioning program in 1972.

In March 1996 he was appointed Chief of Security Police and after January 1997 as Director of Security Forces and Commander of the U. S. Air Force Security Forces Center, Lackland AFB, Texas. There, drawing heavily on his experience with Safeside (the combat security police experiment), he helped develop new concepts of force protection within the Air Force, creating a fighting force for the evolving expeditionary air force.

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Brigadier General James M. Shames (2001-2004) graduated from the U. S. Air Force Academy in 1974 and began his career as an operations officer for a security police squadron at Patrick AFB, Florida. In early assignments he served as a shift supervisor, branch chief, and then as Chief of the Plans Division, Headquarters US Air Force in Europe. There he was responsible for wartime plans and policy, including the initial planning for and deployment of ground-launched cruise missile systems to Europe.

He also served as Chief of Programming and Budgeting for the Air Force Office of Security Police where he coordinated the programming of objective memorandum initiatives. He subsequently commanded the 37th Training Group at Lackland AFB, Texas, a large technical operation that trains approximately 36,000 people annually.

Later he was assigned as Vice Commander of the Security Forces Center, including the newly formed 820th Security Forces Group and the Force Protection Battlelab. Prior to assuming his assignment as Director, he was responsible for the security forces for Space Command, the Air Force's largest nuclear command.



Brigadier General Robert H. Holmes (2004-2006) entered the Air Force in 1978 after receiving his commission from Officer Training School at Lackland AFB, Texas. A career combat control officer, he has commanded at all levels from detachment to wing, including the 37th Training Wing, the largest training wing in the Air Force. During Operation Enduring Freedom he was the Deputy Commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force—South (Task Force K-Bar), responsible for directing and conducting joint combat operations in southern Afghanistan.

He took over the reins as Director of Security Forces at a critical time in the movement towards a lean, ready-to-fight force of security force members. He oversaw much of the buildup of security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Two watchwords guided his course during his administration: war fighters and relevance.



Major General Mary Kay Hertog (2006-2009)

Gen Hertog entered the Air Force in 1978 as ROTC distinguished graduate. As a career security forces officer, she has worked at unit, major command, and Air Staff level in various positions, to include commanding several large security forces units and a technical training group. Prior to her current assignment she was Commander, 37th Training Wing, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, one of the largest training wings in the US Air Force. After her selection to Major General she took command of 2nd Air Force, Keesler AFB, MS.

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Brig Gen Jimmy E. McMillian (2009 – present) Brig Gen McMillian is Director of Security Forces, Headquarters US Air Force, Washington, D.C. He is the focal point for force protection within the Air Force and responsible for planning and programming the security for more than 30,000 active-duty and Reserve component's security forces at locations worldwide. He provides policy and oversight for protecting Air Force installations from terrorism, criminal acts, sabotage and acts of war, and ensures security forces are trained, equipped and ready to support contingency and exercise plans.

Brig Gen McMillian earned his commission after graduating from The ROTC program at North Carolina Agriculture and Technical State University in 1981. During his career, he has served in a variety of security forces operations. He has also served in major command headquarters positions at Air Combat Command, Air Mobility Command and Air Force Space Command. He has commanded at the squadron, group and wing levels.

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APPENDIX 2

Air Force Security Police Senior Enlisted Advisors

This position was originally designated as the Chief Master Sergeant of Security Police. This was designed to place emphasis on the contributions and importance of the enlisted SP force and establish an advocate for the enlisted SPs. While this title has been used by many over the years to describe this position (including some of the Chiefs), it has not been the official title since the tenure of CMSgt Bob McLaurine. During Chief McLaurine's tenure (1977) the title was changed to Senior Enlisted Advisor. This change was directed by the Air Force to eliminate all duty titles that detracted from the status of the Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force. They wanted no confusion as to who the top NCO in the Air Force was.

CMSgt McLaurine held both titles (Chief Master Sergeant of the Security Police and Senior Enlisted Advisor) and Chiefs John Adkins and Bob Agee both were Senior Enlisted Advisors. In 1987, Headquarters Air Force Office of Security Police (AFOSP) lost the senior enlisted advisor position in an Air Force-wide reduction in senior enlisted advisor slots. The duty title changed to Chief Enlisted Manager with CMSgt Cleveland Perkins' assumption of the duty. At this point the chiefs were also assigned additional staff duties and did not necessarily report directly to the general. Chiefs Craig Timmerman and Wayne Cox also served under this concept. In 1995 CMSgt William Alexander was assigned as the Security Police Manager and was also designated as the career field manager responsible for all SP enlisted training and personnel requirements, issues and actions. In 1996 Chief Daryl Janicki relieved CMSgt Alexander and assumed the title of Security Police Manager. His title was changed to Security Forces Manager in January 1997 when the general's title changed to Director of Security Forces.

Chief Master Sergeant John A. Renfroe, Jr.

Chief Master Sergeant John A. Renfroe served as the Senior Enlisted Advisor to Colonels Don Shultis and Billy J. Carter. While serving at the staff Chief Renfroe was selected as the Outstanding Security Policeman of the Year and served as a member of the Directors' Special Advisory Council.

Chief Renfroe entered the US Army in November 1942. He participated in the Normandy Invasion and the Northern France, Ardennes-Alsace, and Rhineland Campaigns. He was a German prisoner of war following the Battle of the Bulge in 1944. He was liberated 5 April 1945 by an element of the American 90th Division.

After briefly returning to college after the war, Chief Renfroe enlisted in the US Air Force. In 1948 he was selected as cadre to form the ceremonial squadron at Bolling AFB, Washington, D.C. In 1953 Chief Renfroe was an instructor at the SAC Security School, Ft. Carson, Colorado. After numerous assignments he was assigned to Directorate of Security Police Headquarters, 2nd Air Division/Seventh Air Force, in 1965.

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In December 1969 Chief Renfroe was assigned to the staff of the Directorate of Security Police, Headquarters, United States Air Force.

Chief Renfroe is retired and lives in Texas.

Chief Master Sergeant Howard E. Redd

Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force Howard E. Redd served as the Chief Enlisted Advisor to Maj Gen. Thomas Sadler. Chief Redd entered the Air Force on 29 June 1948. His first assignment was to the air police unit at Perrin AFB, Texas.

He served overseas assignments in Japan, Europe, and Vietnam, and served an isolated assignment at Galena AFS, Alaska. From Vietnam, Chief Redd was again assigned to USAFE and was selected to serve as Chief Master Sergeant of Security Police.

Chief Redd retired to Orlando, Florida, where he worked for several years for the U. S. Postal Service. He died in 1990.

Chief Master Sergeant Billy Weathington

Chief Master Sergeant Billy Weathington, a native of Newville, Alabama, was selected in June 1976 to serve as Senior Enlisted Advisor to Brig Gen. Earl Brown.

He joined the Air Force on 16 March 1950. His first assignment was to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, where he became one of more than 1000 air policemen selected to establish security for the aircraft of SAC at the beginning of the Korean War.

Chief Weathington performed duties as aircraft guard, town patrol, desk sergeant, corrections supervisor, flight commander, information security specialist and staff superintendent at three major command headquarters.

Chief Master Sergeant Robert J McLaurine

Chief Master Sergeant Robert J. McLaurine was Senior Enlisted Advisor to Brig Gen William R. Brooksher at AFOSP, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico.

He enlisted in the Air Force at Knoxville, Tennessee, on 25 May 1950. After basic training he was assigned to the 93rd APS, Castle AFB, California. His first overseas assignment was to the 3919th APS, RAF Fairford, England. Over the next several years he rotated between England and stateside SAC bases.

In 1969 Chief McLaurine was a part of Operation Safeside and served with the 821st Combat Security Police Squadron (CSPS) at Phan Rang AB, RVN. Before he returned to the Zone of the Interior (ZI) in 1969 he also served at Pleiku AB and Phu Cat AB, RVN.

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His unit returned to England AFB, Louisiana, where he assumed duty as the Operations Superintendent for the 821st CSPS. In January 1970 he returned to Vietnam as superintendent of the 823rd CSPS at Phan Rang.

He returned to SAC in August 1970. Follow-on assignments included Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota, and Offutt AFB, Nebraska, where in addition to his duties as a staff member for the Director of Security Police, he served two Commanders-in-Chief as Senior Enlisted Advisor.

After another SEA assignment to U-Tapao, Thailand, he was assigned to Tactical Air Command (TAC) at Myrtle Beach AFB, South Carolina. In 1977 he went to Headquarters USAF where he served as Chief Master Sergeant of Security Police for Brig Gen Earl Brown and Senior Enlisted Advisor for Brig Gen William R. Brooksher.

Chief McLaurine died 20 April 1991.

Chief Master Sergeant John T. Adkins

Chief Master Sergeant John T. Adkins served as the Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Air Force Chief of Security Police, Headquarters AFOSP, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico.

Chief Adkins was born 22 July 1936 and was reared as a military dependent. In July 1958 he enlisted in the Air Force and was assigned to the 803rd CDS at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. This assignment was followed by a remote tour with the 3950th Air Base Squadron (ABS), Royal Canadian Air Force Station, Cold Lake, Canada, where he served as senior SAC Air Police Liaison NCO.

Follow-on assignments included tours at Clark AB, Philippines; Plattsburg AFB, New York; Headquarters 7th Air Force, RVN; and Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. While at Barksdale he was assigned duty with Headquarters 8th Air Force Chief of Security Police and was responsible for managing the command's aircraft and nuclear security program.

In 1976 Chief Adkins was assigned to the Office of the Chief of Security Police, Headquarters Pacific Air Force (PACAF). In June he was reassigned to AFOSP, Operations Division, at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico.

Chief Adkins was recognized throughout the Air Force and the civilian community as an expert in the area of crime prevention. The chief assumed the position of Senior Enlisted Advisor 1 April 1982.

Chief Master Sergeant Robert C. Agee

Chief Master Sergeant Robert C. Agee was born 11 April 1940, in Baltimore, Maryland. Entering the Air Force in December 1958, he was initially assigned as a direct duty assignment air policeman with the 15th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, Davis-

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Monthan AFB, Arizona. While assigned to Davis-Monthan, he performed basic security duties and served two years as a sentry dog handler. From October 1951 to July 1962, he was assigned to the 913th Aircraft control and Warning Squadron, Pagwa AS, Pagwa River, Ontario, Canada, where he served as airman-in-charge, Air Police Section.

Returning from Canada in July 1962, Chief Agee was assigned to the 343rd ABS, Duluth International Airport, Minnesota. He was reassigned to the 78th Air Police Squadron (APS), Hamilton AFB, California, in July 1964 and had follow-on assignments to the 48th SPS, RAF Lakenheath, United Kingdom (UK); the 804th SPS, Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota; and the 6170th Combat Support Squadron (CSS), Suwon AB, Korea, as the security police superintendent (July 1970). Following the deactivation of the 6170th CSS in November 1972, he completed his tour with the 51st SPS, Osan AB, Korea.

In June 1973 Chief Agee returned to Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona, where he served a tour as a management engineer with the SAC Management engineering Team. During this tour, Chief Agee was instrumental in the development of SAC security police manpower standards. In October 1975 Chief Agee was reassigned to the 803rd SPS, Davis-Monthan AFB, where he served as the operations superintendent until December 1977. From Davis-Monthan he went to USAFE where he served as chief enlisted advisor to the chief of security police. In 1982 he was appointed senior enlisted advisor at Headquarters AFOSP.

Chief Master Sergeant Cleveland Perkins

Chief Master Sergeant Cleveland Perkins served as the Chief of Resource Management, Directorate of Staff Support, Headquarters AFOSP, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. Chief Perkins also served as the Senior Enlisted Manager for the Air Force Chief of Security Police.

Chief Perkins was born 14 April 1945, in Montgomery, Alabama, and was a 1962 graduate of George Washington Carver High School in Montgomery.

The Chief entered the Air Force in August 1962 and after completing the basic training program was selected for a classified special assignment in Washington, D.C. In June 1964 he received his first overseas orders and was assigned to the 36th SPS at Bitburg AB, Germany, where he performed basic security duties. In October 1967, he returned to the United States to serve as a communicator/plotter, response team leader, and area supervisor for the 306th SPS, McCoy AFB, Florida. In June 1971, Chief Perkins received orders to Southeast Asia (SEA) and was assigned to the 377th SPS, Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN, where he performed duties as base patrolman, desk sergeant, and noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) of the 7th Air Force elite guard.

Returning to the US in June 1972, the chief was assigned to the 63rd SPS, Norton AFB, California, as NCOIC of the gate section and as resource protection inspector. In November 1973 he transferred to the 89th SPS, Andrews AFB, Maryland. During his tour with the Presidential Support Wing he had the opportunity to travel with Presidents

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Nixon, Ford, and Carter. In January 1978 Chief Perkins was assigned to the 3201st SPS, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, as NCOIC of security.

He returned to Germany in February 1980 and was assigned to the 86th SPS, Ramstein AB, where he held positions as Security Flight Chief, Resource Protection Branch Chief, and Law Enforcement Superintendent. In August 1981 he transferred to the Headquarters USAFE security police staff as chief of the Manpower and Organization Branch. In July 1984 the chief arrived at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, to assume duties as chief of Wartime Manpower within the Plans and Programs Directorate at Headquarters AFOSP.

Chief Master Sergeant Ronald P. Fitzpatrick

Chief Master Sergeant Ronald P. Fitzpatrick served as Chief, Wartime Manpower, and Chief Enlisted Manager for Headquarters AFOSP, Kirtland AFB, New Mexico.

Chief Fitzpatrick was born 14 October 1939, in Piedmont, Alabama, and entered the Air Force in April 1961. His first assignment after basic training and technical school was with the air police at RAF Chicksands, England. He remained at RAF Chicksands for four years before transferring to Cudjoe Key, Florida.

From Cudjoe Key, Chief Fitzpatrick returned to USAFE, serving at Hof AS, Germany, at the tri-corners of East Germany and Czechoslovakia as law enforcement flight chief and criminal investigator.

Leaving Hof AS in 1970, Chief Fitzpatrick traveled to McChord AFB, Washington. From McChord, he was ordered to a 12-month remote tour at CCK, Taiwan, serving as NCOIC of customs and excise. His follow-on assignments from CCK were to Malmstrom AFB, Montana, RAF Alconbury, and RAF Wethersfield as Chief, Security Police.

Returning to the United States in August 1982, Chief Fitzpatrick was assigned to Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, as Chief Security Section, and Ops Superintendent. After only two years at Tinker he once again returned to the United Kingdom. His first year was at RAF Bentwaters. After his promotion to Chief Master Sergeant, Chief Fitzpatrick assumed duties as the Chief, Programs and Resources Division, and senior enlisted manager to the commander of the 81st SPS.

On 15 June 1987 Chief Fitzpatrick was appointed Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Wing Commander, 81st Tactical Fighter Wing, RAF Bentwaters/RAF Woodbridge. He remained senior advisor under three different wing commanders before being transferred 16 June 1989 to Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, as Senior Enlisted Advisor at Headquarters AFOSP.

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Chief Master Sergeant Craig W. Timmermann

Chief Master Sergeant Craig W. Timmermann was born in Brooklyn, New York, 10 September 1948. After graduation from high school in Long Island, New York, he entered the Air Force on 23 June 1966. Upon completion of basic training at Lackland AFB, Texas, he began training as an air policeman.

His first assignment was RAF Upper Heyford, UK, where he worked as a law enforcement patrolman, desk sergeant, and investigator. In June 1970 he was transferred to Kingsley Field, Oregon, where he was a flight chief. Prior to departing Kingsley Field he became NCOIC of Pass and Registration. In August 1971 he went to Ubon Royal Thai AB, Thailand, for one year as NCOIC of Investigations and Customs. In 1972 he was reassigned to Plattsburgh AFB, New York, as a law enforcement flight chief and later as the NCOIC of Pass and Registration. In 1973 he was reassigned to Tyndall AFB, Florida, where he was the NCOIC of Investigations and a flight chief.

In January 1975, Chief Timmermann became an instructor at the Security Police Academy, Lackland AFB, Texas. While there, he was selected to instruct at the NCO Leadership School and served as the Chief Instructor. From the PME Center, Chief Timmermann was assigned to the base police squadron at Lackland, where he was the NCOIC of Training until his departure to TUSLOG Detachment 118, Izmir, Turkey, in January 1980 as the NCOIC of Security Police Operations.

In January 1982, he went to Headquarters, USAFE Security Police, where he assisted in developing the Counter Terrorist Action Branch for the command. He then became Chief, Resources Protection Branch, for the command until he was reassigned to RAF Upwood, UK, as Director, Military Studies Branch, USAFE NCO Academy North. In May 1985 he became Chief Enlisted Manager of the 7320th Security Police Group (SPG), RAF Upper Heyford, UK. He served as commandant of the third Air Force NCO Leadership School, RAF Upwood, UK, from May 1988 until September 1989 when he assumed duties as Chief Enlisted Manager of the 48th SPG, RAF Lakenheath, UK. In June 1991, Chief Timmermann became the United States Air Force Security Police Chief Enlisted Manager.

Chief Master Sergeant Wayne H. Cox

Chief Master Sergeant Wayne H. Cox was born 10 December 1946, in Joplin, Missouri, and entered the Air Force in 1966. Upon completion of basic training and Air Police Technical School, he was assigned to the 6th CDS, Walker AFB, New Mexico, as a flight security specialist. In March 1967 he was assigned to the 12th SPS, Cam Ranh Bay AB, RVN. A year later he was reassigned to the 3700th SPS, Lackland AFB, Texas, serving as law enforcement patrolman, desk sergeant, and security police investigator.

In May 1970 he became the NCOIC of administrative security, 6927th Security Squadron, Onna Point, Okinawa. Eighteen months later he was reassigned to the 6922nd Security Group, Clark AB, Philippines, as NCOIC of personnel security.

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His next assignment, in September 1983, was to the 90th SPS, F.E. Warren AFB, Cheyenne, Wyoming. He then went to the 6913th Security Squadron, Rimbach and Augsburg, Germany, in 1974. From September 1976 until May 1981, Chief Cox was NCOIC of security police plans and programs, Headquarters U. S. Air Force Security Service, Kelly AFB, Texas. An assignment to Headquarters AFOSP, Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, as chief of security training followed.

In April 1985 he became security police manager, 501st SPG, RAF Greenham Common, UK. His next assignment took him to Headquarters USAFE as security police manager and staff action officer. In April 1991 Chief Cox became security police manager at the 443rd SPS, Altus AFB, Oklahoma.

He was the Chief Enlisted Manager for Brig Gen Stephen Mannell at the Pentagon.

He retired in June 1995 and now resides in Texas.

Chief Master Sergeant William H. Alexander, Jr.

Chief Master Sergeant William H. Alexander, Jr. served as the Air Force Security Police Manager, Headquarters United States Air Force Washington, D.C., from February 1995 until March 1996.

Born 20 September 1957, in Coatesville, Pennsylvania, Chief Alexander graduated from Coatesville Area Senior High School in 1975. He earned an Associate Degree in Criminal Justice from the Community College of the Air Force in 1988, is a John Levitow Honor Graduate of the NCO Leadership School, a Distinguished Graduate of the NCO Academy, and was promoted to Master Sergeant under the Stripes for Exceptional Performance program.

Chief Alexander entered active duty in December 1975. In April 1976 he reported to Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota, where he served as Security Response Team Member and Flight Security Controller, as a member of the 321st Missile Security Squadron.

In July 1979 Chief Alexander reported to the 4392nd SPG, Vandenberg AFB, California, where he performed duties as Security Controller, Standardization and Evaluation; NCOIC, Pass and Registration; and Security Flight Chief. In January 1985 Chief Alexander was reassigned to the 44th SPG, Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota, where he served as Flight Security Officer and Superintendent, Reports and Administration Branch. In March 1987 he completed Ground Defense Training and reported to Florennes AB, Belgium, as the Superintendent, 485th Missile Defense Squadron, until the unit was deactivated in December 1988.

From January 1989 until June 1991, Chief Alexander served as Superintendent of Missile Warning and Space Launch Security Operations as a member of the Air Force

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Space Command Security Police staff. His next assignment was as Security Superintendent, 8th SPS, Kunsan AB, Republic of Korea (ROK). In June 1982 he reported to Headquarters, Air Combat command, Langley AFB, Virginia, where he served as a member of the Inspector General Team. In July 1993 he served as Security Police Manager, 38 SPS, Andersen AFB, Guam.

Chief Alexander retired from the Air Force on March 31, 1996.

Chief Master Sergeant Daryl P. Janicki

Chief Master Sergeant Daryl P. Janicki became the Air Force Security Forces Manager, Headquarters USAF, Washington, D.C., in March 1996.

Chief Janicki was born 7 August 1955, in McKeesport, Pennsylvania. He entered active duty in September 1973. His first assignment in May 1974 was to the 380th SPS, Plattsburgh AFB, New York, where he performed nuclear security duties and was a member of the Standardization-Evaluation Team. In July 1978, Chief Janicki was reassigned to the 3708th Basic Military Training Squadron, Lackland AFB, Texas, as a military training instructor. In August 1982, he returned to the security police career field and was assigned to the 44th SPS, Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota. In August 1984 he was selected to be a member of the initial security force cadre assigned to initiate the Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) Program at Florennes AB, Belgium, where he served as a Defense Force Superintendent and in various unit staff positions.

His next assignment in December 1985 was with the newly reactivated 432d SPS, Misawa AB, Japan, where he served as Security Superintendent and Training Superintendent in support of the bed down of the new F-16 wing. His follow-on assignments were to the 509th SPS, Pease AFB, New Hampshire; Headquarters SAC, Offutt AFB, Nebraska; and Headquarters Air Combat Command, Langley AFB, Virginia.

Chief Master Sergeant Levi Scott

Chief Master Sergeant Levi Scott was born in Enfield, North Carolina, on 23 Jul 1960. After graduation from Eastman High School he entered the Air Force. He was selected for the security police career field and served his Air Force career in the field. Chief Scott worked his way progressively through the ranks. He served in virtually every position in the force from close-in security to his position as senior enlisted manager.

While on active duty he avidly pursued his educational opportunities. He is a graduate of the Air Force Communications Command Non-Commissioned Officers Academy. He holds an associate degree in security communications through the Community College of the Air Force, an associate degree in general studies through Saint Leo College, and a Bachelor of Arts degree in criminology from Saint Leo University. Finally he has pursued graduate studies in Public Administration through Troy College.

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Chief Master Sergeant Bruce Broder

Chief Master Sergeant Bruce Broder entered the Air Force in June 1979 and was graduated from the SP Academy in October. His first assignment was to RAF Mildenhall. Follow-on assignments included Strategic Air Command, Pacific Air Forces, a tour with the Inspector General, and security forces manager for Air Education and Training Command.

He attended the SAC Noncommissioned Officer Academy at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. The Chief holds an associate degree in criminal justice from the Community College of the Air Force and a Bachelor of Science degree in sociology from the University of the State of New York at Albany, New York.

His career assignments cover the career field, beginning with service as an entry controller and security response team leader. He served as the NCOIC of Security Operations at the 91st SPS, Minot AFB, North Dakota. These assignments were followed by MAJCOM and Air Staff tours.

Chief Master Sergeant Paul Zidack

Chief Master Sergeant Paul E. Zidack is the Security Forces Career Field Manager and the advisor to the Director of Security Forces, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington D.C. Chief Zidack provides guidance on matters concerning the effective utilization and training of over 30,000 active duty and air reserve component Security Forces members, as well as developing operational policy and planning for force protection and operations, nuclear security, physical security and air provost services, integrated defense, and programs and resources.

Chief Zidack entered the Air Force in August 1983. After graduating from the Security Police Academy in December, 1983, he was assigned to 322d Missile Security Squadron, Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota. Other assignments include nuclear bomber and missile security operations with Strategic Air Command, man-portable air defense (Stinger MANPAD) and air base defense operations with Pacific Air Forces, Elite Guard duties with Strategic Air Command and a member of the Central Command (Fwd) and HQ Air Education and Training Command staffs.

FROM JERRY M. BULLOCK, *AIR FORCE SECURITY POLICE, VOL. II* (TURNER PUBLISHING COMPANY, PADUCAH, KENTUCKY, 2000), PP.12-17.

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Appendix 3

Air Police, Security Police and Security Forces Personnel Killed in Action or Line of Duty

Disclaimer: Official records of fatalities are not kept by career field. The names in this list have been gathered from several sources and the probability is high that we do not have every name that belongs here. For that we do apologize.

Southeast Asia Casualties

Name	Date	Place
Adams, Royce H.	14 Apr 69	Da Nang AB, RVN
Adams Edward Jimmie	11 Feb 70	Cam Ranh Bay AB, RVN
Anderson, Herman B	08 Oct 71	U-Tapao RTAB, Thailand
Anthony, Paul W.	08 April 70	Da Nang AB, RVN
Bestmann, Charles E	28 Nov 68	Phan Rang AB, RVN
Bevich, George M.	14 Dec 66	Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN
Birket, Scott L	30 Sep 72	Da Nang AB, RVN
Black, Jimmy P	13 May 75	Nakhon Phanom RTAB, Thailand
Blakeney, Melvin J	07 Jul 73	Nakhon Phanom RTAB, Thailand
Bolster, Dan Arthur	07 Jan 72	Da Nang AB, RVN
Botzem, Willy Kuepper	20 Sep 71	Ubon RTAB, Thailand
Boyd James	28 Feb 68	Bien Hoa AB, RVN
Bridges, Robert Earl	17 Jun 67	Bien Hoa AB, RVN
Bryant, Charles E	11 Apr 68	Da Nang AB, RVN
Carr, Rodney G	10 Mar 73	
Closson, James Stanley	12 Jan 69	Da Nang AB, RVN
Cole, John Matthew	04 Dec 66	Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN
Collums, Bobby G,	13 May 75	Nakhon Phanom RTAB, Thailand
Cook, Danny R	13 Dec 68	Kontum AB, RVN
Cordon, Hubert C	30 Jun 73	Kontum AB, RVN
Coyle, Gerald A	13 May 75	Nakhon Phanom RTAB, Thailand
Cyr, William J.	31 Jan 68	Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN
Davis, John B	14 Jun 73	Nakhon Phanom RTAB, Thailand
Davis, Jr., Aaron	12 Feb 71	Phu Cat AB, RVN
Deuster, Jr., William	27 Feb 67	Udon RTAB, Thailand
DeWolf, Dale Lee	06 Feb 73	Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN
Dwyer, Thomas D.	13 May 76	Nakhon Phanom RTAB, Thailand
England, James C.	01 Mar 70	U-Tapao RTAB, Thailand
Evans, John H.	07 Aug 70	Phan Rang AB, RVN
Faircloth, Larry R.	04 May 68	
Fields, Robert Louis	27 Jan 66	Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN
Fischer, Louis H.	27 Jan 66	Cam Ranh Bay AB, RVN
Ford, Bernard Francis	05 July 67	Phan Rang AB, RVN

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Ford, Bobby W.	13 May 75	Nakhon Phanom RTAB, Thailand
Foster, Tony C.	05 Dec 69	Phu Cat AB, RVN
Francis, James Edward	11 Mar 68	Kontum AB, RVN
Fritz, Gerald W.	13 May 75	Nakhon Phanom RTAB, Thailand
Fuller, Gary Leroy	27 Feb 67	Da Nang AB, RVN
Gabriel, Charles David	06 Jan 67	Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN
Galloway, Melvin R.	06 Mar 70	Kontum AB, RVN
Gay, Gary P.	27 Jan 68	Cam Ranh Bay AB, RVN
Glenn, Jackie D.	13 May 75	Nakhon Phanom RTAB, Thailand
Gray, George Christian	29 Mar 69	Qui Nhon AB, RVN
Grenier, Joseph Kent	04 Sep 70	na
Grillo, Lawrence Hugh	28 May 69	Phan Rang AB, RVN
Hamlin, Darrell L.	13 May 75	Nakhon Phanom RTAB, Thailand
Hankamer, Gregory L.	13 May 75	Nakhon Phanom RTAB, Thailand
Harden, Jr., Roosevelt	11 July 67	Nakhon Phanom RTAB, Thailand
Hebron, Charles Edward	31 Jan 68	Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN
Hicks, James Russell	06 Mar 71	Da Nang AB, RVN
Higgs, David A.	06 Mar 71	Nakhon Phanom RTAB, Thailand
Holbrook, Horace Alvie	12 May 67	Bien Hoa AB, RVN
Holley, Glynn Byron	26 Dec 69	Cam Ranh Bay AB, RVN
Ilaoa, Faleagafulu	13 May 76	Nakhon Phanom RTAB, Thailand
Jensen, Terrence Kay	01 Jul 65	Da Nang AB, RVN
Jones, James Bruce	25 Jan 66	Da Nang AB, RVN
Kelsey, J. C.	02 Dec 66	Nha Trang AB, RVN
Kemp, Jimmy	06 Jun 67	Phu Cat AB, RVN
Krizanowski, Walter T.	25 Aug 70	Da Nang AB, RVN
Lane, Michael D.	13 May 75	Nakhon Phanom RTAB, Thailand
Lehman, Millard W.	08 Jul 66	Binh Thuy AB, RVN
Loftis, Joel Conrad	07 Jun 69	Phan Rang AB, RVN
London, Dennis W.	13 May 75	Nakhon Phanom RTAB, Thailand
MacArthur, Dale Alan	08 Dec 69	Phan Rang AB, RVN
Maisey, Reginald V.	31 Jan 68	Bien Hoa AB, RVN
Malone, Bobby J.	03 Feb 68	Ubon RTAB, Thailand
Mathias, Robert P.	13 May 75	Nakhon Phanom RTAB, Thailand
McDonald, Ronald Irvin	14 April 70	Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN
McFadden, Samuel L.	10 Mar 71	U-Tapao RTAB, Thailand
McKelvey, William R.	13 May 75	Nakhon Phanom RTAB, Thailand
McKnight, Clarence	12 Jun 73	Nakhon Phanom RTAB, Thailand
McNeill, Michael S.	05 Dec 72	na
Midkiff, Gary Bruce	04 Feb 68	Binh Thuy AB, RVN
Milligan, Randall Gayle	15 May 68	Cam Ranh Bay AB, RVN
Mills, Roger Bertha	31 Jan 68	Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN
Moon, Jerry Rudolph	07 Sep 67	Tuy Hoa AB, RVN
Moran II, Edgar C.	13 May 76	Nakhon Phanom RTAB, Thailand
Morgan, Charles R.	12 Aug 68	Nakhon Phanom RTAB, Thailand
Muse, Edward Grady	31 Jan 68	Bien Hoa AB, RVN

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Nealis, Tommy R.	13 May 75	Nakhon Phanom RTAB, Thailand
Neel, Robert Ray	02 May 70	Nha Trang AB, RVN
Nix, John David	25 April 71	Phan Rang AB, RVN
Orsua, Charles David	15 Jul 69	Phan Rang AB, RVN
Pacio, George H.	21 Dec 70	Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN
Packer, Joseph Everette	16 Jun 66	Da Nang AB, RVN
Palmer, Robert A.	02 May 70	Nakhon Phanom RTAB, Thailand
Park, Irving Geon	16 Mar 70	Phu Cat AB, RVN
Pascoe, Robert Edward	18 Jul 67	Pleiku AB, RVN
Perez, Carlos Augusta	01 Dec 67	Pleiku AB, RVN
Peterson, Jr., Rufus G.	19 Nov 71	Pleiku AB, RVN
Piner, John R.	11 Mar 70	Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN
Porovich, Steve	21 Apr 72	Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN
Riddle, Oliver John	04 Dec 66	Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN
Robertson, Robert Merlin	27 Jan 70	Nakhon Phanom RTAB, Thailand
Ross, Robert W.	13 May 75	Nakhon Phanom RTAB, Thailand
Sauer, Paul C.	25 Aug 70	Da Nang AB, RVN
Sisley, Russell Jay	16 Jun 66	Da Nang AB, RVN
Slaughter, Jr., Freddie L.	30 Jul 72	Saigon, RVN
Solomon, Sidney Morton	16 May 70	Bien Hoa AB, RVN
Steen, Leonard Larry	08 Oct 67	Ubon RTAB, Thailand
Stepp, Charles Harold	05 Sep 72	Da Nang AB, RVN
Stewart, Eric V.V.D.	09 Dec 70	U-Tapao RTAB, Thailand
Supnet, Richard Arellano	23 Sep 71	Cam Ranh Bay AB, RVN
Treen, Harlin Perry	12 Aug 68	Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN
Webb, Robert C.	18 Nov 68	Udorn RTAB, Thailand
Whitfield, Jesse J.	08 Oct 70	Udorn RTAB, Thailand
Willis, Thomas Murtin	05 Jun 67	Phan Rang AB, RVN
Wissig, Edward Simon	12 Feb 71	Phu Cat AB, RVN
Wood, Jr., Bertram	25 Sep 70	Pleiku AB, RVN
Woodward, Richard Randolph	08 Feb 66	Da Nang AB, RVN

NOTE: RVN = Republic of Vietnam

Non-Southeast Asia Casualties

Blake, Benard N.	09Oct71	South Dakota
Bohling, Richard	11Jun82	Whiteman AFB, Missouri
Brock, Johnny R.	09Oct71	South Dakota
Burch III, Leslie A.	22Jan85	Honduras
Campbell, Thomas L.	26 Mar78	Maxwell AFB, Alabama
Cloe, Daniel A.	09Oct71	South Dakota
Day, James	8 May 98	Tinker AFB, Oklahoma
Dover, Robert R.	18Mar79	Kelly AFB, Texas
Elms, Sean	12Aug91	Fort Dix, New Jersey

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Faust, Stephen M.	28Oct87	Clark AB, Philippines
Francis, Frederick K.	22Jan85	Honduras
Frasier, Erin	13 Mar 06	Edwards AFB, California
Gray, Robert S.	06Jan78	Clark AB, Philippines
Heitcamp, Donald H.	29May86	South Dakota
Herrington, William C.	15Nov80	Incirlik, Turkey
Holmes, Barry P.	29May86	South Dakota
Hughes, Larry D.	09Oct71	South Dakota
Hursay, Roy L.	27Feb63	Eielson AFB, Alaska
Huskey, Charles L.	29May86	South Dakota
Jones, David E.	11Jun82	Whiteman AFB, Missouri
Kelly, Michael F.	22Jan85	Honduras
Levay, Stacy E.	01Jan92	Andersen AB, Guam
Lucas, Lorainne A.	Aug91	Andersen AB, Guam
Meredith, Thomas P.	11Jun82	Whiteman AFB, Missouri
Morris, George E.	03Apr56	Kirtland AFB, New Mexico
Pace, Marion L.	11Jun82	Whiteman AFB, Missouri
Partridge, Jacob	26 Nov 02	Eielson AFB, AK
Peterson, Alan J.	Jul79	Yokota AB, Japan
Riggs, Timothy R.	11Dec91	Whiteman AFB, Missouri
Roberts, Isiah	17 Apr 69	George AFB, California
Rollinson, William R.	22Jan85	Honduras
Schlin, Daniel J.	1976	Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona
Simons, Charles III	17 Nov 99	Nellis AFB, Nevada
Watts, Michael	11 Sep 06	Malmstrom AFB, North Dakota
Wilson, Glen G.	09Oct71	South Dakota
Wright, Terry L.	09Oct71	South Dakota

Southwest Asia Casualties

Campbell, Charles	14 Oct 98	Al Jaber AB, Kuwait
Chavis, LeeBernard E.	14 Oct06	Baghdad, Iraq
Jacobson, Elizabeth	28 Sep05	Safwan, Iraq
McElroy, Brian	22 Jan06	Taji, Iraq
Norton, Jason L.	22 Jan06	Taji, Iraq
Schroeder, David	14 Oct 98	Al Jaber AB, Kuwait
Ware, Carl J., Jr.	1 Jul 06	Camp Bucca, Iraq
Nathan, Jason	23 Jun 07	Tikrit, Iraq
Self, John	14 May 07	Baghdad, Iraq
Griffin, Travis L.	3 Apr 08	Baghdad, Iraq
Helton, Joseph	8 Sept 09	Baghdad, Iraq

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Appendix 4 Security Uniforms, Weapons & Vehicles

Part 1: Uniforms

As early as 1945, long before the Air Force became an independent service, its leaders were looking at the possibility of obtaining a distinctive new uniform. By 1946 it was clear that it would be some shade of blue. In January 1948, President Truman approved a new uniform for the Air Force, but Congress would not approve the funding. In January 1949, the Air Force and Army addressed the issue again. This time there would be no extra costs. The blue cloth would be introduced as normal replacement procurement in 1950.

On 18 January 1949, President Truman again approved a distinctive blue uniform for the Air force. A week later (25 January) the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Hoyt Vandenberg, spread the word that the blue uniform had been approved and would be available for distribution by 1 September 1950. He clearly stated that no one should purchase a blue uniform until "full instructions, specifications, and samples of cloth" were available.

On 8 April 1949, Air Force Letter 35-46 stated that the new Air Force blue winter uniform (shade #84) for men was available for purchase and immediate use. Distribution of blue uniforms would be made when stocks were available and general issue to airmen was expected to occur by 1 September 1950.

It is well to remind ourselves that the Air Police, Security Police and the Security Forces wear the same uniform as the rest of the Air Force with a few exceptions. The only difference is specialized accessories and accoutrements. This appendix will not attempt to display the numerous changes in the basic blue uniform over the last sixty years. We will show examples of the way the air policemen would have been seen in the various periods of the history of the air force.



An Air Police Honor Guard at Aviano Air Base, Italy, in 1947 ... the brown shoe days. Note the MP brassards.



1947 to 1953 When the Air Force became a separate service, the newly formed Air Police carried a number of military police into the new

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service. As late as 1953 the military police uniform could be seen in air police squadrons.



Very early photo of air policemen. They are dressed in khaki uniforms, with an armband and a white keeper on their garrison caps. They wear web belts and a .45 cal pistol



The shortest-lived uniform was this combination of short sleeve shirt and walking shorts with knee high stockings and a pith helmet. It also came in long trousers with a belted safari jacket. The expressions on the faces of the Airmen who have just passed this pair are very indicative of the disdain the uniform engendered.



Yes, this uniform was worn by the Air Police as a duty uniform



By 1954 the Air Force blue uniform class A was adapted to the Air Police uniform. The well-dressed air policeman assigned to Law Enforcement duties wore a garrison cap with a white cover, leather accessories, and bloused boots. Uniform pictured here is after 1960 and the shield has replaced the brassard.



The Air Force adopted uniforms in shades 505 (pictured here) and 1505 in permanent-pressed materials. This is a law enforcement troop with Sam Browne equipment.

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Mid-fifties bush jacket with one of many variations of the armband



Security Forces Museum display of cold weather jackets. It shows the pith helmet that went with the safari jacket and walking shorts and a white cap. Note two versions of the arm band, both differing from the one above



This was the duty uniform of instructors at the Air Base Defense School at Parks AFB in 1955. The officer is wearing the blue “Ike” jacket, a shiny black helmet liner with the ABD logo on each side of the helmet, bloused boots, and a web belt for the holster for the .45 cal pistol. He is also holding the M-1 Garand rifle



The field uniform at the Air Base Defense School was a set of coveralls. The officer on the left is a student; the instructor on the right is SCARWAF, Special Category Army With Air Force.

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Instructors' field uniform at the Air Base Defense School, Parks AFB, CA. Two-piece fatigue uniform belted with blue belt, bloused boots, and the black helmet liner.



1959 General "Pinky" Burnham pins an Air Police shield on an airman. General Burnham received the first air police badge from Gen Curtis LeMay, the Air Force Chief of Staff. In addition to the badge the security police pioneered with the functional badge. For

these functional badges. several issues of the right, the first issue had colored enamel. It



several years only the SP had this badge. Today every career field has There have been shield. From left to a center that was attached to the

uniform by three clutch fasteners. The clutch fasteners damaged the uniform so a second issue had a safety pin back. It too damaged the uniform; the badge was heavy and the enamel easily scratched and damaged. When the badges were first issued they were assigned by individual numbers and kept in the armory where they were issued each shift along with the weapon and turned in at the end of the shift. God help you if you lost one. This was a problem for the exterior guards on the northern tier when a badge would come off and bury itself in the snow, not to be found until spring. A new issue was made after the adoption of the name security police. This badge was a lighter badge without color and was an item of individual issue. Today the badge is made of shiny and very light metal. It is issued to the apprentice troops on their graduation from the Academy



The 7th Air Force staff in 1968 is an example of the first use of BDU as a daily uniform. Two-piece fatigues, flak vests, M-16s and helmets. The BDUs had a long jacket with slant pockets.

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In Southeast Asia the duty uniform was 1505 light brown short sleeve shirt with slacks. Several variations appear in this photo. The three officers on the left are the Chief of Staff of the Republic of Korea Air Force and members of his staff. The sergeant in the center, dressed in the BDUs of the day, short sleeve, two-piece, with long blouse and slant pockets, is demonstrating the ANPPS 14 anti personnel radar. The

officer next to him is in 1505s and the officer on the right is in the BDU. Camouflage BDUs had not been introduced.



In the months following the Tet Offensive in 1968 the build up continued and with it came new equipment. Here an officer and an NCO are examining the XM-706 Armored car. Both are dressed in standard BDUs. On the officer's baseball-style cap and his collar can be seen the cloth insignia of rank which replaced standard metal insignia on BDUs.

US and Vietnamese airmen manned the Base Defense Ops Center (BDOC) dressed in standard two-piece BDUs with no camouflage. On the sergeant's left shoulder can be seen the Quan Canh patch of the RVN Police.



The decade of the 1970s brought women into the career field. The evolution of the uniform for the women is a story unto itself. This young woman is wearing the white "bubble" beret.

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As women entered the security force in the 1980s they were seen more often in the woodland camouflage Battle Dress Unit (BDU) uniform borrowed from the Army beginning in the early 1980s. The first BDUs were unisex, but a maternity version was later fielded.



A new deployment required a new approach. Here troops deployed to Bosnia in camouflage BDUs styled for the area of operation. They are wearing Personnel Armor System for Ground Troops (PASGT) vest and Kevlar helmet which replaced the Vietnam era flak jacket and the “steel pot” worn by American troops since 1942. The Kevlar helmet provided enhanced neck and ear protection which resulted in a resemblance to the World War II German *Wehrmacht* helmet.



Tricolor desert BDUs

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Air Force blue-gray pattern camouflage BDUs tested in 2004, but not adopted.



The Airman Battle Uniform finally adopted for wear in late 2006 features a green-gray-blue-tan digitized tiger stripe pattern.

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Specialty Uniforms:



Following the model of civilian law enforcement in the 1980s, bicycles came into use as interior patrol vehicles. Uniforms were designed to fit the task.



A Ghillie suit is a type of camouflage clothing designed to resemble heavy underbrush used by Security Forces Close Precision Engagement Teams (snipers). Typically, it is a net or cloth garment covered in loose strips of cloth or twine, sometimes even made to look like leaves and twigs. The Ghillie suit was originally developed by Scottish gamekeepers as a portable hunting blind. The name derives from *ghillie*, the Scots Gaelic for "boy", in English especially used to refer to servants assisting in hunting or fishing expeditions.

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Part 2: Weapons

M1903 "Springfield" Rifle



The Springfield M1903 (more formally the United States Rifle, Caliber .30, Model 1903, also known as the '03 Springfield) is a magazine-fed, bolt-action rifle used primarily during the first half of the 20th century. It was officially adopted as a service rifle June 19, 1903, and was officially replaced as a service rifle by the faster-firing, semi-automatic M-1 "Garand," starting in 1936. The M1903 saw notable use in World War I, World War II, Korea, and, in some cases, Vietnam. It was also used as a sniper rifle in WWII, Korea, and Vietnam. Furthermore, it remains in use as a civilian firearm and among some drill teams into the 21st century.

M1 "Garand" Rifle



Designed by the Springfield Armory's John Garand, the .30 caliber, semi-automatic M-1 replaced the '03 Springfield beginning in 1936. The weapon was 43.6 inches long and weighed close to 10 pounds loaded with the standard 8 round internal clip of ammunition. Until the adoption of the M-14 in the mid-1960s the M-1 remained the primary weapon of American ground forces. It is still the weapon of choice for ceremonial use and for drill teams.

M1 Carbine



This lightweight semi-automatic carbine was designed to meet the requirements for troops in the rear echelon, paratroopers, and frontline troops required to carry other equipment such as engineers who had found the full-size rifles too cumbersome, and pistols and revolvers to be insufficiently accurate or powerful. The .30 caliber carbine weighed only 5.2 pounds empty and was a mere 35.6 inches long. Ammunition was supplied by a 15 or 30 round detachable box magazine. Well over 6 million copies were produced and the M-1 became a standard firearm in the US military during World War II and the Korean War and even into Vietnam, and was produced in several variants. Selective fire versions of the weapon capable of fully automatic fire are designated the M-2 Carbine. The M-3 Carbine was an M-2 with an active infrared scope system.



M1918 Browning Automatic Rifle

A veteran of WW I, the Browning Automatic

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Rifle, Caliber .30, or B.A.R., was designed in 1917 by the weapons designer John Browning, primarily as a replacement for the French-made Chauchat and Hotchkiss M1909 then in use by the Army. Originally intended as a light automatic rifle that could accompany assaulting infantry, the B.A.R spent much of its career in various guises used in the light machine gun role with a bipod. The original M1918 version was and remains the lightest service machine gun to fire the .30-06 Springfield cartridge, though the limited capacity of its standard 20-round magazine tended to hamper its utility as a light machine gun. The predominant version of the B.A.R was the M1918A2 issued in 1940 which deleted the semiautomatic fire mode in favor of two fully automatic modes: fast (500-650 rounds per minute) and slow (300-450 rounds per minute). The B.A.R continues in service in the form of the M240 Medium Machine Gun which is essentially a modernized B.A.R with an inverted feeding mechanism that has been adapted to belt feed the 7.62mm standard NATO round.



M67 90mm Recoilless Rifle

The M-67 was a lightweight (37 pounds), portable (53 inches long), crew-served 90mm weapon intended primarily as an anti-tank weapon made in the United States by the Department of the US Army. It could also be employed in an antipersonnel role with the use of the M590 antipersonnel round. It was designed to be fired primarily from the ground using the bipod and monopod, but it may be fired from the shoulder. The air-cooled, breech-loaded, single-shot rifle fired fixed ammunition. It was designed for direct firing only, and sighting equipment for this purpose was furnished with each weapon. The 57mm and 75mm versions were used extensively by the Viet Cong for stand-off attacks against air bases in Vietnam. Phased out in favor of wire guided anti-tank missiles in the 1970s, the recoilless rifle has made a comeback in the special operations environment in the form of the M3 “Goose.”



M2 60mm and M1 81mm Mortars

While in Security Police inventory since the Korean War, SP units used these smoothbore, muzzle loaded mortars primarily in Vietnam primarily to provide illumination during nighttime penetrations of the perimeter. Served by two-man crews, the M2 weighed 42 pounds while the M1 tipped the scales at 136 pounds. Primarily designed to support an infantry unit in an attack, the Viet Cong used captured American or Soviet versions of these mortars to good effect against firebases and air bases during the Vietnam War.



Colt Pistol M1911A1

Formally designated as Pistol, Caliber .45, Automatic, M1911A1 this single-action, semiautomatic handgun chambered for the .45

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caliber ACP (Automatic Colt Pistol) cartridge. Designed by John Browning in response to problems encountered by American units fighting Moro guerillas during the Philippine-American War, who needed a sidearm that would withstand the rigors of jungle warfare and provide better stopping power than the then-standard .38 Long Colt revolver. It was the standard-issue side arm for the United States Armed Forces from 1911 to 1985 and was widely used in World War I, World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. It remained the standard AP/SP sidearm until replaced by the .38 caliber revolver. In total, the United States procured around 2.7 million M1911 and M1911A1 pistols during its service life.



Smith and Wesson, M10 Military and Police Special

The Smith & Wesson Military & Police revolver, later known as the Smith & Wesson Model 10 is a .38-calibre, six-shot handgun initially developed in 1902 as the Smith & Wesson .38 Hand Ejector model. In the 1970s the .38 replaced the .45 as the standard Air Force sidearm for aircrews, officers, and Security Police.



Hand and Rifle Grenades

The employment of various fragmentation and smoke hand grenades and rifle grenades was taught at the various air base ground defense schools through the Vietnam War. The MK-19 40mm Grenade Machine Gun has replaced the use of rifle grenades in the modern force.



Thompson Submachine Gun, Cal. .45, M1/M1A1

The brainchild of General John T. Thompson, the “Tommy Gun” was selective for semi- or fully-automatic fire and fired a .45 cal. cartridge in 20- or 30-round magazines. With a rate of fire of 700 rounds per minute, the 10 pound six ounce, 31.8 inch long weapon was reliable and would continue to operate under the harshest battlefield conditions. These weapons entered the Air Force inventory from the U. S. Army. While somewhat rare, they could be found in most Air Police armories through about 1960.



The M3/M3A1 "Grease Gun" was a .45-caliber submachine gun developed by the United States during World War II as a cheap substitute for the Thompson. It was nicknamed the “Grease Gun” because of its resemblance to an automotive grease gun. Air Policemen received training on the “Grease Gun” at the SAC

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Security School in the early 1950s. The M3 and M3A1 served through the Korean War and the Vietnam War. The weapon remained in limited use with US military into the 1990s, to include service in the 1991 Gulf War.



M16 Semiautomatic Rifle with M203 40mm Grenade Launcher

The M16 was first adopted in 1964 by the United States Air Force (USAF) as the M16. Various modified versions of the M16 design were subsequently fielded under experimental designations, culminating in the M16A1. The M16A1 was simply the M16 with a forward assist as requested by the Army. This weapon remained the primary infantry rifle of the United States military from 1967 until the 1980s, when it was supplemented by the M16A2. The M16A2, in turn, is currently being supplemented by the M16A4, which incorporates the flattop receiver unit developed for the M4 Carbine. Previous versions of the weapon are still in stock and used primarily by reserve and National Guard units in the United States as well as by the US Air Force. The M203 grenade launcher is a single-shot weapon designed for use with the M16 series rifle and fires a 40mm grenade. The M203A1 grenade launcher is a single-shot weapon designed for use with the M4 series carbine and also fires a 40mm grenade. The M203 is also being used as the delivery system for a growing array of less-than-lethal munitions.



Browning M2 .50 Caliber Machine Gun

The M2 Machine Gun, or Browning .50 Caliber Machine Gun is a heavy machine gun meant for prolonged firing from heavy mounts, less mobile, or static positions originally designed towards the end of World War I by John Browning. It was nicknamed "Ma Deuce" by US troops or simply called "fifty-cal" in reference to its caliber. The 128-pound, 5-foot long, 550 rounds per minute machine gun has been used extensively as a vehicle weapon and for aircraft armament by the United States from the 1920s to the present day. It was heavily used during World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and during operations in Iraq in the 1990s and 2000s. It is the primary heavy machine gun of NATO countries is still in use today.



Colt M4 Carbine

The M4 carbine is a shorter and lighter version of the M16A2 assault rifle, achieving 80% parts commonality with the M16A2. The M4 has selective fire options including semi-automatic and three-round burst (like the M16A2), while the M4A1 has a "full auto" option in place of the three-round burst. The weapon is only of 2 ft. 5.79 in. long with the stock retracted or 2

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ft. 9.49 in. with the stock extended. Weighing 7.5 lbs. loaded the M4 has a cyclic rate of fire: 825 rounds per minute. The M4, along with the M16A4, has mostly replaced M16 and M16A2 firearms and the Air Force plans to transition completely to the M4 Carbine. The M4 has also replaced the M3A1 that has remained in service mostly with Army armored troops.



M9 Semiautomatic Pistol

A semi-automatic, single-action/double-action 9mm pistol the M9 is the primary sidearm of The US military, replacing the .45 caliber model M1911A1. The M9 has a 15-round staggered magazine with a reversible magazine release button that can be positioned for either right- or left-handed shooters. The M9 has a length of 8.54 inches and weighs 2.55 pounds fully loaded.



M18A1 Claymore Mine

The M18A1 was standardized in 1960 for the Vietnam War, and replaced the M18 antipersonnel weapon. Both weapons are similar in appearance and functionality. The M18A1 has an olive colored plastic casing with the words "Front Toward Enemy" molded on it. It is 8 inches long, 3 inches high, and 1.5 inches deep with two sets of adjustable legs. Inside are 1.5 pounds of plastic explosive and 700 steel balls. When detonated, the M18A1 Claymore delivers 700 spherical steel balls over a 60° fan-shaped pattern that is 6 feet, 8 inches high and 165 feet wide at a range of 165 feet.



M24 Sniper Weapons System

The M24 SWS (Sniper Weapon System) is the military and police version of the Remington 700, bolt action, five shot rifle, adopted by the United States Army as their standard sniper rifle in 1988. The M24 is referred to as a "weapons system", because it consists of a rifle, a detachable 10 x 42 Leupold Ultra M3A telescopic sight and other accessories. The rifle itself is 3 ft. 6.99 in. long and weighs 12.1 lbs. (empty without scope). Its maximum effective range is 2,625 ft.



M60 General Purpose Machine Gun

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The M60 machine gun began development in the late 1940s as a program for a new, lighter 7.62 mm machine gun. It was intended to replace the Browning Automatic Rifle and M1919A6 Browning machine gun in the squad automatic weapon role. The US Army officially adopted the M60 in 1957. The M60 is an air-cooled and gas-operated machine gun firing the standard 7.62mm NATO cartridge and feeds from a disintegrating belt of metallic links. In most variants, it has an integrated folding bipod, but can also be mounted on a tripod and some fixed mounts. In the US military, the M60 has largely been replaced by versions of the M240 in the medium machine gun and fixed weapon roles, and by the M249 as a squad automatic weapon. It remains in use in every branch of the US military (as well as other armed forces) and continues to be manufactured. The M60 is 3 feet 6.39 inches long with a weight of 23 pounds with a cyclic rate of fire of 550 rounds per minute.



M-67 Fragmentation Grenade

The M67 grenade is a fragmentation hand grenade used by the US armed forces and was fielded as a replacement for the M61 grenade used during Vietnam and the older MK2 "pineapple" grenade used since World War II. The M67 has a 3- to 5-second fuse that ignites explosives packed inside a round body. Shrapnel is provided by the fragmentation of the grenade casing.



M72 Light Anti-tank Weapon

The M72 LAW is a portable one-shot 66mm anti-tank weapon, designed in the United States by Talley Defense Systems. The LAW replaced the bazooka as the US Army's primary anti-tank weapon after the Korean War. The weapon consists of a rocket packed inside of a launcher made up of two tubes, one inside the other. While closed, the outer assembly acts as a watertight container for the rocket and the percussion cap-type firing mechanism that activates the rocket. The outer tube contains the trigger, the arming handle, front and rear sights, and the rear cover. The inner tube contains the channel assembly which houses the firing pin assembly. Once fired the tube cannot be reloaded. The LAW's intended replacement is the Swedish built M136 AT4, but the LAW has found a new lease of life in the ongoing operations in Iraq by the US Army and Afghanistan by the Canadian Army. The low cost and light weight of the LAW, combined with a proliferation of lightly-armored targets, make it ideal for the type of urban combat seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. Collapsed the M72 is just a little over 2 feet long and weighs only 8.5 pounds.

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M249 Squad Automatic Weapon

The Belgian M249 was the winner of a competition carried out by the US military in the late 1970s–early 1980s for a new squad automatic weapon. The M249 is an air-cooled, gas-operated, fully-automatic-only firearm that

fires belts of linked 5.56 x 45 mm NATO (.223 inch) ammunition through the top-mounted feed tray or M16-type magazines through the side-mounted port. The latter allows a SAW gunner to use riflemen's magazines in an emergency if he runs out of belted ammunition. The Security Forces use the M249 in their air based defense role. The SAW has a cyclic rate of fire of 725 rounds per minute and weighs, along, with bipod and tools, 15.16 pounds.



Mk19 40mm Grenade Machine Gun

The Mk19 grenade machine gun is a belt-fed automatic grenade launcher that first entered service during the Vietnam War. The Mk19 fires 40 mm grenades at a cyclic rate of 325 to 375 rounds per minute, giving a practical rate of fire of 60 rounds per minute (rapid) and

40 rounds per minute (sustained). The weapon operates on the blowback principle, which uses the chamber pressure from each fired round to load and re-cock the weapon. The weapon is served by a crew of two and has an effective range of 1 mile.



MP5K Submachine Gun

The MP5 was first introduced by Heckler & Koch in 1966, the MP5's accuracy, reliability, and wide range of accessories and variations have made it the submachine

gun of choice for military and law enforcement agencies worldwide for over thirty years. The MP5K ("K" stands for *kurz*, meaning "short"), which is only 325 mm long, was introduced in 1976. It has a vertical front grip to reduce muzzle rise and aid in automatic firing. A further development of the model by the US division of HK was the MP5K-PDW (Personal Defense Weapon), in 1991. This model was built for United States Air Force pilots who needed a compact weapon. Unlike the original, the PDW adds a folding stock and can accept a suppressor and laser sight. The 9mm weapon has a maximum effective range of 330 feet and a cyclic rate of fire of 840 rounds per minute.

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M240B General Purpose Machine Gun

The M240 has been used by the United States armed forces since the late 1970s. It is used extensively by infantry, as well as ground vehicles and aircraft. Despite not being the lightest medium machine gun in service, the

M240 is highly regarded for reliability, and its standardization among NATO members is also seen as a major advantage. All variants of the M240 series are fed from disintegrating belts, and are capable of firing most types of 7.62 mm NATO ammunition. The M240 has mainly replaced the M60 in most roles, and although M60s have remained in use they are being slowly phased out and replaced by the M240 as they wear out. The M240 is manufactured by the American division of FN Herstal, a Belgian company.

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Part 3: Vehicles

During the first 25 years of the existence of the career field the Air Police/Security Police were dependent upon the motor pool. It was not until the mid 1970s that vehicles were designed and purchased specifically for the use of the police. Overseas Jeeps were common, along with standard ¼-ton pick-up trucks of various makes. Usually an Air Police squadron was allowed one sedan. For the most part these would be high mileage vehicles equipped with radios, light bars and sirens as add-ons, not as original equipment.



1953 Dodge Carryall, one of several models of carryalls used by Air Police units in the 1950s. Pictured is an Army vehicle but the same vehicle along with several other model carryalls were in the Air Force inventory. These vehicles accounted for many vehicle accidents because of their high center of gravity and ease with which one would rollover on turns or unlevel ground.



M38A1, Truck, Utility, ¼-Ton, 4x4. The M38A1 “round fender” Jeep was manufactured from 1952 to 1957. Overseas the Air Police were equipped with these Willys-Overland Jeeps in many areas. Occasionally they might also be found in SAC Combat Security Police squadrons in the United States.



The M151 Military Utility Tactical Truck or ‘MUTT’ series of vehicles are commonly referred to as Jeeps. Produced by Ford Motor Company beginning in 1960, various models of the M-151 have seen successful military service in 15 different North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries. The High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) is the replacement vehicle for the M151 series jeeps. Pictured here is a Security Police response team in an M60 machine gun-mounted M-151 Jeep in Vietnam.



Typical pick-up truck as delivered from base motor pools to the Air Police/Security Police in the early 1950s and 1960s.

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ATV (All Terrain Vehicle) used for base patrol, off road response, and perimeter security. Manufactured by Kawasaki and Honda.



The Cadillac Gage Peacekeeper™ II armored vehicle employs the latest technology for missions such as law enforcement, riot control, counter-terrorism, SWAT operations, convoy protection or base security. With a top speed of 70 mph, PeaceKeeper II accommodates an eight-person team, while providing crew protection from 7.62mm AP (armor piercing). The compact profile is ideal for urban environments where excellent maneuverability is a necessity.



The M113A1, informally known as the Gavin, is a lightly armored full tracked air transportable personnel carrier designed to carry personnel and certain types of cargo. The M113-family was developed from the M59 and M75 by Ford and Kaiser Aluminium and Chemical Co. in the late 1950s. The vehicle is capable of: amphibious operations in streams and lakes; extended cross-country travel over rough terrain; and high-speed operation on improved roads and highways.



The vehicle pictured here is designated as a M20 Armored Utility Vehicle. Ford built them for use during World War II. The M20 is based on the M8 and is essentially a M8 without the turret and 37mm main gun. There was also a boxed structure added so that the M20 could fulfill its duties as a command and cargo vehicle.



Cargo trucks are the backbone of Army mobility and are essential to the mission of the Marine Corps and other services as well. Since World War II, several generations of these trucks have been fielded for service in the US military and continue on duty. These trucks are classified into two large families, the 2 ½-ton ("deuce and a half") and the five-ton. Within those families, each generation of truck based on one chassis design is designated as a "series" which includes many variations on the base truck for various purposes. That is, one series of chassis will be provided with specialized bodies for cargo trucks, tank trucks, vans and so forth as well as long wheel base versions and other variants.

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Police sedans:

This is typical of the stock motor pool vehicles received by the security police before 1976--high mileage, mostly used as base taxis until the mileage reached the limits of its effective maintenance. The impression of one Law Enforcement troop: "I envied my civilian police friends. I joined the Air Force in 1972.

My first patrol car was a 1967 Chevy station wagon. It had almost 100,000 miles on it--a base taxi they slapped a couple of bubble gum lights on, hooked up a push button wailing siren, and stuck a radio inside. It wasn't even an automatic-- three-speed, manual on the column." He doesn't say but it probably did not have a working air conditioner. Air Staff planners in the '70s advocated specialized vehicles for the Security Police. The effort was brought to fruition after Maj Gen Tom Sadler became the Air Force Chief of Police.



In 1975 the Security Police procured the first dedicated police sedans. Since that time several models have been purchased, including Ford Crown Victoria, Chevy Impala, and Plymouth Volare. Pictured here Plymouth Volares, part of the first mass purchase of purpose-built police vehicles.



The High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle: HMMWV or HUMVEE is a light, highly mobile, diesel-powered, four-wheel-drive vehicle equipped with an automatic transmission. Based on the M998 chassis, using common components and kits, the HMMWV can be configured to become a troop carrier, armament carrier, S250 shelter carrier, ambulance, TOW missile carrier, and a Scout vehicle.

Pictured here is an M-1116 Up-Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) operated by Airmen from 87th Expeditionary Security Force Squadron, supporting Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, Djibouti, provides security for the task force's air assets.



The V-100/M-706 "Commando" was a highly mobile, fully amphibious armored car used for reconnaissance, convoy escort, riot control, security and as a personnel carrier. The vehicle protected the crew from small arms fire, grenades and anti-personnel mines. All surfaces were angled for maximum deflection. The vehicle was powered by 215 hp, 361 cu inch Chrysler

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V8 engine. Its 4 wheel drive, run flat tires and high clearance give it excellent mobility. The “Commando” was produced by Cadillac-Gage in the mid- to late- 60s and was used extensively in Vietnam.

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GLOSSARY

AAF	Army Air Force
ABGD	Air Base Ground Defense
ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
ABS	Air Base Security
ACC	Air Combat Command
ADC	Air Defense Command
ADVON	Advanced Echelon
AECTU	Air Expeditionary Combat Task Unit
AEF	American Expeditionary Forces or Aerospace Expeditionary Forces
AETC	Air Education and Training Command
AEW	Air Expeditionary Wing
AFB	Air Force Base
AFI	Air Force Instructions
AFIGAC	Air Force Inspector General Activity Center
AFLETS	Air Force Law Enforcement Terminal Service
AFM	Air Force Manual
AFMC	Air Force Materiel Command
AFMPC	Air Force Military Personnel Center
AFMTC	Air Force Missile Test Center or Air Force Military Training Center
AFOSI	Air Force Office of Special Investigations
AFOSP	Air Force Office of Security Police
AFR	Air Force Regulation
AFRES	Air Force Reserve
AFS	Air Force Station
AFSFC	Air Force Security Forces Center
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AFSPC	Air Force Security Police Center or Air Force Space Command
AGE	Aerospace Ground Equipment
AMC	Air Materiel Command or Air Mobility Command
ANG	Air National Guard
AP	Air Police
APC	Armored Personnel Carrier
APG	Air Police Group
APM	Air Provost Marshal
APMD	Air Provost Marshal Directorate
APMPC	Air Force Military Personnel Center
APRON	Air Police Squadron
ARPC	Air Reserve Personnel Center
ATC	Air Training Command
Avn	Aviation
AZR	Short for course number AZR 77150

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BAR	Browning Automatic Rifle
BEQ	Bachelor Enlisted Quarters
BMEWS	Ballistic Missile Early Warning System
BMT	Basic Military Training
BOQ	Bachelor Officers Quarters
BOS	Base Operating Support
BPS	Balanced Pressure (Detection) System
BUR	Bottom-up Review
C3	Command, Control, and Communications
CAT	Camper Alert Team
CDS	Combat Defense Squadron
CENTCOM	Central Command
CID	Criminal Investigation Division
ConAC	Continental Air Command
CONUS	Continental United States
COSVN	Central Office for South Vietnam
CREEP	Committee to Re-elect the President
CRG	Contingency Response Group
CSC	Central Security Control
CSP	Combat Security Police
CSPS	Combat Security Police Squadron
CSPW	Combat Security Police Wing
CSS	Combat Support Squadron
CS/SST	Combat Skills/Terrorist Threat Training
CSU	Civilian Services Unit
DAO	Defense Attaché Office
DARE	Drug Abuse Resistance Education
DCM	Deputy Commander for Maintenance
DCO	Deputy Commander for Operations
DCR	Deputy Commander for Resources
DCS	Deputy Commander for Security
DCS/O	Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
DDA	Direct Duty Assignment
DEFCON	Defense Condition
DFC	Defense Force Commander
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DOD	Department of Defense
DSP	Director of Security Police
ECP	Entry Control Point
ENDEX	End of Exercise
EOT	Equal Opportunity Treatment
ESFS	Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron
EST	Emergency Services Team
FAST	Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team
FEAF	Far Eastern Air Force
FEBA	Forward Edge of the Battle Area

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FECOM	Far East Command
FOA	Field Operating Agency
FOB	Forward Operating Base
FPB	Force Protection Battlelab
FPI	Force Protection Intelligence
FWMF	Free World Military Forces
GHQAF	General Headquarters Air Force
HQUSAF/SP	Headquarters US Air Force Security Police
IBD	Integrated Base Defense
IBDSS	Integrated Base Defense Security System
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
ICE	Increased Combat Effectiveness
IDE	Intrusion Detection Equipment
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IG	Inspector General
IRBM	Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JAAF	Joint Action Armed Forces
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JSA	Joint Service Agreement
JSF	Joint Security Force
JTF	Joint Task Force
KIA	Killed in Action
KP	Kitchen Police
KUMMSC	Kirtland Underground Munitions Storage Complex
LAW	Light Anti-tank Weapon
LCC	Launch Control Center
LSA	Logistical Support Area
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MACV	Military Assistance Command Vietnam
MAF	Missile Alert Facility
MAJCOM	Major Command
MATS	Military Air Transport Service
MCID	Multipurpose Concealed Intrusion Detector
MCM	<i>Manual for Courts Martial</i>
MLR	Main Line of Resistance
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MP	Military Police
MRBM	Medium Range Ballistic Missile
MSG	Marine Security Guards
MSS	Missile Security Squadrons
MTT	Mobile Training Team
MWD	Military Working Dog
NAF	Numbered Air Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

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NCIC	National Crime Information Center
NCOIC	Non-commissioned Officer in Charge
NEADS	Northeast Air Defense Sector
NORAD	North American Air Defense Command
NSC	National Security Council
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
OJT	On-the-job Training
OPFOR	Opposing Force
OSI	Office of Special Investigation
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
PAD	Program Action Directorates
PAL	Police are Loveable
PLF	People's Liberation Front
PME	Professional Military Education
POL	Petroleum, Oil, Lubricant
POW	Prisoner of War
QC	Quan Canh
QRF	Quick Response Force
QRT	Quick Response Team
RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
RAF	Royal Air Force
ROK	Republic of Korea
ROKA	Republic of Korea Army
RPG	Rocket Propelled Grenade
R & R	Rest & Recuperation
RTAFB	Royal Thai Air Force Base
RTG	Retraining Group
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander in Europe
SACON	Security Alert Condition
SACR	Strategic Air Command Regulation
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SAM	Surface to Air Missile
SAT	Sabotage Alert Team
SAV	Staff Assistance Visit
SAW	Squad Automatic Weapon
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SDI	Special Duty Identifier
SELARM	Selective Arming
SFG	Security Forces Group
SLBM	Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
SPAMS	Security Police Automated Management System
SPD	Safeguarding
SPECS	Security Police Elements for Contingencies
SPEMA	Security Police Equipment Monitoring Activity
SPG	Security Police Group

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SPI	Information Security
SPL	Law Enforcement and Training
SPO	Security Police Policy
SPP	Plans and Programs (Chap 9, p. 15)
SPS	Security Police Squadron or Physical Security
SPX	Plans and Programs (Chap 9, p. 15)
STAR	Security Trained and Ready
SWAT	Special Weapons and Tactics
TAC	Tactical Air Command
TAOR	Tactical Area of Responsibility
TF 1041	Task Force 1041
TFW	Tactical Fighter Wing
TIF	Theater Internment Facility
TNT	Tactical Neutralization Teams
T O & E	Table of Organization and Equipment
TSSE	Tactical Security Support Equipment
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice
UGV	Unmanned Ground Vehicle
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
USAFE	U S Air Force in Europe
USDB	United States Disciplinary Barracks
UTC	Unit Type Code
VBIED	Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device
VNAF	Vietnamese Air Force
WAF	Women in the Air Force
WARSKIL	Air Force Wartime Skills Project
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WSA	Weapons Storage Area
XO	Directorate of Operations
XOF	Directorate of Forces
ZI	Zone of the Interior

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